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by John Frederick Schroeder and Benson John Lossing

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Title: Life And Times Of Washington, Volume 2

Author:  John Frederick Schroeder and Benson John Lossing

Release Date: May, 2005  [EBook #8145]
[This file was first posted on June 19, 2003]

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LIFE AND TIMES OF WASHINGTON

VOLUME II

by John F. Schroeder and Benson John Lossing

[Editorial note: The title page of the 1903 source for this e-text
                 identifies the author only as "Schroeder-Lossing"
                 without first names or other identification.  The
                 available evidence indicates the work was begun by
                 John Frederick Schroeder (1800-1857) and after his
                 death was completed by Benson John Lossing (1813-
                 1891).]




REVISED, ENLARGED, AND ENRICHED: AND WITH A SPECIAL INTRODUCTION BY
EDWARD C. TOWNE, B.A.




[Note from etext producer: Some portions of the original hard copy from
which this text was produced were missing. These places in the text are
indicated with the notation: [missing text]. Anyone who has access to an
intact copy is encouraged to contact Project Gutenberg.]





TABLE OF CONTENTS.


VOLUME II. PART IV. Washington Continental Commander-in-Chief.
1775-1783.


CHAP. X. Lord Howe Outgeneraled by Washington

     XI. Washington Holds Howe in Check

    XII. Burgoyne's Defeat and Surrender

   XIII. Washington at Valley Forge

    XIV. The Battle of Monmouth

     XV. Washington Directs a Descent on Rhode Island

    XVI. Washington Prepares to Chastise the Indians

   XVII. Washington's Operations in the Northern States

  XVIII. Campaign in the North--Arnold's Treason

    XIX. Operations at the South

     XX. Preparations for a New Campaign

    XXI. The Campaign at the South

   XXII. Continuation of the Campaign at the South

  XXIII. Washington Captures Cornwallis

   XXIV. Final Events of the Revolution

       *       *       *       *       *

PART V. Washington, a Private Citizen. 1783-1788.

 CHAP.

      I. Washington's Return to Private Life

     II. Washington President of the Constitutional Convention

       *       *       *       *       *

PART VI. Washington as President and in Retirement. 1789-1799.

      I. Washington Elected First President of the United States

     II. Washington's Inauguration and First Administration Formed

    III. Measures for Establishing the Public Credit

     IV. Establishment of a National Bank

      V. Political Parties Developed

     VI. Washington Inaugurates the System of Neutrality

    VII. Washington Sends Jay to England

   VIII. Washington Quells the Western Insurrection

     IX. Washington Signs Jay's Treaty

      X. Washington Maintains the Treaty-Making Power of the Executive

     XI. Washington Retires from the Presidency

    XII. Washington Appointed Lieutenant-General

   XIII. Last Illness, Death, and Character of Washington

       *       *       *       *       *

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. Vol. II.

 WASHINGTON AS PRESIDENT

 VALLEY FORGE--WASHINGTON AND LAFAYETTE

 WASHINGTON AT TRENTON

 MAJOR-GENERAL BARON STEUBEN

 PHILIP SCHUYLER

 HORATIO GATES

 BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN

 TREASON OF ARNOLD

 ROBERT MORRIS

 LEE'S CAVALRY SKIRMISHING AT THE BATTLE OF GUILFORD

 GENERAL FRANCIS MARION

 MAJOR-GENERAL NATHANAEL GREENE

 ALEXANDER HAMILTON

 ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON

 WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL TO HIS OFFICERS

 LAFAYETTE

 JOHN JAY

 INAUGURATION OF WASHINGTON

 THE FIRST CABINET

 JOHN HANCOCK

 JOHN ADAMS

 WASHINGTON AND FAMILY AT MOUNT VERNON

 CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL

 THOMAS JEFFERSON

 HENRY LAURENS




CHAPTER X.


WASHINGTON OUT-GENERALS HOWE. 1777.


Among the many perplexing subjects which claimed the attention of
Washington during the winter (1776-1777), while he was holding his
headquarters among the hills at Morristown, none gave him more
annoyance than that of the treatment of American prisoners in the hands
of the enemy. Among the civilized nations of modern times prisoners of
war are treated with humanity and principles are established on which
they are exchanged. The British officers, however, considered the
Americans as rebels deserving condign punishment and not entitled to
the sympathetic treatment commonly shown to the captive soldiers of
independent nations. They seem to have thought that the Americans would
never be able, or would never dare, to retaliate. Hence their prisoners
were most infamously treated. Against this the Americans remonstrated,
and, on finding their remonstrances disregarded, they adopted a system
of retaliation which occasioned much unmerited suffering to
individuals. Col. Ethan Allen, who had been defeated and made prisoner
in a bold but rash attempt against Montreal, was put in irons and sent
to England as a traitor. In retaliation, General Prescott, who had been
taken at the mouth of the Sorel, was put in close confinement for the
avowed purpose of subjecting him to the same fate which Colonel Allen
should suffer.

Both officers and privates, prisoners to the Americans, were more
rigorously confined than they would otherwise have been, and, that they
might not impute this to wanton harshness and cruelty, they were
distinctly told that their own superiors only were to blame for any
severe treatment they might experience.

The capture of General Lee became the occasion of embittering the
complaints on this subject, and of aggravating the sufferings of the
prisoners of war. Before that event something like a cartel for the
exchange of prisoners had been established between Generals Howe and
Washington, but the captivity of General Lee interrupted that
arrangement. The general, as we have seen, had been an officer in the
British army, but having been disgusted had resigned his commission,
and, at the beginning of the troubles, had offered his services to
Congress, which were readily accepted. General Howe affected to
consider him as a deserter, and ordered him into close confinement.
Washington had no prisoner of equal rank, but offered six Hessian field
officers in exchange for him, and required that, if that offer should
not be accepted, General Lee should be treated according to his rank in
the American army. General Howe replied that General Lee was a deserter
from his majesty's service, and could not be considered as a prisoner
of war nor come within the conditions of the cartel. A fruitless
discussion ensued between the Commanders-in-Chief. Congress took up the
matter and resolved that General Washington be directed to inform
General Howe, that should the proffered exchange of six Hessian field
officers for General Lee not be accepted, and his former treatment
continued, the principle of retaliation shall occasion five of the
Hessian field officers, together with Lieut. Col. Archibald Campbell,
or any other officers that are or shall be in possession of equivalent
in number or quality, to be detained, in order that the treatment which
General Lee shall receive may be exactly inflicted upon their persons.
Congress also ordered a copy of their resolution to be transmitted to
the Council of Massachusetts Bay, and that they be desired to detain
Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, and keep him in close custody till the
further orders of Congress, and that a copy be also sent to the
committee of Congress, in Philadelphia, and that they be desired to
have the prisoners, officers, and privates lately taken properly
secured in some safe place.

Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell of the Seventy-first Regiment, with about
270 of his men, had been made prisoner in the bay of Boston, while
sailing for the harbor, ignorant of the evacuation of the town by the
British. Hitherto the colonel had been civilly treated; but, on
receiving the order of Congress respecting him, the Council of
Massachusetts Bay, instead of simply keeping him in safe custody,
according to order, sent him to Concord jail, and lodged him in a
filthy and loathsome dungeon, about twelve or thirteen feet square. He
was locked in by double bolts and expressly prohibited from entering
the prison yard on any consideration whatever. A disgusting hole,
fitted up with a pair of fixed chains, and from which a felon had been
removed to make room for his reception, was assigned him as an inner
apartment. The attendance of a servant was denied him, and no friend
was allowed to visit him.

Colonel Campbell naturally complained to Howe of such unworthy
treatment, and Howe addressed Washington on the subject. The latter
immediately wrote to the Council of Massachusetts Bay, and said, "You
will observe that exactly the same treatment is to be shown to Colonel
Campbell and the Hessian officers that General Howe shows to General
Lee, and as he is only confined to a commodious house, with genteel
accommodation, we have no right or reason to be more severe to Colonel
Campbell, whom I wish to be immediately removed from his present
situation and put into a house where he may live comfortably."

The historian (Gordon), who wrote at the time, gives a very graphic
account of the sufferings of the American prisoners in New York, which,
dreadful as it seems, is confirmed by many contemporary authorities. He
says: "Great complaints were made of the horrid usage the Americans met
with after they were captured."

The garrison of Fort Washington surrendered by capitulation to General
Howe, the 16th of November. The terms were that the fort should be
surrendered, the troops be considered prisoners of war, and that the
American officers should keep their baggage and sidearms. These
articles were signed and afterwards published in the New York papers.
Major Otho Holland Williams, of Rawling's Rifle Regiment, in doing his
duty that day, unfortunately fell into the hands of the enemy. The
haughty deportment of the officers, and the scurrility of the soldiers
of the British army, he afterward said, soon dispelled his hopes of
being treated with lenity. Many of the American officers were plundered
of their baggage and robbed of their sidearms, hats, cockades, etc.,
and otherwise grossly ill-treated. Williams and three companions were,
on the third day, put on board the Baltic-Merchant, a hospital ship,
then lying in the sound. The wretchedness of his situation was in some
degree alleviated by a small pittance of pork and parsnip which a good-
natured sailor spared him from his own mess. The fourth day of their
captivity, Rawlings, Hanson, M'Intire, and himself, all wounded
officers, were put into one common dirt-cart and dragged through the
city of New York as objects of derision, reviled as rebels, and treated
with the utmost contempt.

From the cart they were set down at the door of an old wastehouse, the
remains of Hampden Hall, near Bridewell, which, because of the openness
and filthiness of the place, he had a few months before refused as
barracks for his privates, but now was willing to accept for himself
and friends, in hopes of finding an intermission of the fatigue and
persecution they had perpetually suffered. Some provisions were issued
to the prisoners in the afternoon of that day, what quantity he could
not declare, but it was of the worst quality he ever, till then, saw
made use of. He was informed the allowance consisted of six ounces of
pork, one pound of biscuit, and some peas per day for each man, and two
bushels and a half of sea coal per week for the officers to each
fireplace. These were admitted on parole, and lived generally in
wastehouses. The privates, in the coldest season of the year, were
close confined in churches, sugar-houses, and other open buildings
(which admitted all kinds of weather), and consequently were subjected
to the severest kind of persecution that ever unfortunate captives
suffered.

Officers were insulted and often struck for attempting to afford some
of the miserable privates a small relief. In about three weeks Colonel
Williams was able to walk, and was himself a witness of the sufferings
of his countrymen. He could not describe their misery. Their
constitutions were not equal to the rigor of the treatment they
received and the consequence was the death of many hundreds. The
officers were not allowed to take muster-rolls, nor even to visit their
men, so that it was impossible to ascertain the numbers that perished;
but from frequent reports and his own observations, he verily believed,
as well as had heard many officers give it as their opinion, that not
less than 1,500 prisoners perished in the course of a few weeks in the
city of New York, and that this dreadful mortality was principally
owing to the want of provisions and extreme cold. If they computed too
largely, it must be ascribed to the shocking brutal manner of treating
the dead bodies, and not to any desire of exaggerating the account of
their sufferings.

When the King's commissary of prisoners intimated to some of the
American officers General Howe's intention of sending the privates home
on parole, they all earnestly desired it, and a paper was signed
expressing that desire; the reason for signing was, they well knew the
effects of a longer confinement, and the great numbers that died when
on parole justified their pretensions to that knowledge. In January
almost all the officers were sent to Long Island on parole, and there
billeted on the inhabitants at $2 per week.

The filth in the churches (in consequence of fluxes) was beyond
description. Seven dead have been seen in one of them at the same time,
lying among the excrements of their bodies. The British soldiers were
full of their low and insulting jokes on those occasions, but less
malignant than the Tories. The provision dealt out to the prisoners was
not sufficient for the support of life, and was deficient in quantity,
and more so in quality. The bread was loathsome and not fit to be
eaten, and was thought to have been condemned. The allowance of meat
was trifling and of the worst sort. The integrity of these suffering
prisoners was hardly credible. Hundreds submitted to death rather than
enlist in the British service, which they were most generally pressed
to do. It was the opinion of the American officers that Howe perfectly
understood the condition of the private soldiers, and they from thence
argued that it was exactly such as he and his council intended. After
Washington's success in the Jerseys, the obduracy, and malevolence of
the Royalists subsided in some measure. The surviving prisoners were
ordered to be sent out as an exchange, but several of them fell down
dead in the streets while attempting to walk to the vessels.

Washington wrote to General Howe in the beginning of April: "It is a
fact not to be questioned that the usage of our prisoners while in your
possession, the privates at least, was such as could not be justified.
This was proclaimed by the concurrent testimony of all who came out.
Their appearance justified the assertion, and melancholy experience in
the speedy death of a large part of them, stamped it with infallible
certainty."

The cruel treatment of the prisoners being the subject of conversation
among some officers captured by Sir Guy Carleton, General Parsons, who
was of the company, said, "I am very glad of it." They expressed their
astonishment and desired him to explain himself. He thus addressed
them: "You have been taken by General Carleton, and he has used you
with great humanity, would you be inclined to fight against him?" The
answer was, "No." "So," added Parsons, "would it have been, had the
troops taken by Howe been treated in like manner, but now through this
cruelty we shall get another army."

The Hon. William Smith, learning how the British used the prisoners,
and concluding it would operate to that end by enraging the Americans,
applied to the committee of New York State for leave to go into the
city and remonstrate with the British upon such cruel treatment, which
he doubted not but that he should put a stop to. The committee,
however, either from knowing what effect the cruelties would have in
strengthening the opposition to Britain, or from jealousies of his
being in some other way of disservice to the American cause or from
these united, would not grant his request.

Washington, at the beginning of 1777, determined to have the army
inoculated for the smallpox, which had made fearful ravages in the
ranks. It was carried forward as secretly and carefully as possible,
and the hospital physicians in Philadelphia were ordered at the same
time to inoculate all the soldiers who passed through that city on
their way to join the army. The same precautions were taken in the
other military stations, and thus the army was relieved from an evil
which would have materially interfered with the success of the ensuing
campaign. The example of the soldiery proved a signal benefit to the
entire population, the practice of inoculation became general, and, by
little and little, this fatal malady disappeared almost entirely.

In the hope that something might be effected at New York, Washington
ordered General Heath, who was in command in the Highlands, to move
down towards the city with a considerable force. Heath did so, and in a
rather grandiloquent summons called upon Fort Independence to
surrender. The enemy, however, stood their ground, and Heath, after a
few days, retreated, having done nothing, and exposed himself to
ridicule for not having followed up his words with suitable deeds.

While Washington was actively employed in the Jerseys in asserting the
independence of America, Congress could not afford him much assistance,
but that body was active in promoting the same cause by its enactments
and recommendations. Hitherto the Colonies had been united by no bond
but that of their common danger and common love of liberty. Congress
resolved to render the terms of their union more definite, to ascertain
the rights and duties of the several Colonies, and their mutual
obligations toward each other. A committee was appointed to sketch the
principles of the union or confederation.

This committee presented a report in thirteen Articles of Confederation
and perpetual Union between the States, and proposed that, instead of
calling themselves the United Colonies, as they had hitherto done, they
should assume the name of the United States of America; that each State
should retain its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the confederation
expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled; that
they enter into a firm league for mutual defense; that the free
inhabitants of any of the States shall be entitled to the privileges
and immunities of free citizens in any other State; that any traitor or
great delinquent fleeing from one State and found in another shall be
delivered up to the State having jurisdiction of his offense; that full
faith and credit shall be given in each of the States to the records,
acts, and judicial proceedings of every other State; that delegates
shall be annually chosen in such manner as the legislature of each
State shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday of
November, with power to each State to recall its delegates, or any of
them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead;
that no State shall be represented in Congress by less than two or more
than seven members, and no person shall be a delegate for more than
three out of six years, nor shall any delegate hold a place of
emolument under the United States; that each State shall maintain its
own delegates; that in Congress each State shall have only one vote;
that freedom of speech shall be enjoyed by the members, and that they
shall be free from arrest, except for treason, felony, or breach of the
peace; that no State, without the consent of Congress, shall receive
any ambassador, or enter into any treaty with any foreign power; that
no person holding any office in any of the United States shall receive
any present, office, or title from any foreign State, and that neither
Congress nor any of the States shall grant any titles of nobility; that
no two or more of the States shall enter into any confederation
whatever without the consent of Congress; that no State shall impose
any duties which may interfere with treaties made by Congress; that in
time of peace no vessels of war or military force shall be kept up in
any of the States but by the authority of Congress, but every State
shall have a well-regulated and disciplined militia; that no State,
unless invaded, shall engage in war without the consent of Congress,
nor shall they grant letters of marque or reprisal till after a
declaration of war by Congress; that colonels and inferior officers
shall be appointed by the Legislature of each State for its own troops;
that the expenses of war shall be defrayed out of a common treasury,
supplied by the several States according to the value of the land in
each; that taxes shall be imposed and levied by authority and direction
of the several States within the time prescribed by Congress; that
Congress has the sole and exclusive right of deciding on peace and war,
of sending and receiving ambassadors, and entering into treaties; that
Congress shall be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and
differences between two or more of the States; that Congress have the
sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of
coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective
States, fixing the standard of weights and measures, regulating the
trade, establishing post-offices, appointing all officers of the land
forces in the service of the United States, except regimental officers,
appointing all the officers of the naval forces, and commissioning all
officers whatever in the service of the United States, making rules for
the government and regulation of the said land and naval forces, and
directing their operations; that Congress have authority to appoint a
committee to sit during their recess, to be dominated a Committee of
the States, and to consist of one delegate from each State; that
Congress shall have power to ascertain the necessary sums of money to
be raised for the service of the United States, and to appropriate and
apply the same, to borrow money or emit bills on the credit of the
United States, to build and equip a navy, to fix the number of land
forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its quota, in
proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such State; that the
consent of nine States shall be requisite to any great public measure
of common interest; that Congress shall have power to adjourn to any
time within the year, and to any place within the United States, but
the adjournment not to exceed six months, and that they shall publish
their proceedings monthly, excepting such parts relating to treaties,
alliances, or military operations, as in their judgment require
secrecy; that the yeas and nays of the delegates of each State shall,
if required, be entered on the journal, and extracts granted; that the
Committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall, during the recess
of Congress, exercise such powers as Congress shall vest them with;
that Canada, if willing, shall be admitted to all the advantages of the
union; but no other colony shall be admitted, unless such admission
shall be agreed to by nine States; that all bills of credit emitted,
moneys borrowed, or debts contracted by Congress before this
confederation, shall be charges on the United States; that every State
shall abide by the determinations of Congress on all questions
submitted to them by this confederation; that the articles of it shall
be inviolably observed by every State, and that no alteration in any of
the articles shall be made, unless agreed to by Congress, and afterward
confirmed by the legislature of every State.

Such was the substance of this confederation or union. After much
discussion, at thirty-nine sittings, the articles were approved by
Congress, transmitted to the several State Legislatures, and, meeting
with their approbation, were ratified by all the delegates on the 15th
of November, 1778.

Congress maintained an erect posture, although its affairs then wore
the most gloomy aspect. It was under the provisions of this
confederation that the war was afterward carried on, and, considered as
a first essay of legislative wisdom, it discovers a good understanding,
and a respectable knowledge of the structure of society. Had peace been
concluded before the settlement of this confederation, the States would
probably have broken down into so many independent governments, and the
strength of the Union been lost in a number of petty sovereignties.

It is not hazarding much to say that, considering all the
circumstances, it was the best form of government which could have been
framed at that time. Its radical defect arose from its being a
confederation of independent States, in which the central government
had no direct recourse to the people. It required all grants of men or
money to be obtained from the State governments, who were often, during
the war, extremely dilatory in complying with the requisitions of
Congress. This defect was strongly felt by Washington, who was often
compelled to exert his personal influence, which, in all the States,
was immense, to obtain the supplies which Congress had no power to
exact. We shall see hereafter, that in forming the new constitution, a
work in which Washington took a leading part, this defect was remedied.

While Congress was beginning to form these articles of confederation,
and Washington was giving a new aspect to the war in New Jersey, the
people of Great Britain, long accustomed to colonial complaints and
quarrels, and attentive merely to their own immediate interests, paid
no due regard to the progress of the contest or to the importance of
the principles in which it originated. Large majorities in both houses
of parliament supported the ministry in all their violent proceedings,
and although a small minority, including several men of distinguished
talents, who trembled for the fate of British liberty if the court
should succeed in establishing its claims against the colonists,
vigorously opposed the measures of administration, yet the great body
of the people manifested a loyal zeal in favor of the war, and the ill
success of the Colonists in the campaign of 1776, gave that zeal
additional energy.

But amidst all the popularity of their warlike operations, the
difficulties of the ministry soon began to multiply. In consequence of
hostilities with the American provinces, the British West India islands
experienced a scarcity of the necessaries of life. About the time when
the West India fleet was about to set sail, under convoy, on its
homeward voyage, it was discovered that the negroes of Jamaica
meditated an insurrection. By means of the draughts to complete the
army in America, the military force in that island had been weakened,
and the ships of war were detained to assist in suppressing the
attempts of the negroes. By this delay the Americans gained time for
equipping their privateers. After the fleet sailed it was dispersed by
stormy weather and many of the ships, richly laden, fell into the hands
of the American cruisers who were permitted to sell their prizes in the
ports of France, both in Europe and in the West Indies.

The conduct of France was now so openly manifested that it could no
longer be winked at, and it drew forth a remonstrance from the British
cabinet. The remonstrance was civilly answered, and the traffic in
British prizes was carried on somewhat more covertly in the French
ports in Europe; but it was evident that both France and Spain were in
a state of active preparation for war. The British ministry could no
longer shut their eyes against the gathering storm, and began to
prepare for it. About the middle of October (1776) they put sixteen
additional ships into commission, and made every exertion to man them.

On the 31st of October the parliament met and was opened by a speech
from the throne, in which his majesty stated that it would have given
him much satisfaction if he had been able to inform them that the
disturbances in the revolted Colonies were at an end, and that the
people of America, recovering from their delusion, had returned to
their duty; but so mutinous and determined was the spirit of their
leaders that they had openly abjured and renounced all connection and
communication with the mother country and had rejected every
conciliatory proposition. Much mischief, he said, would accrue not only
to the commerce of Great Britain but to the general system of Europe if
this rebellion were suffered to take root. The conduct of the Colonists
would convince every one of the necessity of the measures proposed to
be adopted, and the past success of the British arms promised the
happiest results; but preparations must be promptly made for another
campaign. A hope was expressed of the general continuance of
tranquility in Europe, but that it was thought advisable to increase
the defensive resources at home.

The addresses to the speech were in the usual form, but amendments were
moved in both houses of parliament; in the Commons by Lord John
Cavendish and in the Lords by the Marquis of Rockingham. After an
animated debate the amendment was rejected, in the House of Commons by
242 against 87, and in the Lords by 91 against 26. During the session
of parliament some other attempts were made for adopting conciliatory
measures, but the influence of ministry was so powerful that they were
all completely defeated, and the plans of administration received the
approbation and support of parliament.

During the winter (1776-1777), which was very severe, the British
troops at Brunswick and Amboy were kept on constant duty and suffered
considerable privations. The Americans were vigilant and active, and
the British army could seldom procure provisions or forage without
fighting. But although in the course of the winter the affairs of the
United States had begun to wear a more promising aspect, yet there were
still many friends of royalty in the provinces. By their open
attachment to the British interest, numbers had already exposed
themselves to the hostility of the patriotic party; and others, from
affection to Britain or distrust of the American cause, gave their
countenance and aid to General Howe. Early in the season a considerable
number of these men joined the royal army, and were embodied under the
direction of the Commander-in-Chief with the same pay as the regular
troops, besides the promise of an allotment of land at the close of the
disturbances. Governor Tryon, who had been extremely active in engaging
and disciplining them, was promoted to the rank of major-general of the
Loyal Provincialists. [1]

The campaign opened on both sides by rapid predatory incursions and
bold desultory attacks. At Peekskill, on the North river, about fifty
miles above New York, the Americans had formed a post, at which, during
the winter, they had collected a considerable quantity of provisions
and camp-equipage to supply the stations in the vicinity as occasion
might require.

The most mountainous part of the district, named the Manor of Courland,
was formed into a kind of citadel, replenished with stores, and
Peekskill served as a port to it. On the 23d of March (1777), as soon
as the river was clear of ice, Howe, who thought Peekskill of more
importance than it really was, detached Colonel Bird, with about 500
men, under convoy of a frigate and some armed vessels, against that
post. General M'Dougal, who commanded there, had then only about 250
men in the place. He had timely notice of Colonel Bird's approach, and,
sensible that his post was untenable, he exerted himself to remove the
stores to the strong grounds about two miles and a half in his rear;
but before he had made much progress in the work the British appeared,
when he set fire to the stores and buildings and retreated. Colonel
Bird landed and completed the destruction of the stores which he was
unable to remove. On the same day he re-embarked, and returned to New
York.

On the 8th of April (1777), says Gordon, Congress concluded upon the
erection of a monument to the memory of General Warren in the town of
Boston, and another to the memory of General Mercer in Fredericksburg,
in Virginia, and that the eldest son of General Warren, and the
youngest son of General Mercer, be educated from henceforward at the
expense of the United States. They conveyed in a few words the highest
eulogium on the characters and merits of the deceased. Through
inattention, General Warren, who fell on Breed's Hill, had not been
properly noted when Congress passed their resolve respecting General
Montgomery: the proposal for paying due respect to the memory of Mercer
led to the like in regard to Warren.

On the 13th of April Lord Cornwallis and General Grant, with about
2,000 men, attempted to surprise and cut off General Lincoln, who, with
500 men, was posted at Bound Brook, seven miles from Brunswick, and
nearly succeeded in their enterprise. But by a bold and rapid movement
Lincoln, when almost surrounded, forced his way between the British
columns and escaped, with the loss of sixty men, his papers, three
field pieces, and some baggage.

At that early period of the campaign Howe attempted no grand movement
against the main body of the army under Washington at Morristown, but
he made several efforts to interrupt his communications, destroy his
stores, and impede his operations. He had received information that the
Americans had collected a large quantity of stores in the town of
Danbury and in other places on the borders of Connecticut. These he
resolved to destroy, and appointed Major-General Tryon of the
Provincials, who panted for glory in his newly-acquired character, to
command an expedition for that purpose, but prudently directed Generals
Agnew and Sir William Erskine to accompany him.

On the 25th of April (1777) the fleet appeared off the coast of
Connecticut, and in the evening the troops were landed without
opposition between Fairfield and Norwalk. General Silliman, then
casually in that part of the country, immediately dispatched expresses
to assemble the militia. In the meantime Tryon proceeded to Danbury
which he reached about 2 the next day. On his approach Colonel
Huntingdon, who had occupied the town with about 150 men, retired to a
neighboring height, and Danbury, with the magazines it contained, was
consumed by fire.

General Arnold, who was also in the State superintending the recruiting
service, joined General Silliman at Reading, where that officer had
collected about 500 militia. General Wooster, who had resigned his
commission in the Continental service, and been appointed major-general
of the militia, fell in with them at the same place, and they proceeded
in the night through a heavy rain to Bethel, about eight miles from
Danbury. Having heard next morning that Tryon, after destroying the
town and magazines, was returning, they divided their troops, and
General Wooster, with about 300 men, fell in his rear, while Arnold,
with about 500, crossing the country, took post in his front at
Ridgefield. Wooster came up with his rear about 11 in the morning,
attacked it with great gallantry, and a sharp skirmish ensued in which
he was mortally wounded, [2] and his troops were repulsed.

Tryon then proceeded to Ridgefield where he found Arnold already
entrenched on a strong piece of ground, and prepared to dispute his
passage. A warm skirmish ensued, which continued nearly an hour. Arnold
was at length driven from the field after which he retreated to
Paugatuck, about three miles east of Norwalk.

At break of day next morning, after setting Ridgefield on fire, the
British resumed their march. About 11 in the forenoon, April 28th
(1777), they were again met by Arnold, whose numbers increased during
the day to rather more than 1,000 men, among whom were some Continental
troops. A continued skirmishing was kept up until 5 in the afternoon,
when the British formed on a hill near their ships. The Americans
attacked them with intrepidity, but were repulsed and broken. Tryon,
availing himself of this respite, re-embarked his troops and returned
to New York.

The loss of the British amounted to about 170 men. [3] That of the
Americans was represented by Tryon as being much more considerable. By
themselves it was not admitted to exceed 100. In this number, however,
were comprehended General Wooster, Lieutenant-Colonel Gould, and
another field officer, killed, and Colonel Lamb wounded. Several other
officers and volunteers were killed. Military and hospital stores to a
considerable amount, which were greatly needed by the army, were
destroyed in the magazines at Danbury, but the loss most severely felt
was rather more than 1,000 tents which had been provided for the
campaign about to open.

Not long afterward this enterprise was successfully retaliated. A
British detachment had been for some time employed in collecting forage
and provisions on the eastern end of Long Island. Howe supposed this
part of the country to be so completely secured by the armed vessels
which incessantly traversed the Sound, that he confided the protection
of the stores deposited at a small port called Sag Harbor to a schooner
with twelve guns and a company of infantry.

General Parsons, who commanded a few recruits at New Haven, thinking it
practicable to elude the cruisers in the bay, formed the design of
surprising this party and other adjacent posts, the execution of which
was entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Meigs, a gallant officer who had
accompanied Arnold in his memorable march to Quebec. He embarked with
about 230 men on board 13 whale-boats, and proceeded along the coast to
Guilford, where he was to cross the Sound. With about 170 of his
detachment, under convoy of two armed sloops, he proceeded (May 23,
1777) across the Sound to the north division of the island near
Southhold in the neighborhood of which a small foraging party against
which the expedition was in part directed, was supposed to lie, but
they had marched two days before to New York. The boats were conveyed
across the land, a distance of about fifteen miles, into a bay which
deeply intersects the eastern end of Long Island, where the troops re-
embarked. Crossing the bay they landed at 2 in the morning, about four
miles from Sag Harbor, which they completely surprised and carried with
charged bayonets. At the same time a division of the detachment secured
the armed schooner and the vessels laden with forage, which were set on
fire and entirely consumed. Six of the enemy were killed and ninety
taken prisoners. A very few escaped under cover of the night.

The object of his expedition being effected without the loss of a man,
Colonel Meigs returned to Guilford with his prisoners. "Having," as was
stated in the letter to General Parsons, "moved with such uncommon
celerity as to have transported his men by land and water 90 miles in
25 hours." Congress directed a sword to be presented to him, and passed
a resolution expressing the high sense entertained of his merit, and of
the prudence, activity, and valor displayed by himself and his party.

The exertions made by Washington through the winter to raise a powerful
army for the ensuing campaign had not been successful. The hopes
respecting its strength, which the flattering reports made from every
quarter had authorized him to form, were cruelly disappointed, and he
found himself not only unable to carry into effect the offensive
operations he had meditated, but unequal even to defensive warfare.
That steady and persevering courage, however, which had supported
himself and the American cause through the gloomy scenes of the
preceding year did not forsake him, and that sound judgment which
applies to the best advantage those means which are attainable, however
inadequate they may be, still remained. His plan of operations was
adapted to that which he believed his enemy had formed. He was
persuaded either that General Burgoyne, who was then at Quebec, would
endeavor to take Ticonderoga and to penetrate to the Hudson, in which
event General Howe would cooperate with him by moving up that river,
and attempting to possess himself of the forts and high grounds
commanding its passage, or that Burgoyne would join the grand army at
New York by sea, after which the combined armies would proceed against
Philadelphia.

To counteract the designs of the enemy, whatever they might be, to
defend the three great points, Ticonderoga, the Highlands of New York,
and Philadelphia, against two powerful armies so much superior to him
in arms, in numbers, and in discipline, it was necessary to make such
an arrangement of his troops as would enable the parts reciprocally to
aid each other without neglecting objects of great and almost equal
magnitude, which were alike threatened, and were far asunder. To effect
these purposes, the troops of New England and New York were divided
between Ticonderoga and Peekskill, while those from Jersey to North
Carolina inclusive, were directed to assemble at the camp to be formed
in Jersey. The more southern troops remained in that State for its
protection.

These arrangements being made and the recruits collected, the camp at
Morristown was broken up, the detachments called in, and the army
assembled at Middlebrook (May 28, 1777), just behind a connected ridge
of strong and commanding heights north of the road leading to
Philadelphia, and about ten miles from Brunswick.

This camp, the approaches to which were naturally difficult, Washington
took care to strengthen still further by entrenchments. The heights in
front commanded a prospect of the course of the Raritan, the road to
Philadelphia, the hills about Brunswick, and a considerable part of the
country between that place and Amboy, so as to afford him a full view
of the most interesting movements of the enemy.

The force brought into the field by the United States required all the
aid which could be derived from strong positions and unremitting
vigilance. On the 20th of May (1777) the army in Jersey, excluding
cavalry and artillery, amounted to only 8,378 men, of whom upwards of
2,000 were sick. The effective rank and file were only 5,738.

Had this army been composed of the best disciplined troops, its
inferiority in point of numbers must have limited its operations to
defensive war, and have rendered it incompetent to the protection of
any place whose defense would require a battle in the open field. But
more than half the troops were unacquainted with the first rudiments of
military duty, and had never looked an enemy in the face. As an
additional cause of apprehension, a large proportion of the soldiers,
especially from the middle States, were foreigners, in whose attachment
to the American cause full confidence could not be placed.

Washington, anticipating a movement by land toward Philadelphia, had
taken the precaution to give orders for assembling on the western bank
of the Delaware an army of militia strengthened by a few Continental
troops, the command of which was given to General Arnold who was then
in Philadelphia employed in the settlement of his accounts.

The first and real object of the campaign on the part of Howe was the
acquisition of Philadelphia. He intended to march through Jersey, and
after securing the submission of that State to cross the Delaware on a
portable bridge constructed in the winter for the purpose and proceed
by land to that city. If, in the execution of this plan, the Americans
could be brought to a general action on equal ground, the advantages of
the royal army must insure a victory. But should Washington decline an
engagement and be again pressed over the Delaware the object would be
as certainly obtained.

Had Howe taken the field before the Continental troops were assembled
this plan might probably have been executed without any serious
obstruction, but the tents and camp equipage expected from Europe did
not arrive until Washington had collected his forces and taken
possession of the strong post on the Heights of Middlebrook. It would
be dangerous to attack him on such advantageous ground, for, although
his camp might be forced, victory would probably be attended with such
loss as to disable the victor from reaping its fruits.

If it was deemed too hazardous to attack the strong camp at
Middlebrook, an attempt to cross the Delaware in the face of an army
collected on its western bank, while that under Washington remained
unbroken in his rear, was an experiment of equal danger. It suited the
cautious temper of Howe to devise some other plan of operation to which
he might resort should he be unable to seduce Washington from his
advantageous position.

The two great bays of Delaware and Chesapeake suggested the alternative
of proceeding by water, should he be unable to maneuver Washington out
of his present encampment.

The plan of the campaign being settled and some small reinforcements
with the expected camp equipage being received from Europe, Howe,
leaving a garrison in New York and a guard in Amboy, assembled his army
at Brunswick, and gave strong indications of an intention to penetrate
through the country to the Delaware and reach Philadelphia by land.

Believing this to be his real design Washington (June 13, 1777) placed
a select corps of riflemen under the command of Colonel Morgan, who had
distinguished himself in the unfortunate attempt to storm Quebec, and
in whom those particular qualities which fit a man for the command of a
partisan corps, designed to act on the lines of a formidable enemy,
were eminently united.

He was ordered to take post at Vanvighton's bridge on the Raritan, just
above its confluence with the Millstone river, to watch the left flank
of the British army and seize every occasion to harass it.

Early in the morning of the 14th, Howe, leaving 2,000 men under the
command of General Matthews at Brunswick, advanced in two columns
toward the Delaware. The front of the first, under Cornwallis, reached
Somerset Court House, nine miles from Brunswick, by the appearance of
day, and the second, commanded by General de Heister, reached
Middlebush about the same time.

This movement was made with the view of inducing Washington to quit his
fortified camp and approach the Delaware, in which event, Howe expected
to bring on an engagement on ground less disadvantageous than that now
occupied by the American army. But Washington understood the importance
of his position too well to abandon it.

On the first intelligence that the enemy was in motion, he drew out his
whole army, and formed it to great advantage on the heights in front of
his camp. This position was constantly maintained. The troops remained
in order of battle during the day, and in the night slept on the ground
to be defended.

In the meantime the Jersey militia, with alacrity theretofore
unexampled in that State, took the field in great numbers. They
principally joined General Sullivan, who had retired from Princeton,
behind the Sourland hills toward Flemington, where an army of some
extent was forming, which could readily cooperate with that under the
immediate inspection of Washington.

The settled purpose of Washington was to defend his camp, but not to
hazard a general action on other ground. He had therefore determined
not to advance from the heights he occupied into the open country,
either towards the enemy or the Delaware.

The object of Howe was, by acting on his anxiety for Philadelphia, to
seduce him from the strong ground about Middlebrook, and tempt him to
approach the Delaware in the hope of defending its passage. Should he
succeed in this, he had little doubt of being able to bring on an
engagement, in which he counted with certainty on victory.

The considerations which restrained Howe from attempting to march
through Jersey, leaving the American army in full force in his rear,
had determined Washington to allow him to proceed to the Delaware, if
such should be his intention. In that event, he had determined to throw
those impediments only in the way of the hostile army which might
harass and retard its march, and maintaining the high and secure
grounds north of the road to be taken by the enemy, to watch for an
opportunity of striking some important blow with manifest advantage.

Washington was not long in penetrating Howe's designs. "The views of
the enemy," he writes to General Arnold in a letter of the 17th (June,
1777), "must be to destroy this army and get possession of
Philadelphia. I am, however, clearly of opinion, that they will not
move that way until they have endeavored to give a severe blow to this
army. The risk would be too great to attempt to cross a river when they
must expect to meet a formidable opposition in front and would have
such a force as ours in their rear. They might possibly be successful,
but the probability would be infinitely against them. Should they be
imprudent enough to make the attempt, I shall keep close upon their
heels and will do everything in my power to make the project fatal to
them."

"But, besides the argument in favor of their intending, in the first
place, a stroke at this army, drawn from the policy of the measure,
every appearance contributes to conform the opinion. Had their design
been for the Delaware in the first instance, they would probably have
made a secret, rapid march for it, and not have halted so as to awaken
our attention, and give us time to prepare for obstructing them.
Instead of that they have only advanced to a position necessary to
facilitate an attack on our right, the part in which we are most
exposed. In addition to this circumstance, they have come out as light
as possible, leaving all their baggage, provisions, boas, and bridges
at Brunswick. This plainly contradicts the idea of their intending to
push for the Delaware."

Finding the American army could not be drawn from its strong position
Howe determined to waste no more time in threatening Philadelphia by
land, but to withdraw from Jersey and to embark his army as
expeditiously as possible for the Chesapeake or the Delaware. On the
night of the 19th of June (1777), he returned to Brunswick, and on the
22d to Amboy, from which place the heavy baggage and a few of his
troops passed into Staten Island on the bridge which had been designed
for the Delaware. [2]

Washington had expected this movement from Brunswick and had made
arrangements to derive some advantage from it. General Greene was
detached with three brigades to annoy the British rear, and Sullivan
and Maxwell were ordered to cooperate with him. In the meantime the
army paraded on the Heights of Middlebrook, ready to act as
circumstances might require.

About sunrise, Colonel Morgan drove in a picket-guard, soon after which
that division commenced its march to Amboy. Some sharp skirmishing took
place between this party and Morgan's regiment, but the hope of gaining
any important advantage was entirely disappointed, and the retreat to
Amboy was effected with inconsiderable loss.

In order to cover his light parties, which still hung on the British
flank and rear, Washington advanced six or seven miles to Quibbletown
on the road to Amboy, and Lord Stirling's division was pushed still
further, to the neighborhood of the Metucking Meeting House, for the
purpose of co-operating with the light parties should the retreat to
Staten Island afford an opportunity of striking at the rear.

Believing it now practicable to bring on an engagement and probably
hoping to turn the left of the American army and gain the heights in
its rear, Howe, in the night of the 25th, recalled the troops from
Staten Island, and early next morning (June 26, 1777) made a rapid
movement in two columns, towards Westfield. The right, under the
command of Cornwallis took the route by Woodbridge to the Scotch
plains, and the left, led by Howe in person, marched by Metucking
Meeting House to fall into the rear of the right column. It was
intended that the left should take a separate road soon after this
junction and attack the left flank of the American army at Quibbletown,
while Cornwallis should gain the heights on the left of the camp at
Middlebrook. Four battalions with six pieces of cannon were detached to
Bonhamtown.

About Woodbridge the right column fell in with one of the American
parties of observation, which gave notice of this movement. Washington
discerned his danger, put the whole army instantly in motion, and
regained the camp at Middlebrook. Cornwallis fell in with Lord Stirling
and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the Americans were driven from
their ground with the loss of three field-pieces and a few men. They
retreated to the hills about the Scotch Plains and were pursued as far
as Westfield. Perceiving the passes in the mountains on the left of the
American camp to be guarded, and the object of this skilful maneuver to
be, consequently, unattainable, Cornwallis returned through Rahway to
Amboy, and the whole army crossed over to Staten Island. Washington was
now again left to his conjectures respecting the plan of the campaign.
The very next day (June 27), after Howe had finally evacuated the
Jerseys, intelligence was received of the appearance of Burgoyne on
Lake Champlain, and that Ticonderoga was threatened. This intelligence
strengthened the opinion that the design of Howe must be to seize the
passes in the mountains on the Hudson, secure the command of that
river, and effect a junction between the two armies. Yet Washington
could not permit himself to yield so entirely to this impression, as to
make a movement which might open the way by land to Philadelphia. His
army, therefore, maintained its station at Middlebrook, but
arrangements were made to repel any sudden attack on the posts which
defended the Hudson.

Some changes made in the stations of the British ships and troops
having relieved Washington from his apprehensions of a sudden march to
Philadelphia, he advanced Sullivan's division to Pompton Plains, on the
way to Peekskill, and proceeded with the main body of his army to
Morristown, thus approaching the Highlands of New York without removing
so far from Middlebrook as to be unable to regain that camp should Howe
indicate an intention to seize it.

Meanwhile Howe prosecuted diligently his plan of embarkation, which was
necessarily attended with circumstances indicating a much longer voyage
than one up the North river. These circumstances were immediately
communicated to the Eastern States, and Congress was earnestly pressed
to strengthen the fortifications on the Delaware, and to increase the
obstructions in that river.

In the midst of these appearances certain intelligence was received
that Burgoyne was in great force on the lakes, and was advancing
against Ticonderoga. This intelligence confirmed the opinion that the
main object of Howe must be to effect a junction with Burgoyne on the
North river. Under this impression Washington ordered Sullivan to
Peekskill, and slowly advanced himself, first to Pompton Plains, and
afterward to the Clove, where he determined to remain until the views
of the enemy should be disclosed.

While Washington thus anxiously watched the movements of his adversary,
an agreeable and unexpected piece of intelligence was received from New
England. The command of the British troops in Rhode Island had devolved
on General Prescot. Thinking himself perfectly secure in an island, the
water surrounding which was believed to be entirely guarded by his
cruisers, and at the head of an army greatly superior to any force then
collected in that department, he indulged himself in convenient
quarters rather distant from camp, and was remiss with respect to the
guards about his person. Information of this negligence was
communicated to the main, and a plan was formed to surprise him. This
spirited enterprise was executed with equal courage and address by
Lieutenant-Colonel Barton of the Rhode Island militia.

On the night of the 10th (June, 1777) he embarked on board four
whale-boats at Warwick Neck, with a party consisting of about forty
persons, including Captains Adams and Philips, and several other
officers. After proceeding about ten miles by water unobserved by the
British guard boats, although several ships of war lay in that quarter,
he landed on the west of the island, about midway between Newport and
Bristol Ferry, and marching a mile to the quarters of Prescot,
dexterously seized the sentinel at his door, and one of his aids. The
general himself was taken out of bed and conveyed to a place of safety.

The success of this intrepid enterprise diffused the more joy
throughout America, because it was supposed to secure the liberation of
General Lee by enabling Washington to offer an officer of equal rank in
exchange for him.

Congress expressed a high sense of the gallant conduct of Colonel
Barton and his party, and presented him with a sword as a mark of
approbation.

As the fleet fell down toward Sandy Hook, Washington withdrew slowly
from the Clove, and disposed his army in different divisions, so as to
march to any point which might be attacked.

At length the embarkation was completed and the fleet put to sea.
Still, its destination was uncertain. It might be going to the south,
or it might return to New York and ascend the Hudson. Soon, however,
Washington received intelligence that it had been seen off the capes of
the Delaware. It was of course expected to come up the Delaware and
attack Philadelphia.

Washington ordered the army to march to Germantown, and himself
hastened forward to Chester. The fleet of the British had disappeared
again. It might have returned to New York, or it might have sailed to
New England, with a view to joining Burgoyne as he was advancing on
Ticonderoga.

During this period of suspense and conjecture, Washington was for
several days in Philadelphia consulting on public measures with the
committees and members of Congress. Here he first met Lafayette. This
young nobleman, whose name has since become so dear to every American
heart, was born at Auvergne, in France, on the 6th of September, 1757.
His family was of ancient date and of the highest rank among the French
nobility. He was left an orphan at an early age, heir to an immense
estate, and exposed to all the temptations of "the gayest and most
luxurious city on earth at the period of its greatest corruption. He
escaped unhurt." Having completed his college education, he married at
the age of sixteen the daughter of the Duke D'Ayen, of the family of
Noailles. She was younger than himself and was always "the encourager
of his virtues, and the heroic partner of his sufferings, his great
name, and his honorable grave." [3]

In the summer of 1776 (says Mr. Everett), and just after the American
declaration of independence, Lafayette was stationed at Metz, a
garrisoned town on the road from Paris to the German frontier with the
regiment to which he was attached as a captain of dragoons, not then
nineteen years of age. The Duke of Gloucester, the brother of the King
of England happened to be on a visit to Metz, and a dinner was given to
him by the commandant of the garrison. Lafayette was invited with other
officers to the entertainment. Dispatches had just been received by the
duke from England relating to American affairs--the resistance of the
Colonists, and the strong measures adopted by the ministers to crush
the rebellion. Among the details stated by the Duke of Gloucester was
the extraordinary fact that these remote, scattered, and unprotected
settlers of the wilderness had solemnly declared themselves an
independent people. That word decided the fortunes of the enthusiastic
listener, and not more distinctly was the great declaration a charter
of political liberty to the rising States, than it was a commission to
their youthful champion to devote his life to the same cause.

The details which he heard were new to him. The American contest was
known to him before but as a rebellion--a tumultuary affair in a remote
transatlantic colony. He now, with a promptness of perception which,
even at this distance of time, strikes us as little less than
miraculous, addressed a multitude of inquiries to the Duke of
Gloucester on the subject of the contest. His imagination was kindled
at the idea of a civilized people struggling for political liberty. His
heart was warmed with the possibility of drawing his sword in a good
cause. Before he left the table his course was mentally resolved on,
and the brother of the King of England (unconsciously, no doubt) had
the singular fortune to enlist, from the French court and the French
army, this gallant and fortunate champion in the then unpromising cause
of the colonial Congress.

He immediately repaired to Paris to make further inquiries and
arrangements toward the execution of his great plan. He confided it to
two young friends, officers like himself, the Count de Sgur and
Viscount de Noailles, and proposed to them to join him. They shared his
enthusiasm, and determined to accompany him, but on consulting their
families, they were refused permission. But they faithfully kept
Lafayette's secret. Happily--shall I say--he was an orphan, independent
of control, and master of his own fortune, amounting to near $40,000
per annum.

He next opened his heart to the Count de Broglie, a marshal in the
French army. To the experienced warrior, accustomed to the regular
campaigns of European service, the project seemed rash and quixotic,
and one that he could not countenance. Lafayette begged the count at
least not to betray him, as he was resolved (notwithstanding his
disapproval of the subject) to go to America. This the count promised,
adding, however, "I saw your uncle fall in Italy, and I witnessed your
father's death at the battle of Minden, and I will not be accessory to
the ruin of the only remaining branch of the family." He then used all
the powers of argument which his age and experience suggested to him,
to dissuade Lafayette from the enterprise, but in vain. Finding his
determination unalterable, he made him acquainted with the Baron De
Kalb, who the count knew was about to embark for America--an officer of
experience and merit who, as is well known, fell at the battle of
Camden.

The Baron de Kalb introduced Lafayette to Silas Deane, then agent of
the United States in France, who explained to him the state of affairs
in America, and encouraged him in his project. Deane was but
imperfectly acquainted with the French language, and of manners
somewhat repulsive. A less enthusiastic temper than that of Lafayette
might, perhaps, have been chilled by the reception that he met with
from Deane. He had, as yet, not been acknowledged in any public
capacity, and was beset by the spies of the British ambassador. For
these reasons it was judged expedient that the visit of Lafayette
should not be repeated, and their further negotiations were conducted
through the intervention of Mr. Carmichael, an American gentleman at
that time in Paris. The arrangement was at length concluded, in virtue
of which Deane took upon himself, without authority, but by a happy
exercise of discretion, to engage Lafayette to enter the American
service with the rank of major-general. A vessel was about to be
dispatched with arms and other supplies for the American army, and in
this vessel it was settled that he should take passage.

At this juncture the news reached France of the evacuation of New York,
the loss of Fort Washington, the calamitous retreat through New Jersey,
and other disasters of the campaign of 1776. The friends of America in
France were in despair. The tidings, bad in themselves, were greatly
exaggerated in the British gazettes. The plan of sending an armed
vessel with munitions was abandoned. The cause, always doubtful, was
now pronounced desperate, and Lafayette was urged by all who were privy
to his project, to give up an enterprise so wild and hopeless. Even our
commissioners (for Deane had been joined by Dr. Franklin and Arthur
Lee) told him they could not in conscience urge him to proceed. His
answer was: "My zeal and love of liberty have perhaps hitherto been the
prevailing motive with me, but now I see a chance of usefulness which I
had not anticipated. These supplies I know are greatly wanted by
Congress. I have money; I will purchase a vessel to convey them to
America, and in this vessel my companions and myself will take
passage."

His purpose was opposed by the government, and he was obliged to escape
into Spain and sail from that country. He landed near Georgetown in
South Carolina, and in company with the Baron de Kalb, the companion of
his voyage, proceeded to Charleston, where they were received with
enthusiasm by the magistrates and the people.

As soon as possible they proceeded by land to Philadelphia. On his
arrival there, with the eagerness of a youth anxious to be employed
upon his errand, he sent his letters to Mr. Lovell, chairman of the
committee of foreign relations. He called the next day at the hall of
Congress, and asked to see this gentleman. Mr. Lovell came out to him,
stated that so many foreigners offered themselves for employment in the
American army that Congress was greatly embarrassed to find them
commands; that the finances of the country required the most rigid
economy, and that he feared, in the present case, there was little hope
of success. Lafayette perceived that the worthy chairman had made up
his report without looking at the papers; he explained to him that his
application, if granted, would lay no burden upon the finances of
Congress, and addressed a letter to the president, in which he
expressed a wish to enter the American army on the condition of serving
without pay or emolument, and on the footing of a volunteer. These
conditions removed the chief obstacles alluded to in reference to the
appointment of foreign officers; the letters brought by Lafayette made
known to Congress his high connections, and his large means of
usefulness, and without an hour's delay he received from them a
commission of major-general in the American army, a month before he was
twenty years of age.

Washington was at headquarters when Lafayette reached Philadelphia, but
he was daily expected in the city. The introduction of the youthful
stranger to the man on whom his career depended was therefore delayed a
few days. It took place in a manner peculiarly marked with the
circumspection of Washington, at a dinner party, where Lafayette was
one among several guests of consideration. Washington was not
uninformed of the circumstances connected with his arrival in the
country. He knew what benefit it promised the cause if his character
and talents were adapted to the cause he had so boldly struck out, and
he knew also how much it was to be feared that the very qualities which
had prompted him to embark in it, would make him a useless and even a
dangerous auxiliary. We may well suppose that the piercing eye of the
Father of his Country was not idle during the repast. But that
searching glance, before which pretense or fraud never stood
undetected, was completely satisfied. When they were about to separate,
Washington took Lafayette aside, spoke to him with kindness, paid a
just tribute to the noble spirit which he had shown, and the sacrifices
he had made in the American cause, invited him to make the headquarters
of the army his home, and to regard himself at all times as one of the
family of the Commander-in-Chief.

Such was the reception given to Lafayette by the most sagacious and
observant of men, and the personal acquaintance thus commenced ripened
into an intimacy, a confidence, and an affection without bounds, and
never for one moment interrupted. If there lived a man whom Washington
loved it was Lafayette. The proofs of this are not wanted by those who
have read the history of the Revolution, but the private correspondence
of these two great men, hitherto unpublished, discloses the full extent
of the mutual regard and affection which united them. It not only shows
that Washington entertained the highest opinion of the military talent,
the personal probity, and the general prudence and energy of Lafayette,
but that he regarded him with the tenderness of a father, and found in
the affection which Lafayette bore to him in return one of the greatest
comforts and blessings of his own life. Whenever the correspondence of
Washington and Lafayette shall be published, the publication will do
what perhaps nothing else can--raise them both in the esteem and
admiration of mankind.

Our readers will pardon this somewhat lengthened quotation respecting
the bosom friend of Washington. We now return to our narrative of
events.

Late in the month of August (1777), Washington was relieved from his
suspense in regard to the movements of Howe. He received intelligence
that the British fleet had sailed up Chesapeake Bay, and that he was
landing his army at the head of Elk river, now Elkton. It was at length
clearly apparent that his object was the capture of Philadelphia.

At the place of debarkation the British army was within a few days'
march of Philadelphia; no great rivers were in its way, and there was
no very strong position of which the enemy could take possession. On
landing, General Howe issued a proclamation promising that private
property should be respected, and offering pardon and protection to all
who should submit to him, but, as the American army was at hand, the
proclamation produced little effect.

Washington distinctly understood the nature of the contest in which he
was engaged, and, sensible of the inferiority of his raw and disorderly
army to the veteran troops under Howe, he wished to avoid a general
engagement, but aware of the effect which the fall of Philadelphia
would produce on the minds of the people, determined to make every
effort in order to retard the progress and defeat the aim of the royal
army.

Accordingly, he marched to meet General Howe, who, from want of horses,
many of which had perished in the voyage, and from other causes, was
unable to proceed from the head of the Elk before the 3d of September
(1777). On the advance of the royal array, Washington retreated across
Brandywine creek, which falls into the Delaware at Wilmington. He took
post with his main body opposite Chad's ford, where it was expected the
British would attempt the passage, and ordered General Sullivan, with a
detachment, to watch the fords above. He sent General Maxwell with
about 1,000 light troops, to occupy the high ground on the other side
of the Brandywine, to skirmish with the British, and retard them in
their progress.

On the morning of the 11th of September, the British army advanced in
two columns; the right, under General Knyphausen, marched straight to
Chad's ford; the left, under Cornwallis, accompanied by Howe and
Generals Grey, Grant, and Agnew, proceeded by a circuitous route toward
a point named the Forks, where the two branches of the Brandywine
unite, with a view to turn the right of the Americans and gain their
rear. General Knyphausen's van soon found itself opposed to the light
troops under General Maxwell. A smart conflict ensued. General
Knyphausen reinforced his advanced guard, and drove the Americans
across the rivulet to shelter themselves under their batteries on the
north bank. General Knyphausen ordered some artillery to be placed on
the most advantageous points, and a cannonade was carried on with the
American batteries on the heights beyond the ford.

Meanwhile the left wing of the British crossed the fords above the
Forks. Of this movement General Washington had early notice, but the
information which he received from different quarters, through his raw
and unpracticed scouts, was confused and contradictory, and
consequently his operations were embarrassed. After passing the fords,
Cornwallis took the road to Dilworth, which led him on the American
right. General Sullivan, who had been appointed to guard that quarter,
occupied the heights above Birmingham Church, his left extending to the
Brandywine, his artillery judiciously placed, and his right flank
covered by woods. About four in the afternoon Cornwallis formed the
line of battle and began the attack: for some time the Americans
sustained it with intrepidity, but at length gave way. When Washington
heard the firing in that direction he ordered General Greene, with a
brigade, to support General Sullivan. General Greene marched four miles
in forty-two minutes, but, on reaching the scene of action, he found
General Sullivan's division defeated, and in confusion. He covered the
retreat, and, after some time, finding an advantageous position, he
renewed the battle, and arrested the progress of the pursuing enemy.

General Knyphausen, as soon as he heard the firing of Cornwallis's
division, forced the passage of Chad's ford, attacked the troops
opposed to him, and compelled them to make a precipitate and disorderly
retreat. General Washington, with the part of his army which he was
able to keep together, retired with his artillery and baggage to
Chester, where he halted within eight miles of the British army, till
next morning, when he retreated to Philadelphia.

Among the foreign officers engaged in this battle besides Lafayette,
who was wounded in the leg during the action, were General Deborre, a
French officer; [6] General Conway, an Irishman, who had served in
France; Capt. Louis Fleury, a French engineer, and Count Pulaski, a
Polish nobleman, subsequently distinguished as a commander of cavalry.

As must ever be the case in new-raised armies, unused to danger and
from which undeserving officers have not been expelled, their conduct
was not uniform. Some regiments, especially those which had served the
preceding campaign, maintained their ground with the firmness and
intrepidity of veterans, while others gave way as soon as they were
pressed. The author of a very correct history of the war, speaking of
this action, says: "A part of the troops, among whom were particularly
numbered some Virginia regiments, and the whole corps of artillery,
behaved exceedingly well in some of the actions of this day, exhibiting
a degree of order, firmness, and resolution, and preserving such a
countenance in extremely sharp service, as would not have discredited
veterans. Some other bodies of their troops behaved very badly."

The official letter of Sir William Howe stated his loss at rather less
than 100 killed and 400 wounded, and this account was accepted at the
time as true. A late discovery shows its falsehood. Mr. Headley, in his
recent "Life of Washington," notices the finding of a document which
settles the question.

It was found, he says, among Gen. James Clinton's papers, carefully
filed away and indorsed by himself. On the back, in his own
handwriting, is inscribed: "Taken from the enemy's ledgers, which fell
into the hands of General Washington's army at the action of
Germantown."

Within is the following statement: "State of the British troops and
position they were in when they made the attack at Brandywine, the 11th
of September, 1777.

The upper ford, under the command of Lieutenant
Lord Cornwallis:

                                                     Killed and
Second Regiment, British Guards; Second                 wounded.
Regiment, Light Infantry                      1,740         612
Second Brigade, British Foot                  2,240         360
First Division, Hessians                        800          70
Ferguson's Riflemen                              80          46
                                             ______       _____
Totals                                        4,860       1,088


Middle ford, under the command of Major-General
Gray:


Second Battalion, Guards                                    500
Second Battalion, Second Highlanders                        700
Second Battalion, Seventieth Highlanders                    700
                                                           ____
Total                                                     1,900


Lower ford, under the command of Lieutenant-General
Knyphausen:

Second Brigade, consisting of the Fourth,            Killed and
  Fifth, Tenth, Fifteenth, Twenty-third,                wounded.
  Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth, Fortieth,
  Forty-fourth, and Fifty-fifth Regiments     2,240         580
  Hessians to the amount of                     800          28
  Queen's Rangers                               480         290
                                           ________       _____

     Total                                    3,520         898
                                              1,900
                                              4,860       1,088
                                           ________      ______

     The whole British force                 10,280       1,986
                                              1,986
                                           ________
                                             8,294"

The estimate, says Mr. Headley, of the total force which the British
had on the field, makes the two armies actually engaged about equal.
The heavy loss here given seems, at first sight, almost incredible, and
puts an entirely different aspect on the battle. Of the authenticity
and accuracy of this document I think there can be no doubt.

From the ardor with which Washington had inspired his troops before
this action, it is probable that the conflict would have been more
severe had the intelligence respecting the movement on the left of the
British army been less contradictory. Raw troops, changing their ground
in the moment of action, and attacked in the agitation of moving, are
easily thrown into confusion. This was the critical situation of a part
of Sullivan's division, and was the cause of its breaking before Greene
could be brought up to support it, after which it was impossible to
retrieve the fortune of the day. But had the best disposition of the
troops been made at the time, which subsequent intelligence would
suggest, the action could not have terminated in favor of the
Americans. Their inferiority in numbers, in discipline, and in arms was
too great to leave them a probable prospect of victory. A battle,
however, was not to be avoided. The opinion of the public and of
Congress demanded it. The loss of Philadelphia, without an attempt to
preserve it, would have excited discontent throughout the country,
which might be productive of serious mischief, and action, though
attended with defeat, provided the loss be not too great, must improve
an army in which not only the military talents, but even the courage of
officers, some of them of high rank, remained to be ascertained.

The battle of Brandywine was not considered as decisive by Congress,
the general, or the army. The opinion was carefully cherished that the
British had gained only the ground, and that their loss was still more
considerable than had been sustained by the Americans. Congress
appeared determined to risk another battle for the metropolis of
America. Far from discovering any intention to change their place of
session, they passed vigorous resolutions for reinforcing the army, and
directed Washington to give the necessary orders for completing the
defenses of the Delaware.

From Chester the army marched through Darby, over the Schuylkill bridge
to its former ground near the falls of that river. Greene's division,
which, having been less in action, was more entire than any other,
covered the rear, and the corps of Maxwell remained at Chester until
the next day as a rallying point for the small parties and straggling
soldiers who might yet be in the neighborhood.

Having allowed his army one day for repose and refreshment, Washington
recrossed the Schuylkill and proceeded on the Lancaster road, with the
intention of risking another engagement.

Sir William Howe passed the night of the 11th on the field of battle.
On the succeeding day he detached Major-General Grant with two brigades
to Concord Meeting House, and on the 13th (September, 1777), Lord
Cornwallis joined General Grant, and marched toward Chester. Another
detachment took possession of Wilmington, to which place the sick and
wounded were conveyed.

To prevent a sudden movement to Philadelphia by the lower road the
bridge over the Schuylkill was loosened from its moorings, and General
Armstrong was directed, with the Pennsylvania militia, to guard the
passes over that river.

On the fifteenth the American army, intending to gain the left of the
British, reached the Warren tavern, on the Lancaster road, twenty-three
miles from Philadelphia. Intelligence was received early next morning
that Howe was approaching in two columns. It being too late to reach
the ground he had intended to occupy Washington resolved to meet and
engage him in front.

Both armies prepared with great alacrity for battle. The advanced
parties had met, and were beginning to skirmish, when they were
separated by a heavy rain, which, becoming more and more violent,
rendered the retreat of the Americans a measure of absolute necessity.
The inferiority of their arms never brought them into such imminent
peril as on this occasion. Their gun-locks not being well secured,
their muskets soon became unfit for use. Their cartridge-boxes had been
so badly constructed as not to protect their ammunition from the
tempest. Their cartridges were soon damaged, and this mischief was the
more serious, because very many of the soldiers were without bayonets.

The army being thus rendered unfit for action the design of giving
battle was reluctantly abandoned by Washington and a retreat commenced.
It was continued all the day and great part of the night, through a
cold and most distressing rain and very deep roads. A few hours before
day (September 17th), the troops halted at the Yellow Springs, where
their arms and ammunition were examined, and the alarming fact was
disclosed that scarcely a musket in a regiment could be discharged and
scarcely one cartridge in a box was fit for use. This state of things
suggested the precaution of moving to a still greater distance in order
to refit their arms, obtain a fresh supply of ammunition, and revive
the spirits of the army. Washington therefore retired to Warwick
Furnace on the south branch of French creek, where ammunition and
muskets might be obtained in time to dispute the passage of the
Schuylkill and make yet another effort to save Philadelphia.

The extreme severity of the weather had entirely stopped the British
army. During two days Howe made no other movement than to unite his
columns.

From French creek General Wayne was detached with his division into the
rear of the British with orders to join General Smallwood, and,
carefully concealing himself and his movements, to seize every occasion
which this march might offer of engaging them to advantage. Meanwhile,
General Washington crossed the Schuylkill at Parker's Ferry, and
encamped on both sides of Perkyomen creek.

General Wayne lay in the woods near the entrance of the road from Darby
into that leading to Lancaster, about three miles in the rear of the
left wing of the British troops encamped at Trydruffin, where he
believed himself to be perfectly secure. But the country was so
extensively disaffected that Howe received accurate accounts of his
position and of his force. Major-General Gray was detached to surprise
him, and effectually accomplished his purpose. About 11 in the night of
the 20th his pickets, driven in with charged bayonets, gave the first
intimation of Gray's approach. Wayne instantly formed his division,
and, while his right sustained a fierce assault, directed a retreat by
the left, under cover of a few regiments, who, for a short time,
withstood the violence of shock. In his letter to Washington, he says
that they gave the assailants some well-directed fires, which must have
done considerable execution, and that, after retreating from the ground
on which the engagement commenced, they formed again, at a small
distance from the scene of action, but that both parties drew off
without renewing the conflict. He states his loss at about 150 killed
and wounded. The British accounts admit, on their part, a loss of only
7.

When the attack commenced, General Smallwood, who was on his march to
join Wayne, a circumstance entirely unexpected by General Gray, was
within less than a mile of him, and, had he commanded regulars, might
have given a very different turn to the night. But his militia thought
only of their own safety, and, having fallen in with a party returning
from the pursuit of Wayne, fled in confusion, with the loss of only one
man.

Some severe animadversions on this unfortunate affair having been made
in the army, General Wayne demanded a court-martial, which, after
investigating his conduct, was unanimously of opinion, "that he had
done everything to be expected from an active, brave, and vigilant
officer," and acquitted him with honor.

Having secured his rear, by compelling Wayne to take a greater
distance, Howe marched along the valley road to the Schuylkill and
encamped on the bank of that river, from the Fatland ford up to French
creek, along the front of the American army. To secure his right from
being turned, Washington again changed his position and encamped with
his left near, but above, the British right.

Howe now relinquished his plan of bringing Washington to another
battle, and thinking it advisable, perhaps, to transfer the seat of war
to the neighborhood of his ships, determined to cross the Schuylkill
and take possession of Philadelphia. In the afternoon he ordered one
detachment to cross at Fatland ford, which was on his right, and
another to cross at Gordon's ford, on his left, and to take possession
of the heights commanding them. These orders were executed without much
difficulty, and the American troops placed to defend these fords were
easily dispersed.

This service being effected, the whole army marched by its right, about
midnight, and crossing at Fatland without opposition, proceeded a
considerable distance toward Philadelphia, and encamped with its left
near Sweed's ford and its right on the Manatawny road, having Stony Run
in its course.

It was now apparent that only immediate victory could save Philadelphia
from the grasp of the British general whose situation gave him the
option of either taking possession of that place or endeavoring to
bring on another engagement. If, therefore, a battle must certainly be
risked to save the capital it would be necessary to attack the enemy.

Public opinion, which a military chief finds too much difficulty in
resisting, and the opinion of Congress, required a battle; but, on a
temperate consideration of circumstances, Washington came to the wise
decision of avoiding one for the present.

His reasons for this decision were conclusive. Wayne and Smallwood had
not yet joined the army. The Continental troops ordered from Peekskill,
who had been detained for a time by an incursion from New York, were
approaching, and a reinforcement of Jersey militia, under General
Dickenson, was also expected.

To these powerful motives against risking an engagement, other
considerations of great weight were added, founded on the condition of
his soldiers. An army, maneuvering in an open country, in the face of a
very superior enemy, is unavoidably exposed to excessive fatigue and
extreme hardship. The effect of these hardships was much increased by
the privations under which the American troops suffered. While in
almost continual motion, wading deep rivers, and encountering every
vicissitude of the seasons, they were without tents, newly without
shoes, or winter clothes, and often without food.

A council of war concurred in the opinion Washington had formed, not to
march against the enemy, but to allow his harassed troops a few days
for repose and to remain on his present ground until the expected
reinforcements should arrive.

Immediately after the battle of Brandywine, the distressed situation
of the army had been represented to Congress, who had recommended the
executive of Pennsylvania to seize the cloths and other military stores
in the warehouses of Philadelphia, and, after granting certificates
expressing their value, to convey them to a place of safety. The
executive, being unwilling to encounter the odium of this strong
measure, advised that the extraordinary powers of the Commander-in-
Chief should be used on the occasion. Lieut. Col. Alexander Hamilton,
one of the General's aides, already in high estimation for his talents
and zeal, was employed on this delicate business. "Your own prudence,"
said the General, in a letter to him while in Philadelphia, "will point
out the least exceptionable means to be pursued; but remember, delicacy
and a strict adherence to the ordinary mode of application must give
place to our necessities. We must, if possible, accommodate the
soldiers with such articles as they stand in need of or we shall have
just reason to apprehend the most injurious and alarming consequences
from the approaching season."

All the efforts, however, of this very active officer could not obtain
a supply in any degree adequate to the pressing and increasing wants of
the army.

Colonel Hamilton was also directed to cause the military stores which
had been previously collected to a large amount in Philadelphia, and
the vessels which were lying at the wharves, to be removed up the
Delaware. This duty was executed with so much vigilance that very
little public property fell, with the city, into the hands of the
British general, who entered it on the 26th of September (1777). The
members of Congress separated on the 18th, in the evening, and
reassembled at Lancaster on the 27th of the same month. From thence
they subsequently adjourned to Yorktown, where they remained eight
months, till Philadelphia was evacuated by the British.

From the 25th of August, when the British army landed at the head of
Elk, until the 26th of September, when it entered Philadelphia, the
campaign had been active, and the duties of the American general
uncommonly arduous.

Some English writers bestow high encomiums on Sir William Howe for his
military skill and masterly movements during this period. At Brandywine
especially, Washington is supposed to have been "out-generaled, more
out-generaled than in any action during the war." If all the operations
of this trying period be examined, and the means in possession of both
be considered, the American chief will appear in no respect inferior to
his adversary, or unworthy of the high place assigned to him in the
opinions of his countrymen. With an army decidedly inferior, not only
in numbers, but in every military requisite except courage, in an open
country, he employed his enemy near thirty days in advancing about
sixty miles. In this time he fought one general action, and, though
defeated, was able to reassemble the same undisciplined, unclothed, and
almost unfed army; and, the fifth day afterward, again to offer battle.
When the armies were separated by a storm which involved him in the
most distressing circumstances, he extricated himself from them, and
still maintained a respectable and imposing countenance.

The only advantage he is supposed to have given was at the battle of
Brandywine, and that was produced by the contrariety and uncertainty of
the intelligence received. A general must be governed by his
intelligence, and must regulate his measures by his information. It is
his duty to obtain correct information, and among the most valuable
traits of a military character is the skill to select those means which
will obtain it. Yet the best-selected means are not always successful;
and, in a new army, where military talent has not been well tried by
the standard of experience, the general is peculiarly exposed to the
chance of employing not the best instruments. In a country, too, which
is covered with wood precise information of the numbers composing
different columns is to be gained with difficulty.

Taking into view the whole series of operations, from the landing of
Howe at the Head of Elk to his entering Philadelphia, the superior
generalship of Washington is clearly manifest. Howe, with his numerous
and well-appointed army, performed a certain amount of routine work and
finally gained the immediate object which he had in view--the
possession of Philadelphia--when, by every military rule, he should
have gone up the Hudson to cooperate with Burgoyne. Washington, with
his army, composed almost entirely of raw recruits and militia, kept
his adversary out of Philadelphia a month, still menaced him with an
imposing front in his new position, and subsequently held him in check
there while Gates was defeating and capturing Burgoyne.

We shall see, in the ensuing chapter, that although Howe had attained
his first object in gaining possession of Philadelphia, he had still
many new difficulties and dangers to encounter at the hands of his
daring and persevering opponent before he could comfortably establish
himself in winter quarters.

1. Footnote: About this time the Royalists in the counties of Somerset
and Worcester, in the province of Maryland, became so formidable that
an insurrection was dreaded. And it was feared that the insurgents
would, in such a case, be joined by a number of disaffected persons in
the county of Sussex, in the Delaware State. Congress, to prevent this
evil, recommended the apprehension and removal of all persons of
influence, or of desperate characters, within the counties of Sussex,
Worcester, and Somerset, who manifested a disaffection to the American
cause, to some remote place within their respective States, there to be
secured. From appearances, Congress had also reason to believe that the
Loyalists in the New England governments and New York State, had
likewise concerted an insurrection. See Gordon's "History of the
American Revolution," vol. II, pp. 461, 462. By the same authority we
are informed that General Gates wrote to General Fellowes for a strong
military force, for the prevention of plots and insurrection in the
provinces of New England and New York.

2. Footnote: Congress voted a monument to his memory.

3. Footnote: Stedman, the British historian of the Revolution,
acknowledges a loss of 200, including 10 officers.

4. Footnote: Lieutenant-Colonel Palfrey, formerly an aide-de-camp to
General Washington, and now paymaster-general, wrote to his friend: "I
was at Brunswick just after the enemy had left it. Never let the
British troops upbraid the Americans with want of cleanliness, for such
dog-kennels as their huts were my eyes never beheld. Mr. Burton's
house, where Lord Cornwallis resided, stunk so I could not bear to
enter it. The houses were torn to pieces, and the inhabitants as well
as the soldiers have suffered greatly for want of provisions."--Gordon,
"History of the American Revolution."

5. Footnote: Eulogy on Lafayette. See "Orations and Speeches on Various
Occasions," by Edward Everett, vol. I, p. 462.

6. Footnote: Deborre's brigade broke first; and, on an inquiry into his
conduct being directed, he resigned. A misunderstanding existed between
him and Sullivan, on whose right he was stationed.

7. Footnote: All English writers do not concur in this view of the
matter. The British historian, Stedman, gives the following sharp
criticism on Howe's conduct in the affair of the Brandywine:

"The victory does not seem to have been improved in the degree which
circumstances appeared to have admitted. When the left column of the
British had turned Washington's right flank, his whole army was hemmed
in:--General Knyphausen and the Brandywine in front; Sir William Howe
and Lord Cornwallis on his right; the Delaware in his rear; and the
Christiana river on his left. He was obliged to retreat twenty-three
miles to Philadelphia, when the British lay within eighteen miles of
it. Had the Commander-in-Chief detached General Knyphausen's column in
pursuit early next morning, General Washington might with ease have
been intercepted, either at the Heights of Crum Creek, nine miles; at
Derby, fourteen; or at Philadelphia, eighteen miles, from the British
camp; or, the Schuylkill might have been passed at Gray's Ferry, only
seventy yards over, and Philadelphia, with the American magazines,
taken, had not the pontoons been improvidently left at New York as
useless. Any one of these movements, it was thought, might have been
attended with the total destruction of the American army. For some
reason, however, which it is impossible to divine, the Commander-in-
Chief employed himself for several days in making slight movements
which could not by any possibility produce any important benefits to
the British cause."




CHAPTER XI.


WASHINGTON HOLDS HOWE IN CHECK. 1777.


Washington seems to have been by no means disheartened at the loss of
Philadelphia. On the contrary he justly regarded the circumstance of
the enemy holding that city as one which might, as in the sequel it
actually did, turn to the advantage of the American cause. Writing to
General Trumbull on the 1st of October (1777), he says: "You will hear,
before this gets to hand, that the enemy have at length gained
possession of Philadelphia. Many unavoidable difficulties and unlucky
accidents which we had to encounter helped to promote this success.
This is an event which we have reason to wish had not happened, and
which will be attended with several ill consequences, but I hope it
will not be so detrimental as many apprehend, and that a little time
and perseverance will give us some favorable opportunity of recovering
our loss, and of putting our affairs in a more flourishing condition.
Our army has now had the rest and refreshment it stood in need of, and
our soldiers are in very good spirits."

Philadelphia being lost Washington sought to make its occupation
inconvenient and insecure by rendering it inaccessible to the British
fleet. With this design works had been erected on a low, marshy island
in the Delaware, near the junction of the Schuylkill, which, from the
nature of its soil, was called Mud Island. On the opposite shore of
Jersey, at Red Bank, a fort had also been constructed which was
defended with heavy artillery. In the deep channel between, or under
cover of these batteries, several ranges of _chevaux-de-frise_ had been
sunk. These were so strong and heavy as to be destructive of any ship
which might strike against them, and were sunk in such a depth of water
as rendered it equally difficult to weigh them or cut them through; no
attempt to raise them, or to open the channel in any manner, could be
successful until the command of the shores on both sides should be
obtained.

Other ranges of _chevaux-de-frise_ had been sunk about three miles
lower down the river, and some considerable works were in progress at
Billingsport on the Jersey side, which were in such forwardness as to
be provided with artillery. These works were further supported by
several galleys mounting heavy cannon, together with two floating
batteries, a number of armed vessels, and some fire ships.

The present relative situation of the armies gave a decisive importance
to these works. Cutting off the communication of Howe with his
brother's fleet, they prevented his receiving supplies by water. While
the American vessels in the river above Fort Mifflin, the name given to
the fort on Mud Island, rendered it difficult to forage in Jersey,
Washington hoped to render his supplies on the side of Pennsylvania so
precarious as to compel him to evacuate Philadelphia.

The advantages of this situation were considerably diminished by the
capture of the Delaware frigate.

The day after Cornwallis entered Philadelphia three batteries were
commenced for the purpose of acting against any American ships which
might appear before the town. While yet incomplete they were attacked
by two frigates, assisted by several galleys and gondolas. The
Delaware, being left by the tide while engaged with the battery,
grounded and was captured, soon after which the smaller frigate and the
other vessels retired under the guns of the fort. This circumstance was
the more unfortunate as it gave the British general the command of the
ferry, and consequently free access to Jersey, and enabled him to
intercept the communication between the forts below and Trenton, from
which place the garrisons were to have drawn their military stores.

All the expected reinforcements, except the State regiment and militia
from Virginia, being arrived, and the detached parties being called in,
the effective strength of the army amounted to 8,000 Continental troops
and 3,000 militia. With this force Washington determined to approach
the enemy and seize the first favorable moment to attack him. In
pursuance of this determination the army took a position on the
Skippack road, September 30th (1777), about twenty miles from
Philadelphia and sixteen from Germantown--a village stretching on both
sides the great road leading northward from Philadelphia, which forms
one continued street nearly two miles in length. The British line of
encampment crossed this village at right angles near the center, and
Cornwallis, with four regiments of grenadiers, occupied Philadelphia.
The immediate object of General Howe being the removal of the
obstructions in the river, Colonel Stirling, with two regiments, had
been detached to take possession of the fort at Billingsport, which he
accomplished without opposition. This service being effected, and the
works facing the water destroyed, Colonel Stirling was directed to
escort a convoy of provisions from Chester to Philadelphia. Some
apprehensions being entertained for the safety of this convoy, another
regiment was detached from Germantown, with directions to join Colonel
Stirling.

This division of the British force appeared to Washington to furnish a
fair opportunity to engage Sir William Howe with advantage. Determining
to avail himself of it, he formed a plan for surprising the camp at
Germantown. This plan consisted, in its general outline, of a night
march and double attack, consentaneously made, on both flanks of the
enemy's right wing, while a demonstration, or attack, as circumstances
should render proper, was to be directed on the western flank of his
left wing. With these orders and objects the American army began its
march from Skippack creek at 7 o'clock in the evening of the 3d of
October (1777), in two columns--the right, under Sullivan and Wayne,
taking the Chestnut Hill road, followed by Stirling's division in
reserve; the left, composed of the divisions of Greene and Stephen,
with M'Dougal's brigade and 1,400 Maryland and Jersey militia taking
the Limekiln and old York roads, while Armstrong's Pennsylvania militia
advanced by the Ridge road. Washington accompanied the right wing, and
at dawn of day, next morning, attacked the royal army. After a smart
conflict he drove in the advance guard, which was stationed at the head
of the village, and with his army divided into five columns prosecuted
the attack, but Lieutenant-Colonel Musgrave, of the Fortieth regiment,
which had been driven in, and who had been able to keep five companies
of the regiment together, threw himself into a large stone house in the
village, belonging to Mr. Chew, which stood in front of the main column
of the Americans, and there almost a half of Washington's army was
detained for a considerable time. Instead of masking Chew's house with
a sufficient force and advancing rapidly with their main body, the
Americans attacked the house, which was obstinately defended. The delay
was very unfortunate, for the critical moment was lost in fruitless
attempts on the house; the royal troops had time to get under arms and
be in readiness to resist or attack, as circumstances required. General
Grey came to the assistance of Colonel Musgrave; the engagement for
some time was general and warm; at length the Americans began to give
way and effected a retreat with all their artillery. The morning was
very foggy, a circumstance which had prevented the Americans from
combining and conducting their operations as they otherwise might have
done, but which now favored their retreat by concealing their
movements.

In this engagement the British had 600 men killed or wounded; among the
slain were Brigadier-General Agnew and Colonel Bird, officers of
distinguished reputation. The Americans lost an equal number in killed
and wounded, besides 400 who were taken prisoners. General Nash, of
North Carolina, was among those who were killed. After the battle
Washington returned to his encampment at Skippack creek.

The plan of attack formed by Washington for the battle of Germantown
was fully justified by the result. The British camp was completely
surprised, and their army was on the point of being entirely routed,
when the continued fog led the American soldiers to mistake friends for
foes, and caused a panic which threw everything into confusion and
enabled the enemy to rally.

Washington, writing to his brother John Augustine, says: "If it had not
been for a thick fog, which rendered it so dark at times that we were
not able to distinguish friend from foe at the distance of thirty
yards, we should, I believe, have made a decisive and glorious day of
it. But Providence designed it otherwise, for, after we had driven the
enemy a mile or two, after they were in the utmost confusion and flying
before us in most places, after we were upon the point, as it appeared
to everybody, of grasping a complete victory, our own troops took
fright and fled with precipitation and disorder. How to account for
this I know not, unless, as I before observed, the fog represented
their own friends to them for a reinforcement of the enemy, as we
attacked in different quarters at the same time, and were about closing
the wings of our army when this happened. One thing, indeed,
contributed not a little to our misfortune, and that was a want of
ammunition on the right wing, which began the engagement, and in the
course of two hours and forty minutes, which time it lasted, had, many
of them, expended the forty rounds that they took into the field. After
the engagement we removed to a place about twenty miles from the enemy
to collect our forces together, to take care of our wounded, get
furnished with necessaries again, and be in a better posture either for
offensive or defensive operations. We are now advancing toward the
enemy again, being at this time within twelve miles of them."

Writing to the President of Congress (October 7, 1777) he still imputes
the disaster to the fog: "It is with much chagrin and mortification I
add that every account confirms the opinion I at first entertained,
that our troops retreated at the instant when victory was declaring
herself in our favor. The tumult, disorder, and even despair, which, it
seems, had taken place in the British army, were scarcely to be
paralleled; and it is said, so strongly did the idea of a retreat
prevail, that Chester was fixed on as their rendezvous. I can discover
no other cause for not improving this happy opportunity, than the
extreme haziness of the weather."

Much controversy has arisen among writers as to the cause of failure at
Germantown, but Washington's means of observation were certainly not
inferior to those of any other person whatever, and in the above
extracts the whole matter is clearly explained. He does not refer to
the delay at Chew's house as the cause of failure. Panic struck as the
British were, they would have been defeated, notwithstanding the delay
at that impromptu fortress, if the fog had not occasioned the American
soldiers to believe that the firing on their own side proceeded from
the enemy, and that they were about to be surrounded. Hence the recoil
and retreat. It was apparently a great misfortune, but it was the
destiny of Washington to achieve greatness in spite of severe and
repeated misfortunes.

The same opinion respecting the fog is expressed in the following
extract from a letter from General Sullivan to the President of New
Hampshire: "We brought off all our cannon and all our wounded. Our loss
in the action amounts to less than 700, mostly wounded. We lost some
valuable officers, among whom were the brave General Nash, and my two
aides-de-camp, Majors Sherburne and White, whose singular bravery must
ever do honor to their memories. Our army rendezvoused at Paulen's
Mills, and seems very desirous of another action. The misfortunes of
this day were principally owing to a thick fog which, being rendered
still more so by the smoke of the cannon and musketry, prevented our
troops from discovering the motions of the enemy, or acting in concert
with each other. I cannot help observing that with great concern I saw
our brave commander exposing himself to the hottest fire of the enemy
in such a manner that regard for my country obliged me to ride to him
and beg him to retire. He, to gratify me and some others, withdrew a
small distance, but his anxiety for the fate of the day soon brought
him up again, where he remained till our troops had retreated."

Congress unanimously adopted the following resolution on hearing of the
battle of Germantown:

"_Resolved,_ That the thanks of Congress be given to General
Washington, for his wise and well-concerted attack upon the enemy's
army near Germantown, on the 4th instant, and to the officers and
soldiers of the army for their brave exertions on that occasion;
Congress being well satisfied, that the best designs and boldest
efforts may sometimes fail by unforeseen incidents, trusting that, on
future occasions, the valor and virtue of the army will, by the
blessing of Heaven, be crowned with complete and deserved success."

The attention of both armies was now principally directed to the forts
below Philadelphia. These it was the great object of Howe to destroy,
and of Washington to defend and maintain.

The loss of the Delaware frigate, and of Billingsport, greatly
discouraged the seamen by whom the galleys and floating batteries were
manned. Believing the fate of America to be decided, an opinion
strengthened by the intelligence received from their connections in
Philadelphia, they manifested the most alarming defection, and several
officers as well as sailors deserted to the enemy. This desponding
temper was checked by the battle of Germantown, and by throwing a
garrison of Continental troops into the fort at Red Bank, called Fort
Mercer, the defense of which had been entrusted to militia. This fort
commanded the channel between the Jersey shore and Mud Island, and the
American vessels were secure under its guns. The militia of Jersey were
relied on to reinforce its garrison, and also to form a corps of
observation which might harass the rear of any detachment investing the
place.

To increase the inconvenience of Howe's situation by intercepting his
supplies Washington ordered 600 militia, commanded by General Potter,
to cross the Schuylkill and scour the country between that river and
Chester, and the militia on the Delaware, above Philadelphia, were
directed to watch the roads in that vicinity.

The more effectually to stop those who were seduced by the hope of gold
and silver to supply the enemy at this critical time, Congress passed a
resolution subjecting to martial law and to death all who should
furnish them with provisions, or certain other enumerated articles, who
should be taken within thirty miles of any city, town, or place in
Jersey, Pennsylvania, or Delaware, occupied by British troops.

These arrangements being made to cut off supplies from the country,
Washington took a strong position at White Marsh, within fourteen miles
of Philadelphia.

Meanwhile General Howe was actively preparing to attack Fort Mifflin
from the Pennsylvania shore. He erected some batteries at the mouth of
the Schuylkill, in order to command Webb's Ferry, which were attacked
by Commodore Hazlewood and silenced; but the following night a
detachment crossed over Webb's Ferry into Province Island, and
constructed a slight work opposite Fort Mifflin, within two musket
shots of the blockhouse, from which they were enabled to throw shot and
shells into the barracks. When daylight discovered this work three
galleys and a floating battery were ordered to attack it and the
garrison surrendered. While the boats were bringing off the prisoners,
a large column of British troops were seen marching into the fortress,
upon which the attack on it was renewed, but without success, and two
attempts made by Lieutenant-Colonel Smith to storm it failed. [1]

In a few nights works were completed on the high ground of Province
Island, which enfiladed the principal battery of Fort Mifflin, and
rendered it necessary to throw up some cover on the platform to protect
the men who worked the guns.

The aid expected from the Jersey militia was not received. "Assure
yourself," said Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, in a letter pressing
earnestly for a reinforcement of Continental troops, "that no
dependence is to be put on the militia; whatever men your Excellency
determines on sending, no time is to be lost." The garrison of Fort
Mifflin was now reduced to 156 effectives, and that of Red Bank did not
much exceed 200.

In consequence of these representations Washington ordered Col.
Christopher Greene, of Rhode Island, with his regiment, to Red Bank,
and Lieut.-Col. John Greene, of Virginia, with about 200 men, to Fort
Mifflin.

Immediately after the battle of Brandywine Admiral Howe had sailed for
the Delaware, where he expected to arrive in time to meet and cooperate
with the army in and about Philadelphia. But the winds were so
unfavorable, and the navigation of the Bay of Delaware so difficult,
that his van did not get into the river until the 4th of October. The
ships of war and transports which followed came up from the 6th to the
8th, and anchored from New Castle to Reddy Island.

The frigates, in advance of the fleet, had not yet succeeded in their
endeavors to effect a passage through the lower double row of
_chevaux-de-frise_. Though no longer protected by the fort at
Billingsport, they were defended by the water force above, and the work
was found more difficult than had been expected. It was not until the
middle of October that the impediments were so far removed as to afford
a narrow and intricate passage through them. In the meantime the fire
from the Pennsylvania shore had not produced all the effect expected
from it, and it was perceived that greater exertions would be necessary
for the reduction of the works than could safely be made in the present
relative situation of the armies. Under this impression, General Howe,
soon after the return of the American army to its former camp on the
Skippack, withdrew his troops from Germantown into Philadelphia, as
preparatory to a combined attack by land and water on Forts Mercer and
Mifflin.

After effecting a passage through the works sunk in the river at
Billingsport, other difficulties still remained to be encountered by
the ships of war. Several rows of _chevaux-de-frise_ had been sunk
about half a mile below Mud Island, which were protected by the guns of
the forts, as well as by the movable water force. To silence these
works, therefore, was a necessary preliminary to the removal of these
obstructions in the channel.

On the 21st of October (1777) a detachment of Hessians, amounting to
1,200 men, commanded by Col. Count Donop, crossed the Delaware at
Philadelphia with orders to storm Fort Mercer, at Red Bank. The
fortifications consisted of extensive outer works, within which was an
entrenchment eight or nine feet high, boarded and fraized. Late in the
evening of the 22d Count Donop appeared before the fort and attacked it
with great intrepidity. It was defended with equal resolution by the
brave garrison of Rhode Island Continentals, under command of Col.
Christopher Greene. The outer works being too extensive to be manned by
the troops in the fort, were used only to gall the assailants while
advancing. On their near approach the garrison retired within the inner
entrenchment, whence they poured upon the Hessians a heavy and
destructive fire. Colonel Donop received a mortal wound, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Mengerode, the second in command, fell about the
same time. [2]

Lieutenant-Colonel Linsing, the oldest remaining officer, drew off his
troops and returned next day to Philadelphia. The loss of the
assailants was estimated by the Americans at 400 men. The garrison was
reinforced from Fort Mifflin, and aided by the galleys which flanked
the Hessians in their advance and retreat. The American loss, in killed
and wounded, amounted to only thirty-two men.

The ships having been ordered to cooperate with Count Donop, the
Augusta, with four smaller vessels, passed the lower line of
_chevaux-de-frise_, opposite to Billingsport, and lay above it, waiting
until the assault should be made on the fort. The flood tide setting in
about the time the attack commenced they moved with it up the river.
The obstructions sunk in the Delaware had in some degree changed its
channel, in consequence of which the Augusta and the Merlin grounded a
considerable distance below the second line of _chevaux-de-frise_, and
a strong wind from the north so checked the rising of the tide that
these vessels could not be floated by the flood. Their situation,
however, was not discerned that evening, as the frigates which were
able to approach the fort, and the batteries from the Pennsylvania
shore, kept up an incessant fire on the garrison, till night put an end
to the cannonade. Early next morning it was recommenced in the hope
that, under its cover, the Augusta and the Merlin might be got off. The
Americans, on discovering their situation, sent four fire ships against
them, but without effect. Meanwhile a warm cannonade took place on both
sides, in the course of which the Augusta took fire, and it was found
impracticable to extinguish the flames. Most of the men were taken out,
the frigates withdrawn, and the Merlin set on fire, after which the
Augusta blew up, and a few of the crew were lost in her.

This repulse inspired Congress with flattering hopes for the permanent
defense of the posts on the Delaware. That body expressed its high
sense of the merits of Colonel Greene, of Rhode Island, who had
commanded in Fort Mercer; of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, of Maryland, who
had commanded in Fort Mifflin; and of Commodore Hazlewood, who
commanded the galleys; and presented a sword to each of these officers,
as a mark of the estimation in which their services were held.

The situation of these forts was far from justifying this confidence of
their being defensible. That on Mud Island had been unskillfully
constructed and required at least 800 men fully to man the lines. The
island is about half a mile long. Fort Mifflin was placed at the lower
end, having its principal fortifications in front for the purpose of
repelling ships coming up the river. The defenses in the rear consisted
only of a ditch and palisade, protected by two blockhouses, the upper
story of one of which had been destroyed in the late cannonade. Above
the fort were two batteries opposing those constructed by the British
on Province and Carpenter's Islands, which were separated from Mud
Island only by a narrow passage between 400 and 500 yards wide.

The garrison of Fort Mifflin consisted of only 300 Continental troops,
who were worn down with fatigue and incessant watching, under the
constant apprehension of being attacked from Province Island, from
Philadelphia, and from the ships below.

Having failed in every attempt to draw the militia of New Jersey to the
Delaware, Washington determined to strengthen the garrison by further
drafts from his army. Three hundred Pennsylvania militia were detached
to be divided between the two forts, and a few days afterward General
Varnum was ordered, with his brigade, to take a position above
Woodbury, near Red Bank, and to relieve and reinforce the garrisons of
both forts as far as his strength would permit. Washington hoped that
the appearance of so respectable a Continental force might encourage
the militia to assemble in greater numbers.

Aware of the advantage to result from a victory over the British army
while separated from the fleet, Washington had been uniformly
determined to risk much to gain one. He had, therefore, after the
battle of Germantown, continued to watch assiduously for an opportunity
to attack his enemy once more to advantage. The circumspect caution of
General Howe afforded none. After the repulse at Red Bank his measures
were slow but certain, and were calculated to insure the possession of
the forts without exposing his troops to the hazard of an assault.

In this state of things intelligence was received of the successful
termination of the northern campaign, in consequence of which great
part of the troops who had been employed against Burgoyne, might be
drawn to the aid of the army in Pennsylvania. But Washington had just
grounds to apprehend that before these reinforcements could arrive Howe
would gain possession of the forts and remove the obstructions to the
navigation of the Delaware. This apprehension furnished a strong motive
for vigorous attempts to relieve Fort Mifflin. But the relative force
of the armies, the difficulty of acting offensively against
Philadelphia, and, above all, the reflection that a defeat might
disable him from meeting his enemy in the field even after the arrival
of the troops expected from the north, determined Washington not to
hazard a second attack under existing circumstances.

To expedite the reinforcements for which he waited, Washington
dispatched Colonel Hamilton to General Gates, with directions to
represent to him the condition of the armies in Pennsylvania, and to
urge him, if he contemplated no other service of more importance,
immediately to send the regiments of Massachusetts and New Hampshire to
aid the army of the middle department. These orders were not
peremptory, because it was possible that some other object (as the
capture of New York) still more interesting than the expulsion of
General Howe from Philadelphia might be contemplated by Gates; and
Washington meant not to interfere with the accomplishment of such
object.

On reaching General Putnam, Colonel Hamilton found that a considerable
part of the northern army had joined that officer, but that Gates had
detained four brigades at Albany for an expedition intended to be made
in the winter against Ticonderoga. Having made such arrangements with
Putnam as he supposed would secure the immediate march of a large body
of Continental troops from that station, Colonel Hamilton proceeded to
Albany for the purpose of remonstrating with General Gates against
retaining so large and valuable a part of the army unemployed at a time
when the most imminent danger threatened the vitals of the country.
Gates was by no means disposed to part with his troops. He could not
believe that an expedition then preparing at New York was designed to
reinforce General Howe; and insisted that, should the troops then
embarked at that place, instead of proceeding to the Delaware, make a
sudden movement up the Hudson, it would be in their power, should
Albany be left defenseless, to destroy the valuable arsenal which had
been there erected, and the military stores captured with Burgoyne,
which had been chiefly deposited in that town.

Having, after repeated remonstrances, obtained an order directing three
brigades to the Delaware, Hamilton hastened back to Putnam and found
the troops which had been ordered to join Washington, still at
Peekskill. The detachment from New York had suggested to Putnam the
possibility of taking that place; and he does not appear to have made
very great exertions to divest himself of a force he deemed necessary
for an object, the accomplishment of which would give so much splendor
to his military character. In addition to this circumstance, an opinion
had gained ground among the soldiers that their share of service for
the campaign had been performed, and that it was time for them to go
into winter quarters. Great discontents, too, prevailed concerning
their pay, which the government had permitted to be more than six
months in arrear; and in Poor's brigade a mutiny broke out in the
course of which a soldier who was run through the body by his captain,
shot the captain dead before he expired. Colonel Hamilton came in time
to borrow money from the Governor, George Clinton, of New York, to put
the troops in motion; and they proceeded by brigades to the Delaware.
But these several delays retarded their arrival until the contest for
the forts on that river was terminated.

The preparations of Sir William Howe being completed, a large battery
on Province Island of twenty-four and thirty-two pounders and two
howitzers of eight inches each opened, early in the morning of the 10th
of November, upon Fort Mifflin, at the distance of 500 yards, and kept
up an incessant fire for several successive days. The blockhouses were
reduced to a heap of ruins; the palisades were beaten down, and most of
the guns dismounted and otherwise disabled. The barracks were battered
in every part, so that the troops could not remain in them. They were
under the necessity of working and watching the whole night to repair
the damages of the day, and to guard against a storm, of which they
were in perpetual apprehension. If, in the days, a few moments were
allowed for repose, it was taken on the wet earth, which, in
consequence of heavy rains, had become a soft mud. The garrison was
relieved by General Varnum every forty-eight hours, but his brigade was
so weak that half the men were constantly on duty.

Colonel Smith was decidedly of opinion, and General Varnum concurred
with him, that the garrison could not repel an assault, and ought to be
withdrawn; but Washington still cherished the hope that the place might
be maintained until he should be reinforced from the northern army.
Believing that an assault would not be attempted until the works were
battered down, he recommended that the whole night should be employed
in making repairs. His orders were that the place should be defended to
the last extremity; and never were orders more faithfully executed.

Several of the garrison were killed and among them Captain Treat, a
gallant officer, who commanded the artillery. Colonel Smith received a
contusion on his hip and arm which compelled him to give up the command
and retire to Red Bank. Major Fleury, a French officer of distinguished
merit, who served as engineer, reported to Washington that, although
the blockhouses were beaten down, all the guns in them, except two,
disabled, and several breaches made in the walls, the place was still
defensible; but the garrison was so unequal to the numbers required by
the extent of the lines, and was so dispirited by watching, fatigue,
and constant exposure to the cold rains, which were almost incessant,
that he dreaded the event of an attempt to carry the place by storm.
Fresh troops were ordered to their relief from Varnum's brigade, and
the command was taken, first by Colonel Russell, and afterward by Major
Thayer. The artillery, commanded by Captain Lee, continued to be well
served. The besiegers were several times thrown into confusion, and a
floating battery, which opened on the morning of the 14th, was silenced
in the course of the day.

The defense being unexpectedly obstinate, the assailants brought up
their ships (November 15, 1777) as far as the obstructions in the river
permitted and added their fire to that of the batteries, which was the
more fatal as the cover for the troops had been greatly impaired. The
brave garrison, however, still maintained their ground with unshaken
firmness. In the midst of this stubborn conflict, the Vigilant and a
sloop-of-war were brought up the inner channel, between Mud and
Province Islands, which had, unobserved by the besieged, been deepened
by the current in consequence of the obstructions in the main channel,
and, taking a station within 100 yards of the works, not only kept up a
destructive cannonade, but threw hand-grenades into them, while the
musketeers from the round-top of the Vigilant killed every man that
appeared on the platform.

Major Thayer applied to the Commodore to remove these vessels, and he
ordered six galleys on the service, but, after reconnoitering their
situation, the galleys returned without attempting anything. Their
report was that these ships were so covered by the batteries on
Province Island as to be unassailable.

It was now apparent to all that the fort could be no longer defended.
The works were in ruins. The position of the Vigilant rendered any
further continuance on the island a prodigal and useless waste of human
life; and on the 16th, about 11 at night, the garrison was withdrawn.

A second attempt was made to drive the vessels from their stations,
with a determination, should it succeed, to repossess the island, but
the galleys effected nothing, and a detachment from Province Island
soon occupied the ground which had been abandoned.

The day after, receiving intelligence of the evacuation of Fort
Mifflin, Washington deputed Generals De Kalb and Knox to confer with
General Varnum and the officers at Fort Mercer on the practicability of
continuing to defend the obstructions in the channel, to report
thereon, and to state the force which would be necessary for that
purpose. Their report was in favor of continuing the defense. A council
of the navy officers had already been called by the Commodore in
pursuance of a request of the Commander-in-Chief, made before the
evacuation had taken place, who were unanimously of opinion that it
would be impracticable for the fleet, after the loss of the island, to
maintain its station or to assist in preventing the _chevaux-de-frise_
from being weighed by the ships of the enemy.

General Howe had now completed a line of defense from the Schuylkill to
the Delaware, and a reinforcement from New York had arrived at Chester.
These two circumstances enabled him to form an army in the Jerseys,
sufficient for the reduction of Fort Mercer, without weakening himself
so much in Philadelphia as to put his lines in hazard. Still, deeming
it of the utmost importance to open the navigation of the Delaware
completely, he detached Lord Cornwallis, about 1 in the morning of the
17th (1777), with a strong body of troops to Chester. From that place
his lordship crossed over to Billingsport, where he was joined by the
reinforcement from New York.

Washington received immediate intelligence of the march of this
detachment, which he communicated to General Varnum, with orders that
Fort Mercer should be defended to the last extremity. With a view to
military operations in that quarter he ordered one division of the army
to cross the river at Burlington, and dispatched expresses to the
northern troops who were marching on by brigades, directing them to
move down the Delaware on its northern side until they should receive
further orders.

General Greene was selected for this expedition. A hope was entertained
that he would be able not only to protect Fort Mercer, but to obtain
some decisive advantage over Lord Cornwallis, as the situation of the
fort, which his lordship could not invest without placing himself
between Timber and Manto creeks, would expose the assailants to great
peril from a respectable force in their rear. But, before Greene could
cross the Delaware, Cornwallis approached with an army rendered more
powerful than had been expected by the junction of the reinforcement
from New York, and Fort Mercer was evacuated. A few of the smaller
galleys escaped up the river, and the others were burnt by their crews.

Washington still hoped to recover much of what had been lost. A victory
would restore the Jersey shore, and this object was deemed so important
that General Greene's instructions indicated the expectation that he
would be in a condition to fight Cornwallis.

Greene feared the reproach of avoiding an action less than the just
censure of sacrificing the real interests of his country by engaging
the enemy on disadvantageous terms. The numbers of the British exceeded
his, even counting his militia as regulars, and he determined to wait
for Glover's brigade, which was marching from the north. Before its
arrival, Cornwallis took post on Gloucester point, a point of land
making deep into the Delaware, which was entirely under cover of the
guns of the ships, from which place he was embarking his baggage and
the provisions he had collected for Philadelphia.

Believing that Cornwallis would immediately follow the magazines he had
collected, and that the purpose of Howe was, with his united forces, to
attack the American army while divided, General Washington ordered
Greene to re-cross the Delaware and join the army.

Thus, after one continued struggle of more than six weeks, in which the
Continental troops displayed great military virtues, the army in
Philadelphia secured itself in the possession of that city by opening a
free communication with the fleet.

While Lord Cornwallis was in Jersey, and General Greene on the Delaware
above him, the reinforcements from the north being received, an attack
on Philadelphia was strongly pressed by several officers high in rank,
and was, in some measure, urged by that torrent of public opinion,
which, if not resisted by a very firm mind, overwhelms the judgment,
and by controlling measures not well comprehended may frequently
produce, especially in military transactions, the most disastrous
effects. The officers who advised this measure were Lord Stirling,
Generals Wayne, Scott, and Woodford. The considerations urged upon
Washington in its support were: That the army was now in greater force
than he could expect it to be at any future time; that being joined by
the troops who had conquered Burgoyne, his own reputation, the
reputation of his army, the opinion of Congress and of the nation
required some decisive blow on his part; and that the rapid
depreciation of the paper currency, by which the resources for carrying
on the war were dried up, rendered indispensable some grand effort to
bring it to a speedy termination.

Washington reconnoitered the enemy's lines with great care and took
into serious consideration the plan of attack proposed. The plan
proposed was that General Greene should embark 2,000 men at Dunks'
ferry, and descending the Delaware in the night land in the town just
before day, attack the enemy in the rear, and take possession of the
bridge over the Schuylkill; that a strong corps should march down on
the west side of that river, occupy the heights enfilading the works of
the enemy, and open a brisk cannonade upon them, while a detachment
from it should march down to the bridge and attack in front at the same
instant that the party descending the river should commence its assault
on the rear.

Not only the Commander-in-Chief, but some of his best officers--those
who could not be impelled by the clamors of the ill-informed to ruin
the public interests--were opposed to this mad enterprise. The two
armies, they said, were now nearly equal in point of numbers, and the
detachment under Lord Cornwallis could not be supposed to have so
weakened Sir William Howe as to compensate for the advantages of his
position. His right was covered by the Delaware, his left by the
Schuylkill, his rear by the junction of those two rivers, as well as by
the city of Philadelphia, and his front by a line of redoubts extending
from river to river and connected by an abatis and by circular works.
It would be indispensably necessary to carry all these redoubts, since
to leave a part of them to play on the rear of the columns while
engaged in front with the enemy in Philadelphia would be extremely
hazardous. Supposing the redoubts carried and the British army driven
into the town, yet all military men were agreed on the great peril of
storming a town. The streets would be defended by an artillery greatly
superior to that of the Americans, which would attack in front, while
the brick houses would be lined with musketeers, whose fire must thin
the ranks of the assailants.

A part of the plan, on the successful execution of which the whole
depended, was that the British rear should be surprised by the corps
descending the Delaware. This would require the concurrence of too many
favorable circumstances to be calculated on with any confidence. As the
position of General Greene was known, it could not be supposed that Sir
William Howe would be inattentive to him. It was probable that not even
his embarkation would be made unnoticed, but it was presuming a degree
of negligence which ought not to be assumed to suppose that he could
descend the river to Philadelphia undiscovered. So soon as his movement
should be observed, the whole plan would be comprehended, since it
would never be conjectured that Greene was to attack singly.

If the attack in front should fail, which was not even improbable, the
total loss of the 2,000 men in the rear must follow, and General Howe
would maintain his superiority through the winter.

The situation did not require these desperate measures. The British
general would be compelled to risk a battle on equal terms or to
manifest a conscious inferiority to the American army. The depreciation
of paper money was the inevitable consequence of immense emissions
without corresponding taxes. It was by removing the cause, not by
sacrificing the army, that this evil was to be corrected.

Washington possessed too much discernment to be dazzled by the false
brilliant presented by those who urged the necessity of storming
Philadelphia in order to throw lustre round his own fame and that of
his army, and too much firmness of temper, too much virtue and real
patriotism to be diverted from a purpose believed to be right, by the
clamors of faction or the discontents of ignorance. Disregarding the
importunities of mistaken friends, the malignant insinuations of
enemies, and the expectations of the ill-informed, he persevered in his
resolution to make no attempt on Philadelphia. He saved his army and
was able to keep the field in the face of his enemy, while the clamor
of the moment wasted in air and was forgotten.

About this time Washington learnt, by a letter from General Greene,
that his young friend Lafayette, although hardly recovered from the
wound received at Brandywine, had signalized his spirit and courage by
an attack on Cornwallis' picket guard at Gloucester point, below
Philadelphia. "The Marquis," writes Greene, "with about 400 militia and
the rifle corps, attacked the enemy's picket last evening, killed about
20, wounded many more, and took about 20 prisoners. The Marquis is
charmed with the spirited behavior of the militia and rifle corps; they
drove the enemy about half a mile and kept the ground till dark. The
enemy's picket consisted of about 300 and were reinforced during the
skirmish. The Marquis is determined to be in the way of danger."

The following letter to Washington, cited by Sparks, contains
Lafayette's own account of this affair: "After having spent the most
part of the day in making myself well acquainted with the certainty of
the enemy's motions, I came pretty late into the Gloucester road
between the two creeks. I had 10 light horse, almost 150 riflemen, and
2 pickets of militia. Colonel Armand, Colonel Laumoy, and the
Chevaliers Duplessis and Gimat were the Frenchmen with me. A scout of
my men, under Duplessis, went to ascertain how near to Gloucester were
the enemy's first pickets, and they found at the distance of two miles
and a half from that place a strong post of 350 Hessians, with field
pieces, and they engaged immediately. As my little reconnoitering party
were all in fine spirits I supported them. We pushed the Hessians more
than half a mile from the place where their main body had been and we
made them run very fast. British reinforcements came twice to them,
but, very far from recovering their ground, they always retreated. The
darkness of the night prevented us from pursuing our advantage. After
standing on the ground we had gained, I ordered them to return very
slowly to Haddonfield."

The Marquis had only one man killed and six wounded. "I take the
greatest pleasure," he added, "in letting you know that the conduct of
our soldiers was above all praise. I never saw men so merry, so
spirited, and so desirous to go on to the enemy, whatever force they
might have, as that same small party in this little fight."

Washington, in a letter to Congress dated November 26, 1777, mentions
this affair with commendation, and suggests, as he had repeatedly done
before, Lafayette's appointment to one of the vacant divisions of the
army, and on the same day that this letter was received Congress voted
that such an appointment would be agreeable to them. Three days
afterward Washington placed Lafayette in command of the division of
General Stephen, who had been dismissed from the army for having been
intoxicated, to the great injury of the public service, on the eventful
day of the battle of Germantown. We shall see that this appointment, by
enabling Lafayette to act occasionally on a separate command, afforded
him the opportunity of rendering essential service to the cause of
independence.

On the 27th of November (1777), the Board of War was increased from
three to five members, viz.: General Mifflin, formerly aide to
Washington and recently quartermaster-general; Joseph Trumbull, Richard
Peters, Col. Timothy Pickering, of Massachusetts, and General Gates.
Gates was appointed president of the board, with many flattering
expressions from Congress. His recent triumph over Burgoyne had gained
him many friends among the members of Congress and a few among the
officers of the army. His head, naturally not over-strong, had been
turned by success, and he entered into the views of a certain clique
which had recently been formed, whose object was to disparage
Washington and put forward rather high pretensions in favor of the
"hero of Saratoga." This clique, called from the name of its most
active member, General Conway, the "Conway Cabal," we shall notice
hereafter. At the time of this change in the constitution of the Board
of War it was in full activity, and its operations were well known to
Washington. In fact, he had already applied the match which ultimately
exploded the whole conspiracy and brought lasting disgrace on every one
of its members.

General Howe in the meantime was preparing to attack Washington in his
camp, and, as he confidently threatened, to "drive him beyond the
mountains."

On the 4th of December (1777), Captain M'Lane, a vigilant officer on
the lines, discovered that an attempt to surprise the American camp at
White Marsh was about to be made, and communicated the information to
Washington. In the evening of the same day General Howe marched out of
Philadelphia with his whole force, and about 11 at night, M'Lane, who
had been detached with 100 chosen men, attacked the British van at the
Three Mile Run on the Germantown road, and compelled their front
division to change its line of march. He hovered on the front and flank
of the advancing army, galling them severely until 3 next morning, when
the British encamped on Chestnut Hill in front of the American right,
and distant from it about three miles. A slight skirmish had also taken
place between the Pennsylvania militia, under General Irvine, and the
advanced light parties of the enemy, in which the general was wounded
and the militia without much other loss were dispersed.

The range of hills on which the British were posted approached nearer
to those occupied by the Americans as they stretched northward. Having
passed the day in reconnoitering the right Howe changed his ground in
the course of the night, and moving along the hills to his right took
an advantageous position about a mile in front of the American left.
The next day he inclined still further to his right, and in doing so
approached still nearer to the left wing of the American army.
Supposing a general engagement to be approaching Washington detached
Gist, with some Maryland militia, and Morgan, with his rifle corps, to
attack the flanking and advanced parties of the enemy. A sharp action
ensued in which Major Morris, of New Jersey, a brave officer in
Morgan's regiment was mortally wounded, and twenty-seven of his men
were killed and wounded. A small loss was also sustained in the
militia. The parties first attacked were driven in, but the enemy
reinforcing in numbers and Washington unwilling to move from the
heights and engage on the ground which was the scene of the skirmish,
declining to reinforce Gist and Morgan, they, in turn, were compelled
to retreat.

Howe continued to maneuver toward the flank and in front of the left
wing of the American army. Expecting to be attacked in that quarter in
full force Washington made such changes in the disposition of his
troops as the occasion required, and the day was consumed in these
movements. In the course of it Washington rode through every brigade of
his army, delivering in person his orders respecting the manner of
receiving the enemy, exhorting his troops to rely principally on the
bayonet, and encouraging them by the steady firmness of his
countenance, as well as by his words, to a vigorous performance of
their duty. The dispositions of the evening indicated an intention to
attack him the ensuing morning, but in the afternoon of the 8th the
British suddenly filed off from their right, which extended beyond the
American left, and retreated to Philadelphia. The parties detached to
harass their rear could not overtake it. [3]

The loss of the British in this expedition, as stated in the official
letter of General Howe, rather exceeded 100 in killed, wounded, and
missing, and was sustained principally in the skirmish of the 7th
(December, 1777) in which Major Morris fell.

On no former occasion had the two armies met, uncovered by works, with
superior numbers on the side of the Americans. The effective force of
the British was then stated at 12,000 men. Stedman, the historian, who
then belonged to Howe's army, states its number to have been 14,000.
The American army consisted of precisely 12,161 Continental troops and
3,241 militia. This equality in point of numbers rendered it a prudent
precaution to maintain a superiority of position. As the two armies
occupied heights fronting each other neither could attack without
giving to its adversary some advantage in the ground, and this was an
advantage which neither seemed willing to relinquish.

The return of Howe to Philadelphia without bringing on an action after
marching out with the avowed intention of fighting is the best
testimony of the respect which he felt for the talents of his adversary
and the courage of the troops he was to encounter.

The cold was now becoming so intense that it was impossible for an army
neither well-clothed nor sufficiently supplied with blankets longer to
keep the field in tents. It had become necessary to place the troops in
winter quarters, but in the existing state of things the choice of
winter quarters was a subject for serious reflection. It was impossible
to place them in villages without uncovering the country or exposing
them to the hazard of being beaten in detachment.

To avoid these calamities it was determined to take a strong position
in the neighborhood of Philadelphia, equally distant from the Delaware
above and below that city, and there to construct huts in the form of a
regular encampment which might cover the army during the winter. A
strong piece of ground at Valley Forge, on the west side of the
Schuylkill between twenty and thirty miles from Philadelphia, was
selected for that purpose, and some time before day on the morning of
the 11th of December (1777) the army marched to take possession of it.
By an accidental concurrence of circumstances Lord Cornwallis had been
detached the same morning at the head of a strong corps on a foraging
party on the west side of the Schuylkill. He had fallen in with a
brigade of Pennsylvania militia commanded by General Potter which he
soon dispersed, and, pursuing the fugitives, had gained the heights
opposite Matron's ford, over which the Americans had thrown a bridge
for the purpose of crossing the river, and had posted troops to command
the defile called the Gulph just as the front division of the American
army reached the bank of the river. This movement had been made without
any knowledge of the intention of General Washington to change his
position or any design of contesting the passage of the Schuylkill, but
the troops had been posted in the manner already mentioned for the sole
purpose of covering the foraging party.

Washington apprehended from his first intelligence that General Howe
had taken the field in full force. He therefore recalled the troops
already on the west side and moved rather higher up the river for the
purpose of understanding the real situation, force, and designs of the
enemy. The next day Lord Cornwallis returned to Philadelphia, and in
the course of the night the American army crossed the river.

Here the Commander-in-Chief communicated to his army in general orders
the manner in which he intended to dispose of them during the winter.
He expressed in strong terms his approbation of their conduct,
presented them with an encouraging state of the future prospects of
their country, exhorted them to bear with continuing fortitude the
hardships inseparable from the position they were about to take, and
endeavored to convince their judgments that those hardships were not
imposed on them by unfeeling caprice, but were necessary for the good
of their country.

The winter had set in with great severity, and the sufferings of the
army were extreme. In a few days, however, these sufferings were
considerably diminished by the erection of logged huts, filled up with
mortar, which, after being dried, formed comfortable habitations, and
gave content to men long unused to the conveniences of life. The order
of a regular encampment was observed, and the only appearance of winter
quarters was the substitution of huts for tents.

Stedman, who, as we have already remarked, was in Howe's army, has not
only given a vivid description of the condition of Washington's army,
which agrees in the main with those of our own writers, but he has also
exhibited in contrast the condition and conduct of the British army in
Philadelphia. We transcribe this instructive passage:

"The American general determined to remain during the winter in the
position which he then occupied at Valley Forge, recommending to his
troops to build huts in the woods for sheltering themselves from the
inclemency of the weather. And it is perhaps one of the most striking
traits in General Washington's character that he possessed the faculty
of gaining such an ascendancy over his raw and undisciplined followers,
most of whom were destitute of proper winter clothing and otherwise
unprovided with necessaries, as to be able to prevail upon so many of
them to remain with him during the winter in so distressing a
situation. With immense labor he raised wooden huts, covered with straw
and earth, which formed very uncomfortable quarters. On the east and
south an entrenchment was made--the ditch six feet wide and three in
depth; the mound not four feet high, very narrow, and such as might
easily have been beat down by cannon. Two redoubts were also begun but
never completed. The Schuylkill was on his left with a bridge across.
His rear was mostly covered by an impassable precipice formed by Valley
creek, having only a narrow passage near the Schuylkill. On the right
his camp was accessible with some difficulty, but the approach on his
front was on ground nearly on a level with his camp. It is indeed
difficult to give an adequate description of his misery in this
situation. His army was destitute of almost every necessary of
clothing, nay, almost naked, and very often on short allowance of
provisions; an extreme mortality raged in his hospitals, nor had he any
of the most proper medicines to relieve the sick. There were perpetual
desertions of parties from him of ten to fifty at a time. In three
months he had not 4,000 men and these could by no means be termed
effective. Not less than 500 horses perished from want and the severity
of the season. He had often not three days' provisions in his camp and
at times not enough for one day. In this infirm and dangerous state he
continued from December to May, during all which time every person
expected that General Howe would have stormed or besieged his camp, the
situation of which equally invited either attempt. To have posted 2,000
men on a commanding ground near the bridge, on the north side of the
Schuylkill, would have rendered his escape on the left impossible;
2,000 men placed on a like ground opposite the narrow pass would have
as effectually prevented a retreat by his rear, and five or six
thousand men stationed on the front and right of his camp would have
deprived him of flight on those sides. The positions were such that if
any of the corps were attacked they could have been instantly
supported. Under such propitious circumstances what mortal could doubt
of success? But the British army, neglecting all these opportunities,
was suffered to continue at Philadelphia where the whole winter was
spent in dissipation. A want of discipline and proper subordination
pervaded the whole army, and if disease and sickness thinned the
American army encamped at Valley Forge, indolence and luxury perhaps
did no less injury to the British troops at Philadelphia. During the
winter a very unfortunate inattention was shown to the feelings of the
inhabitants of Philadelphia, whose satisfaction should have been
vigilantly consulted, both from gratitude and from interest. They
experienced many of the horrors of civil war. The soldiers insulted and
plundered them, and their houses were occupied as barracks without any
compensation being made to them. Some of the first families were
compelled to receive into their habitations individual officers who
were even indecent enough to introduce their mistresses into the
mansions of their hospitable entertainers. This soured the minds of the
inhabitants, many of whom were Quakers. But the residence of the army
at Philadelphia occasioned distresses which will probably be considered
by the generality of mankind as of a more grievous nature. It was with
difficulty that fuel could be got on any terms. Provisions were most
exorbitantly high. Gaming of every species was permitted and even
sanctioned. This vice not only debauched the mind, but by sedentary
confinement and the want of seasonable repose enervated the body. A
foreign officer held the bank at the game of faro by which he made a
very considerable fortune, and but too many respectable families in
Britain had to lament its baleful effects. Officers who might have
rendered honorable service to their country were compelled, by what was
termed a bad run of luck, to dispose of their commissions and return
penniless to their friends in Europe. The father who thought he had
made a provision for his son by purchasing him a commission in the army
ultimately found that he had put his son to school to learn the science
of gambling, not the art of war. Dissipation had spread through the
army, and indolence and want of subordination, its natural
concomitants. For if the officer be not vigilant the soldier will never
be alert.

"Sir William Howe, from the manners and religious opinions of the
Philadelphians, should have been particularly cautious. For this public
dissoluteness of the troops could not but be regarded by such people as
a contempt of them, as well as an offense against piety; and it
influenced all the representations which they made to their countrymen
respecting the British. They inferred from it, also, that the commander
could not be sufficiently intent on the plans of either conciliation or
subjugation; so that the opinions of the Philadelphians, whether
erroneous or not, materially promoted the cause of Congress. During the
whole of this long winter of riot and dissipation, General Washington
was suffered to continue with the remains of his army, not exceeding
5,000 effective men at most, undisturbed at Valley Forge, considerable
arrears of pay due to them; almost in a state of nature for want of
clothing; the Europeans in the American service disgusted and deserting
in great numbers, and indeed in companies, to the British army, and the
natives tired of the war. Yet, under all these favorable circumstances
for the British interest, no one step was taken to dislodge Washington,
whose cannon were frozen up and could not be moved. If Sir William Howe
had marched out in the night he might have brought Washington to
action, or if he had retreated, he must have left his sick, cannon,
ammunition, and heavy baggage behind. A nocturnal attack on the
Americans would have had this further good effect: it would have
depressed the spirit of revolt, confirmed the wavering, and attached
them to the British interest. It would have opened a passage for
supplies to the city, which was in great want of provisions for the
inhabitants. It would have shaken off that lethargy in which the
British soldiers had been immerged during the winter. It would have
convinced the well-affected that the British leader was in earnest. If
Washington had retreated the British could have followed. With one of
the best-appointed in every respect and finest armies (consisting of at
least 14,000 effective men) ever assembled in any country, a number of
officers of approved service, wishing only to be led to action, this
dilatory commander, Sir William Howe, dragged out the winter without
doing any one thing to obtain the end for which he was commissioned.
Proclamation was issued after proclamation calling upon the people of
America to repair to the British standard, promising them remission of
their political sins and an assurance of protection in both person and
property, but these promises were confined merely to paper. The best
personal security to the inhabitants was an attack by the army, and the
best security of property was peace, and this to be purchased by
successful war. For had Sir William Howe led on his troops to action
victory was in his power and conquest in his train. During Sir William
Howe's stay at Philadelphia a number of disaffected citizens were
suffered to remain in the garrison; these people were ever upon the
watch and communicated to Washington every intelligence he could wish
for."

We have copied this passage from Stedman, with a view to show the
contrast between the situation of Washington and Howe and their
respective armies, as exhibited by an enemy to our cause. It is
literally the contrast between virtue and vice. The final result shows
that Providence in permitting the occupation of Philadelphia by the
British army was really promoting the cause of human liberty.

Stedman's statement of the numbers of Washington's army is erroneous,
even if it refers only to effective men, and his schemes for
annihilating Washington's army would probably not have been so easily
executed as he imagined. Still the army was very weak. Marshall says
that although the total of the army exceeded 17,000 men (February,
1778), the present effective rank and file amounted to only 5,012. This
statement alone suggests volumes of misery, sickness, destitution, and
suffering.

We must now call the reader's attention to the northern campaign of
1777 which, remote as it was from Washington's immediate scene of
action, was not conducted without his aid and direction.

1. Footnote: This was Lieut.-Col. Samuel Smith, of the Maryland line.
After serving in this perilous post at Fort Mifflin, he was made
general, and in that rank assisted in the defense of Baltimore in the
War of 1812. See Document [A] at the end of this chapter.

2. Footnote: Donop was a brave officer. He was found on the battlefield
by Captain Mauduit Duplessis, a talented French engineer, who had
assisted Greene in defense of the fort, and who attended the
unfortunate count on his death-bed till he expired, three days after
the battle, at the early age of thirty-seven. "I die," said he, in his
last hour, "a victim of my ambition, and of the avarice of my
sovereign." A fine commentary on the mercenary system of the German
princes. The government of Hesse Cassel quite recently caused the
remains of Count Donop to be removed from Red Bank, to be interred with
distinguished honor in his own country.

3. Footnote: Judge Marshall, the biographer of Washington, on whose
account of this affair ours is founded, was present on the occasion. He
served in the army from the beginning of the war; was appointed first
lieutenant in 1776, and captain in 1777. He resigned his commission in
1778, and, devoting himself to the practice of the law, subsequently
rose to the eminent office of Chief Justice of the United States. He
died at Philadelphia, July 6th, 1836, aged seventy-nine.




CHAPTER XII.


BURGOYNE'S INVASION OF NEW YORK PUNISHED BY SCHUYLER AND GATES. 1777.


We have already had occasion to refer to what was passing in the North
during the time when Washington was conducting the arduous campaign in
Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. General Schuyler had held the chief
command of the army operating against Canada since the opening of the
war in 1775. Under his direction the force of Montgomery was sent to
Quebec in the disastrous expedition of which we have already related
the history, and Arnold was acting in a subordinate capacity to
Schuyler when he so bravely resisted the descent of Carleton on the
lakes. Schuyler also performed the best part of the service of
resisting the invasion of New York from Canada, and nearly completed
the campaign which terminated in the surrender of Burgoyne to Gates. To
the events of this campaign we now call the reader's attention.

At the commencement of the campaign of 1777 the American army on the
frontier of Canada having been composed chiefly of soldiers enlisted
for a short period only, had been greatly reduced in numbers by the
expiration of their term of service.

The cantonments of the British northern army, extending from Isle aux
Noix and Montreal to Quebec, were so distant from each other that they
could not readily have afforded mutual support in case of an attack,
but the Americans were in no condition to avail themselves of this
circumstance. They could scarcely keep up even the appearance of
garrisons in their forts and were apprehensive of an attack on
Ticonderoga as soon as the ice was strong enough to afford an easy
passage to troops over the lakes. At the close of the preceding
campaign General Gates had joined the army under Washington, and the
command of the army in the northern department, comprehending Albany,
Ticonderoga, Fort Stanwix, and their dependencies, remained in the
hands of General Schuyler. The services of that meritorious officer
were more solid than brilliant, and had not been duly valued by
Congress, which, like other popular assemblies, was slow in discerning
real and unostentatious merit. Disgusted at the injustice which he had
experienced he was restrained from leaving the army merely by the deep
interest which he took in the arduous struggle in which his country was
engaged, but after a full investigation of his conduct during the whole
of his command, Congress was at length convinced of the value of his
services and requested him to continue at the head of the army of the
northern department. That army he found too weak for the services which
it was expected to perform and ill-supplied with arms, clothes, and
provisions. He made every exertion to organize and place it on a
respectable footing for the ensuing campaign, but his means were scanty
and the new levies arrived slowly. General St. Clair, who had served
under Gates, commanded at Ticonderoga, and, including militia, had
nearly 2,000 men under him, but the works were extensive and would have
required 10,000 men to man them fully. [1]

The British ministry had resolved to prosecute the war vigorously on
the northern frontier of the United States, and appointed Burgoyne, who
had served under Carleton in the preceding campaign, to command the
royal army in that quarter. The appointment gave offense to Carleton,
then Governor of Canada, who naturally expected to be continued in the
command of the northern army, and that officer testified his
dissatisfaction by tendering the resignation of his government. But
although displeased with the nomination, he gave Burgoyne every
assistance in his power in preparing for the campaign.

Burgoyne had visited England during the winter, concerted with the
ministry a plan of the campaign and given an estimate of the force
necessary for its successful execution. Besides a fine train of
artillery and a suitable body of artillerymen, an army, consisting of
more than 7,000 veteran troops, excellently equipped and in a high
state of discipline, was put under his command. Besides this regular
force he had a great number of Canadians and savages.

The employment of the savages had been determined on at the very
commencement of hostilities, their alliance had been courted and their
services accepted, and on the present occasion the British ministry
placed no small dependence on their aid. Carleton was directed to use
all his influence to bring a large body of them into the field, and his
exertions were very successful. General Burgoyne was assisted by a
number of distinguished officers, among whom were Generals Philips,
Fraser, Powel, Hamilton, Riedesel, and Specht. A suitable naval
armament, under the orders of Commodore Lutwych, attended the
expedition.

After detaching Colonel St. Leger with a body of light troops and
Indians, amounting to about 800 men, by the way of Lake Oswego and the
Mohawk river, to make a diversion in that quarter and to join him when
he advanced to the Hudson, Burgoyne left St. John's on the 16th of
June, and, preceded by his naval armament, sailed up Lake Champlain and
in a few days landed and encamped at Crown Point earlier in the season
than the Americans had thought it possible for him to reach that place.

He met his Indian allies and, in imitation of a savage partisan, gave
them a war feast, at which he made them a speech in order to inflame
their courage and repress their barbarous cruelty. He next issued a
lofty proclamation addressed to the inhabitants of the country in
which, as if certain of victory, he threatened to punish with the
utmost severity those who refused to attach themselves to the royal
cause. He talked of the ferocity of the Indians and their eagerness to
butcher the friends of independence, and he graciously promised
protection to those who should return to their duty. The proclamation
was so far from answering the general's intention that it was derided
by the people as a model of pomposity.

Having made the necessary arrangements on the 30th of June, Burgoyne
advanced cautiously on both sides of the narrow channel which connects
Lakes Champlain and George, the British on the west and the German
mercenaries on the east, with the naval force in the center, forming a
communication between the two divisions of the army, and on the 1st of
July his van appeared in sight of Ticonderoga.

The river Sorel issues from the north end of Lake Champlain and throws
its superfluous waters into the St. Lawrence. Lake Champlain is about
eighty miles long from north to south, and about fourteen miles broad
where it is widest. Crown Point stands at what may properly be
considered the south end of the lake, although a narrow channel, which
retains the name of the lake, proceeds southward and forms a
communication with South river and the waters of Lake George.

Ticonderoga is on the west side of the narrow channel, twelve miles
south from Crown Point. It is a rocky angle of land, washed on three
sides by the water and partly covered on the fourth side by a deep
morass. On the space on the northwest quarter, between the morass and
the channel, the French had formerly constructed lines of
fortification, which still remained, and those lines the Americans had
strengthened by additional works.

Opposite Ticonderoga on the east side of the channel, which is here
between three and four hundred yards wide, stands a high circular hill
called Mount Independence, which had been occupied by the Americans
when they abandoned Crown Point, and carefully fortified. On the top of
it, which is flat, they had erected a fort and provided it sufficiently
with artillery. Near the foot of the mountain, which extends to the
water's edge, they had raised entrenchments and mounted them with heavy
guns, and had covered those lower works by a battery about half way up
the hill.

With prodigious labor they had constructed a communication between
those two posts by means of a wooden bridge which was supported by
twenty-two strong wooden pillars placed at nearly equal distances from
each other. The spaces between the pillars were filled up by separate
floats, strongly fastened to each other and to the pillars by chains
and rivets. The bridge was twelve feet wide and the side of it next
Lake Champlain was defended by a boom formed of large pieces of timber,
bolted and bound together by double iron chains an inch and a half
thick. Thus an easy communication was established between Ticonderoga
and Mount Independence and the passage of vessels up the strait
prevented.

Immediately after passing Ticonderoga the channel becomes wider and, on
the southeast side, receives a large body of water from a stream at
that point called South river, but higher up named Wood creek. From the
southwest come the waters flowing from Lake George, and in the angle
formed by the confluence of those two streams rises a steep and rugged
eminence called Sugar Hill, which overlooks and commands both
Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. That hill had been examined by the
Americans, but General St. Clair, considering the force under his
command insufficient to occupy the extensive works of Ticonderoga and
Mount Independence and flattering himself that the extreme difficulty
of the ascent would prevent the British from availing themselves of it,
neglected to take possession of Sugar Hill. It may be remarked that the
north end of Lake George is between two and three miles above
Ticonderoga, but the channel leading to it is interrupted by rapids and
shallows and is unfit for navigation. Lake George is narrow, but is
thirty-five miles long, extending from northeast to southwest. At the
head of it stood a fort of the same name, strong enough to resist an
attack of Indians, but incapable of making any effectual opposition to
regular troops. Nine miles beyond it was Fort Edward on the Hudson.

On the appearance of Burgoyne's van St. Clair had no accurate knowledge
of the strength of the British army, having heard nothing of the
reinforcement from Europe. He imagined that they would attempt to take
the fort by assault and flattered himself that he would easily be able
to repulse them. But, on the 2d of July, the British appeared in great
force on both sides of the channel and encamped four miles from the
forts, while the fleet anchored just beyond the reach of the guns.
After a slight resistance Burgoyne took possession of Mount Hope, an
important post on the south of Ticonderoga, which commanded part of the
lines of that fort as well as the channel leading to Lake George, and
extended his lines so as completely to invest the fort on the west
side. The German division under General Riedesel occupied the eastern
bank of the channel and sent forward a detachment to the vicinity of
the rivulet which flows from Mount Independence. Burgoyne now labored
assiduously in bringing forward his artillery and completing his
communications. On the 5th of the month (July, 1777) he caused Sugar
Hill to be examined, and being informed that the ascent, though
difficult, was not impracticable, he immediately resolved to take
possession of it and proceeded with such activity in raising works and
mounting guns upon it that his battery might have been opened on the
garrison next day.

These operations received no check from the besieged, because, as it
has been alleged, they were not in a condition to give any. St. Clair
was now nearly surrounded. Only the space between the stream which
flows from Mount Independence and South river remained open, and that
was to be occupied next day.

In these circumstances it was requisite for the garrison to come to a
prompt and decisive resolution, either at every hazard to defend the
place to the last extremity or immediately to abandon it. St. Clair
called a council of war, the members of which unanimously advised the
immediate evacuation of the forts, and preparations were instantly made
for carrying this resolution into execution. The British had the
command of the communication with Lake George, and consequently the
garrison could not escape in that direction. The retreat could be
effected by the South river only. Accordingly the invalids, the
hospital, and such stores as could be most easily removed, were put on
board 200 boats and, escorted by Colonel Long's regiment, proceeded, on
the night between the 5th and 6th of July, up the South river towards
Skeenesborough. The garrisons of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence
marched by land through Castleton, towards the same place. The troops
were ordered to march out in profound silence and particularly to set
nothing on fire. But these prudent orders were disobeyed, and, before
the rear guard was in motion, the house on Mount Independence, which
General Fermoy had occupied, was seen in flames. That served as a
signal to the enemy, who immediately entered the works and fired, but
without effect, on the rear of the retreating army.

The Americans marched in some confusion to Hubbardton whence the main
body, under St. Clair, pushed forward to Castleton. But the English
were not idle. General Fraser, at the head of a strong detachment of
grenadiers and light troops, commenced an eager pursuit by land upon
the right bank of Wood creek: General Riedesel, behind him, rapidly
advanced with his Brunswickers, either to support the English or to act
separately as occasion might require. Burgoyne determined to pursue the
Americans by water. But it was first necessary to destroy the boom and
bridge which had been constructed in front of Ticonderoga. The British
seamen and artificers immediately engaged in the operation, and in less
time than it would have taken to describe their structure, those works
which had cost so much labor and so vast an expense, were cut through
and demolished. The passage thus cleared, the ships of Burgoyne
immediately entered Wood creek and proceeded with extreme rapidity in
search of the Americans. All was in movement at once upon land and
water. By three in the afternoon the van of the British squadron,
composed of gunboats, came up with and attacked the American galleys
near Skeenesborough Falls. In the meantime three regiments which had
been landed at South bay, ascended and passed a mountain with great
expedition, in order to turn the retreating army above Wood creek, to
destroy the works at the Falls of Skeenesborough, and thus to cut off
the retreat of the army to Fort Anne. But the Americans eluded this
stroke by the rapidity of their march. The British frigates having
joined the van, the galleys, already hard pressed by the gunboats, were
completely overpowered. Two of them surrendered; three of them were
blown up. The Americans having set fire to their boats, mills, and
other works, fell back upon Fort Anne, higher up Wood creek. All their
baggage, however, was lost and a large quantity of provisions and
military stores fell into the hands of the British.

The pursuit by land was not less active. Early on the morning of the
7th of July (1777) the British overtook the American rear guard who, in
opposition to St. Clair's orders, had lingered behind and posted
themselves on strong ground in the vicinity of Hubbardton. Fraser's
troops were little more than half the number opposed to him, but aware
that Riedesel was close behind and fearful lest his chase should give
him the slip, he ordered an immediate attack. Warner opposed a vigorous
resistance, but a large body of his militia retreated and left him to
sustain the combat alone, when the firing of Riedesel's advanced guard
was heard and shortly after his whole force, drums beating and colors
flying, emerged from the shades of the forest and part of his troops
immediately effected a junction with the British line. Fraser now gave
orders for a simultaneous advance with the bayonet which was effected
with such resistless impetuosity that the Americans broke and fled,
sustaining a very serious loss. St. Clair, upon hearing the firing,
endeavored to send back some assistance, but the discouraged militia
refused to return and there was no alternative but to collect the
wrecks of his army and proceed to Fort Edward to effect a junction with
Schuyler.

Burgoyne lost not a moment in following up his success at
Skeenesborough, but dispatched a regiment to effect the capture of Fort
Anne, defended by a small party under the command of Colonel Long. This
officer judiciously posted his troops in a narrow ravine through which
his assailants were compelled to pass and opened upon them so severe a
fire in front, flank, and rear, that the British regiments, nearly
surrounded, with difficulty escaped to a neighboring hill, where the
Americans attacked them anew with such vigor that they must have been
utterly defeated had not the ammunition of the assailants given out at
this critical moment. No longer being able to fight Long's troops fell
back, and, setting the fort on fire, also directed their retreat to the
headquarters at Fort Edward.

While at Skeenesborough, General Burgoyne issued a second proclamation
summoning the people of the adjacent country to send ten deputies from
each township to meet Colonel Skeene at Castleton in order to
deliberate on such measures as might still be adopted to save those who
had not yet conformed to his first and submitted to the royal
authority. General Schuyler, apprehending some effect from this paper,
issued a counter-proclamation, stating the insidious designs of the
enemy--warning the inhabitants by the example of Jersey of the danger
to which their yielding to this seductive proposition would expose them
and giving them the most solemn assurances that all who should send
deputies to this meeting or in any manner aid the enemy, would be
considered as traitors and should suffer the utmost rigor of the law.

Nothing, as Botta remarks, [2] could exceed the consternation and
terror which the victory of Ticonderoga and the subsequent successes of
Burgoyne spread through the American provinces nor the joy and
exultation they excited in England. The arrival of these glad tidings
was celebrated by the most brilliant rejoicings at court and welcomed
with the same enthusiasm by all those who desired the unconditional
reduction of America. They already announced the approaching
termination of this glorious war; they openly declared it a thing
impossible that the rebels should ever recover from the shock of their
recent losses, as well of men as of arms and of military stores, and
especially that they should ever regain their courage and reputation,
which, in war, always contribute to success as much, at least, as arms
themselves. Even the ancient reproaches of cowardice were renewed
against the Americans and their own partisans abated much of the esteem
they had borne them. They were more than half disposed to pronounce the
Colonists unworthy to defend that liberty which they gloried in with so
much complacency. But it deserves to be noted here especially that
there was no sign of faltering on the part of the people, no
disposition to submit to the invading force. The success of the enemy
did but nerve our fathers to more vigorous resolves to maintain the
cause of liberty even unto death.

Certainly the campaign had been opened and prosecuted thus far in a
very dashing style by Burgoyne and had he been able to press forward it
is quite possible that success might have crowned his efforts. But
there were some sixteen miles of forest yet to be traversed; Burgoyne
waited for his baggage and stores, and meanwhile General Schuyler, who
was in command of the American forces, took such steps as would
necessarily put a stop to the rapid approach of the enemy. Trenches
were opened, the roads and paths were obstructed, the bridges were
broken up, and in the only practicable defiles large trees were cut in
such a manner on both sides of the road as to fall across and
lengthwise, which, with their branches interwoven, presented an
insurmountable barrier; in a word, this wilderness, of itself by no
means easy of passage, was thus rendered almost absolutely
impenetrable. Nor did Schuyler rest satisfied with these precautions;
he directed the cattle to be removed to the most distant places and the
stores and baggage from Fort George to Fort Edward, that articles of
such necessity for the troops might not fall into the power of the
British. He urgently demanded that all the regiments of regular troops
found in the adjacent States should be sent without delay to join him;
he also made earnest and frequent calls upon the militia of New England
and of New York. He likewise exerted his utmost endeavors to procure
himself recruits in the vicinity of Fort Edward and the city of Albany;
the great influence he enjoyed with the inhabitants gave him in this
quarter all the success he could desire. Finally, to retard the
progress of the enemy, he resolved to threaten his left flank.
Accordingly, he detached Colonel Warner, with his regiment, into the
State of Vermont with orders to assemble the militia of the country and
to make incursions toward Ticonderoga. In fact Schuyler did everything
which was possible to be done under the circumstances, and it is not
too much to assert in justice to the good name of General Schuyler,
that the measures which he adopted paved the way to the victory which
finally crowned the American arms at Saratoga.

Washington, equally with Congress, supposing that Schuyler's force was
stronger and that of the British weaker than was really the case, was
very greatly distressed and astonished at the disasters which befell
the American cause in the north. He waited, therefore, with no little
anxiety, later and more correct information before he was willing to
pronounce positively upon the course pursued by St. Clair. When that
officer joined Schuyler the whole force did not exceed 4,400 men; about
half of these were militia, and the whole were ill-clothed, badly
armed, and greatly dispirited by the recent reverses. Very ungenerously
and unjustly it was proposed to remove the northern officers from the
command and send successors in their places. An inquiry was instituted
by order of Congress, which resulted honorably for Schuyler and his
officers, and Schuyler, the able commander and zealous-hearted patriot,
remained for the present at the head of the northern department. [3]

Washington exerted himself with all diligence to send reinforcements
and supplies to the army of Schuyler. The artillery and warlike stores
were expedited from Massachusetts. General Lincoln, a man of great
influence in New England, was sent there to encourage the militia to
enlist. Arnold, in like manner, repaired thither; it was thought his
ardor might serve to inspire the dejected troops. Colonel Morgan, an
officer whose brilliant valor we have already had occasion to remark,
was ordered to take the same direction with his troop of light horse.
All these measures, conceived with prudence and executed with
promptitude, produced the natural effect. The Americans recovered by
degrees their former spirit and the army increased from day to day.

During this interval Burgoyne actively exerted himself in opening a
passage from Fort Anne to Fort Edward. But, notwithstanding the
diligence with which the whole army engaged in the work, their progress
was exceedingly slow, so formidable were the obstacles which nature as
well as art had thrown in their way. Besides having to remove the
fallen trees with which the Americans had obstructed the roads they had
no less than forty bridges to construct and many others to repair; one
of these was entirely of log work, over a morass two miles wide. In
short the British encountered so many impediments in measuring this
inconsiderable space that it was found impossible to reach the banks of
the Hudson near Fort Edward until the 30th of July (1777). The
Americans, either because they were too feeble to oppose the enemy or
that Fort Edward was no better than a ruin, not susceptible of defense,
or finally because they were apprehensive that Colonel St. Leger, after
the reduction of Fort Stanwix, might descend by the left bank of the
Mohawk to the Hudson and thus cut off their retreat, retired lower down
to Stillwater where they threw up entrenchments. At the same time they
evacuated Fort George, having previously burned their boats upon the
lake, and in various ways obstructed the road to Fort Edward. Burgoyne
might have reached Fort Edward much more readily by way of Lake George,
but he had judged it best to pursue the panic-stricken Americans, and,
despite the difficulties of the route, not to throw any discouragements
in the way of his troops by a retrograde movement.

At Fort Edward General Burgoyne again found it necessary to pause in
his career, for his carriages, which in the hurry had been made of
unseasoned wood, were much broken down and needed to be repaired. From
the unavoidable difficulties of the case not more than one-third of the
draught horses contracted for in Canada had arrived, and General
Schuyler had been careful to remove almost all the horses and draught
cattle of the country out of his way. Boats for the navigation of the
Hudson, provisions, stores, artillery, and other necessaries for the
army were all to be brought from Fort George, and although that place
was only nine or ten miles from Fort Edward, yet such was the condition
of the roads, rendered nearly impassable by the great quantities of
rain that had fallen, that the labor of transporting necessaries was
incredible. Burgoyne had collected about 100 oxen, but it was often
necessary to employ ten or twelve of them in transporting a single
boat. With his utmost exertions he had on the 15th of August conveyed
only twelve boats into the Hudson and provisions for the army for four
days in advance. Matters began to assume a very serious aspect indeed,
and as the further he removed from the lakes the more difficult it
became to get supplies from that quarter, Burgoyne saw clearly that he
must look elsewhere for sustenance for his army.

The British commander was not ignorant that the Americans had
accumulated considerable stores, including live cattle and vehicles of
various kinds at Bennington, about twenty-four miles east of the
Hudson. Burgoyne, easily persuaded that the Tories in that region would
aid his efforts, and thinking that he could alarm the country as well
as secure the supplies of which he began to stand in great need,
determined to detach Colonel Baum with a force of some six or eight
hundred of Riedesel's dragoons for the attack upon Bennington. His
instructions to Baum were "to try the affections of the country, to
disconcert the counsels of the enemy, to mount Riedesel's dragoons, to
complete Peters' corps (of Loyalists), and to obtain large supplies of
cattle, horses, and carriages." Baum set off on the 13th of August on
this expedition which was to result so unfortunately to himself, and
which proved in fact the ruin of Burgoyne's entire plans and purposes.

We have spoken of the consternation which filled the minds of men a
short time before this, when Burgoyne seemed to be marching in triumph
through the country. The alarm, however, subsided, and the New England
States resolved to make most vigorous efforts to repel the attack of
the enemy. John Langdon, a merchant of Portsmouth and speaker of the
New Hampshire Assembly, roused the desponding minds of his fellow-
members to the need of providing defense for the frontiers, and with
whole-hearted patriotism thus addressed them: "I have $3,000 in hard
money; I will pledge my plate for $3,000 more. I have seventy hogsheads
of Tobago rum which shall be sold for the most it will bring. These are
at the service of the State. If we succeed in defending our firesides
and homes I may be remunerated, if we do not the property will be of no
value to me. Our old friend Stark, who so nobly sustained the honor of
our State at Bunker Hill may be safely entrusted with the conduct of
the enterprise, and we will check the progress of Burgoyne." That brave
son of New Hampshire, General Stark, conceiving himself aggrieved by
certain acts of Congress in appointing junior officers over his head,
had resigned his commission. He was now prevailed upon to take service
under authority from his native State, it being understood that he was
to act independently as to his movements against the enemy. His
popularity speedily called in the militia, who were ready to take the
field under him without hesitation.

Soon after Stark proceeded to Manchester, twenty miles north of
Bennington, where Colonel Seth Warner, the former associate of Ethan
Allen, had taken post with the troops under his command. Here he met
General Lincoln, who had been sent by Schuyler to lead the militia to
the west bank of the Hudson. Stark refused to obey Schuyler's orders,
and Congress, on the 19th of August (1777), passed a vote of censure
upon his conduct. But Stark did not know of this, and as his course was
clearly that of sound policy, and his victory two days before the
censure cast upon him showed it to be so, he had the proud satisfaction
of knowing that the Commander-in-Chief approved of his plan of
harassing the rear of the British, and that the victory of Bennington
paralyzed the entire operations of Burgoyne.

On the day that Baum set out Stark arrived at Bennington. The progress
of the German troops, at first tolerably prosperous, was soon impeded
by the state of the roads and the weather, and as soon as Stark heard
of their approach he hurried off expresses to Warner to join him, who
began his march in the night. After sending forward Colonel Gregg to
reconnoiter the enemy he advanced to the rencontre with Baum, who,
finding the country thus rising around him, halted and entrenched
himself in a strong position above the Wollamsac river and sent off an
express to Burgoyne, who instantly dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel
Breyman with a strong reinforcement.

During the 15th of August (1777) the rain prevented any serious
movement. The Germans and English continued to labor at their
entrenchments upon which they had mounted two pieces of artillery. The
following day was bright and sunny and early in the morning Stark sent
forward two columns to storm the entrenchments at different points, and
when the firing had commenced threw himself on horseback and advanced
with the rest of his troops. As soon as the enemy's columns were seen
forming on the hill-side, he exclaimed, "See, men! there are the red
coats; we must beat to-day, or Molly Stark's a widow." The military
replied to this appeal by a tremendous shout and the battle which
ensued, as Stark states in his official report, "lasted two hours, and
was the hottest I ever saw. It was like one continual clap of thunder."
The Indians ran off at the beginning of the battle; the Tories were
driven across the river; and although the Germans fought bravely they
were compelled to abandon the entrenchments, and fled, leaving their
artillery and baggage on the field.

As Breyman and his corps approached they heard the firing and hurried
forward to the aid of their countrymen. An hour or two earlier they
might have given a different turn to the affair, but the heavy rain had
delayed their progress. They met and rallied the fugitives and returned
to the field of battle. Stark's troops, who were engaged in plunder,
were taken in great measure by surprise, and the victory might after
all have been wrested from their grasp but for the opportune arrival of
Warner's regiment at the critical moment. The battle continued until
sunset when the Germans, overwhelmed by numbers, at length abandoned
their baggage and fled. Colonel Baum, their brave commander, was
killed, and the British loss amounted to some eight or nine hundred
effective troops, in killed and prisoners. The loss of the Americans
was 30 killed and 40 wounded. Stark's horse was killed in the action.

Too much praise, as Mr. Everett well remarks, [4] cannot be bestowed on
the conduct of those who gained the battle of Bennington, officers and
men. It is, perhaps, the most conspicuous example of the performance by
militia of all that is expected of regular, veteran troops. The
fortitude and resolution with which the lines at Bunker Hill were
maintained by recent recruits against the assault of a powerful army of
experienced soldiers have always been regarded with admiration. But at
Bennington the hardy yeomen of New Hampshire, Vermont, and
Massachusetts, many of them fresh from the plough and unused to the
camp, "advanced," as General Stark expresses it in his official letter,
"through fire and smoke, and mounted breastworks that were well
fortified and defended with cannon."

Fortunately for the success of the battle Stark was most ably seconded
by the officers under him; every previous disposition of his little
force was most faithfully executed. He expresses his particular
obligations to Colonels Warner and Herrick, "whose superior skill was
of great service to him." Indeed the battle was planned and fought with
a degree of military talent and science which would have done no
discredit to any service in Europe. A higher degree of discipline might
have enabled the general to check the eagerness of his men to possess
themselves of the spoils of victory, but his ability, even in that
moment of dispersion and under the flush of success, to meet and
conquer a hostile reinforcement, evinces a judgment and resource not
often equaled in partisan warfare.

In fact it would be the height of injustice not to recognize in this
battle the marks of the master mind of the leader, which makes good
officers and good soldiers out of any materials and infuses its own
spirit into all that surround it. This brilliant exploit was the work
of Stark from its inception to its achievement. His popular name called
the militia together. His resolute will obtained him a separate
commission--at the expense, it is true, of a wise political principle,
but on the present occasion with the happiest effect. His firmness
prevented him from being overruled by the influence of General Lincoln,
which would have led him with his troops across the Hudson. How few are
the men who in such a crisis would not merely not have sought but
actually have repudiated a junction with the main army! How few who
would not only have desired, but actually insisted on taking the
responsibility of separate action! Having chosen the burden of acting
alone, he acquitted himself in the discharge of his duty with the
spirit and vigor of a man conscious of ability proportioned to the
crisis. He advanced against the enemy with promptitude; sent forward a
small force to reconnoiter and measure his strength; chose his ground
deliberately and with skill; planned and fought the battle with
gallantry and success.

The consequences of this victory were of great moment. It roused the
people and nerved them to the contest with the enemy, and it also
justified the sagacity of Washington, whose words we have quoted on a
previous page. Burgoyne's plans were wholly deranged and instead of
relying upon lateral excursions to keep the population in alarm and
obtain supplies, he was compelled to procure necessaries as best he
might. His rear was exposed, and Stark, acting on his line of policy,
prepared to place himself so that Burgoyne might be hemmed in and be,
as soon after he was, unable to advance or retreat. When Washington
heard of Stark's victory he was in Bucks county, Pennsylvania, whence
he wrote to Putnam: "As there is now not the least danger of General
Howe's going to New England I hope the whole force of that country will
turn out and by following the great stroke struck by General Stark,
near Bennington, entirely crush General Burgoyne, who, by his letter to
Colonel Baum, seems to be in want of almost everything."

The defeat at Bennington was not the only misfortune which now fell
upon the British arms. We have noted on a previous page that Burgoyne
had detached Colonel St. Leger with a body of regular troops,
Canadians, Loyalists, and Indians, by the way of Oswego, to make a
diversion on the upper part of the Mohawk river and afterward join him
on his way to Albany. On the 2d of August (1777) St. Leger approached
Fort Stanwix, or Schuyler, a log fortification situated on rising
ground near the source of the Mohawk river, and garrisoned by about 600
Continentals under the command of Colonel Gansevoort. Next day he
invested the place with an army of sixteen or seventeen hundred men,
nearly one-half of whom were Indians, and the rest British, Germans,
Canadians, and Tories. On being summoned to surrender Gansevoort
answered that he would defend the place to the last.

On the approach of St. Leger to Fort Schuyler, General Herkimer, who
commanded the militia of Tryon county, assembled about 700 of them and
marched to the assistance of the garrison. On the forenoon of the 6th
of August a messenger from Herkimer found means to enter the fort and
gave notice that he was only eight miles distant and intended that day
to force a passage into the fort and join the garrison. Gansevoort
resolved to aid the attempt by a vigorous sally, and appointed Colonel
Willet with upwards of 200 men to that service.

St. Leger received information of the approach of Herkimer, and placed
a large body consisting of the "Johnson Greens," and Brant's Indians in
ambush near Oriskany, on the road by which he was to advance. Herkimer
fell into the snare. The first notice which he received of the presence
of an enemy was from a heavy discharge of musketry on his troops, which
was instantly followed by the war-whoop of the Indians who attacked the
militia with their tomahawks. Though disconcerted by the suddenness of
the attack many of the militia behaved with spirit, and a scene of
unutterable confusion and carnage ensued. The royal troops and the
militia became so closely crowded together that they had not room to
use firearms, but pushed and pulled each other, and using their
daggers, fell pierced by mutual wounds. Some of the militia fled at the
first onset; others made their escape afterwards; about 100 of them
retreated to a rising ground where they bravely defended themselves
till a successful sortie from the fort compelled the British to look to
the defense of their own camp. Colonel Willet in this sally killed a
number of the enemy, destroyed their provisions, carried off some
spoil, and returned to the fort without the loss of a man. Besides the
loss of the brave General Herkimer, who was slain, the number of the
killed was computed at 400. St. Leger, imitating the grandiloquent
style of Burgoyne, again summoned the fort to surrender, but Colonel
Gansevoort peremptorily refused. Colonel Willet, accompanied by
Lieutenant Stockwell, having passed through the British camp, eluded
the patrols and the savages and made his way for fifty miles through
pathless woods and dangerous morasses and informed General Schuyler of
the position of the fort and the need of help in the emergency. He
determined to afford it to the extent of his power, and Arnold, who was
always ready for such expeditions, agreed to take command of the troops
for the purpose of relieving the fort. Arnold put in practice an acute
stratagem, which materially facilitated his success. It was this. Among
the Tory prisoners was one Yost Cuyler, who had been condemned to
death, but whom Arnold agreed to spare on consideration of his
implicitly carrying out his plan. Accordingly, Cuyler, having made
several holes in his coat to imitate bullet shots, rushed breathless
among the Indian allies of St. Leger and informed them that he had just
escaped in a battle with the Americans who were advancing on them with
the utmost celerity. While pointing to his coat for proof of his
statement, a sachem, also in the plot, came in and confirmed the
intelligence. Other scouts arrived speedily with a report which
probably grew out of the affair at Bennington, that Burgoyne's army was
entirely routed. All this made a deep impression upon the fickle-minded
redmen.

Fort Schuyler was better constructed and defended with more courage
than St. Leger had expected, and his light artillery made little
impression on it. His Indians, who liked better to take scalps and
plunder than to besiege fortresses became very unmanageable. The loss
which they had sustained in the encounters with Herkimer and Willet
deeply affected them; they had expected to be witnesses of the triumphs
of the British and to share with them the plunder. Hard service and
little reward caused bitter disappointment, and when they knew that a
strong detachment of Americans was marching against them, they resolved
to take safety in flight. St. Leger employed every argument and
artifice to detain them, but in vain; part of them went off and all the
rest threatened to follow if the siege were persevered in. Therefore,
on the 22d of August (1777), St. Leger raised the siege, and retreated
with circumstances indicating great alarm; the tents were left
standing, the artillery was abandoned, and a great part of the baggage,
ammunition, and provisions fell into the hands of the garrison, a
detachment from which harassed the retreating enemy. But the British
troops were exposed to greater danger from the fury of their savage
allies than from the pursuit of the Americans. During the retreat they
robbed the officers of their baggage, and the army generally of their
provisions and stores. Not content with this they first stripped off
their arms, and afterwards murdered with their own bayonets all those
who from inability to keep up, from fear or other cause were separated
from the main body. The confusion, terror, and sufferings of this
retreat found no respite till the royal troops reached the lake on
their way to Montreal.

Arnold arrived at Fort Schuyler two days after the retreat of the
besiegers, but finding no occasion for his services he soon returned to
camp. The successful defense of Fort Stanwix, or Schuyler, powerfully
cooperated with the defeat of the royal troops at Bennington in raising
the spirits and invigorating the activity of the Americans. The
Loyalists became timid; the wavering began to doubt the success of the
royal arms, and the great body of the people became convinced that
nothing but steady exertion on their part was necessary to ruin that
army which a short time before had appeared to be sweeping every
obstacle from its path on the high road to victory. The decisive
victory at Bennington and the retreat of St. Leger from Fort Schuyler,
however important in themselves, were still more so in their
consequences. An army which had spread terror and dismay in every
direction--which had previously experienced no reverse of fortune was
considered as already beaten, and the opinion became common that the
appearance of the great body of the people in arms would secure the
emancipation of their country. It was, too, an advantage of no
inconsiderable importance resulting from this change of public opinion
that the disaffected became timid, and the wavering who, had the
torrent of success continued, would have made a merit of contributing
their aid to the victor were no longer disposed to put themselves and
their fortunes in hazard to support an army whose fate was so
uncertain.

The barbarities which had been perpetrated by the Indians belonging to
the invading armies excited still more resentment than terror. As the
prospect of revenge began to open their effect became the more
apparent, and their influence on the royal cause was the more sensibly
felt because they had been indiscriminate.

The murder of Miss M'Crea passed through all the papers on the
continent, and the story being retouched by the hand of more than one
master, excited a peculiar degree of sensibility. [5]

But there were other causes of still greater influence in producing the
events which afterward took place. The last reinforcements of
Continental troops arrived in camp about this time and added both
courage and strength to the army. The harvest, which had detained the
northern militia upon their farms, was over, and General Schuyler,
whose continued and eminent services had not exempted him from the
imputation of being a traitor, was succeeded by General Gates, who
possessed a large share of the public confidence.

When Schuyler was directed by Congress to resume the command of the
northern department, Gates withdrew himself from it. When the
resolution passed recalling the general officers who had served in that
department, General Washington was requested to name a successor to
Schuyler. On his expressing a wish to decline this nomination and
representing the inconvenience of removing all the general officers,
Gates was again directed to repair thither and take the command, and
their resolution to recall the brigadiers was suspended until the
Commander-in-Chief should be of opinion that it might be carried into
effect with safety.

Schuyler retained the command until the arrival of Gates, which was on
the 10th of August (1777), and continued his exertions to restore the
affairs of the department, though he felt acutely the disgrace of being
recalled in this critical and interesting state of the campaign. "It
is," said he, in a letter to the Commander-in-Chief, "matter of extreme
chagrin to me to be deprived of the command at a time when, soon if
ever, we shall probably be enabled to face the enemy; when we are on
the point of taking ground where they must attack to a disadvantage,
should our force be inadequate to facing them in the field; when an
opportunity will in all probability occur in which I might evince that
I am not what Congress have too plainly insinuated by taking the
command from me."

If error be attributable to the evacuation of Ticonderoga, no portion
of it was committed by Schuyler. His removal from the command was
probably severe and unjust as respected himself, but perhaps wise as
respected America. The frontier towards the lakes was to be defended by
the troops of New England, and however unfounded their prejudices
against him might be, it was prudent to consult them.

Notwithstanding the difficulties which multiplied around him Burgoyne
remained steady to his purpose. The disasters at Bennington and on the
Mohawk produced no disposition to abandon the enterprise and save his
army.

It had now become necessary for Burgoyne to recur to the slow and
toilsome mode of obtaining supplies from Fort George. Having, with
persevering labor, collected provision for thirty days in advance he
crossed the Hudson on the 13th and 14th of September (1777) and
encamped on the heights and plains of Saratoga, with a determination to
decide the fate of the expedition in a general engagement.

Gates, having been joined by all the Continental troops destined for
the northern department and reinforced by large bodies of militia, had
moved from his camp in the islands, and advanced to the neighborhood of
Stillwater.

The bridges between the two armies having been broken down by General
Schuyler, the roads being excessively bad and the country covered with
wood, the progress of the British army down the river was slow. On the
night of the 17th of September, Burgoyne encamped within four miles of
the American army and the next day was employed in repairing the
bridges between the two camps. In the morning of the 19th he advanced
in full force toward the American left. Morgan was immediately detached
with his rifle corps to observe the enemy and to harass his front and
flanks. He fell in with a picket in front of the right wing which he
attacked with vivacity and drove in upon the main body. Pursuing with
too much ardor he was met in considerable force, and after a severe
encounter was compelled in turn to retire in some disorder. Two
regiments led by Arnold being advanced to his assistance his corps was
rallied, and the action became more general. The Americans were formed
in a wood, with an open field in front, and invariably repulsed the
British corps which attacked them, but when they pursued those corps to
the main body they were in turn driven back to their first ground.
Reinforcements were continually brought up, and about 4 in the
afternoon upward of 3,000 American troops were closely engaged with the
whole right wing of the British army commanded by General Burgoyne in
person. The conflict was extremely severe and only terminated with the
day. At dark the Americans retired to their camp, and the British, who
had found great difficulty in maintaining their ground, lay all night
on their arms near the field of battle.

In this action the killed and wounded on the part of the Americans were
between three and four hundred. Among the former were Colonels Colburn
and Adams and several other valuable officers. The British loss has
been estimated at rather more than 500 men.

Each army claimed the victory and each believed itself to have beaten
near the whole of the hostile army with only a part of its own force.
The advantage, however, taking all circumstances into consideration,
was decidedly with the Americans. In a conflict which nearly consumed
the day, they found themselves at least equal to their antagonists. In
every quarter they had acted on the offensive, and after an encounter
for several hours had not lost an inch of ground. They had not been
driven from the field, but had retired from it at the close of day to
the camp from which they had marched to battle. Their object, which was
to check the advancing enemy, had been obtained, while that of the
British general had failed. In the actual state of things to fight
without being beaten was on their part victory, while on the part of
the British to fight without a decisive victory was defeat. The Indians
who found themselves beaten in the woods by Morgan, [6] and restrained
from scalping and plundering the unarmed by Burgoyne, saw before them
the prospect of hard fighting without profit, grew tired of the service
and deserted in great numbers. The Canadians and Provincials were not
much more faithful, and Burgoyne soon perceived that his hopes must
rest almost entirely on his European troops.

With reason, therefore, this action was celebrated throughout the
United States as a victory and considered as the precursor of the total
ruin of the invading army. The utmost exultation was displayed and the
militia were stimulated to fly to arms and complete the work so happily
begun.

General Lincoln, in conformity with directions which have been stated,
had assembled a considerable body of New England militia in the rear of
Burgoyne, from which he drew three parties of about 500 men each. One
of these was detached under the command of Colonel Brown to the north
end of Lake George, principally to relieve a number of prisoners who
were confined there, but with orders to push his success, should he be
fortunate, as far as prudence would admit. Colonel Johnson, at the head
of another party, marched towards Mount Independence, and Colonel
Woodbury with a third was detached to Skeenesborough to cover the
retreat of both the others. With the residue, Lincoln proceeded to the
camp of Gates.

Colonel Brown, after marching all night, arrived at the break of day on
the north end of the lake where he found a small post which he carried
without opposition. The surprise was complete, and he took possession
of Mount Defiance, Mount Hope, the landing place, and about 200
batteaux. With the loss of only three killed and five wounded, he
liberated 100 American prisoners and captured 293 of the enemy. This
success was joyfully proclaimed through the northern States. It was
believed confidently that Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were
recovered, and the militia were exhorted, by joining their brethren in
the army, to insure that event if it had not already happened.

The attempt on those places, however, failed. The garrison repulsed the
assailants, who, after a few days abandoned the siege. On their return
through Lake George in the vessels they had captured the militia made
an attack on Diamond Island, the depot of all the stores collected at
the north end of the lake. Being again repulsed they destroyed the
vessels they had taken and returned to their former station.

The day after the battle of Stillwater General Burgoyne took a position
almost within cannon-shot of the American camp, fortified his right,
and extended his left to the river. Directly after taking this ground
he received a letter from Sir Henry Clinton informing him that he
should attack Fort Montgomery about the 20th of September (1777). The
messenger returned with information that Burgoyne was in extreme
difficulty and would endeavor to wait for aid until the 12th of
October. [7]

Both armies retained their position until the 7th of October (1777).
Burgoyne in the hope of being relieved by Sir Henry Clinton, and Gates
in the confidence of growing stronger every day.

Having received no further intelligence from Sir Henry and being
reduced to the necessity of diminishing the ration issued to his
soldiers, Burgoyne determined to make one more trial of strength with
his adversary. In execution of this determination he drew out on his
right 1,500 choice troops whom he commanded in person assisted by
Generals Philips, Riedesel, and Fraser.

The right wing was formed within three-quarters of a mile of the left
of the American camp, and a corps of rangers, Indians, and Provincials
was pushed on through secret paths to show themselves in its rear and
excite alarm in that quarter.

These movements were perceived by General Gates, who determined to
attack their left and at the same time to fall on their right flank.
Poor's brigade and some regiments from New Hampshire were ordered to
meet them in front, while Morgan with his rifle corps made a circuit
unperceived and seized a very advantageous height covered with wood on
their right. As soon as it was supposed that Morgan had gained the
ground he intended to occupy the attack was made in front and on the
left in great force. At this critical moment Morgan poured in a deadly
and incessant fire on the front and right flank.

While the British right wing was thus closely pressed in front and on
its flank, a distinct division of the American troops was ordered to
intercept its retreat to camp, and to separate it from the residue of
the army. Burgoyne perceived the danger of his situation and ordered
the light infantry under General Fraser with part of the Twenty-fourth
regiment to form a second line in order to cover the light infantry of
the right and secure a retreat. While this movement was in progress the
left of the British right was forced from its ground and the light
infantry was ordered to its aid. In the attempt to execute this order
they were attacked by the rifle corps with great effect, and Fraser was
mortally wounded. Overpowered by numbers and pressed on all sides by a
superior weight of fire, Burgoyne with great difficulty and with the
loss of his field pieces and great part of his artillery corps regained
his camp. The Americans followed close in his rear, and assaulted his
works throughout their whole extent. Toward the close of day the
entrenchments were forced on their right, and General Arnold with a few
men actually entered their works, but his horse being killed under him
and himself wounded, the troops were forced out of them, and it being
nearly dark they desisted from the assault. The left of Arnold's
division was still more successful. Jackson's regiment of
Massachusetts, then led by Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks, turned the right
of the encampment and stormed the works occupied by the German reserve.
Lieutenant-Colonel Breyman who commanded in them was killed and the
works were carried. The orders given by Burgoyne to recover them were
not executed, and Brooks maintained the ground he had gained.

Darkness put an end to the action and the Americans lay all night with
their arms in their hands about half a mile from the British lines
ready to renew the assault with the return of day. The advantage they
had gained was decisive. They had taken several pieces of artillery,
killed a great number of men, made upwards of 200 prisoners, among whom
were several officers of distinction, and had penetrated the lines in a
part which exposed the whole to considerable danger.

Unwilling to risk the events of the next day on the same ground,
Burgoyne changed his position in the course of the night and drew his
whole army into a strong camp on the river heights, extending his right
up the river. This movement extricated him from the danger of being
attacked the ensuing morning by an enemy already in possession of part
of his works. The 8th of October (1777) was spent in skirmishing and
cannonading. About sunset the body of General Fraser, who had been
mortally wounded on the preceding day was, agreeably to his own desire,
carried up the hill to be interred in the great redoubt attended only
by the officers who had lived in his family. Generals Burgoyne,
Philips, and Riedesel, in testimony of respect and affection for their
late brave companion in arms joined the mournful procession which
necessarily passed in view of both armies. The incessant cannonade, the
steady attitude and unfaltering voice of the chaplain, and the firm
demeanor of the company, though occasionally covered with the earth
thrown up by the shot from the hostile batteries ploughing the ground
around them, the mute expression of feeling pictured on every
countenance, and the increasing gloom of the evening, all contributed
to give an affecting solemnity to the obsequies. General Gates
afterwards declared that if he had been apprised of what was going on
he would at least have silenced his batteries and allowed the last
offices of humanity to be performed without disturbance, or even have
ordered minute-guns to be fired in honor of the deceased general.

Gates perceived the strength of Burgoyne's new position and was not
disposed to hazard an assault. Aware of the critical situation of his
adversary he detached a party higher up the Hudson for the purpose of
intercepting the British army on its retreat, while strong corps were
posted on the other side of the river to guard its passage.

This movement compelled Burgoyne again to change his position and to
retire to Saratoga. About 9 at night the retreat was commenced and was
effected with the loss of his hospital, containing about 300 sick, and
of several batteaux laden with provisions and baggage. On reaching the
ground to be occupied he found a strong corps already entrenched on the
opposite side of the river prepared to dispute its passage. From
Saratoga, Burgoyne detached a company of artificers under a strong
escort to repair the roads and bridges toward Fort Edward. Scarcely had
this detachment moved when the Americans appeared in force on the
heights south of Saratoga creek and made dispositions which excited the
apprehension of a design to cross it and attack his camp. The Europeans
escorting the artificers were recalled, and a Provincial corps employed
in the same service, being attacked by a small party, ran away and left
the workmen to shift for themselves. No hope of repairing the roads
remaining it became impossible to move the baggage and artillery.

The British army was now almost completely environed by a superior
force. No means remained of extricating itself from difficulties and
dangers which were continually increasing, but fording a river, on the
opposite bank of which a formidable body of troops was already posted,
and then escaping to Fort George through roads impassable by artillery
or wagons, while its rear was closely pressed by a victorious enemy.
[8]

A council of general officers, called to deliberate on their situation,
took the bold resolution to abandon everything but their arms and such
provisions as the soldiers could carry, and by a forced march in the
night up the river, to extricate themselves from the American army, and
crossing at Fort Edward, or at a ford above it, to press on to Fort
George.

Gates had foreseen this movement and had prepared for it. In addition
to placing strong guards at the fords of the Hudson he had formed an
entrenched camp on the high grounds between Fort Edward and Fort
George. The scouts sent to examine the route returned with this
information and the plan was abandoned as impracticable.

Nothing could be more hopeless than the condition of the British army,
or more desperate than that of their General, as described by himself.
In his letter to Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for American
affairs, he says: "A series of hard toil, incessant effort, stubborn
action, until disabled in the collateral branches of the army by the
total defection of the Indians; the desertion or timidity of the
Canadians and provincials, some individuals excepted; disappointed in
the last hope of any cooperation from other armies; the regular troops
reduced by losses from the best parts to 3,500 fighting men, not 2,000
of which were British; only three days' provisions upon short allowance
in store; invested by an army of 16,000 men, and no appearance of
retreat remaining--I called into council all the generals, field
officers, and captains commanding corps, and by their unanimous
concurrence and advice I was induced to open a treaty with
Major-General Gates."

A treaty was opened with a general proposition stating the willingness
of the British general to spare the further effusion of blood, provided
a negotiation could be effected on honorable terms. This proposition
was answered by a demand that the whole army should ground their arms
in their encampment and surrender themselves prisoners of war. This
demand was instantly rejected with a declaration that if General Gates
designed to insist on it the negotiation must immediately break off and
hostilities recommence. On receiving this decided answer Gates receded
from the rigorous terms at first proposed, and a convention was signed
(October 17, 1777), in which it was agreed that the British army, after
marching out of their encampment with all the honors of war, should lay
down their arms and not serve against the United States till exchanged.
They were not to be detained in captivity, but to be permitted to
embark for England.

The situation of the armies considered, [9] these terms were highly
honorable to the British general and favorable to his nation. They were
probably more advantageous than would have been granted by Gates had he
entertained no apprehension from Sir Henry Clinton, who was at length
making the promised diversion on the North river, up which he had
penetrated as far as Aesopus. The drafts made from Peekskill for both
armies had left that post in a situation to require the aid of militia
for its security. The requisitions of General Putnam were complied
with, but the attack upon them being delayed, the militia, who were
anxious to attend to their farms, became impatient; many deserted, and
Putnam was induced to discharge the residue.

Governor Clinton immediately ordered out half the militia of New York
with assurances that they should be relieved in one month by the other
half. This order was executed so slowly that the forts were carried
before the militia were in the field.

Great pains had been taken and much labor employed to render the
position of the American army for guarding the passage up the Hudson
secure. The principal defenses were Forts Montgomery and Clinton. They
had been constructed on the western bank of the Hudson, on very high
ground extremely difficult of access and were separated from each other
by a small creek which runs from the mountains into the river. These
forts were too much elevated to be battered from the water, and the
hills on which they stood were too steep to be ascended by troops
landing at the foot of them. The mountains, which commence five or six
miles below them, are so high and rugged, the defiles, through which
the roads leading to them pass, so narrow and so commanded by the
heights on both sides, that the approaches to them are extremely
difficult and dangerous.

To prevent ships from passing the forts, _chevaux-de-frise_ had been
sunk in the river and a boom extended from bank to bank, which was
covered with immense chains stretched at some distance in its front.
These works were defended by the guns of the forts and by a frigate and
galleys stationed above them, capable of opposing with an equal fire in
front any force which might attack them by water from below.

Fort Independence is four or five miles below Forts Montgomery and
Clinton and on the opposite side of the river on a high point of land,
and Fort Constitution is rather more than six miles above them on an
island near the eastern shore. Peekskill, the general headquarters of
the officer commanding at the station, is just below Fort Independence
and on the same side of the river. The garrisons had been reduced to
about 600 men and the whole force under Putnam did not much exceed
2,000. Yet this force, though far inferior to that which Washington had
ordered to be retained at the station, was, if properly applied, more
than competent to the defense of the forts against any numbers which
could be spared from New York. To insure success to the enterprise it
was necessary to draw the attention of Putnam from the real object and
to storm the works before the garrisons could be aided by his army.
This Sir Henry Clinton accomplished.

Between three and four thousand men embarked at New York and landed on
the 5th of October (1777) at Verplanck's Point on the east side of the
Hudson, a short distance below Peekskill, upon which Putnam retired to
the heights in his rear. On the evening of the same day a part of these
troops re-embarked and the fleet moved up the river to Peekskill Neck
in order to mask King's Ferry, which was below them. The next morning
at break of day the troops destined for the enterprise landed on the
west side of Stony Point and commenced their march through the
mountains into the rear of Forts Clinton and Montgomery. This
disembarkation was observed, but the morning was so foggy that the
numbers could not be distinguished, and a large fire, which was
afterward perceived at the landing place, suggested the idea that the
sole object of the party on shore was the burning of some storehouses.
In the meantime the maneuvers of the vessels and the appearance of a
small detachment left at Verplanck's Point persuaded Putnam that the
meditated attack was on Fort Independence.

His whole attention was directed to this object, and the real designs
of the enemy were not suspected until a heavy firing from the other
side of the river announced the assault on Forts Clinton and
Montgomery. Five hundred men were instantly detached to reinforce the
garrisons of those places, but, before this detachment could cross the
river, the forts were in possession of the British.

Having left a battalion at the pass of Thunderhill to keep up a
communication, Sir Henry Clinton had formed his army into two
divisions--one of which, consisting of 900 men, commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, made a circuit by the forest of Deane, in
order to fall on the back of Fort Montgomery, while the other,
consisting of 1,200 men, commanded by General Vaughan and accompanied
by Sir Henry Clinton in person, advanced slowly against Fort Clinton.

Both posts were assaulted about five in the afternoon. The works were
defended with resolution and were maintained until dark, when, the
lines being too extensive to be completely manned, the assailants
entered them in different places. The defense being no longer possible
some of the garrison were made prisoners, while their better knowledge
of the country enabled others to escape. Governor Clinton passed the
river in a boat and Gen. James Clinton, though wounded in the thigh by
a bayonet, also made his escape. Lieutenant-Colonels Livingston and
Bruyn and Majors Hamilton and Logan were among the prisoners. The loss
sustained by the garrisons was about 250 men; that of the assailants
was stated by Sir Henry Clinton at less than 200. Among the killed were
Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell and two other field officers.

As the boom and chains drawn across the river could no longer be
defended the Continental frigates and galleys lying above them were
burnt to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. Fort
Independence and Fort Constitution were evacuated the next day and
Putnam retreated to Fishkill. General Vaughan, after burning
Continental village, where stores to a considerable amount had been
deposited, proceeded at the head of a strong detachment up the river to
Aesopus, which he also destroyed. [10]

Putnam, whose army had been augmented by reinforcements of militia to
6,000 men, detached General Parsons with 2,000 to repossess himself of
Peekskill and of the passes in the Highlands, while with the residue he
watched the progress of the enemy up the river. The want of heavy
artillery prevented his annoying their ships in the Hudson.

On the capitulation of Burgoyne, near 5,000 men had been detached by
Gates to aid Putnam. Before their arrival General Vaughan had returned
to New York, whence a reinforcement to General Howe was then about to
sail.

Great as was the injury sustained by the United States from this
enterprise Great Britain derived from it no solid advantage. It was
undertaken at too late a period to save Burgoyne, and though the passes
in the Highlands were acquired, they could not be retained. The British
had reduced to ashes every village and almost every house within their
power, but this wanton and useless destruction served to irritate
without tending to subdue. A keenness was given to the resentment of
the injured, which outlived the contest between the two nations.

The army which surrendered at Saratoga exceeded 5,000 men. On marching
from Ticonderoga it was estimated at 9,000. In addition to this great
military force the British lost and the Americans acquired, a fine
train of artillery, 7,000 stand of excellent arms, clothing for 7,000
recruits, with tents and other military stores to a considerable
amount.

The thanks of Congress were voted to General Gates and his army, and a
medal of gold in commemoration of this great event was ordered to be
struck and presented to him by the President in the name of the United
States. Colonel Wilkinson, his adjutant-general, whom he strongly
recommended, was appointed brigadier-general by brevet.

In the opinion that the British would not immediately abandon the
passes in the Highlands, Congress ordered Putnam to join Washington
with a reinforcement not exceeding 2,500 men, and directed Gates to
take command of the army on the Hudson, with unlimited powers to call
for aids of militia from the New England States as well as from New
York and New Jersey.

A proposition to authorize the Commander-in-Chief, after consulting
with General Gates and Governor George Clinton, to increase the
detachment designed to strengthen his army, if he should then be of
opinion that it might be done without endangering the objects to be
accomplished by Gates, was seriously opposed. An attempt was made to
amend this proposition so as to make the increase of the reinforcement
to depend on the assent of Gates and Clinton, but this amendment was
lost by a considerable majority and the original resolution was
carried. These proceedings were attended with no other consequences
than to excite some degree of attention to the state of parties.

Soon after the capitulation of Burgoyne, Ticonderoga and Mount
Independence were evacuated and the garrison retired to Isle aux Noix
and St. John's. The effect produced by this event on the British
cabinet and nation was great and immediate. It seemed to remove the
delusive hopes of conquest with which they had been flattered, and
suddenly to display the mass of resistance which must yet be
encountered. Previous to the reception of this disastrous intelligence
the employment of savages in the war had been the subject of severe
animadversion. Parliament was assembled on the 20th of November (1777),
and, as usual, addresses were proposed in answer to the speech from the
throne entirely approving the conduct of the administration. In the
House of Lords the Earl of Chatham moved to amend the address by
introducing a clause recommending to his majesty an immediate cessation
of hostilities and the commencement of a treaty of conciliation, "to
restore peace and liberty to America, strength and happiness to
England, security and permanent prosperity to both countries." In the
course of the very animated observations made by this extraordinary man
in support of his motion, he said: "But, my lords, who is the man that,
in addition to the disgraces and mischiefs of war, has dared to
authorize and associate to our arms the tomahawk and scalping-knife of
the savage? to call into civilized alliance the wild and inhuman
inhabitant of the woods? to delegate to the merciless Indian the
defense of disputed rights and to wage the horrors of his barbarous war
against our brethren? My lords, these enormities cry aloud for redress
and punishment. Unless thoroughly done away they will be a stain on the
national character. It is not the least of our national misfortunes
that the strength and character of our army are thus impaired.
Familiarized to the horrid scenes of savage cruelty, it can no longer
boast of the noble and generous principles which dignify a soldier; no
longer sympathise with the dignity of the royal banner nor feel the
pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war that makes ambition
virtue. What makes ambition virtue? The sense of honor. But is this
sense of honor consistent with the spirit of plunder or the practice of
murder? Can it flow from mercenary motives? or can it prompt to cruel
deeds?"

The conduct of the administration, however, received the full
approbation of large majorities, but the triumph these victories in
parliament afforded them was of short duration. The disastrous issue of
an expedition from which the most sanguine expectations had been formed
was soon known, and the mortification it produced was extreme. A
reluctant confession of the calamity was made by the minister and a
desire to restore peace on any terms consistent with the integrity of
the empire found its way into the cabinet.

The surrender of Burgoyne was an event of very great importance in a
political point of view as it undoubtedly decided the French government
to form an alliance with the United States, but it was only one of the
many disasters to the British arms which compelled them to acknowledge
our independence. There remained much to be done. Washington was still
to endure greater hardships and mortifications--to have his patriotism
and disinterestedness more severely tried than ever during the coming
campaigns. We must now return to his dreary camp at Valley Forge.

1. Footnote: The weakness of St. Clair's garrison was partly owing to
its having contributed detachments to the support of Washington's army
in New Jersey.

2. Footnote: "History of the War of Independence." vol. II, p. 280.

3. Footnote: Washington, writing to General Schuyler, clearly presaged
the great and auspicious change in affairs which was soon to take
place: "Though our affairs have for some days past worn a gloomy
aspect, yet I look forward to a happy change. I trust General
Burgoyne's army will meet sooner or later an effectual check, and, as I
suggested before, that the success he has had will precipitate his
ruin. From your accounts, he appears to be pursuing that line of
conduct which, of all others, is most favorable to us--I mean acting in
detachment. This conduct will certainly give room for enterprise on our
part, and expose his parties to great hazard. Could we be so happy as
to cut one of them off, though it should not exceed four, five, or six
hundred men, it would inspirit the people, and do away much of their
present anxiety. In such an event, they would lose sight of past
misfortunes, and urged on at the same time by a regard for their own
security, they would fly to arms, and afford every aid in their power."

4. Footnote: "Life of John Stark," p. 58.

5. Footnote: Mr. Jones, an officer of the British army, had gained the
affections of Miss M'Crea, a lovely young lady of amiable character and
spotless reputation, daughter of a gentleman attached to the royal
cause, residing near Fort Edward, and they had agreed to be married. In
the course of service, the officer was removed to some distance from
his bride, and became anxious for her safety and desirous of her
company. He engaged some Indians, of two different tribes, to bring her
to camp, and promised a keg of rum to the person who should deliver her
safe to him. She dressed to meet her bridegroom, and accompanied her
Indian conductors; but by the way, the two chiefs, each being desirous
of receiving the promised reward, disputed which of them should deliver
her to her lover. The dispute rose to a quarrel, and, according to
their usual method of disposing of a disputed prisoner, one of them
instantly cleft the head of the lady with his tomahawk.

This is the common version of the story found in the histories. Mr.
Lossing, in his Field Book of the Revolution, relying on the traditions
in the neighborhood of the scene, comes to the conclusion that the lady
was accidentally killed by a party of Americans in pursuit of the
Indians who had carried her off. Irving says she was killed by one of
the Indians.

6. Footnote: Colonel Morgan, with his regiment of riflemen, had been
recently sent by Washington to join the northern army. Gates, writing
to Washington, May 226, 1777, says: "I cannot sufficiently thank your
Excellency for sending Colonel Morgan's corps to this army; they will
be of the greatest service to it; for, until the late success this way,
I am told the army were quite panic-struck by the Indians, and their
Tory and Canadian assassins in Indian dress. Horrible, indeed, have
been the cruelties they have wantonly committed upon the miserable
inhabitants, insomuch that all is now fair with General Burgoyne, even
if the bloody hatchet he has so barbarously used should find its way
into his own head."

7. Footnote: Letter of Burgoyne.

8. Footnote: Gordon, in his history of the war, states himself to have
received from General Glover an anecdote showing that all these
advantages were on the point of being exposed to imminent hazard: "On
the morning of the 11th, Gates called the general officers together,
and informed them of his having received certain intelligence, which
might be depended upon, that the main body of Burgoyne's army was
marched off for Fort Edward with what they could take; and that the
rear guard only was left in the camp, who, after a while, were to push
off as fast as possible, leaving the heavy baggage behind. On this it
was concluded to advance and attack the camp in half an hour. The
officers repaired immediately to their respective commands. General
Nixon's, being the eldest brigade, crossed the Saratoga creek first.
Unknown to the Americans, Burgoyne had a line formed behind a parcel of
brushwood, to support the park of artillery where the attack was to be
made. General Glover was upon the point of following Nixon. Just as he
entered the water, he saw a British soldier making across, whom he
called and examined. This soldier was a deserter, and communicated the
very important fact that the whole British army were in their
encampment. Nixon was immediately stopped, and the intelligence
conveyed to Gates, who countermanded his orders for the assault, and
called back his troops, not without sustaining some loss from the
British artillery." Gordon is confirmed by General Wilkinson, who was
adjutant-general in the American army. The narrative of the General
varies from that of Gordon only in minor circumstances.

9. Footnote: The American army consisted of 9,093 Continental troops.
The number of the militia fluctuated, but amounted, at the signature of
the convention, to 4,129. The sick exceeded 2,500 men.

10.




CHAPTER XIII.


WASHINGTON AT VALLEY FORGE. 1777, 1778.


We have already given some details of the sufferings endured by
Washington and his brave soldiers at Valley Forge. One-half the tale is
not told--never will be told; their sufferings were unutterable. A
review of this portion of Washington's life will show that at Valley
Forge not only was a great deal suffered but a great deal was done.
Here the army was hardened from the gristle of youth to the bone and
muscle of manhood. It entered the tents of that dreary encampment a
courageous but disorderly rabble; it left them a disciplined army. But
we must not anticipate events.

This army, which was under the immediate command of Washington, was
engaged through the winter (1777-1778) in endeavoring to stop the
intercourse between Philadelphia and the country. To effect this object
General Smallwood was detached with one division to Wilmington; Colonel
Morgan, who had been detached from Gates's army, was placed on the
lines on the west side of the Schuylkill, and General Armstrong with
the Pennsylvania militia, was stationed near the old camp at White
Marsh. Major Jameson with two troops of cavalry and M'Lane's infantry,
was directed to guard the east and Capt. Henry Lee with his troop, the
west side of that river. General Count Pulaski, who commanded the
horse, led the residue of the cavalry to Trenton, where he trained them
for the ensuing campaign.

One of the first operations meditated by Washington after crossing the
Schuylkill was the destruction of a large quantity of hay which
remained in the islands above the mouth of Darby creek, within the
power of the British. Early in the morning, after his orders for this
purpose had been given (December 22d), Howe marched out in full force
and encamped between Darby and the middle ferry, so as completely to
cover the islands while a foraging party removed the hay. Washington,
with the intention of disturbing this operation, gave orders for
putting his army in motion, when the alarming fact was disclosed that
the commissary's stores were exhausted and that the last ration had
been delivered and consumed.

Accustomed as were the Continental troops to privations of every sort,
it would have been hazarding too much to move them under these
circumstances against a powerful enemy. In a desert or in a garrison
where food is unattainable, courage, patriotism, and habits of
discipline enable the soldier to conquer wants which, in ordinary
situations, would be deemed invincible. But to perish in a country
abounding with provisions requires something more than fortitude; nor
can soldiers readily submit while in such a country to the deprivation
of food. It is not, therefore, surprising that among a few of the
troops some indications of a mutiny appeared. It is much more
astonishing that the great body of the army bore a circumstance so
irritating, and to them so unaccountable, without a murmur.

On receiving intelligence of the fact, Washington ordered the country
to be scoured and provisions for supplying the pressing wants of the
moment to be seized wherever found. In the meantime light parties were
detached to harass the enemy about Darby, where Howe, with his
accustomed circumspection, kept his army so compact and his soldiers so
within the lines that an opportunity to annoy him was seldom afforded
even to the vigilance of Morgan and Lee. After completing his forage he
returned, with inconsiderable loss, to Philadelphia.

That the American army, while the value still retained by paper bills
placed ample funds in the hands of government, should be destitute of
food in the midst of a State so abounding with provisions as
Pennsylvania, is one of those extraordinary facts which cannot fail to
excite attention. A few words of explanation seem to be needed to
account for such a fact. Early in the war the office of
commissary-general had been conferred on Colonel Trumbull, of
Connecticut, a gentleman well fitted for that important station. Yet,
from the difficulty of arranging so complicated a department,
complaints were repeatedly made of the insufficiency of supplies. The
subject was taken up by Congress, but the remedy administered served
only to increase the disease. The system was not completed till near
midsummer, and then its arrangements were such that Colonel Trumbull
refused the office assigned to him. The new plan contemplated a number
of subordinate officers, all to be appointed by Congress, and neither
accountable to nor removable by the head of the department. This
arrangement, which was made in direct opposition to the opinion of the
Commander-in-Chief, drove Colonel Trumbull from the army. Congress,
however, persisted in the system, and its effects were not long in
unfolding themselves. In every military division of the continent loud
complaints were made of the deficiency of supplies. The armies were
greatly embarrassed and their movements suspended by the want of
provisions. The present total failure of all supply was preceded by
issuing meat unfit to be eaten. Representations on this subject had
been made to the Commander-in-Chief and communicated to Congress. That
body had authorized him to seize provisions for the use of his army
within seventy miles of headquarters and to pay for them in money or in
certificates. The odium of this measure was increased by the failure of
government to provide funds to take up these certificates when
presented. At the same time the provisions carried into Philadelphia
were paid for in specie at a fair price. The temptation was too great
to be resisted. Such was the dexterity employed by the inhabitants in
eluding the laws that notwithstanding the vigilance of the troops
stationed on the lines they often succeeded in concealing their
provisions from those authorized to impress for the army and in
conveying them to Philadelphia. Washington, urged on by Congress,
issued a proclamation requiring all the farmers within seventy miles of
Valley Forge to thresh out one-half of their grain by the 1st of
February and the rest by the 1st of March, under the penalty of having
the whole seized as straw. Many farmers refused, defended their grain
and cattle with muskets and rifle, and, in some instances, burnt what
they could not defend.

It would seem that Washington had a sufficiently heavy burden upon his
shoulders in the harassing cares and anxieties of his position, and
that he might have been spared from trials of another sort to which he
was exposed at this time, but Washington experienced what every great
and good man must expect to meet with in an envious and malicious
world. Thus far, apparently, little else than ill-success had attended
the military exploits of the Commander-in-Chief. He had been compelled
to retreat continually before a powerful enemy. New York and
Philadelphia had been lost, and there was almost nothing of a brilliant
or striking character in what had transpired during the war under
Washington's immediate direction. On the other hand, the victory at
Saratoga had thrown a lustre around Gates' name which far outshone for
the time the solid and enduring light of Washington's noble and
patriotic devotion to his country. It was the first great victory of
the war and it was a victory which necessarily had a most important
effect upon the future prospects of the United States. No wonder, then,
that restless and envious men should make invidious comparisons between
the hero of Saratoga and the Commander-in-Chief. No wonder that
Washington should suffer from detraction and the intrigues of
dissatisfied and scheming men, to whom his unsullied virtue, purity,
and integrity were invincible obstacles to every design of theirs to
promote selfish or ambitious ends.

A direct and systematic attempt was made to ruin the reputation of
Washington, and from the name of the person principally concerned this
attempt is known by the title of Conway's Cabal. General Gates and
General Mifflin of the army and Samuel Adams and others in Congress had
more or less to do with this matter. Gates and Mifflin had taken
offense at not receiving certain appointments during the siege of
Boston, and were at no time well disposed toward Washington; Conway, a
restless, boastful, and intriguing character, had always been
distrusted by Washington, and he knew it. Some of the New England
members do not seem ever to have cordially liked Washington's
appointment as Commander-in-Chief, and now, when the capture of
Burgoyne had been effected by the northern army without the
intervention of Washington the malcontents ventured to assume a bolder
attitude. Anonymous letters were freely circulated, attributing the
ill-success of the American arms to the incapacity or vacillating
policy of Washington and filled with insinuations and exaggerated
complaints against the Commander-in-Chief. [1]

Washington was not unaware of what his enemies were attempting, but it
was not till after the victory of Saratoga that the matter assumed a
definite shape. The success of the northern army, which in fact was
chiefly due to Schuyler, so elated Gates that he seemed to adopt the
views of those other members of the cabal who were disposed to favor
his aspirations to the office of commander-in-chief. He even ventured
to do what few men ever dared, to treat Washington with disrespect.
After the victory of the 7th of October (1777) had opened to him the
prospect of subduing the army of Burgoyne, he not only omitted to
communicate his success to Washington, but carried on a correspondence
with Conway, in which that officer expressed great contempt for the
Commander-in-Chief. When the purport of this correspondence, which had
been divulged by Wilkinson to Lord Stirling, became known to
Washington, he exploded the whole affair by sending the offensive
expressions directly to Conway, who communicated the information to
Gates. [1] Gates demanded the name of the informer in a letter to
Washington, far from being conciliatory in its terms, which was
accompanied with the very extraordinary circumstance of being passed
through Congress. Washington's answer completely humbled him.

It pointed out the inconsistencies and contradictions of Gates' defense
and showed him that Washington had penetrated his whole scheme and
regarded it with lofty contempt. In a subsequent letter Gates besought
him to bury the subject in oblivion.

Meantime, Washington's enemies in Congress were bold and active. A new
Board of War was created, of which Gates was appointed the president,
and Mifflin, who was of the party unfriendly to Washington, was one of
its members. Conway, who was probably the only brigadier in the army
that had joined this faction, was appointed Inspector-general and was
promoted above senior brigadiers to the rank of major-general. These
were evidences that if the hold which the Commander-in-Chief had taken
of the affections and confidence of the army and nation could be
loosened, the party in Congress disposed to change their general was
far from being contemptible in point of numbers. But to loosen this
hold was impossible. The indignation with which the idea of such a
change was received, even by the victorious troops who had conquered
under Gates, forms the most conclusive proof of its strength. Even the
northern army clung to Washington as the savior of his country.

These machinations to diminish the well-earned reputation of Washington
made no undue impression on his steady mind, nor did they change one of
his measures. His sensibilities seem to have been those of patriotism,
of apprehension for his country, rather than of wounded pride. [2]

His desire to remain at the head of the army seemed to flow from the
conviction that his retaining that station would be useful to his
country, rather than from the gratification his high rank might furnish
to ambition.

When he unbosomed himself to his private friends, the feelings and
sentiments he expressed were worthy of Washington. To Mr. Laurens, [3]
the President of Congress, and his private friend, who, in an
unofficial letter, had communicated an anonymous accusation made to
him, as President, containing heavy charges against the Commander-in-Chief,
he said. "I cannot sufficiently express the Obligation I feel toward you
for your friendship and politeness upon an occasion in which I am deeply
interested. I was not unapprised that a malignant faction had been for
some time forming to my prejudice, which, conscious as I am of having
ever done all in my power to answer the important purposes of the trusts
reposed in me, could not but give me some pain on a personal account;
but my chief concern arises from an apprehension of the dangerous
consequences which intestine dissensions may produce to the common
cause.

"As I have no other view than to promote the public good, and am
unambitious of honors not founded in the approbation of my country, I
would not desire in the least degree to suppress a free spirit of
inquiry into any part of my conduct that even faction itself may deem
reprehensible. The anonymous paper handed you exhibits many serious
charges and it is my wish that it may be submitted to Congress. This I
am the more inclined to as the suppression or concealment may possibly
involve you in embarrassment hereafter since it is uncertain how many
or who may be privy to the contents.

"My enemies take an ungenerous advantage of me. They know the delicacy
of my situation and that motives of policy deprive me of the defense I
might otherwise make against their insidious attacks. They know I
cannot combat their insinuations, however injurious, without disclosing
secrets it is of the utmost moment to conceal. But why should I expect
to be free from censure, the unfailing lot of an elevated station?
Merit and talents which I cannot pretend to rival have ever been
subject to it. My heart tells me it has been my unremitted aim to do
the best which circumstances would permit. Yet I may have been very
often mistaken in my judgment of the means and may in many instances
deserve the imputation of error."

While Washington expressed himself in these modest terms to a personal
friend, he assumed a much bolder and higher tone to the dastardly
enemies who were continually thwarting his designs and injuring the
public service by their malignity and incapacity. These were public
enemies to be publicly arraigned. Seizing the occasion to which we have
already referred, when the army was unable to march against the enemy
for want of provisions, he sent to the President of Congress the
following letter which, of course, like the rest of his correspondence,
was to be read to the whole house. It is severer than any he had ever
written: "Full as I was in my representation of the matters in the
commissary's department yesterday, fresh and more powerful reasons
oblige me to add that I am now convinced beyond a doubt that unless
some great and capital change suddenly takes place in that line this
army must inevitably be reduced to one or other of these three
things--to starve, dissolve, or disperse in order to obtain
subsistence. Rest assured, sir, that this is not an exaggerated
picture, and that I have abundant reason to suppose what I say.

"Saturday afternoon receiving information that the enemy in force had
left the city and were advancing toward Darby with apparent design to
forage and draw subsistence from that part of the country, I ordered
the troops to be in readiness that I might give every opposition in my
power, when, to my great mortification, I was not only informed but
convinced that the men were unable to stir on account of a want of
provisions, and that a dangerous mutiny begun the night before, and
which with difficulty was suppressed by the spirited exertions of some
officers, was still much to be apprehended from the want this article.

"This brought forth the only commissary in the purchasing line in this
camp and with him this melancholy and alarming truth, that he had not a
single hoof of any kind to slaughter and not more than twenty-five
barrels of flour! From hence form an opinion of our situation when I
add that he could not tell when to expect any.

"All I could do under these circumstances was to send out a few light
parties to watch and harass the enemy, whilst other parties were
instantly detached different ways to collect, if possible, as much
provisions as would satisfy the pressing wants of the soldiers; but
will this answer? No, sir. Three or four days of bad weather would
prove our destruction. What then is to become of the army this winter?
And if we are now as often without provisions as with them what is to
become of us in the spring when our force will be collected, with the
aid perhaps of militia, to take advantage of an early campaign before
the enemy can be reinforced? These are considerations of great
magnitude, meriting the closest attention, and will, when my own
reputation is so intimately connected with and to be affected by the
event, justify my saying that the present commissaries are by no means
equal to the execution of the office, or that the disaffection of the
people surpasses all belief. The misfortune, however, does in my
opinion proceed from both causes, and though I have been tender
heretofore of giving my opinion or of lodging complaints, as the change
in that department took place contrary to my judgment and the
consequences thereof were predicted, yet finding that the inactivity of
the army, whether for want of provisions, clothes, or other essentials
is charged to my account, not only by the common vulgar but by those in
power, it is time to speak plain in exculpation of myself. With truth
then I can declare that no man, in my opinion, ever had his measures
more impeded than I have by every department of the army. Since the
month of July we have had no assistance from the Quartermaster-General,
and to want of assistance from this department the Commissary-General
charges great part of his deficiency. To this I am to add that
notwithstanding it is a standing order (often repeated) that the troops
shall always have two days' provision by them, that they may be ready
at any sudden call, yet scarcely any opportunity has ever offered of
taking advantage of the enemy that has not been either totally
obstructed or greatly impeded on this account, and this, the great and
crying evil, is not all. Soap, vinegar, and other articles allowed by
Congress we see none of, nor have we seen them, I believe, since the
battle of Brandywine. The first, indeed, we have little occasion
for--few men having more than one shirt, many only the moiety of one,
and some none at all. In addition to which, as a proof of the little
benefit from a clothier-general, and at the same time as a further
proof of the inability of an army under the circumstances of this to
perform the common duties of soldiers, we have, by a field return this
day made, besides a number of men confined to hospitals for want of
shoes and others in farmers' houses on the same account, no less than
2,898 men now in camp unfit for duty because they are barefoot and
otherwise naked. By the same return it appears that our whole strength
in Continental troops, including the eastern brigades, which have
joined us since the surrender of General Burgoyne, exclusive of the
Maryland troops sent to Wilmington, amounts to no more than 8,200 in
camp fit for duty; notwithstanding which, and that since the 4th inst.,
our number fit for duty, from the hardships and exposures they have
undergone, particularly from the want of blankets, have decreased near
2,000 men, we find, gentlemen, without knowing whether the army was
really going into winter quarters or not (for I am sure no resolution
of mine would warrant the remonstrance), reprobating the measure as
much as if they thought the soldiers were made of stocks or stones, and
equally insensible to frost and snow; and, moreover, as if they
conceived it easily practicable for an inferior army, under the
disadvantages I have described ours to be--which are by no means
exaggerated--to confine a superior one, in all respects well appointed
and provided for a winter's campaign, within the city of Philadelphia,
and to cover from depredation and waste the States of Pennsylvania,
Jersey, etc. But what makes this matter still more extraordinary in my
eye is that these very gentlemen, who were well apprised of the
nakedness of the troops from ocular demonstration, who thought their
own soldiers worse clad than others and advised me near a month ago to
postpone the execution of a plan I was about to adopt, in consequence
of a resolve of Congress for seizing clothes, under strong assurances
that an ample supply would be collected in ten days, agreeably to a
decree of the State (not one article of which, by the by, is yet come
to hand), should think a winter's campaign and the covering of their
States from the invasion of an enemy so easy and practicable a
business. I can assure those gentlemen that it is a much easier and
less distressing thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room, by
a good fireside, than to occupy a cold, bleak hill, and sleep under
frost and snow without clothes or blankets. However, although they seem
to have little feeling for the naked and distressed soldiers, I feel
superabundantly for them, and from my soul pity those miseries which it
is not in my power either to relieve or to prevent."

This letter must have convinced Washington's implacable enemies in
Congress that he had no thoughts of conciliating them. He despised and
defied them. Its effect on those who were friendly to him would
necessarily be inspiriting. His bold attitude justified their reliance
on his moral courage and enabled them to demand the enactment of those
measures which were necessary for the preservation of the army and the
successful assertion of the country's independence.

It is probable that this letter gave the finishing stroke to the Conway
Cabal. While Gates and Mifflin denied that they had ever desired or
aimed at Washington's removal from the office of Commander-in-Chief and
sought to recover his confidence, Conway himself, who was still
inspector-general, after denying any design to remove Washington, still
maintained an offensive attitude toward him, wrote impertinent letters
to him, and persisted in intriguing against him with Congress. But he
found himself foiled in all his ambitious and factious designs, and he
had become excessively unpopular in the army. He felt at last that he
was in a false position; we shall presently see how his career in this
country terminated.

Washington's conduct through the whole period of the Conway Cabal,
which lasted several months, is highly characteristic of the man. While
he regarded it with contempt, so far as he was personally concerned, he
felt annoyed and distressed at the injury which it was inflicting on
the public service. When the moment was come for unmasking the
conspirators, by informing Conway that he was aware of their designs,
he applied the match which was to explode the whole plot and cover its
originators with shame and confusion. This he did in a quiet,
business-like way because the public service required it. Congress,
having committed itself by promoting his enemies, could not at once
retract, but the officers themselves made haste to escape from public
indignation by denials and apologies, and the final effect of the
Conway Cabal was to establish Washington more firmly than ever in the
confidence and affection of the whole country. [4]

His situation, however, was by no means enviable. His army was much
attached to him, but weakened by disease, and irritated by nakedness
and hunger, it was almost on the point of dissolution. In the midst of
the difficulties and dangers with which he was surrounded Washington
displayed a singular degree of steady perseverance, unshaken fortitude,
and unwearied activity. Instead of manifesting irritable impatience
under the malignant attacks made on his character he behaved with
magnanimity, and earnestly applied to Congress and to the legislative
bodies of the several States for reinforcements to his army in order
that he might be prepared to act with vigor in the ensuing campaign.

But to recruit and equip the army was no easy task. The great
depreciation of paper money rendered the pay of the soldiers inadequate
to their support, and consequently it was not likely that voluntary
enlistment would be successful, especially since the patriotic ardor of
many had begun to cool by the continuance of the war, and all knew that
great hardships and dangers were to be encountered by joining the army.
The pay even of the officers, in the depreciated paper currency, was
wholly unequal to the maintenance of their rank. Some of them who had
small patrimonial estates found them melting away, while their lives
were unprofitably devoted to the service of their country, and they who
had no private fortune could not appear in a manner becoming their
station. A commission was a burden, and many considered the acceptance
of one as conferring rather than receiving a favor--a state of things
highly disadvantageous to the service, for the duties of an office
scarcely reckoned worth holding will seldom be zealously and actively
discharged. There was reason to apprehend that many of the most
meritorious officers would resign their commissions, and that they only
who were less qualified for service would remain with the army.

Congress, moved by the remonstrances of Washington, and by the
complaints with which they were assailed from every quarter, deputed a
committee of their body to reside in camp during the winter, and in
concert with the general to examine the state of the army and report on
the measures necessary to be taken for placing it in a more respectable
condition. The members of this committee were Francis Dana, General
Reed, Nathaniel Folsom, Charles Carroll, and Governeur Morris. On their
arrival at Valley Forge Washington submitted to them a memoir, filling
fifty folio pages, exhibiting the existing state of the army, the
deficiencies and disorders, and their causes, and suggesting such
reforms as he deemed necessary. Upon this document the plan for
improving the efficiency of the army was formed and communicated to
Congress by the committee, who remained in camp nearly three months.
Congress approved of their proceedings and adopted their plan, but they
legislated so slowly that the effect of their proceedings was hardly
felt before the month of April (1778).

Among the reforms recommended by the committee, called the "Committee
of Arrangement," who were sent to the camp, none met with so much
opposition in Congress as that which provided for increasing the pay of
the officers and soldiers of the army. Hitherto there had been no
provision made for officers after the war should end, and the pay which
they were actually receiving being in depreciated Continental bills was
merely nominal. To the effect of this state of things in the army we
have already adverted. It was most disastrous. Washington was desirous
that Congress should make provision for giving officers half pay for
life, or some other permanent provision, and increasing the inducements
for soldiers to enlist. A party in Congress opposed this as having the
appearance of a standing army, a pension list, and a privileged order
in society.

In a letter to Congress Washington said: "If my opinion is asked with
respect to the necessity of making this provision for the officers I am
ready to declare that I do most religiously believe the salvation of
the cause depends upon it, and without it your officers will moulder to
nothing, or be composed of low and illiterate men, void of capacity for
this or any other business.

"Personally, as an officer, I have no interest in their decision,
because I have declared, and I now repeat it, that I never will receive
the smallest benefit from the half-pay establishment, but as a man who
fights under the weight of a proscription, and as a citizen, who wishes
to see the liberty of his country established upon a permanent
foundation, and whose property depends upon the success of our arms, I
am deeply interested. But all this apart and justice out of the
question, upon the single ground of economy and public saving, I will
maintain the utility of it, for I have not the least doubt that until
officers consider their commissions in an honorable and interested
point of view, and are afraid to endanger them by negligence and
inattention, no order, regularity, or care either of the men or public
property, will prevail."

The following passages, from a letter addressed to a delegate in
Congress from Virginia, exhibit the view Washington took at the time of
public affairs and the spirit and eloquence with which he pleaded the
cause of the country and the army.

"Before I conclude there are one or two points more upon which I will
add an observation or two. The first is the indecision of Congress and
the delay used in coming to determinations on matters referred to them.
This is productive of a variety of inconveniences, and an early
decision, in many cases, though it should be against the measure
submitted, would be attended with less pernicious effects. Some new
plan might then be tried, but while the matter is held in suspense
nothing can be attempted. The other point is the jealousy which
Congress unhappily entertain of the army, and which, if reports are
right, some members labor to establish. You may be assured there is
nothing more injurious or more unfounded. This jealousy stands upon the
commonly received opinion, which under proper limitations is certainly
true, that standing armies are dangerous to a State. The prejudices in
other countries have only gone to them in time of peace, and these from
their not having in general cases any of the ties, the concerns, or
interests of citizens, or any other dependence than what flowed from
their military employ; in short, from their being mercenaries,
hirelings. It is our policy to be prejudiced against them in time of
war, though they are citizens, having all the ties and interests of
citizens, and in most cases property totally unconnected with the
military line.

"If we would pursue a right system of policy, in my opinion, there
should be none of these distinctions. We should all, Congress and army,
be considered as one people, embarked in one cause, in one interest,
acting on the same principle and to the same end. The distinction, the
jealousies set up, or perhaps only incautiously let out, can answer not
a single good purpose. They are impolitic in the extreme. Among
individuals the most certain way to make a man your enemy is to tell
him you esteem him such. So with public bodies, and the very jealousy
which the narrow politics of some may affect to entertain of the army,
in order to a due subordination to the supreme civil authority, is a
likely means to produce a contrary effect--to incline it to the pursuit
of those measures which they may wish it to avoid. It is unjust because
no order of men in the thirteen States has paid a more sacred regard to
the proceedings of Congress than the army, for without arrogance or the
smallest deviation from truth it may be said that no history now extant
can furnish an instance of an army's suffering such uncommon hardships
as ours has done, and bearing them with the same patience and
fortitude. To see men without clothes to cover their nakedness, without
blankets to lie on, without shoes (for the want of which their marches
might be traced by the blood from their feet), and almost as often
without provisions as with them, marching through the frost and snow,
and at Christmas taking up their winter quarters within a day's march
of the enemy, without a house or hut to cover them till they could be
built, and submitting without a murmur, is a proof of patience and
obedience which in my opinion can scarcely be paralleled."

Such representations as these could not fail to produce some effect
even on the minds of those who were opposed to the measures which
Washington proposed. Still the action of Congress was, as usual,
dilatory. After a great deal of discussion a vote was passed by a small
majority to give the officers half pay for life. This vote was
reconsidered, and it was finally agreed that the officers should
receive half pay for seven years after the close of the war, or that
each noncommissioned officer and soldier, who should continue in the
army till the close of the war, should receive a bounty of $80.

We have anticipated the order of time in order to dispose finally of
this matter which was not terminated till the spring of 1778.

During the winter Howe confined his operations to those small
excursions that were calculated to enlarge the comforts of his own
soldiers, who, notwithstanding the favorable dispositions of the
neighboring country, were much distressed for fuel and often in great
want of forage and fresh provisions. The vigilance of the parties on
the lines, especially on the south side of the Schuylkill, intercepted
a large portion of the supplies intended for the Philadelphia market,
and corporal punishment was frequently inflicted on those who were
detected in attempting this infraction of the laws. As Capt. Henry Lee,
called in the army "Light Horse Harry," was particularly active, a plan
was formed late in January to surprise and capture him in his quarters.
An extensive circuit was made by a large body of cavalry who seized
four of his patrols without communicating an alarm. About break of day
the British horse appeared, upon which Captain Lee placed his troopers
that were in the house at the doors and windows, who behaved so
gallantly as to repulse the assailants without losing a horse or man.
Only Lieutenant Lindsay and one private were wounded. The whole number
in the house did not exceed ten. That of the assailants was said to
amount to 200. They lost a sergeant and three men, with several horses
killed, and an officer and three men wounded. The result of this
skirmish gave great pleasure to Washington who had formed a high
opinion of Lee's talents as a partisan. He mentioned the affair in his
orders with strong marks of approbation, and in a private letter to the
captain testified the satisfaction he felt. For his merit through the
preceding campaign Congress promoted him to the rank of major and gave
him an independent partisan corps, to consist of three troops of horse.

While the deficiency of the public resources, arising from the alarming
depreciation of the bills of credit, manifested itself in all the
military departments, a plan was matured in Congress and in the Board
of War, without consulting the Commander-in-Chief, for a second
irruption into Canada. It was proposed to place the Marquis de
Lafayette at the head of this expedition and to employ Generals Conway
and Stark as the second and third in command.

This was a measure planned by those who were not friendly to
Washington; and one of its objects was to detach Lafayette from his
best and dearest friend and bring him over to the Conway party.
Lafayette would have declined the appointment, but Washington advised
him to accept it, probably foreseeing how the affair would terminate.

The first intimation to Washington that the expedition was contemplated
was given in a letter from the President of the Board of War of the
24th of January (1778), enclosing one of the same date to the Marquis,
requiring his attendance on Congress to receive his instructions.
Washington was requested to furnish Colonel Hazen's regiment, chiefly
composed of Canadians, for the expedition, and in the same letter his
advice and opinion were asked respecting it. The northern States were
to furnish the necessary troops.

Without noticing the manner in which this business had been conducted
and the marked want of confidence it betrayed, Washington ordered
Hazen's regiment to march toward Albany, and Lafayette proceeded
immediately to the seat of Congress at Yorktown. At his request he was
to be considered as an officer detached from the army of Washington, to
remain under his orders, and Major-General the Baron de Kalb was added
to the expedition; after which Lafayette repaired in person to Albany
to take charge of the troops who were to assemble at that place in
order to cross the lakes on the ice and attack Montreal.

On arriving at Albany he found no preparations made for the expedition.
Nothing which had been promised being in readiness, he abandoned the
enterprise as impracticable. Some time afterward Congress also
determined to relinquish it, and Washington was authorized to recall
both Lafayette and De Kalb.

While the army lay at Valley Forge the Baron Steuben arrived in camp.
This gentleman was a Prussian officer who came to the United States
with ample recommendations. He had served many years in the armies of
the great Frederick, had been one his aides-de-camp, and had held the
rank of lieutenant-general. He was well versed in the system of field
exercise which the King of Prussia had introduced, and was qualified to
each it to raw troops. He claimed no rank and offered his services as a
volunteer. After holding a conference with Congress he proceeded to
Valley Forge.

Although the office of inspector-general had been bestowed on Conway,
he had never entered on its duties, and his promotion to the rank of
major-general had given much umbrage to the brigadiers who had been his
seniors. That circumstance, in addition to the knowledge of his being
in a faction hostile to the Commander-in-Chief, rendered his situation
in the army so uncomfortable that he withdrew to Yorktown, in
Pennsylvania, which was then the seat of Congress. When the expedition
to Canada was abandoned he was not directed, with Lafayette and De
Kalb, to rejoin the army. Entertaining no hope of being permitted to
exercise the functions of his new office, he resigned his commission
about the last of April and, some time afterward, returned to France.
[6]

On his resignation the Baron Steuben, who had, as a volunteer,
performed the duties of inspector-general much to the satisfaction of
the Commander-in-Chief and of the army, was, on the recommendation of
Washington, appointed to that office, with the rank of major-general,
without exciting the slightest murmur.

This gentleman was of immense service to the American troops. He
established one uniform system of field exercise, and, by his skill and
persevering industry, effected important improvements through all ranks
of the army during its continuance at Valley Forge.

While it was encamped at that place several matters of great interest
engaged the attention of Congress. Among them was the stipulation in
the convention of Saratoga for the return of the British army to
England. Boston was named as the place of embarkation. At the time of
the capitulation the difficulty of making that port early in the winter
was unknown to General Burgoyne. Consequently, as some time must elapse
before a sufficient number of vessels for the transportation of his
army could be collected, its embarkation might be delayed until the
ensuing spring.

On being apprised of this circumstance, Burgoyne applied to Washington,
desiring him to change the port of embarkation and to appoint Newport,
in Rhode Island, or some other place on the Sound instead of Boston,
and, in case this request should not be complied with, soliciting, on
account of his health and private business, that the indulgence might
be granted to himself and suite. Washington, not thinking himself
authorized to decide on such an application, transmitted it to
Congress, which took no notice of the matter further than to pass a
resolution "That General Washington be directed to inform General
Burgoyne that Congress will not receive or consider any proposition for
indulgence or altering the terms of the convention of Saratoga, unless
immediately addressed to their own body." The application was
accordingly made to Congress, who readily complied with the request in
so far as it respected himself personally, but refused the indulgence
to his troops, and ultimately forbade their embarkation.

Congress watched with a jealous eye every movement of the convention
army and soon gave public indications of that jealousy. Early in
November they ordered General Heath, who commanded in Boston, "to take
the name, rank, former place of abode, and description of every person
comprehended in the convention of Saratoga, in order that, if afterward
found in arms against the United States, they might be punished
according to the law of nations." Burgoyne showed some reluctance to
the execution of this order, and his reluctance was imputed to no
honorable motives.

If the troops had been embarked in the Sound they might have reached
Britain early in the winter, where, without any breach of faith,
government might have employed them in garrison duty and been enabled
to send out a corresponding number of troops in time to take an active
part in the next campaign. But if the port of Boston were adhered to as
the place of embarkation, the convention troops could not, it was
thought, sail before the spring, and, consequently, could not be
replaced by the troops whose duties they might perform at home till
late in the year 1778. This circumstance, perhaps, determined Congress
to abide by Boston as the port of embarkation, and in this their
conduct was free from blame. But, by the injuries mutually inflicted
and suffered in the course of the war, the minds of the contending
parties were exasperated and filled with suspicion and distrust of each
other. Congress placed no reliance on British faith and honor, and, on
the subject under consideration, gave clear evidence that on those
points they were not over-scrupulous themselves.

On arriving in Boston the British officers found their quarters
uncomfortable. This probably arose from the large number of persons to
be provided for and the scarcity of rooms, fuel, and provisions,
arising from the presence of the whole captured army. But the officers
were much dissatisfied, and, after a fruitless correspondence with
Heath, Burgoyne addressed himself to Gates and complained of the
inconvenient quarters assigned his officers as a breach of the articles
of capitulation. Congress was highly offended at the imputation and
considered or affected to consider the charge as made with a view to
justify a violation of the convention by his army as soon as they
escaped from captivity. A number of transports for carrying off the
convention troops was collected in the Sound sooner than was expected,
but that number, amounting only to twenty-six, the Americans thought
insufficient for transporting such a number of men to Britain in the
winter season, and inferred that the intention could only be to carry
them to the Delaware and incorporate them with Howe's army. They also
alleged that a number of cartouche-boxes and other accoutrements of war
belonging to the British army had not been delivered up, agreeably to
the convention, and argued that this violation on the part of the
British released Congress from its obligations to fulfill the terms of
that compact.

On the 8th of January (1778), Congress resolved "to suspend the
embarkation of the army till a distinct and explicit ratification of
the convention of Saratoga shall be properly notified by the court of
Great Britain to Congress." Afterward the embarkation of the troops was
delayed or refused for various reasons, and that part of the convention
remained unfulfilled. The troops were long detained in Massachusetts;
they were afterward sent to the back parts of Virginia and none of them
were released but by exchange.

Mrs. Washington, as usual, visited her illustrious consort in his
quarters at Valley Forge during the winter. Writing from thence to a
friend in Boston, she says: "I came to this place some time about the
1st of February (1778), where I found the General very well. The
General's apartment is very small; he has had a log cabin built to dine
in, which has made our quarters much more tolerable than they were at
first." To those American citizens who are now reaping the rich fruits
of Washington's toils and sufferings in his country's cause, these few
lines are very suggestive. One cannot help contrasting the luxurious
habitations of the present generation with that log hut of the Father
of his Country at Valley Forge, to which the addition of another log
hut to dine in was considered by his consort a very comfortable
appendage. We should remember these things.

The effect of the news of Burgoyne's surrender, which reached Europe in
the autumn of 1777, could not be otherwise than highly favorable to the
cause of American independence. Our envoys in France, Dr. Franklin,
Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee had long been soliciting an alliance with
France. But the cautious ministers of Louis XVI, although secretly
favoring our cause and permitting supplies to be forwarded by
Beaumarchais, and the prizes of our ships to be brought into their
ports and sold, had hitherto abstained from openly supporting us, lest
our arms should finally prove unsuccessful. But the surrender of a
large army to Gates and the firm attitude of Washington's army,
besieging Howe in Philadelphia, as they had previously besieged him in
Boston, gave a new turn to French policy and disposed the ministry of
Louis to treat for an alliance with the new republic.

On the other hand, the British court was in a state of utter
consternation. The war began to assume a more portentous aspect, and
the British ministry, unable to execute their original purpose, lowered
their tone and showed an inclination to treat with the Colonies on any
terms which did not imply their entire independence and complete
separation from the British empire. In order to terminate the quarrel
with America before the actual commencement of hostilities with France,
Lord North introduced two bills into the House of Commons. The first
declared that Parliament would impose no tax or duty whatever, payable
within any of the Colonies of North America, except only such duties as
it might be expedient to impose for the purposes of commerce, the net
produce of which should always be paid and applied to and for the use
of the Colonies in which the same shall be respectively levied, in like
manner as other duties collected under the authority of their
respective Legislatures are ordinarily paid and applied; the second
authorized the appointment of commissioners by the Crown, with power to
treat with either the constituted authorities or with individuals in
America, but that no stipulation entered into should have any effect
till approved in Parliament. It empowered the commissioners, however,
to proclaim a cessation of hostilities in any of the Colonies; to
suspend the operation of the Non-intercourse Act; also to suspend,
during the continuance of the act, so much of all or any of the acts of
Parliament which have passed since the 10th day of February, 1763, as
relates to the Colonies; to grant pardons to any number or description
of persons, and to appoint a governor in any Colony in which his
Majesty had heretofore exercised the power of making such appointment.
The duration of the act was limited to the 1st day of June, 1779.

These bills passed both Houses of Parliament, and as about the time of
their introduction ministry received information of the conclusion of
the treaty between France and the Colonies, they sent off copies of
them to America, even before they had gone through the usual
formalities, in order to counteract the effects which the news of the
French alliance might produce. Early in March, the Earl of Carlisle,
George Johnstone, and William Eden, Esqs., were appointed commissioners
for carrying the acts into execution, and the celebrated Dr. Adam
Ferguson, then professor of moral philosophy in the University of
Edinburgh, was nominated their secretary. The commissioners sailed
without delay for America. But the present measure, like every other
concession in the course of this protracted contest, came too late.
What was now offered would at one time have been hailed in America with
acclamations of joy and secured the grateful affection of the
Colonists. But circumstances were now changed. The minds of the people
were completely alienated from the parent state and their spirits
exasperated by the events of the war. Independence had been declared,
victory had emblazoned the standards of Congress, and a treaty of
alliance with France had been concluded.

On the 16th of December (1777) the preliminaries of a treaty between
France and America were agreed on, and the treaty itself was signed at
Paris on the 6th of February, 1778--an event of which the British
ministry got information in little more than forty-eight hours after
the signatures were affixed. The principal articles of the treaty were:
That if Britain, in consequence of the alliance, should commence
hostilities against France, the two countries should mutually assist
each other; that the independence of America should be effectually
maintained; that if any part of North America still professing
allegiance to the Crown of Britain should be reduced by the Colonies it
should belong to the United States; that if France should conquer any
of the British West India Islands they should be deemed its property;
that the contracting parties should not lay down their arms till the
independence of America was formally acknowledged, and that neither of
them should conclude a peace without the consent of the other.

Lord North's conciliatory bills reached America before the news of the
French treaty and excited in Congress considerable alarm. There were a
number of Loyalists in each of the Colonies; many, though not
unfriendly to the American cause, had never entered cordially into the
quarrel, and the heavy pressure of the war had begun to cool the zeal
and exhaust the patience of some who had once been forward in their
opposition to Britain. Congress became apprehensive lest a disposition
should prevail to accept of the terms proposed by the British
government, and the great body of the people be willing to resign the
advantages of independence, in order to escape from present calamity.

The bills were referred to a committee, which, after an acute and
severe examination, gave in a report well calculated to counteract the
effects which it was apprehended the terms offered would produce on the
minds of the timid and wavering. They reported as their opinion that it
was the aim of those bills to create divisions in the States; and "that
they were the sequel of that insidious plan, which, from the days of
the Stamp Act down to the present time, hath involved this country in
contention and bloodshed; and that, as in other cases, so in this,
although circumstances may at times force them to recede from their
un-

[missing text]

of the British fleets and armies and the acknowledgment of American
independence. At the same time the bills were published, together with
the action of Congress on the subject, and dispersed throughout the
country. This decisive stand was taken before it was known that a
treaty had been concluded with France.

The British commissioners, Carlisle, Johnstone, and Eden, charged with
negotiating and reconciliation on the basis of Lord North's bills, did
not arrive until (June, 1778) six weeks after drafts of the bills had
been published by Governor Tryon and rejected by Congress. On their
arrival at New York, Sir Henry Clinton, who had succeeded Howe as
Commander-in-Chief, requested a passport for Dr. Ferguson, the
secretary of the commissioners, to proceed to Yorktown and lay certain
papers before Congress.

Washington, not deeming the matter within his province, declined until
he could have the instruction of Congress, who sustained him in
refusing the passport. The commissioners, impatient of delay, sent on
the papers through the ordinary medium of a flag, addressed to the
President of Congress.

The commissioners offered in their letter to consent to an immediate
cessation of hostilities by sea and land; to agree that no military
force should be kept up in the Colonies without the consent of
Congress, and also both to give up the right of taxation and to provide
for a representation in Parliament. They promised to sustain and
finally pay off the paper money then in circulation. Every inducement
short of the recognition of independence was held out to lead the
Colonists to return to their allegiance. But if, when relying upon
their own strength alone, they had refused to listen to such overtures,
they were not likely to do so now that they were assured of the support
of France. By order of Congress the President of that body wrote as
follows to the commissioners: "I have received the letter from your
Excellencies, dated the 9th instant, with the enclosures, and laid them
before Congress. Nothing but an earnest desire to spare the further
effusion of human blood could have induced them to read a paper
containing expressions so disrespectful to his Most Christian Majesty,
the good and great ally of these States, or to consider propositions so
derogatory to the honor of an independent nation. The acts of the
British Parliament, the commission from your sovereign, and your letter
suppose the people of these States to be subjects of the Crown of Great
Britain and are founded on the idea of dependence, which is utterly
inadmissible. I am further directed to inform your Excellencies that
Congress are inclined to peace, notwithstanding the unjust claims from
which this war originated, and the savage manner in which it hath been
conducted. They will, therefore, be ready to enter upon the
consideration of a treaty of peace and commerce not inconsistent with
treaties already subsisting, when the King of Great Britain shall
demonstrate a sincere disposition for that purpose. The only solid
proof of this disposition will be an explicit acknowledgment of these
States or the withdrawing his fleets and armies."

The British commissioners remained several months in the country and
made many and various attempts to accomplish the objects of their
mission, but without success.

They were compelled to return to England baffled and disappointed. Thus
the Americans, as an eloquent historian suggests, steady in their
resolutions, chose rather to trust to their own fortune, which they had
already proved, and to the hope they placed in that of France, than to
link themselves anew to the tottering destiny of England; abandoning
all idea of peace, war became the sole object of their solicitude. Such
was the issue of the attempts to effect an accommodation and thus were
extinguished the hopes which the negotiation had given birth to in
England. It was the misfortune of England to be governed by ministers
who were never willing to do justice until they were compelled by main
force. Their present concessions, as on all previous occasions, came
too late.

We have had frequent occasion to notice the embarrassments and
mortifications to which Washington was subjected by the interference of
Congress in those executive matters which should have been left
entirely under his own control. This was particularly injurious to the
public service in their conduct with respect to the treatment and
exchange of prisoners. Much correspondence on this subject took place
between Washington and Howe during the winter when the army was at
Valley Forge, and whenever the generals were on the eve of arranging an
exchange Congress would interfere and prevent it. Washington had been
compelled, by his sense of justice and humanity, to censure Howe for
his treatment of American prisoners. An order hastily given out by the
Board of War exposed Washington himself, without any fault of his own,
to a similar censure from Howe. The circumstances, as related by
Marshall, were these:

"General Washington had consented that a quartermaster, with a small
escort, should come out of Philadelphia, with clothes and other
comforts for the prisoners who were in possession of the United States.
He had expressly stipulated for their security, and had given them a
passport. While they were traveling through the country, information
was given to the Board of War that General Howe had refused to permit
provisions to be sent in to the American prisoners in Philadelphia by
water. This information was not correct. General Howe had only
requested that flags should not be sent up or down the river without
previous permission obtained from himself. On this information,
however, the board ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Smith immediately to
seize the officers, though protected by the passport of Washington,
their horses, carriages, and the provisions destined for the relief to
the British prisoners, and to secure them until further orders, either
from the Board or from the Commander-in-Chief.

"Washington, on hearing this circumstance, dispatched one of his aids
with orders for the immediate release of the persons and property which
had been confined; but the officers refused to proceed on their
journey, and returned to Philadelphia. [10]

"This untoward event was much regretted by Washington. In a letter
received some time afterwards, Howe, after expressing his willingness
that the American prisoners should be visited by deputy commissaries,
who should inspect their situation and supply their wants, required, as
the condition on which this indulgence should be granted, 'that a
similar permit should be allowed to persons appointed by him, which
should be accompanied with the assurance of General Washington, that
his authority will have sufficient weight to prevent any interruption
to their progress, and any insult to their persons.' This demand was
ascribed to the treatment to which officers under the protection of his
passport had already been exposed.

"Washington lamented the impediment to the exchange of prisoners, which
had hitherto appeared to be insuperable, and made repeated but
ineffectual efforts to remove it. Howe had uniformly refused to proceed
with any cartel unless his right to claim for all the diseased and
infirm, whom he had liberated, should be previously admitted.

"At length, after all hope of inducing him to recede from that high
ground had been abandoned, he suddenly relinquished it of his own
accord, and acceded completely to the proposition of Washington for the
meeting of commissioners, in order to settle equitably the number to
which he should be entitled for those he had discharged in the
preceding winter. This point being adjusted, commissioners were
mutually appointed, who were to meet on the 10th of March (1778), at
Germantown, to arrange the details of a general cartel.

"Washington had entertained no doubt of his authority to enter into
this agreement. On the 4th of March, however, he had the mortification
to perceive in a newspaper a resolution of Congress, calling on the
several States for the amounts of supplies furnished the prisoners,
that they might be adjusted according to the rule of the 10th of
December, before the exchange should take place.

"On seeing this embarrassing resolution, Washington addressed a letter
to Howe, informing him that particular circumstances had rendered it
inconvenient for the American commissioners to attend at the time
appointed, and requesting that their meeting should be deferred from
the 10th to the 21st of March. The interval was employed in obtaining a
repeal of the resolution.

"It would seem probable that the dispositions of Congress, on the
subject of an exchange, did not correspond with those of Washington.
From the fundamental principle of the military establishment of the
United States at its commencement, an exchange of prisoners would
necessarily strengthen the British much more than the American army.
The war having been carried on by troops raised for short times, aided
by militia, the American prisoners, when exchanged, returned to their
homes as citizens, while those of the enemy again took the field.

"Washington, who was governed by a policy more just, and more
permanently beneficial, addressed himself seriously to Congress, urging
as well the injury done the public faith and his own personal honor, by
this infraction of a solemn engagement, as the cruelty and impolicy of
a system which must cut off forever all hopes of an exchange, and
render imprisonment as lasting as the war. He represented in strong
terms the effect such a measure must have on the troops on whom they
should thereafter be compelled chiefly to rely, and its impression on
the friends of those already in captivity. These remonstrances produced
the desired effect, and the resolutions were repealed. The
commissioners met according to the second appointment; but, on
examining their powers, it appeared that those given by Washington were
expressed to be in virtue of the authority vested in him, while those
given by Howe contained no such declaration. This omission produced an
objection on the part of Congress; but Howe refused to change the
language, alleging that he designed the treaty to be of a personal
nature, founded on the mutual confidence and honor of the contracting
generals, and had no intention either to bind his government or to
extend the cartel beyond the limits and duration of his own command.

"This explanation being unsatisfactory to the American commissioners,
and Howe persisting in his refusal to make the required alteration in
his powers, the negotiation was broken off, and this fair prospect of
terminating the distresses of the prisoners on both sides passed away
without effecting the good it had promised.

"Some time after the failure of this negotiation for a general cartel,
Howe proposed that all prisoners actually exchangeable should be sent
into the nearest posts, and returns made of officer for officer of
equal rank, and soldier for soldier, as far as numbers would admit; and
that if a surplus of officers should remain, they should be exchanged
for an equivalent in privates.

"On the representations of Washington, Congress acceded to this
proposition so far as related to the exchange of officer for officer
and soldier for soldier, but rejected the part which admitted an
equivalent in privates for a surplus of officers, because the officers
captured with Burgoyne were exchangeable within the powers of Howe.
Under this agreement an exchange took place to a considerable extent;
but as the Americans had lost more prisoners than they had taken,
unless the army of Burgoyne should be brought into computation, many of
their troops were still detained in captivity."

The British army held possession of Philadelphia during the winter and
the following spring; but they were watched and checked during the
whole time by the Americans. They were not quite so closely besieged as
in Boston, but they were quite as effectually prevented from
accomplishing any military purpose. They sent out occasional foraging
parties, who were fiercely attacked by Washington's detachments, and
almost always purchased their supplies with blood. But Howe never made
an attack on Washington's camp. Doctor Franklin, when he heard in Paris
that General Howe had taken Philadelphia, corrected his informant very
justly. "Say, rather," said the acute philosopher, "that Philadelphia
has taken General Howe." The capture of Philadelphia, as we have
already taken occasion to remark, was perfectly useless--in fact, worse
than useless--to the British arms. It only provided winter quarters to
an army which would have been more comfortable and secure in New York;
and it held them beleaguered at a remote point when their services were
greatly needed to aid Burgoyne and save his army from capture. In point
of fact, Philadelphia did take Howe; and Washington kept him out of the
way and fully employed until Burgoyne had fallen, and by his fall had
paved the way to the French alliance and to the ruin of the British
cause in America.

1. Footnote: The cool contempt expressed in Washington's letter to
Conway is one of the most curious features of this affair. It reads as
follows: "To Brigadier-General Conway: Sir--A letter which I received
last night contained the following paragraph: 'In a letter from General
Conway to General Gates, he says, "Heaven has determined to save your
country, or a weak general and bad counsellors would have ruined it."'
I am, sir, your humble servant."

2. Footnote: Marshall

3. Footnote: John Hancock, who succeeded Peyton Randolph as president
of Congress, retired on the 29th of October, 1777. His successor was
Henry Laurens, of South Carolina.

4. Footnote: The correspondence relating to the Conway Cabal is given
entire in the Appendix to the fifth volume of Sparks' "Writings of
Washington." It is very curious and interesting. Among other letters
are anonymous ones addressed to Patrick Henry, Governor of Virginia,
and to Mr. Laurens, President of Congress, full of slanders against
Washington.

5. Footnote: Previous to this affair, Captain Lee, in his frequent
skirmishes with the enemy, had already captured at least a hundred of
their men.

6. Footnote: General Conway, after his resignation, frequently indulged
in expressions of extreme hostility to the Commander-in-Chief. These
indiscretions were offensive to the gentlemen of the army. In
consequence of them, he was engaged in an altercation with General
Caldwalader, which produced a duel, in which Conway received a wound
supposed for some time to be mortal. While his recovery was despaired
of, he addressed the following letter to General Washington:

PHILADELPHIA, July 23d, 1778.

SIR--I find myself just able to hold the pen during a few minutes, and
take this opportunity of expressing my sincere grief for having done,
written, or said, any thing disagreeable to your excellency. My career
will soon be over; therefore, justice and truth prompt me to declare my
last sentiments. You are, in my eyes, the great and good man. May you
long enjoy the love, veneration, and esteem of these States, whose
liberties you have asserted by your virtues. I am, with the greatest
respect, sir,

Your excellency's most obedient humble servant, THS. CONWAY.

7. Footnote: Gordon says: "May 13, 1778. General Burgoyne landed at
Portsmouth. On his arrival at London, he soon discovered that he was no
longer an object of court favor. He was refused admission to the royal
presence; and from thence experienced all those marks of being in
disgrace, which are so well understood, and so quickly observed by the
retainers and followers of courts."

8. Footnote: As early as the month of April, 1776, Turgot had said to
the ministers of Louis XVI--"The supposition of the absolute separation
between Great Britain and her Colonies seems to me infinitely probable.
This will be the result of it; when the independence of the Colonies
shall be entire and recognized by the English themselves, a total
revolution will follow in the political and commercial relations
between Europe and America; and I firmly believe that every other
mother-country will be forced to abandon all empire over her Colonies,
and to leave an entire freedom of commerce with all nations, to content
herself with partaking with others in the advantages of a free trade,
and with preserving the old ties of friendship and fraternity with her
former colonists. If this is an evil, I believe that there exists no
remedy or means of hindering it; that the only course to pursue is to
submit to the inevitable necessity, and console ourselves as best we
may under it. I must also observe, that there will be a very great
danger to all such powers as obstinately attempt to resist this course
of events; that after ruining themselves by efforts above their means,
they will still see their Colonies equally escape from them, and become
their bitter enemies, instead of remaining their allies." Mmoire de M.
Turgot,  l'occasion du Mmoire remis par M. le Compte de Vergennes sur
la manire dont la France at l'Espagne doivent envisager les suites de
la querelle entre la Grande Bretagne et ses Colonies. In "Politique de
tous les Cabinets de l'Europe pendant les Rgnes to Louis XV. et de
Louis XVI." Par L.P. Segue l'ain.

9. Footnote: The commissioners published their final manifesto and
proclamation to the Americans on the 3d of October, and on the 10th.
Congress issued a cautionary declaration in reply. No overtures were
made to the commissioners from any quarter, and not long after they
embarked for England. Thacher, in his "Military Journal," states that
"Governor Johnstone, one of the commissioners, with inexcusable
effrontery, offered a bribe to Mr. Reed, a member of Congress. In an
interview with Mrs. Ferguson at Philadelphia, whose husband was a
Royalist, he desired she would mention to Mr. Reed, that if he would
engage his interest to promote the object of their commission, he might
have any office in the Colonies in the gift of his Britannic majesty,
and ten thousand pounds in hand. Having solicited an interview with Mr.
Reed, Mrs. Ferguson made her communication. Spurning the idea of being
purchased, he replied that he was not worth purchasing, but such as he
was, the King of Great Britain was not rich enough to do it."

10. Footnote: They alleged that their horses had been disabled, and the
clothing embezzled.




CHAPTER XIV


MONMOUTH. 1778.


For prosecuting the campaign of 1778 Washington had not been provided
with an adequate force. The committee of Congress who visited the army
at Valley Forge had agreed that the army should consist of about 40,000
men, besides artillery and horse. In May (1778) the army, including the
detachments at different places, was found to amount only to 15,000,
with little prospect of increase. At Valley Forge Washington had
11,800. The British army at this time numbered 33,000. With such odds
the plan of operations for this season must necessarily be defensive.

From the position which Washington had taken at Valley Forge, and from
the activity and vigilance of his patrols, the British army in
Philadelphia was straitened for forage and fresh provisions. A
considerable number of the people of Pennsylvania were well affected to
the British cause and desirous of supplying the troops, while many more
were willing to carry victuals to Philadelphia, where they found a
ready market and payment in gold or silver, whereas the army at Valley
Forge could pay only in paper money of uncertain value. But it was not
easy to reach Philadelphia nor safe to attempt it, for the American
parties often intercepted and took the provisions without payment and
not unfrequently chastised those engaged. The first operations on the
part of the British, therefore, in the campaign of 1778, were
undertaken in order to procure supplies for the army. About the middle
of March a strong detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Mawhood, made a
foraging excursion for six or seven days into Jersey, surprised and
defeated the American parties at Hancock's and Quinton's bridges on
Always creek, which falls into the Delaware to the south of Reedy
Island, killed or took fifty or sixty of the militia prisoners, and
after a successful expedition returned to Philadelphia with little
loss.

A corps of Pennsylvania militia, daily varying in number, sometimes not
exceeding fifty, sometimes amounting to 600, under General Lacey, had
taken post at a place called Crooked Billet, about seventeen miles from
Philadelphia on the road to New York, for the purpose of intercepting
the country people who attempted to carry provisions to the British
army. Early on the morning of the 4th of May, Colonel Abercrombie and
Major Simcoe, with a strong detachment, attempted to surprise this
party, but Lacey escaped with little loss, except his baggage, which
fell into the hands of the enemy.

On the 7th of May the British undertook an expedition against the
galleys and other shipping which had escaped up the Delaware after the
reduction of Mud Island, and destroyed upward of forty vessels and some
stores and provisions. The undisputed superiority of the British naval
force and the consequent command of the Delaware gave them great
facilities in directing a suitable armament against any particular
point, and the movements of the militia, on whom Congress chiefly
depended for repelling sudden predatory incursions and for guarding the
roads to Philadelphia, were often tardy and inefficient. The roads were
ill guarded, and the British frequently accomplished their foraging and
returned to camp before an adequate force could be assembled to oppose
them.

To remedy these evils--to annoy the rear of the British troops in case
they evacuated Philadelphia, which it was now suspected they intended
to do, and also to form an advanced guard of the main army--Lafayette,
with upward of 2,000 chosen men and six pieces of artillery, was
ordered to the east of the Schuylkill, and took post on Barren Hill,
seven or eight miles in advance of the army at Valley Forge. Sir
William Howe immediately got notice of his position and formed a plan
to surprise and cut him off. For that purpose a detachment of 5,000 of
the best troops of the British army, under General Grant, marched from
Philadelphia on the night of the 20th of May and took the road which
runs along the Delaware and consequently does not lead directly to
Barren Hill. But after advancing a few miles the detachment turned to
the left, and proceeding by White Marsh passed at no great distance
from Lafayette's left flank and about sunrise reached a point in his
rear where two roads diverged, one leading to the camp of the marquis,
the other to Matson's ford, each about a mile distant. There General
Grant's detachment was first observed by the Americans, and the British
perceived by the rapid movements of some hostile horsemen that they
were seen. Both Lafayette's camp and the road leading from it to
Matson's ford were concealed from the British troops by intervening
woods and high grounds. General Grant spent some time in making
dispositions for the intended attack. That interval was actively
improved by Lafayette, who, although not apprised of the full extent of
his danger, acted with promptitude and decision. He marched rapidly to
Matson's ford, from which he was somewhat more distant than the British
detachment, and reached it while General Grant was advancing against
Barren Hill in the belief that Lafayette was still there. The Americans
hurried through the ford leaving their artillery behind, but on
discovering they were not closely pursued some of them returned and
dragged the field pieces across the river; a small party was also sent
into the woods to retard the progress of the British advanced guard, if
it should approach while the artillery was in the ford.

On finding the camp at Barren Hill deserted General Grant immediately
pursued in the track of the retreating enemy toward Matson's ford. His
advanced guard overtook some of the small American party, which had
been sent back to cover the passage of the artillery, before they could
recross the river and took or killed a few of them, but on reaching the
ford General Grant found Lafayette so advantageously posted on the
rising ground on the opposite bank and his artillery so judiciously
placed that it was deemed unadvisable to attack him. Thus the attempt
against Lafayette failed, although the plan was well concerted and on
the very point of success. In the British army sanguine expectations of
the favorable issue of the enterprise were entertained, and in order to
insure a happy result a large detachment, under General Grey, in the
course of the night took post at a ford of the Schuylkill, two or three
miles in front of Lafayette's right flank, to intercept him if he
should attempt to escape in that direction, while the main body of the
army advanced to Chestnut Hill to support the attack, but on the
failure of the enterprise the whole returned to Philadelphia.

General Grant's detachment was seen by Washington from the camp at
Valley Forge about the time it was discovered by the troops at Barren
Hill, alarm guns were fired by his order to warn Lafayette of his
danger, and the whole army was drawn out to be in readiness to act as
circumstances might require. The escape of the detachment was the cause
of much joy and congratulation in the American and of disappointment
and chagrin in the British army.

That a strong detachment of hostile troops should pass at a small
distance from Lafayette's flank and gain his rear unobserved seems to
argue a want of due vigilance on the part of that officer, but a
detachment of the Pennsylvania militia had been posted at a little
distance on his left and he relied on them for watching the roads in
that quarter. The militia, however, had quitted their station without
informing him of their movement, and consequently his left flank and
the roads about White Marsh remained unguarded.

This was the last enterprise attempted by Sir William Howe. Soon after
he resigned the command of the army. So far back as the month of
October in the preceding year he had requested to be relieved from the
painful service in which he was engaged. On the 14th of April, 1778, he
received the King's permission to resign, but at the same time he was
directed, while he continued in command, to embrace every opportunity
of putting an end to the war by a due employment of the force under his
orders. In the beginning of June after having received, in a triumphal
procession and festival, a testimony of the approbation and esteem of
the army he sailed for England, leaving the troops under the care of
Sir Henry Clinton as his successor.

Sir William Howe has been much blamed for inactivity and for not
overwhelming the Americans, but he was at least as successful as any
other general employed in the course of the war. He was cautious and
sparing of the lives of his men. In his operations he discovered a
respectable share of military science, and he met with no great
reverses. They who blame him for want of energy may look to the history
of Generals Burgoyne and Cornwallis for the fate of more enterprising
leaders in America.

About the time when Howe resigned the command of the army the British
government ordered the evacuation of Philadelphia. While the British
had an undisputed naval superiority Philadelphia was in some respects a
good military station. Although in all the States a decided majority of
the people gave their support to Congress, yet in every province south
of New England there was a considerable minority friendly to the claims
of the mother country. The occupation of Philadelphia, the principal
city of the confederation, encouraged the latter class of the
inhabitants, and the army there formed a point round which they might
rally. But Philadelphia is more than 100 miles up the Delaware, and as
Howe had been unable to drive Washington from the field he had found
some difficulty in subsisting his army in that city, even when the
British ships had the full command of the sea and could force their way
up the great rivers; but when the empire of the ocean was about to be
disputed by the French Philadelphia became a hazardous post on account
of the difficulty and uncertainty of procuring provisions, receiving
communications, or sending aid to such places as might be attacked. It
was accordingly resolved to abandon that city, and after shipping his
cavalry, formed of the German troops and American Loyalists, his
provision train and heavy baggage, on the few vessels that were in the
river, Clinton had to march the remainder of his army through the
Jerseys to New York, where the communication with the ocean is more
easy.

The preparations for this movement could not be so secretly made as to
escape the notice of the Americans, and to be in readiness for it was
one reason of detaching Lafayette to Barren Hill, where he had been
exposed to so much danger. Washington called in his detachments and
pressed the State governments to hasten the march of their new levies
in order that he might be enabled to act offensively; but the new
levies arrived slowly, and in some instances the State Legislatures
were deliberating on the means of raising them at the time when they
should have been in the field.

Although Washington was satisfied of the intention of the British
Commander-in-Chief to evacuate Philadelphia yet it was uncertain in
what way he would accomplish his purpose, but the opinion that he
intended to march through the Jerseys to New York gained ground in the
American camp; and in this persuasion Washington detached General
Maxwell with the Jersey brigade across the Delaware to cooperate with
General Dickinson, who was assembling the Jersey militia, in breaking
down the bridges, felling trees across the roads, and impeding and
harassing the British troops in their retreat, but with orders to be on
his guard against a sudden attack.

Washington summoned a council of war to deliberate on the measures to
be pursued in that emergency. It was unanimously resolved not to molest
the British army in passing the Delaware, but with respect to
subsequent operations there was much difference of opinion in the
council. General Lee, who had lately joined the army after his
exchange, was decidedly against risking either a general or partial
engagement. The British army he estimated at 10,000 men fit for duty,
exclusive of officers, while the American army did not amount to more
than 11,800; he was, therefore, of opinion that with so near an
equality of force it would be criminal to hazard a battle. He relied
much on the imposing attitude in which their late foreign alliance
placed them, and maintained that nothing but a defeat of the army could
now endanger their independence. Almost all the foreign officers agreed
in opinion with General Lee, and among the American generals only Wayne
and Cadwalader were decidedly in favor of attacking the enemy. Under
these circumstances Washington, although strongly inclined to fight,
found himself constrained to act with much circumspection.

Having made all the requisite preparations Sir Henry Clinton, early in
the morning of the 18th of June (1778), led the British army to the
confluence of the Delaware and Schuylkill, where boats and other
vessels were ready to receive them, and so judicious were the
arrangements made by Admiral Lord Howe that all the troops, with the
baggage and artillery, were carried across the Delaware and safely
landed on the Jersey side of the river before 10 in the forenoon. Many
of the Loyalists of Philadelphia accompanied the army, carrying their
effects along with them, and such of them as ventured to remain behind
met with little indulgence from their irritated countrymen. Several of
them were tried for their lives and two Quakers were executed. The
Americans entered the city before the British rear guard had entirely
left it.

There were two roads leading from Philadelphia to New York--the one
running along the western bank of the Delaware to Trenton Ferry, and
the other along the eastern bank to the same point. The British army
had wisely crossed the river at the point where it was least exposed to
molestation and entered on the last of these two roads. In marching
through a difficult and hostile country Sir Henry Clinton prudently
carried along with him a considerable quantity of baggage and a large
supply of provisions, so that the progress of the army, thus heavily
encumbered, was but slow. It proceeded leisurely through Huddersfield,
Mount Holly, and Crosswick, and reached Allentown on the 24th (June,
1778), having in seven days marched less than forty miles. This slow
progress made the Americans believe that Sir Henry Clinton wished to be
attacked. General Maxwell, who was posted at Mount Holly, retired on
his approach, and neither he nor General Dickinson was able to give him
much molestation.

As the march of the British army till it passed Crosswick was up the
Delaware, and only at a small distance from that river, Washington, who
left Valley Forge on the day that Sir Henry Clinton evacuated
Philadelphia, found it necessary to take a circuitous route and pass
the river higher up at Coryell's Ferry, where he crossed it on the 22d
and took post at Hopewell on the high grounds in that vicinity, and
remained during the 23d in that position.

From Allentown there were two roads to New York--one on the left,
passing through South Amboy to the North river; the other on the right,
leading to Sandy Hook. The first of these was somewhat shorter but the
river Raritan lay in the way and it might be difficult and dangerous to
pass it in presence of a hostile force. Sir Henry Clinton, therefore,
resolved to take the road to Sandy Hook by which the Raritan would be
altogether avoided.

Although a great majority in the American council of war were averse to
fighting, yet Washington was strongly inclined to attack the British
army. He summoned the council of war a second time and again submitted
the subject to their consideration, but they adhered to their former
opinion, and Washington, still inclined to attack the enemy, determined
to act on his own responsibility.

The Jersey militia and a brigade of Continentals, under Generals
Dickinson and Maxwell, hovered on the left flank of the British army;
General Cadwalader, with a Continental regiment and a few militia was
in its rear, and Colonel Morgan, with his rifle regiment 600 strong,
was on its right. These detachments were ordered to harass the enemy as
much as possible.

As Sir Henry Clinton proceeded on the route toward Sandy Hook
Washington strengthened his advanced guard till it amounted to 5,000
men. General Lee, from his rank, had a claim to the command of that
force, but at first he declined it and Lafayette was appointed to that
service. But General Lee perceiving the importance of the command
solicited the appointment which he had at first declined, and was
accordingly sent forward with a reinforcement, when, from seniority,
the whole of the advanced guard became subject to his orders.

On the evening of the 27th (June, 1778) Sir Henry Clinton took a strong
position on the high grounds about Freehold Court House, in the county
of Monmouth. His right was posted in a small wood; his left was covered
by a thick forest and a morass; he had a wood in front, also a marsh
for a considerable space toward his left, and he was within twelve
miles of the high grounds at Middletown, after reaching which no
attempt could be made upon him with any prospect of success. His
position was unassailable, but Washington resolved to attack his rear
in the morning, as soon as it descended from the high grounds into the
plain beyond them and gave orders accordingly to Lee, who was at
Englishtown, three miles in the rear of the British army and as much in
advance of the main body of the Americans.

By the strong parties on his flanks and rear Clinton was convinced that
the hostile army was at hand, and suspecting that an attempt on his
baggage was intended on the morning of the 28th he changed his order of
march and put all the baggage under the care of General Knyphausen, who
commanded the van division of his army, in order that the rear
division, consisting of the flower of the troops under Cornwallis,
might be unencumbered and ready to act as circumstances might require.
Clinton remained with the rear division.

To avoid pressing on Knyphausen Cornwallis remained on his ground until
about 8, and then descending from the heights of Freehold into an
extensive plain took up his line of march in rear of the front
division.

General Lee had made dispositions for executing orders given the
preceding evening, and repeated in the morning, and soon after the
British rear had moved from its ground prepared to attack it. General
Dickinson had been directed to detach some of his best troops, to take
such a position as to cooperate with him, and Morgan, with his
riflemen, was ordered to act on the right flank.

Lee appeared on the heights of Freehold soon after Cornwallis had left
them, and following the British into the plain ordered General Wayne to
attack the rear of their covering party with sufficient vigor to check
it, but not to press it so closely as either to force it up to the main
body or to draw reinforcements to its aid. In the meantime he intended
to gain the front of this party by a shorter road, and, intercepting
its communication with the line, to bear it off before it could be
assisted. While in the execution of this design an officer in the suite
of Washington came up to gain intelligence and Lee communicated to him
his present object. Before he reached the point of destination,
however, there was reason to believe that the British rear was much
stronger than had been conjectured. The intelligence on this subject
being contradictory, and the face of the country well calculated to
conceal the truth, he deemed it advisable to ascertain the fact
himself.

Sir Henry Clinton, soon after the rear division was in full march,
received intelligence that an American column had appeared on his left
flank. This, being a corps of militia, was soon dispersed and the march
was continued. When his rear guard had descended from the heights he
saw it followed by a strong corps, soon after which a cannonade was
commenced upon it, and at the same time a respectable force showed
itself on each of his flanks. Suspecting a design on his baggage he
determined to attack the troops in his rear so vigorously as to compel
a recall of those on his flanks, and for this purpose marched back his
whole rear division. This movement was in progress as Lee advanced for
the purpose of reconnoitering. He soon perceived his mistake respecting
the force of the British rear, but still determined to engage on that
ground although his judgment disapproved the measure--there being a
morass immediately in his rear, which would necessarily impede the
reinforcements which might be advancing to his aid and embarrass his
retreat should he be finally overpowered. This was about 10. While both
armies were preparing for action General Scott (as stated by General
Lee) mistook an oblique march of an American column for a retreat, and
in the apprehension of being abandoned left his position and repassed
the ravine in his rear.

Being himself of opinion that the ground was unfavorable Lee did not
correct the error he ascribed to Scott but ordered the whole detachment
to regain the heights. He was closely pressed and some slight
skirmishing ensued without much loss on either side.

As soon as the firing announced the commencement of the action the rear
division of the army advanced rapidly to the support of the front. As
they approached the scene of action, Washington, who had received no
intelligence from Lee giving notice of his retreat, rode forward, and
to his utter astonishment and mortification met the advanced corps
retiring before the enemy without having made a single effort to
maintain its ground. The troops he first saw neither understood the
motives which had governed Lee nor his present design, and could give
no other information than that by his orders they had fled without
fighting.

Washington rode to the rear of the division where he met Lee, to whom
he spoke in terms of some warmth, implying disapprobation of his
conduct. [2]

Orders were immediately given to Colonel Stewart and Lieutenant-Colonel
Ramsay to form their regiments for the purpose of checking the pursuit,
and Lee was directed to take proper measures with the residue of his
force to stop the British column on that ground. Washington then rode
back to arrange the rear division of the army.

These orders were executed with firmness, and, when forced from his
ground, Lee brought off his troops in good order, and was directed to
form in the rear of Englishtown.

This check afforded time to draw up the left wing and second line of
the American army on an eminence covered by a morass in front. Lord
Stirling, who commanded the left wing, brought up a detachment of
artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington, and some field pieces,
which played with considerable effect on a division of the British
which had passed the morass, and was pressing on to the charge. These
pieces, with the aid of several parties of infantry, effectually
stopped the advance of the enemy.

Finding themselves warmly opposed in front, the British attempted to
turn the left flank of the American army, but were repulsed. They then
attempted the right with as little success. General Greene had advanced
a body of troops with artillery to a commanding piece of ground in his
front, which not only disappointed the design of turning the right, but
enfiladed the party which yet remained in front of the left wing.

At this moment General Wayne was advanced with a body of infantry to
engage them in front, who kept up so hot and well-directed a fire that
they soon withdrew behind the ravine to the ground on which the action
had commenced immediately after the arrival of Washington.

Lafayette, speaking of this battle, said: "Never was General Washington
greater in war than in this action. His presence stopped the retreat.
His dispositions fixed the victory. His fine appearance on horseback,
his calm courage roused by the animation produced by the vexation of
the morning, gave him the air best calculated to excite enthusiasm."

The position now taken by the British army was very strong. Both flanks
were secured by thick woods and morasses, and their front was
accessible only through a narrow pass. The day had been intensely hot,
and the troops were much fatigued. Notwithstanding these circumstances,
Washington resolved to renew the engagement. For this purpose he
ordered Brigadier-General Poor, with his own and the North Carolina
brigade, to gain their right flank, while Woodford with his brigade
should turn their left. At the same time the artillery was ordered to
advance and play on their front. These orders were obeyed with
alacrity, but the impediments on the flanks of the British were so
considerable, that before they could be overcome it was nearly dark.
Further operations were therefore deferred until next morning; and the
brigades which had been detached to the flanks of the British army
continued on their ground through

[missing text]

the justifiable claims, there can be no doubt but they will, as
heretofore, upon the first favorable occasion, again display that lust
of domination which hath rent in twain the mighty empire of Britain."

They further reported it as their opinion that any men or body of men
who should presume to make any separate or partial convention or
agreement with commissioners under the Crown of Great Britain should be
considered and treated as open and avowed enemies of the United States.
The committee further gave it as their opinion that the United States
could not hold any conference with the British commissioners unless
Britain first withdrew her fleets and armies, or in positive and
express terms acknowledged the independence of the States.

While these things were going on, Mr. Silas Deane arrived from Paris
with the important and gratifying information that treaties of alliance
and commerce had been concluded between France and the United States.
This intelligence diffused a lively joy throughout America and was
received by the people as the harbinger of their independence. The
alliance had been long expected, and the delays thrown in the way of
its accomplishment had excited many uneasy apprehensions. But these
were now dissipated, and, to the fond imaginations of the people, all
the prospects of the United States appeared gilded with the cheering
beams of prosperity.

Writing to the President of Congress on this occasion (May 4, 1778),
Washington says: "Last night at 11 o'clock I was honored with your
dispatches of the 3d. The contents afford me the most sensible
pleasure. Mr. Silas Deane had informed me by a line from Bethlehem that
he was the bearer of the articles of alliance between France and the
States. I shall defer celebrating this happy event in a suitable manner
until I have liberty from Congress to announce it publicly. I will only
say that the army are anxious to manifest their joy upon the occasion."

On the 7th of May the great event referred to in the preceding extract
was celebrated by the army at Valley Forge with the highest enthusiasm.
The following general orders were issued by Washington on the day
before:

"It having pleased the Almighty Ruler of the universe to defend the
cause of the United American States, and finally to raise us up a
powerful friend among the princes of the earth, to establish our
liberty and independency upon a lasting foundation, it becomes us to
set apart a day for gratefully acknowledging the Divine goodness and
celebrating the important event, which we owe to his Divine
interposition. The several brigades are to be assembled for this
purpose at 9 o'clock to-morrow morning, when their chaplains will
communicate the intelligence contained in the postscript of the
'Pennsylvania Gazette' of the 2d instant, and offer up thanksgiving and
deliver a discourse suitable to the occasion. At half after 10 o'clock
a cannon will be fired, which is to be a signal for the men to be under
arms; the brigade inspectors will then inspect their dress and arms and
form the battalions according to the instructions given them, and
announce to the commanding officers of the brigade that the battalions
are formed.

"The commanders of brigades will then appoint the field officers to the
battalions, after which each battalion will be ordered to load and
ground their arms. At half-past 11 a second cannon will be fired as a
signal for the march, upon which the several brigades will begin their
march by wheeling to the right by platoons and proceed by the nearest
way to the left of their ground by the new position; this will be
pointed out by the brigade inspectors. A third signal will then be
given, on which there will be a discharge of thirteen cannon, after
which a running fire of the infantry will begin on the right of
Woodford's and continue throughout the front line; it will then be
taken upon the left of the second line and continue to the right. Upon
a signal given, the whole army will huzza, 'Long live the King of
France!' The artillery then begins again and fires thirteen rounds;
this will be succeeded by a second general discharge of the musketry in
a running fire, and huzza, 'Long live the friendly European Powers!'
The last discharge of thirteen pieces of artillery will be given,
followed by a general running fire and huzza, 'The American States!'"

An officer who was present describes the scene as follows:

"Last Wednesday was set apart as a day of general rejoicing, when we
had a _feu de joie_ conducted with the greatest order and regularity.
The army made a most brilliant appearance, after which his Excellency
dined in public, with all the officers of his army, attended with a
band of music. I never was present where there was such unfeigned and
perfect joy as was discovered in every countenance. The entertainment
was concluded with a number of patriotic toasts, attended with huzzas.
When the General took his leave there was a universal clap, with loud
huzzas, which continued till he had proceeded a quarter of a mile,
during which time there were a thousand hats tossed in the air. His
Excellency turned round with his retinue and huzzaed several times."

Dr. Thacher, in his "Military Journal," mentions the presence of
"Washington's lady and suite, Lord Stirling and the Countess of
Stirling, with other general officers and ladies," at this _fte_. Our
readers, after passing with us through the dismal scenes of the
preceding winter, will readily sympathize with the army in the feelings
attending this celebration. It is worthy of special notice that in his
general order Washington was careful to give the religious feature of
the scene a prominent place by distinctly acknowledging the Divine
interposition in favor of the country. This was his invariable habit on
all occasions. Religion with him was not merely an opinion, a creed, or
a sentiment. It was a deep-rooted, all-pervading feeling, governing his
life and imparting earnestness, dignity, and power to all his actions.
Hence the reverence and affection which was the voluntary homage of all
who knew him.

Lord North's conciliatory bills, as we have seen, were not acceptable
to Congress. Washington's views in relation to them are given in the
following letter, written to a member of that body two days after he
had learned the terms proposed by the British government:

"Nothing short of independence, it appears to me, can possibly do. A
peace on other terms would, if I may be allowed the expression, be a
peace of war. The injuries we have received from the British nation
were so unprovoked, and have been so great and so many, that they can
never be forgotten. Besides the feuds, the jealousies, the animosities
that would ever attend a union with them; besides the importance, the
advantages, which we should derive from an unrestricted commerce, our
fidelity as a people, our gratitude, our character as men, are opposed
to a coalition with them but in case of the last extremity. Were we
easily to accede to terms of dependence, no nation, upon future
occasions, let the oppression of Britain be ever so flagrant and
unjust, would interpose for our relief, or, at most; they would do it
with a cautious reluctance and upon conditions most probably that would
be hard, if not dishonorable, to us."

Congress fully agreed in these views and rejected the advances of the
British government, refusing all terms of accommodation which did not
begin with the withdrawal is probable that explanations might have been
made which would have rescued him from the imputations that were cast
on him, and have restored him to the esteem of the army, could his
haughty temper have brooked the indignity he believed to have been
offered him on the field of battle. Washington had taken no measures in
consequence of the events of that day, and would probably have come to
no resolution concerning them without an amicable explanation, when he
received from Lee a letter expressed in very unbecoming terms, in which
he, in the tone of a superior, required reparation for the injury
sustained "from the very singular expressions" said to have been used
on the day of the action by Washington.

This letter was answered (July 30, 1778) by an assurance that, so soon
as circumstances would admit of an inquiry, he should have an
opportunity of justifying himself to the army, to America, and to the
world in general; or of convincing them that he had been guilty of
disobedience of orders and misbehavior before the enemy. On his
expressing a wish for a speedy investigation of his conduct, and for a
court-martial rather than a court of inquiry, he was arrested--first,
for disobedience of orders in not attacking the enemy on the 28th of
June, agreeably to repeated instructions; secondly, for misbehavior
before the enemy on the same day, in making an unnecessary, disorderly,
and shameful retreat; and thirdly, for disrespect to the
Commander-in-Chief in two letters.

Before this correspondence had taken place, strong and specific charges
of misconduct had been made against General Lee by several officers of
his detachment, and particularly by Generals Wayne and Scott. In these,
the transactions of the day, not being well understood, were
represented in colors much more unfavorable to Lee than facts, when
properly explained, would seem to justify.

These representations, most probably, induced the strong language of
the second article in the charge. A court-martial, over which Lord
Stirling presided, after a tedious investigation, found him guilty of
all the charges exhibited against him, and sentenced him to be
suspended for one year. This sentence was afterward, though with some
hesitation, approved almost unanimously by Congress. The court,
softened in some degree the severity of the second charge, by finding
him guilty, not in its very words, but "of misbehavior before the
enemy, by making an unnecessary, and, in some few instances, a
disorderly retreat."

Lee defended himself with his accustomed ability. He proved that, after
the retreat had commenced, in consequence of General Scott's repassing
the ravine, on the approach of the enemy, he had designed to form on
the first advantageous piece of ground he could find; and that in his
own opinion, and in the opinion of some other officers, no safe and
advantageous position had presented itself until he met Washington, at
which time it was his intention to fight the enemy on the very ground
afterwards taken by Washington himself. He suggested a variety of
reasons in justification of his retreat, which, if they do not
absolutely establish its propriety, give it so questionable a form as
to render it probable that a public examination never would have taken
place, could his proud spirit have stooped to offer explanation instead
of outrage to the Commander-in-Chief.

His suspension gave general satisfaction through the army. Without
judging harshly of his conduct as a military man, they perfectly
understood the insult offered to their general by his letters; and,
whether rightly or not, believed his object to have been to disgrace
Washington and to obtain the supreme command for himself. So devotedly
were all ranks attached to their general, that the mere suspicion of
such a design would have rendered his continuance in the army extremely
difficult.

Whatever judgment may be formed on the propriety of his retreat, it is
not easy to justify either the omission to keep the Commander-in-Chief
continually informed of his situation and intentions, or the very rude
letters written after the action was over.

The battle of Monmouth gave great satisfaction to Congress. A
resolution was passed unanimously, thanking Washington for the activity
with which he marched from the camp at Valley Forge in pursuit of the
enemy; for his distinguished exertions in forming the line of battle,
and for his great good conduct in the action; and he was requested to
signify the thanks of Congress to the officers and men under his
command who distinguished themselves by their conduct and valor in the
battle.

After the battle of Monmouth, Washington gave his army one day's
repose, and then (June 30, 1778,) commenced his march toward Brunswick,
at which place he encamped, and remained for several days. Thence he
sent out parties to reconnoiter the enemy's position, and learn his
intentions. Among other persons sent out with this design was Aaron
Burr, a lieutenant-colonel, who had served in Arnold's expedition to
Quebec, and who was destined to become a conspicuous person in American
history.

Clinton had arrived with his army in the neighborhood of Sandy Hook on
the 30th of June. Here he was met by Lord Howe with the fleet, which
had just arrived from Philadelphia. Sandy Hook having been converted by
the winter storms from a peninsula to an island, Lord Howe caused a
bridge of boats to be constructed, over which Clinton's army passed
from the mainland to the Hook. It was soon afterward distributed into
different encampments on Staten Island, Long Island, and the island of
New York.

When Washington had learned that the British army was thus situated, he
was satisfied that Clinton had no present intention of passing up the
Hudson, and he halted a few days at Paramus, at which place he received
intelligence of an important event which will claim our attention in
the next chapter.

1. Footnote: Spencer, "History of the United States."

2. Footnote: This interview between Washington and Lee was followed by
such important results that one is naturally curious to know exactly
what passed between them. The interview is described by Lee himself in
his defense before the court-martial:

"When I arrived first in his presence, conscious of having done nothing
which could draw on me the least censure, but rather flattering myself
with his congratulation and applause, I confess I was disconcerted,
astonished, and confounded by the words and manner in which his
Excellency accosted me. It was so novel and unexpected from a man,
whose discretion, humanity, and decorum I had from the first of our
acquaintance stood in admiration of, that I was for some time unable to
make any coherent answer to questions so abrupt, and in a great measure
to me unintelligible. The terms, I think, were these: 'I desire to
know, sir, what is the reason, whence arises this disorder and
confusion?' The manner in which he expressed them was much stronger and
more severe than the expressions themselves. When I recovered myself
sufficiently, I answered that I saw or knew of no confusion but what
naturally arose from disobedience of orders, contradictory
intelligence, and the impertinence and presumption of individuals, who
were invested with no authority, intruding themselves in matters above
them and out of their sphere; that the retreat in the first instance
was contrary to my intentions, contrary to my orders, and contrary to
my wishes."

Washington replied that all this might be true, but that he ought not
to have undertaken the enterprise unless he intended to go through with
it. He then rode away, and ordered some of the retreating regiments to
be formed on the ground which he pointed out.

Gordon says that, after the first meeting with Lee, Washington rode on
towards the rear of the retreating troops. He had not gone many yards
before he met his secretary, who told him that the British army were
within fifteen minutes' march of that place, which was the first
intelligence he received of their pushing on so briskly. He remained
there till the extreme rear of the retreating troops got up, when,
looking about, and judging the ground to be an advantageous spot for
giving the enemy the first check, he ordered Colonel Stewart's and
Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsey's battalions to form and incline to their
left, that they might be under cover of a corner of woods, and not be
exposed to the enemy's cannon in front. Lee having been told by one of
his aids that Washington had taken the command, answered, "Then I have
nothing further to do," and turned his horse and rode after his
Excellency in front. Washington, on his coming up, asked, "Will you
command on this ground or not? If you will, I will return to the main
body and have them formed upon the next height." Lee replied, "It is
equal with me where I command." Washington then told him, "I expect you
will take proper measures for checking the enemy," Lee said, "Your
orders shall be obeyed, and I will not be the first to leave the
field." Washington then rode to the main army, which was formed with
the utmost expedition on the eminence, with the morass in front.
Immediately upon his riding off, a warm cannonade commenced between the
British and American artillery on the right of Stewart and Ramsay,
between whom and the advanced troops of the British army a heavy fire
began soon after in the skirt of the woods before mentioned. The
British pressed on close; their light horse charged upon the right of
the Americans, and the latter were obliged to give way in such haste,
that the British horse and infantry came out of the wood seemingly
mixed with them.

The action then commenced between the British and Colonel Livingston's
regiment, together with Varnum's brigade, which had been drawn up by
Lee's order, and lined the fence that stretched across the open field
in front of the bridge over the morass, with the view of covering the
retreat of the artillery and the troops advanced with them. The
artillery had timely retired to the rear of the fence, and from an
eminence discharged several rounds of shot at the British engaged with
Livingston's and Varnum's troops; these were soon broken by a charge of
the former, and retired. The artillery were then ordered off. Prior to
the commencement of the last action, Lee sent orders to Colonel Ogden,
who had drawn up in the wood nearest the bridge to defend that post to
the last extremity, thereby to cover the retreat of the whole over the
bridge. Lee was one of the last that remained on the field, and brought
off the rear of the retreating troops. Upon his addressing General
Washington, after passing the morass, with, "Sir, here are my troops,
how is it your pleasure that I should dispose of them?" he was ordered
to arrange them in the rear of Englishtown.




CHAPTER XV.


WASHINGTON DIRECTS A DESCENT ON RHODE ISLAND. 1778.


Previous to evacuating Philadelphia, Clinton had received notice from
his government that, in consequence of the alliance between France and
the United States, a new plan of operations had been determined on. The
French were to be attacked in their West Indian possessions by way of
diversion from the main scene of action. Five thousand men were
detached from his army to aid in the execution of this purpose, and
3,000 were sent to Florida. Clinton was also apprised that a French
fleet would probably appear in the Delaware and thus prevent any
possibility of his leaving Philadelphia by water. Hence his sudden
departure from Philadelphia with the remainder of his forces. He was
only just in time to save his army and Lord Howe's fleet.

On the 5th of July (1778), the day on which the British army arrived at
New York, the Count D'Estaing, with a French fleet, appeared on the
coast of Virginia.

In the month of March the French ambassador in London, by order of his
government, notified to the British court the treaties entered into
between France and America. In a few days afterward he quitted London
without the ceremony of taking leave, and about the same time the
British ambassador left Paris in a similar manner. This was considered
equivalent to a declaration of war, and although war was not actually
declared, yet both parties diligently prepared for hostilities.

The French equipped at Toulon a fleet of twelve sail of the line and
six frigates, and gave the command to Count D'Estaing, who, with a
considerable number of troops on board, sailed on the 13th of April
(1778); but meeting with contrary winds he did not reach the coast of
America till the 5th of July. He expected to find the British army in
Philadelphia and the fleet in the Delaware, and if this expectation had
been realized the consequences to Britain must have been calamitous.
But the British fleet and army were at Sandy Hook or New York before
the French fleet arrived on the coast. Count D'Estaing touched at the
capes of the Delaware on the 5th of July, and on learning that the
British had evacuated Philadelphia, he dispatched one of his frigates
up the river with M. Gerard, the first minister from France to the
United States, and then sailed for Sandy Hook.

Washington received intelligence of D'Estaing's arrival in a letter
from the President of Congress while he was at Paramus. The next day he
received a second letter on the same subject, enclosing two
resolutions--one directing him to cooperate with the French admiral and
the other authorizing him to call on the States from New Hampshire to
New Jersey, inclusive, for such aids of militia as he might deem
necessary for the operations of the allied arms. He determined to
proceed immediately to White Plains, whence the army might cooperate
with more facility in the execution of any attempt which might be made
by the fleet, and dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, one of his
aides-de-camp, with all the information relative to the enemy, as well
as to his own army, which might be useful to D'Estaing.
Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens was authorized to consult on future conjoint
operations, and to establish conventional signals for the purpose of
facilitating the communication of intelligence.

The French admiral, on arriving off the Hook, dispatched Major de
Choisi, a gentleman of his family, to Washington for the purpose of
communicating fully his views and his strength. His first object was to
attack New York. If this should be found impracticable, he was desirous
of turning his attention to Rhode Island. To assist in coming to a
result on these enterprises, Washington dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel
Hamilton, another of his aides-de-camp, with such further
communications as had been suggested by inquiries made since the
departure of Laurens.

Fearing that the water on the bar at the entrance of the harbor was not
of sufficient depth to admit the passage of the largest ships of the
French fleet without much difficulty and danger, Washington had turned
his attention to other objects which might be eventually pursued.
General Sullivan, who commanded the troops in Rhode Island, was
directed (July 21, 1778) to prepare for an enterprise against Newport,
and Lafayette was detached with two brigades to join him at Providence.
The next day Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton returned to camp with the
final determination of the Count D'Estaing to relinquish the meditated
attack on the fleet in the harbor of New York, in consequence of the
impracticability of passing the bar.

General Greene was immediately ordered to Rhode Island, of which State
he was a native, and Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens was directed to attach
himself to the French admiral and to facilitate all his views by
procuring whatever might give them effect, after which he was to act
with the army under Sullivan.

Writing to the President of Congress (August 3, 1778), Washington says:
"As the army was encamped and there was no great prospect of a sudden
removal, I judged it advisable to send General Greene to the eastward
on Wednesday last, being fully persuaded his services, as well in the
quartermaster line as in the field, would be of material importance in
the expedition against the enemy in that quarter. He is intimately
acquainted with the whole of that country, and, besides, he has an
extensive interest and influence in it. And, in justice to General
Greene, I take occasion to observe that the public is much indebted to
him for his judicious management and active exertions in his present
department. When he entered upon it, he found it in a most confused,
distracted, and destitute state. This, by his conduct and industry, has
undergone a very happy change and such as enabled us, with great
facility, to make a sudden move, with the whole army and baggage, from
Valley Forge, in pursuit of the enemy, and to perform a march to this
place. In a word, he has given the most general satisfaction, and his
affairs carry much the face of method and system. I also consider it as
an act of justice to speak of the conduct of Colonel Wadsworth,
commissary-general. He has been indefatigable in his exertions to
provide for the army, and, since his appointment, our supplies of
provision have been good and ample."

We copy this extract from Washington's correspondence because it does
justice to Greene and gives us information of the favorable change
which had taken place in the condition of the army since its dreary
sojourn at Valley Forge.

The resolution being taken to proceed against Rhode Island, the fleet
got under way and on the 25th of July (1778) appeared off Newport and
cast anchor about five miles from that place; soon after which General
Sullivan visited D'Estaing and concerted with him a plan of operations.
The fleet was to enter the harbor and land the French troops on the
west side of the island, a little to the north of Dyer's Island. The
Americans were to land at the same time on the opposite coast under
cover of the guns of a frigate.

A delay of several days now took place on account of the tardiness of
the neighboring militia in joining Sullivan's army.

As the militia of New Hampshire and Massachusetts approached, Sullivan
joined Greene at Tiverton and it was agreed with the admiral that the
fleet should enter the main channel immediately (August 8th), and that
the descent should be made the succeeding day. The French fleet passed
the British batteries and entered the harbor without receiving or doing
any considerable damage.

The militia not arriving precisely at the time they were expected,
Sullivan could not hazard the movement which had been concerted, and
stated to the Count the necessity of postponing it till the next day.
Meanwhile the preparations for the descent being perceived, General
Pigot drew the troops which had been stationed on the north end of the
island into the lines at Newport.

On discovering this circumstance the next morning, Sullivan determined
to avail himself of it and to take immediate possession of the works
which had been abandoned. The whole army crossed the east passage and
landed on the north end of Rhode Island. This movement gave great
offense to D'Estaing who resented the indelicacy supposed to have been
committed by Sullivan in landing before the French and without
consulting him.

Unfortunately some difficulties on subjects of mere punctilio had
previously arisen. D'Estaing was a land as well as sea officer, and
held the high rank of lieutenant-general in the service of France.
Sullivan being only a major-general, some misunderstanding on this
delicate point had been apprehended, and Washington had suggested to
him the necessity of taking every precaution to avoid it. This, it was
supposed, had been effected in their first conference, in which it was
agreed that the Americans should land first, after which the French
should land to be commanded by D'Estaing in person. The motives for
this arrangement are not stated. Either his own after-reflections or
the suggestions of others dissatisfied D'Estaing with it and he
insisted that the descent should be made on both sides of the island
precisely at the same instant, and that one wing of the American army
should be attached to the French and land with them. He also declined
commanding in person and wished Lafayette to take charge of the French
troops as well as of the Americans attached to them.

It being feared that this alteration of the plan might endanger both
its parts D'Estaing was prevailed on to reduce his demand from one wing
of the American army to 1,000 militia. When afterward Sullivan crossed
over into the island before the time to which he had himself postponed
the descent, and without giving previous notice to the count of this
movement, considerable excitement was manifested. The count refused to
answer Sullivan's letter, and charged Lieutenant-Colonel Fleury, who
delivered it, with being more an American than a Frenchman.

At this time a British fleet appeared which, after sailing close into
the land and communicating with General Pigot, withdrew some distance
and came to anchor off Point Judith, just without the narrow inlet
leading into the harbor.

After it had been ascertained that the destination of the Count
D'Estaing was America, he was followed by a squadron of twelve ships of
the line under Admiral Byron who was designed to relieve Lord Howe,
that nobleman having solicited his recall. The vessels composing this
squadron meeting with weather unusually bad for the season, and being
separated in different storms, arrived, after lingering through a
tedious passage in various degrees of distress, on different and remote
parts of the American coast. Between the departure of D'Estaing from
the Hook on the 23d of July (1778) and the 30th of that month, four
ships of sixty-four and fifty guns arrived at Sandy Hook.

This addition to the British fleet, though it left Lord Howe
considerably inferior to the Count D'Estaing, determined him to attempt
the relief of Newport. He sailed from New York on the 6th of August and
on the 9th appeared in sight of the French fleet before intelligence of
his departure could be received by the admiral.

At the time of his arrival the wind set directly into the harbor so
that it was impossible to get out of it, but it shifted suddenly to the
northeast the next morning and the count determined to stand out to sea
and give battle. Previous to leaving port (August 10th) he informed
General Sullivan that on his return he would land his men as that
officer should advise.

Not choosing to give the advantage of the weather-gauge Lord Howe also
weighed anchor and stood out to sea. He was followed by D'Estaing, and
both fleets were soon out of sight.

The militia were now arrived and Sullivan's army amounted to 10,000
men. Notwithstanding some objections made by Lafayette to his
commencing operations before the return of D'Estaing, Sullivan
determined to commence the siege immediately. Before this determination
could be executed a furious storm blew down all the tents, rendered the
arms unfit for immediate use, and greatly damaged the ammunition, of
which fifty rounds had just been delivered to each man. The soldiers
having no shelter suffered extremely, and several perished in the storm
which continued three days. On the return of fair weather the siege was
commenced and continued without any material circumstance for several
days.

As no intelligence had been received from the admiral the situation of
the American army was becoming very critical. On the evening of the
19th their anxieties were relieved for a moment by the reappearance of
the French fleet.

The two admirals, desirous the one of gaining and the other of
retaining the advantage of the wind, had employed two days in
maneuvering without coming to action. Toward the close of the second
they were on the point of engaging when they were separated by the
violent storm which had been so severely felt on shore and which
dispersed both fleets. Some single vessels afterward fell in with each
other, but no important capture was made, and both fleets retired in a
very shattered condition, the one to the harbor of New York and the
other to that of Newport.

A letter was immediately dispatched by D'Estaing to Sullivan, informing
him that, in pursuance of orders from the King and of the advice of all
his officers, he had taken the resolution to carry the fleet to Boston.
His instructions directed him to sail for Boston should his fleet meet
with any disaster or should a superior British fleet appear on the
coast.

To be abandoned by the fleet in such critical circumstances and not
only deprived of the brilliant success which they thought within their
reach, but exposed to imminent hazard, caused much disappointment,
irritation, and alarm in the American camp. Lafayette and Greene were
dispatched to D'Estaing to remonstrate with him on the subject and to
press his cooperation and assistance for two days only, in which time
they flattered themselves the most Brilliant success would crown their
efforts. But the count was not popular in the fleet; he was a military
officer as well as a naval commander, and was considered as belonging
to the army rather than to the navy. The officers of the sea service
looked on him with a jealous and envious eye and were willing to thwart
him as far as they were able with safety to themselves. When, on the
pressing application of Lafayette and Greene, he again submitted the
matter to their consideration, they took advantage of the letter of the
admiral's instructions and unanimously adhered to their former
resolution, sacrificing the service of their prince to their own petty
jealousies and animosities. D'Estaing, therefore, felt himself
constrained to set sail for Boston.

The departure of the French marine force left Sullivan's army in a
critical situation. It was in a firm reliance on the cooperation of the
French fleet that the expedition was undertaken, and its sudden and
unexpected departure not only disappointed the sanguine hopes of speedy
success, but exposed the army to much hazard, for the British troops
under General Pigot might have been reinforced and the fleet might have
cut off Sullivan's retreat.

The departure of the French fleet greatly discouraged the American
army, and in a few days Sullivan's force was considerably diminished by
desertion. On the 26th of August he therefore resolved to raise the
siege and retreat to the north end of the island, and took the
necessary precautions for the successful execution of that movement.

In the night of the 28th, Sullivan silently decamped and retired
unobserved. Early in the morning the British discovered his retreat and
instantly commenced a pursuit. They soon overtook the light troops who
covered the retreat of the American army, and who continued skirmishing
and retreating till they reached the north end of the island, where the
army occupied a strong position at a place where the British formerly
had a fortified post, the works of which had been strengthened during
the two preceding days. There a severe conflict for about half an hour
ensued, when the combatants mutually withdrew from the field. The loss
of the armies was nearly equal, amounting to between two and three
hundred killed or wounded in the course of the day.

On the 30th of August there was a good deal of cannonading, but neither
party ventured to attack the other. The British were expecting
reinforcements, and Sullivan, although he made a show of resolutely
maintaining his post, was busily preparing for the evacuation of the
island. In the evening he silently struck his tents, embarked his army,
with all the artillery, baggage, and stores, on board a great number of
boats and landed safely on the continent before the British suspected
his intention to abandon the post. General Sullivan made a timely
escape, for Sir Henry Clinton was on his way, with 4,000 men, to the
assistance of General Pigot. He was detained four days in the Sound by
contrary winds, but arrived on the day after the Americans left the
island. A very short delay would probably have proved fatal to their
army.

The most sanguine expectations had been entertained throughout the
United States of the reduction of Rhode Island and the capture of the
British force which defended it, so that the disappointment and
mortification on the failure of the enterprise were exceedingly bitter.
The irritation against the French, who were considered the authors of
the miscarriage, was violent. Sullivan was confident of success; and
his chagrin at the departure of the French fleet made him use some
expressions, in a general order, which gave offense to D'Estaing.

Washington foresaw the evils likely to result from the general and
mutual irritation which prevailed, and exerted all his influence to
calm the minds of both parties. He had a powerful coadjutor in
Lafayette, who was as deservedly dear to the Americans as to the
French. His first duties were due to his King and country, but he loved
America, and was so devoted to the Commander-in-Chief of its armies, as
to enter into his views and second his softening conciliatory measures
with truly filial affection. Washington also wrote to General Heath,
who commanded at Boston, and to Sullivan and Greene, who commanded at
Rhode Island. In his letter to General Heath he stated his fears "that
the departure of the French fleet from Rhode Island at so critical a
moment, would not only weaken the confidence of the people in their new
allies, but produce such prejudice and resentment as might prevent
their giving the fleet, in its present distress, such zealous and
effectual assistance as was demanded by the exigency of affairs and the
true interests of America;" and added "that it would be sound policy to
combat these effects and to give the best construction of what had
happened; and at the same time to make strenuous exertions for putting
the French fleet, as soon as possible, in a condition to defend itself
and be useful." He also observed as follows: "The departure of the
fleet from Rhode Island is not yet publicly announced here; but when it
is, I intend to ascribe it to necessity produced by the damage received
in the late storm. This, it appears to me, is the idea which ought to
be generally propagated. As I doubt not the force of these reasons will
strike you equally with myself, I would recommend to you to use your
utmost influence to palliate and soften matters, and to induce those
whose business it is to provide succors of every kind for the fleet, to
employ their utmost zeal and activity in doing it. It is our duty to
make the best of our misfortunes and not suffer passion to interfere
with our interest and the public good."

Writing to General Sullivan he observed: "The disagreement between the
army under your command and the fleet has given me very singular
uneasiness. The continent at large is concerned in our cordiality, and
it should be kept up by all possible means consistent with our honor
and policy. First impressions are generally longest retained, and will
serve to fix in a great degree our national character with the French.
In our conduct toward them we should remember that they are a people
old in war, very strict in military etiquette, and apt to take fire
when others seem scarcely warmed. Permit me to recommend, in the most
particular manner, the cultivation of harmony and good agreement, and
your endeavors to destroy that ill-humor which may have found its way
among the officers. It is of the utmost importance, too, that the
soldier and the people should know nothing of this misunderstanding; or
if it has reached them, that means may be used to stop its progress and
prevent its effects."

To General Greene, Washington wrote: "I have not now time to take
notice of the several arguments which were made use of, for and against
the count's quitting the harbor of Newport and sailing for Boston.
Right or wrong, it will probably disappoint our sanguine expectations
of success and which I deem a still worse consequence, I fear it will
sow the seeds of dissension and distrust between us and our new allies,
unless the most prudent measures be taken to suppress the feuds and
jealousies that have already arisen. I depend much on your temper and
influence to conciliate that animosity which, subsists between the
American and French officers in our service. I beg you will take every
measure to keep the protest entered into by the general officers from
being made public. Congress, sensible of the ill consequences that will
flow from our differences being known to the world, have passed a
resolve to that purpose. Upon the whole, my dear sir, you can conceive
my meaning better than I can express it; and I therefore fully depend
on your exerting yourself to heal all private animosities between our
principal officers and the French, and to prevent all illiberal
expression and reflections that may fall from the army at large."

Washington also improved the first opportunity of recommencing his
correspondence with Count D'Estaing, in a letter to him, which, without
noticing the disagreements that had taken place, was well calculated to
soothe every unpleasant sensation which might have disturbed his mind.
In the course of a short correspondence, the irritation which
threatened serious mischiefs gave way to returning good understanding
and cordiality; although here and there popular ill-will manifested
itself in rather serious quarrels and disputes with the French sailors
and marines.

Meantime, in the storm which had separated the fleets of D'Estaing and
Howe when just about to engage, the British fleet had suffered
considerably, but had not sustained so much damage as the French. In a
short time Lord Howe was again ready for sea; and having learned that
D'Estaing had sailed for Boston, he left New York with the intention of
reaching that place before him, or of attacking him there, if he found
it could be done with advantage. But on entering the bay of Boston he
perceived the French fleet in Nantasket Roads, so judiciously stationed
and so well protected by batteries that there was no prospect of
attacking it with success. He therefore returned to New York, where,
finding that by fresh arrivals his fleet was decidedly superior to that
of the French, he availed himself of the permission which he had
received some time before and resigned the command to Admiral Gambier,
who was to continue in the command till the arrival of Admiral Byron,
who was daily expected from Halifax.

Sir Henry Clinton, finding that General Sullivan had effected his
retreat from Rhode Island, set out on his return to New York; but that
the expedition might not be wholly ineffectual, he meditated an attack
on New London, situated on a river which falls into the Sound. The
wind, however, being unfavorable to the enterprise, he gave the command
of the troops on board the transports to Maj.-Gen. Sir Charles Grey,
with orders to proceed in an expedition against Buzzard's Bay, and
continued his voyage to New York. [1]

In obedience to the orders which he had received, General Grey sailed
to Acushnet river where he landed on the 5th of September (1778), and
destroyed all the shipping in the river, amounting to more than seventy
sail. He burned a great part of the towns of Bedford and Fairhaven, the
one on the west and the other on the east bank, destroying a
considerable quantity of military and naval stores, provisions, and
merchandise. He landed at six in the evening, and so rapid were his
movements that the work of destruction was accomplished and the troops
re-embarked before noon the next day. He then proceeded to the island
called Martha's Vineyard, a resort of privateers, where he took or
burned several vessels, destroyed the salt works, compelled the
inhabitants to surrender their arms, and levied from them a
contribution of 1,000 sheep and 300 oxen.

Having mercilessly ravaged the seacoast, the hero of the Paoli massacre
returned, heavily laden with plunder, to New York.

The return of the British fleet and of the troops under Grey relieved
the Americans from the anxious apprehension of an attack on their
allies at Boston. Under that apprehension, Washington had broken up his
camp at White Plains, and proceeding northward taken a position at
Fredericksburg, thirty miles from West Point near the borders of
Connecticut. He detached Generals Gates and M'Dougall to Danbury, in
Connecticut, in order that they might be in readiness to move as
circumstances might require, and he sent General Putnam to West Point
to watch the North river and the important passes in the Highlands. But
the return of the fleet and troops to New York quieted those
apprehensions.

Meanwhile Washington received intelligence that an expedition was
preparing at New York, the object of which was not clearly apparent;
but soon after the return of the troops under Grey the British army
advanced in great force on both sides of the North river. The column on
the west bank, consisting of 5,000 men commanded by Cornwallis,
extended from the Hudson to the Hackensack. The division on the east
side consisting of about 3,000 men under Knyphausen, stretched from the
North river to the Bronx. The communication between them was kept up by
flat-bottomed boats, by means of which the two divisions could have
been readily united if the Americans had advanced against either of
them.

Washington sent out several detachments to observe the movements of
those columns. Colonel Baylor, who with his regiment of cavalry
consisting of upwards of a hundred men had been stationed near Paramus,
crossed the Hackensack on the morning of the 27th of September and
occupied Tappan or Herringtown, a small village near New Tappan, where
some militia were posted. Of these circumstances Cornwallis received
immediate notice and he formed a plan to surprise and cut off both the
cavalry and militia. The execution of the enterprise against Baylor was
entrusted to the unscrupulous General Grey, and Colonel Campbell with a
detachment from Knyphausen's division was to cross the river and attack
the militia at New Tappan. Colonel Campbell's part of the plan failed
by some delay in the passage of the river, during which a deserter
informed the militia of their danger and they saved themselves by
flight. But Grey completely surprised Baylor's troops and killed,
wounded, or took the greater part of them. Colonel Baylor was wounded
and made prisoner. The slaughter on that occasion which as at the
Paoli, was a literal massacre of surprised and defenseless men excited
much indignation and was the subject of loud complaints throughout the
United States.

Three days after the surprise of Baylor, Col. Richard Butler with a
detachment of infantry assisted by Maj. Henry Lee with part of his
cavalry, fell in with a party of 15 chasseurs and about 100 yagers
under Captain Donop, on whom they made such a rapid charge that without
the loss of a man, they killed ten of them on the spot and took about
twenty prisoners.

The movement of the British army up the North river already mentioned,
was made for the purpose of foraging and also to cover a meditated
attack on Little Egg Harbor, and having accomplished its object it
returned to New York. Little Egg Harbor, situated on the coast of
Jersey, was a rendezvous of privateers, and being so near the entrance
to New York ships bound to that port were much exposed to their
depredations. An expedition against it was therefore planned and the
conduct of the enterprise entrusted to Capt. Patrick Ferguson of the
Seventeenth regiment with about 300 men, assisted by Captain Collins of
the navy. He sailed from New York, but short as the passage was he was
detained several days by contrary winds and did not arrive at the place
of his destination till the evening of the 5th of October (1778). The
Americans had got notice of his design and had sent to sea such of
their privateers as were ready for sailing. They had also hauled the
largest of the remaining vessels, which were chiefly prizes, twenty
miles up the river to Chestnut Neck, and had carried their smaller
vessels still further into the country. Ferguson proceeded to Chestnut
Neck, burned the vessels there, destroyed the storehouses and public
works of every sort, and in returning committed many depredations on
private property.

Count Pulaski with his legionary corps composed of three companies of
foot and a troop of horse, officered principally by foreigners, had
been detached by Washington into Jersey to check these depredations. He
was ordered toward Little Egg Harbor and lay without due vigilance
eight or ten miles from the coast. One Juliet, a Frenchman, who had
deserted from the British service and obtained a commission in
Pulaski's corps redeserted, joined Captain Ferguson at Little Egg
Harbor after his return from Chestnut Neck and gave him exact
information of the strength and situation of Pulaski's troops.

Ferguson and Collins immediately resolved to surprise the Polish
nobleman, and for that purpose, on the 15th of October (1778), they
embarked 250 men in boats, rowed ten miles up the river before
daybreak, landed within a small distance of his infantry, left fifty
men to guard their boat, and with the remainder of their force suddenly
fell on the unsuspicious detachment, killed fifty of them among whom
were the Baron de Bosc and Lieutenant de la Borderie, and retreated
with scarcely any loss before they could be attacked by Pulaski's
cavalry.

This was another massacre similar to those of the infamous Grey. [2]
Only five prisoners were taken. The commander pretended to have
received information that Pulaski had ordered his men to give no
quarter, but this was false.

Admiral Byron reached New York and took command of the fleet about the
middle of September (1778). After repairing his shattered vessels he
sailed for the port of Boston. Soon after his arrival in the bay
fortune disconcerted all his plans. A furious storm drove him out to
sea and damaged his fleet so much that he found it necessary to put
into Newport to refit. This favorable moment was seized by the Count
D'Estaing who sailed on the 3d of November for the West Indies.

Thus terminated an expedition from which the most important advantages
had been anticipated. A variety of accidents had defeated plans
judiciously formed which had every probability of success in their
favor.

Lafayette, ambitious of fame on another theater, was now desirous of
returning to France. Expecting war on the continent of Europe he was
anxious to tender his services to his King and to his native country.

From motives of real friendship as well as of policy, Washington was
desirous of preserving the connection of this officer with the army and
of strengthening his attachment to America. He therefore expressed to
Congress his wish that Lafayette, instead of resigning his commission,
might have unlimited leave of absence to return when it should be
convenient to himself, and might carry with him every mark of the
confidence of the government. This policy was adopted by Congress in
its full extent. The partiality of America for Lafayette was well
placed. Never did a foreigner, whose primary attachments to his own
country remained undiminished, feel more solicitude for the welfare of
another than was unceasingly manifested by this young nobleman for the
United States.

The French alliance having effected a change in the position of affairs
on the ocean, Congress devoted a good deal of attention to naval
matters; several new vessels were built and others were purchased, and
the present year (1778) gave token of the spirit and ability of some of
our earlier naval officers in contending with a navy usually held to be
invincible. Early in the year Captain Biddle, in the Randolph, a
frigate of thirty-six guns, engaged his majesty's ship the Yarmouth, a
sixty-four, but after an action of twenty minutes the Randolph blew up
and Captain Biddle and crew perished with the exception of only four
men who were picked up a few days after on a piece of wreck. The
celebrated Paul Jones made his appearance on the English coast during
this year, and rendered his name a terror by the bold and daring
exploits which he performed. Captain Barry, off the coast of Maine,
behaved in a most gallant manner in an action with two English ships,
sustaining the contest for seven hours, and at last escaping with his
men on shore. Captain Talbot in October of this year (1778)
distinguished himself by a well-planned and successful attack upon a
British vessel off Rhode Island. The schooner Pigot, moored at the
mouth of Seconset river, effectually barred the passage, broke up the
local trade, and cut off the supplies of provisions and reinforcements
for that part of the colony. Talbot, earnestly desirous of relieving
the country of this annoyance, obtained the consent of General Sullivan
to make the attempt. With his usual alacrity he set about the affair
and was entirely successful. The Pigot was captured and carried off in
triumph by the gallant band under Talbot. In the succeeding November
Captain Talbot received a complimentary letter from the President of
Congress, together with a resolve of Congress, presenting him with the
commission of lieutenant-colonel in the army of the United States.

There being no prospect of an active winter campaign in the northern or
middle States and the climate admitting of military operations
elsewhere, a detachment from the British army consisting of 5,000 men
commanded by Major-General Grant, sailed early in November under a
strong convoy for the West India islands, and toward the end of the
same month another embarkation was made for the southern parts of the
continent. This second detachment was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Campbell who was escorted by Com. Hyde Parker, and was destined to act
against the Southern States.

As a force sufficient for the defense of New York yet remained the
American army retired into winter quarters (Dec., 1778). The main body
was cantoned in Connecticut, on both sides the North river, about West
Point, and at Middlebrook. Light troops were stationed nearer the
lines, and the cavalry were drawn into the interior to recruit the
horses for the next campaign. In this distribution the protection of
the country, the security of important points, and a cheap and
convenient supply of provisions were consulted.

The troops again wintered in huts, but they were used to this mode of
passing that inclement season. Though far from being well clothed their
condition in that respect was so much improved by supplies from France
that they disregarded the inconveniences to which they were exposed.

Colonel Campbell, who sailed from the Hook about the last of November,
1778, escorted by a small squadron commanded by Com. Hyde Parker
reached the Isle of Tybee, near the Savannah, on the 23d of December,
and in a few days the fleet and the transports passed the bar and
anchored in the river.

The command of the Southern army, composed of the troops of South
Carolina and Georgia, had been committed to Major-General Robert Howe,
who in the course of the preceding summer had invaded East Florida. The
diseases incident to the climate made such ravages among his raw
soldiers that though he had scarcely seen an enemy he found himself
compelled to hasten out of the country with considerable loss. After
this disastrous enterprise his army, consisting of between six and
seven hundred Continental troops aided by a few hundred militia had
encamped in the neighborhood of the town of Savannah, situated on the
southern bank of the river bearing that name. The country about the
mouth of the river is one track of deep marsh intersected by creeks and
cuts of water impassable for troops at any time of the tide, except
over causeways extending through the sunken ground.

Without much opposition Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell effected a landing
on the 29th (December, 1778), about three miles below the town, upon
which Howe formed his line of battle. His left was secured by the
river, and along the whole extent of his front was a morass which
stretched to his right and was believed by him to be impassable for
such a distance as effectually to secure that wing.

After reconnoitering the country Colonel Campbell advanced on the great
road leading to Savannah, and about 3 in the afternoon appeared in
sight of the American army. While making dispositions to dislodge it he
accidentally fell in with a negro who informed him of a private path
leading through the swamp round the right of the American lines to
their rear. Determining to avail himself of this path he detached a
column under Sir James Baird which entered the morass unperceived by
Howe.

As soon as Sir James emerged from the swamp he attacked and dispersed a
body of Georgia militia which gave the first notice to the American
general of the danger which threatened his rear. At the same instant
the British troops in his front were put in motion and their artillery
began to play upon him. A retreat was immediately ordered and the
Continental troops were under the necessity of running across a plain
in front of the corps which had been led to the rear by Sir James Baird
who attacked their flanks with great impetuosity and considerable
effect. The few who escaped retreated up the Savannah, and crossing
that river at Zubly's Ferry took refuge in South Carolina.

The victory was complete and decisive in its consequences. About 100
Americans were either killed in the field or drowned in attempting to
escape through a deep swamp. Thirty-eight officers and 415 privates
were taken. Forty-eight pieces of cannon, twenty-three mortars, the
fort, with all its military stores, a large quantity of provisions
collected for the use of the army, and the capital of Georgia fell into
the hands of the conqueror. These advantages were obtained at the
expense of only seven killed and nineteen wounded.

No military force now remained in Georgia except the garrison of
Sunbury whose retreat to South Carolina was cut off. All the lower part
of that State was occupied by the British who adopted measures to
secure the conquest they had made. The inhabitants were treated with a
lenity as wise as it was humane. Their property was spared and their
persons protected. To make the best use of victory and of the
impression produced by the moderation of the victors a proclamation was
issued inviting the inhabitants to repair to the British standard and
offering protection to those who would return to their allegiance.

The effect of these measures was soon felt. The inhabitants flocked in
great numbers to the royal standard; military corps for the protection
of the country were formed, and posts were established for a
considerable distance up the river.

The northern frontier of Georgia being supposed to be settled into a
state of quiet Colonel Campbell turned his attention toward Sunbury and
was about to proceed against that place when he received intelligence
that it had surrendered to General Prevost.

Sir Henry Clinton had ordered that officer from East Florida to
cooperate with Colonel Campbell. On hearing that the troops from the
north were off the coast he entered the southern frontier of Georgia
(Jan. 9, 1779) and invested Sunbury, which, after a slight resistance
surrendered at discretion. Having placed a garrison in the fort he
proceeded to Savannah, took command of the army, and detached Colonel
Campbell with 800 regulars and a few Provincials to Augusta which fell
without resistance, and thus the whole State of Georgia was reduced.

1. Footnote: This officer was the same Grey who had surprised Wayne's
detachment near the Paoli Tavern, in Pennsylvania (Sept. 20, 1777), as
already related in the text. His merciless massacre of Wayne's men,
with the bayonet, will ever be remembered. A monument is erected on the
spot where the massacre took place, consecrated to the memory of the
sufferers.

2. Footnote: The British government rewarded Grey for his cruelty by
making him a peer. He was the father of Earl Grey, who became prime
minister of Great Britain. This reward to Colonel Grey was in strict
consistency with the spirit in which the whole war against the United
States was conducted. Fortunately, the cruel and brutal outrages of the
invaders reacted on themselves, and contributed greatly to the final
result.




CHAPTER XVI.


WASHINGTON PREPARES TO CHASTISE THE INDIANS. 1778.


While the events were passing which are recorded in the preceding
chapter a terrible war with the Indians was raging on the western
frontier of the United States. While the British were abundantly able
to supply the Indians with all those articles of use and luxury which
they had been accustomed to receive from the whites, Congress was not
in a condition to do anything of this sort to conciliate them or to
secure their neutrality in the existing war. Stimulated by the presents
as well as by the artful representations of British agents the Indians
had consequently become hostile. Early in 1778 there were many
indications of a general disposition among the savages to make war on
the United States, and the frontiers, from the Mohawk to the Ohio, were
threatened with the tomahawk and the scalping-knife. Every
representation from that country supported Washington's opinion that a
war with the Indians should never be defensive and that to obtain peace
it must be carried into their own country. Detroit was understood to be
in a defenseless condition, and Congress resolved on an expedition
against that place. This enterprise was entrusted to General M'Intosh,
who commanded at Pittsburgh, and was to be carried on with 3,000 men,
chiefly militia, to be drawn from Virginia. To facilitate its success
another force was to attack the Senecas, advancing from the east of the
Hudson.

Unfortunately the acts of the government did not correspond with the
vigor of its resolutions. The necessary preparations were not made and
the inhabitants of the frontiers remained without sufficient protection
until the plans against them were matured and the storm which had been
long gathering burst upon them with a fury which spread desolation
wherever it reached.

About 300 white men, commanded by the British Col. John Butler, and
about 500 Indians, led by the Indian Chief Brandt, who had assembled in
the north, marched late in June (1778) against the settlement of
Wyoming. These troops embarked on the Chemung or Tioga and descending
the Susquehanna, landed at a place called the Three Islands, whence
they marched about twenty miles, and crossing a wilderness and passing
through a gap in the mountain, entered the valley of Wyoming near its
northern boundary. At this place a small fort called Wintermoots had
been erected, which fell into their hands without resistance and was
burnt. The inhabitants who were capable of bearing arms assembled on
the first alarm at Forty Fort on the west side of the Susquehanna, four
miles below the camp of the invading army.

The regular troops, amounting to about sixty, were commanded by Col.
Zebulon Butler, [1] the militia by Colonel Dennison. Colonel Butler was
desirous of awaiting the arrival of a small reinforcement under Captain
Spalding who had been ordered by Washington to his aid on the first
intelligence of the danger which threatened the settlement, but the
militia generally, believing themselves sufficiently strong to repel
the invading force, urged an immediate battle so earnestly that Colonel
Butler yielded to their remonstrances, and on the 3d of July (1778)
marched from Forty Fort at the head of near 400 men to attack the
enemy.

The British and Indians were prepared to receive him. Their line was
formed a small distance in front of their camp on a plain thinly
covered with pine, shrub-oaks, and under-growth, and extended from the
river about a mile to a marsh at the foot of the mountain. The
Americans advanced in a single column without interruption until they
approached the enemy, when they received a fire which did not much
mischief. The line of battle was instantly formed and the action
commenced with spirit. The Americans rather gained ground on the right
where Colonel Butler commanded, until a large body of Indians passing
through the skirt of the marsh turned their left flank, which was
composed of militia, and poured a heavy and most destructive fire on
their rear. The word "retreat" was pronounced by some person and the
efforts of the officers to check it were unavailing. The fate of the
day was decided, and a flight commenced on the left which was soon
followed by the right. As soon as the line was broken the Indians,
throwing down their rifles and rushing upon them with the tomahawk,
completed the confusion. The attempt of Colonel Butler and of the
officers to restore order was unavailing and the whole line broke and
fled in confusion. The massacre was general and the cries for mercy
were answered by the tomahawk. Rather less than sixty men escaped, some
to Forty Fort, some by swimming the river, and some to the mountain. A
very few prisoners were made, only three of whom were preserved alive,
who were carried to Niagara.

Further resistance was impracticable and Colonel Dennison proposed
terms of capitulation which were granted to the inhabitants. It being
understood that no quarter would be allowed to the Continental troops
Colonel Butler with his few surviving soldiers fled from the valley.

The inhabitants generally abandoned the country and, in great distress,
wandered into the settlements on the Lehigh and the Delaware. The
Indians, according to their usual practice, destroyed the houses and
improvements by fire and plundered the country. After laying waste the
whole settlement they withdrew from it before the arrival of the
Continental troops, who were ordered to meet them. On the 11th of
November (1778) 500 Indians and Loyalists, with a small detachment of
regular troops, under the command of the notorious John Butler, made an
irruption into the settlement at Cherry Valley, in the State of New
York, surprised and killed Colonel Allen, commander of the American
force at that place, and ten of his soldiers. They attacked a fort
erected there, but were compelled to retreat. Next day they left the
place, after having murdered and scalped thirty-two of the inhabitants,
chiefly women and children.

On the first intelligence of the destruction of Wyoming the regiments
of Hartley and Butler with the remnant of Morgan's corps, commanded by
Major Posey, were detached to the protection of that distressed
country. They were engaged in several sharp skirmishes, made separate
incursions into the Indian settlements, broke up their nearest
villages, destroyed their corn, and, by compelling them to retire to a
greater distance, gave some relief to the inhabitants.

While the frontiers of New York and Pennsylvania were thus suffering
the calamities incident to savage warfare, a fate equally severe was
preparing for Virginia. The western militia of that State had made some
successful incursions into the country northwest of the Ohio and had
taken some British posts on the Mississippi. These were erected into
the county of Illinois, and a regiment of infantry with a troop of
cavalry was raised for its protection. The command of these troops was
given to Col. George Rogers Clarke, a gentleman who courage, hardihood,
and capacity for Indian warfare had given repeated success to his
enterprises against the savages.

This corps was divided into several detachments, the strongest of which
remained with Colonel Clarke at Kaskaskia. Colonel Hamilton, the
Governor of Detroit, was at Vincennes with about 600 men, principally
Indians, preparing an expedition, first against Kaskaskia and then up
the Ohio to Pittsburgh, after which he purposed to desolate the
frontiers of Virginia. Clarke anticipated and defeated his design by
one of those bold and decisive measures, which, whether formed on a
great or a small scale, mark the military and enterprising genius of
the man who plans and executes them.

He was too far removed from the inhabited country to hope for support,
and was too weak to maintain Kaskaskia and the Illinois against the
combined force of regulars and Indians by which he was to be attacked
as soon as the season for action should arrive. While employed in
preparing for his defense he received unquestionable information that
Hamilton had detached his Indians on an expedition against the
frontiers, reserving at the post he occupied only about eighty regulars
with three pieces of cannon and some swivels. Clarke instantly resolved
to seize this favorable moment. After detaching a small galley up the
Wabash with orders to take her station a few miles below Vincennes and
to permit nothing to pass her, he marched in the depth of winter with
130 men, the whole force he could collect, across the country from
Kaskaskia to Vincennes. This march through the woods and over high
waters required sixteen days, five of which were employed in crossing
the drowned lands of the Wabash. The troops were under the necessity of
wading five miles in water frequently up to their breasts. After
subduing these difficulties this small party appeared before the town,
which was completely surprised and readily consented to change its
master.

Hamilton, after defending the fort a short time, surrendered himself
and his garrison prisoners of war. With a few of his immediate agents
and counselors, who had been instrumental in the savage barbarities he
had encouraged, he was, by order of the Executive of Virginia, put in
irons and confined in a jail.

This expedition was important in its consequences. It disconcerted a
plan which threatened destruction to the whole country west of the
Allegheny Mountains, detached from the British interest many of those
numerous tribes of Indians south of the waters immediately
communicating with the Great Lakes, and had most probably considerable
influence in fixing the boundary of the United States.

These Indian hostilities on the western border were a subject of
extreme solicitude to Washington, ever alive as he was to the cry of
distress and ever anxious to preserve peace and security to the rural
population of the country. Experience and observation had long since
taught him that the only effectual protection to the inhabitants of the
frontier settlements consisted in carrying the war with severity into
the enemy's own country. Hence we find that from the moment these
atrocities of the Indians commenced in the western country he was
engaged in planning that expedition which, in the next campaign, under
the direction of General Sullivan, carried desolation to their own
homes and taught them a lesson which they could not soon forget. In the
following extract of a letter to Gov. George Clinton of New York, dated
March 4, 1779, it will be perceived that he speaks of his plan as
already matured:

"The President of Congress has transmitted to me your Excellency's
letter to the delegates of New York, representing the calamitous
situation of the northwestern frontier of that State, accompanied by a
similar application from the Pennsylvania Assembly, and a resolve of
the 25th, directing me to take the most effectual measures for the
protection of the inhabitants and chastisement of the Indians. The
resolve has been in some measure anticipated by my previous
dispositions for carrying on offensive operations against the hostile
tribes of savages. It has always been my intention early to communicate
this matter to your Excellency in confidence, and I take occasion, from
the letter above mentioned, to inform you that preparations have some
time since been making, and they will be conducted to the point of
execution at a proper season, if no unexpected accident prevents, and
the situation of affairs on the maritime frontier justifies the
undertaking.

"The greatest secrecy is necessary to the success of such an
enterprise, for the following obvious reasons: That, immediately upon
the discovery of our design, the savages would either put themselves in
condition to make head against us, by a reunion of all their force and
that of their allies, strengthened besides by succors from Canada; or
elude the expedition altogether, which might be done at the expense of
a temporary evacuation of forests which we could not possess, and the
destruction of a few settlements which they might speedily re-
establish."

Washington concludes this letter by calling upon Governor Clinton for
an account of the force which New York can furnish for the contemplated
expedition and describing the kind of men most desirable for this
peculiar service--"active rangers, who are at the same time expert
marksmen, and accustomed to the irregular kind of wood-fighting
practiced by the Indians." He concludes by expressing a desire to have
the advantage of any sentiments or advice the Governor might be pleased
to communicate relative to the expedition. This is but one among many
instances which might be cited of the vigilance and unceasing activity
of Washington in everything connected with the national defense.

In addition to this Indian war Washington at this time (1778) had
another cause of deep anxiety continually upon his mind, in the
comparatively weak and inefficient character of the legislative body to
whom he must necessarily look for support and sanction in all measures
for the defense of the country. The Congress of 1774--that Congress
whose proceedings and State papers had elicited the admiration of the
illustrious Earl of Chatham--had comprised the ablest and most
influential men in the country. But most of these men had withdrawn
from Congress or had accepted high offices under their own State
governments, and their places had either not been filled at all or had
been filled by incompetent men. For the year 1778 the average number of
members had been between twenty-five and thirty. Some States were not
represented and others had not sent delegates enough to entitle them to
a vote. But small as the number of delegates in Congress was they were
sufficiently numerous to entertain the fiercest feuds among themselves,
and seriously to embarrass the public service by permitting party
considerations to interfere with the measures most essential to the
safety and efficiency of the army and the preservation of order in the
country.

Washington was acutely sensible to this disastrous state of things.
Full of disinterested zeal for the public service he could hardly
comprehend the apathy prevailing in the different States, which
occasioned their omitting to fill up their "quotas" of representatives
in Congress, and he was embarrassed and distressed with the weak and
inefficient manner in which the military and civil affairs, under the
direction of Congress, were conducted. In a letter to Benjamin Harrison
of Virginia, a member of the Congress of 1774, he expresses frankly his
views on this unpleasant topic as follows:

"It appears as clear to me as ever the sun did in its meridian
brightness, that America never stood in more eminent need of the wise,
patriotic, and spirited exertions of her sons than at this period, and
if it is not a sufficient cause for general lamentation my
misconception of the matter impresses it too strongly upon me that the
States, separately, are too much engaged in their local concerns and
have too many of their ablest men withdrawn from the general council
for the good of the commonweal. In a word I think our political system
may be compared to the mechanism of a clock and that we should derive a
lesson from it, for it answers no good purpose to keep the smaller
wheels in order if the greater one, which is the support and prime
mover of the whole, is neglected. How far the latter is the case it
does not become me to pronounce, but as there can be no harm in a pious
wish for the good of one's country, I shall offer it as mine, that each
would not only choose, but absolutely compel their ablest men to attend
Congress, and that they would instruct them to go into a thorough
investigation of the causes that have produced so many disagreeable
effects in the army and country, in a word, that public abuses should
be corrected. Without this it does not in my judgment require the
spirit of divination to foretell the consequences of the present
administration nor to how little purpose the States individually are
framing constitutions, providing laws, and filling offices with the
abilities of their ablest men. These, if the great whole is mismanaged,
must sink in the general wreck, which will carry with it the remorse of
thinking that we are lost by our own folly and negligence or by the
desire, perhaps, of living in ease and tranquility during the
accomplishment of so great a revolution, in the effecting of which the
greatest abilities and the most honest men our American world affords
ought to be employed.

"It is much to be feared, my dear sir, that the States in their
separate capacities have very inadequate ideas of the present danger.
Many persons removed far distant from the scene of action and seeing
and hearing such publications only as flatter their wishes, conceive
that the contest is at an end and that to regulate the government and
police of their own State is all that remains to be done, but it is
devoutly to be wished that a sad reverse of this may not fall upon them
like a thunderclap that is little expected. I do not mean to designate
particular States. I wish to cast no reflections upon any one. The
public believe (and if they do believe it, the fact might almost as
well be so) that the States at this time are badly represented and that
the great and important concerns of the nation are horribly conducted
for want either of abilities or application in the members, or through
the discord and party views of some individuals. That they should be so
is to be lamented more at this time than formerly, as we are far
advanced in the dispute and, in the opinion of many, drawing to a happy
period; we have the eyes of Europe upon us and I am persuaded many
political spies to watch, who discover our situation and give
information of our weaknesses and wants."

We have already seen that Congress, actuated by their wishes rather
than governed by a temperate calculation of the means in their
possession, had, in the preceding winter, planned a second invasion of
Canada to be conducted by Lafayette and that, as the generals only were
got in readiness for this expedition, it was necessarily laid aside.
The design, however, seems to have been suspended, not abandoned. The
alliance with France revived the latent wish to annex that extensive
territory to the United States. That favorite subject was resumed, and
toward autumn a plan was completely digested for a combined attack to
be made by the allies on all the British dominions on the continent and
on the adjacent islands of Cape Breton and Newfoundland. This plan was
matured about the time Lafayette obtained leave to return to his own
country and was ordered to be transmitted by him to Doctor Franklin,
the minister of the United States at the court of Versailles with
instructions to induce, if possible, the French cabinet to accede to
it. Some communications respecting this subject were also made to
Lafayette, on whose influence in securing its adoption by his own
government much reliance was placed, and in October 1778, it was for
the first time transmitted to Washington, with a request that he would
enclose it by Lafayette, with his observations on it, to Doctor
Franklin.

This very extensive plan of military operations for the ensuing
campaign, prepared entirely in the cabinet without consulting, so far
as is known, a single military man, consisted of many parts.

Two detachments, amounting each to 1,600 men, were to march from
Pittsburgh and Wyoming against Detroit and Niagara. A third body of
troops which was to be stationed on the Mohawk during the winter and to
be powerfully reinforced in the spring, was to seize Oswego and to
secure the navigation of Lake Ontario with vessels to be constructed of
materials to be procured in the winter. A fourth corps was to penetrate
into Canada by the St. Francis and to reduce Montreal and the posts on
Lake Champlain, while a fifth should guard against troops from Quebec.

Thus far America could proceed unaided by her ally. But Upper Canada
being reduced another campaign would still be necessary for the
reduction of Quebec. This circumstance would require that the army
should pass the winter in Canada, and in the meantime the garrison of
Quebec might be largely reinforced. It was therefore essential to the
complete success of the enterprise that France should be induced to
take a part in it.

The conquest of Quebec and of Halifax was supposed to be an object of
so much importance to France as well as to the United States that her
aid might be confidently expected.

It was proposed to request the King of France to furnish four or five
thousand troops, to sail from Brest the beginning of May under convoy
of four ships of the line and four frigates, the troops to be clad as
if for service in the West Indies and thick clothes to be sent after
them in August. A large American detachment was to act with this French
army and it was supposed that Quebec and Halifax might be reduced by
the beginning or middle of October. The army might then either proceed
immediately against New Foundland or remain in garrison until the
spring when the conquest of that place might be accomplished.

It had been supposed probable that England would abandon the further
prosecution of the war on the continent of North America, in which case
the government would have a respectable force at its disposal, the
advantageous employment of which had engaged in part the attention of
Washington. He had contemplated an expedition against the British posts
in Upper Canada as a measure which might be eventually eligible and
which might employ the arms of the United States to advantage if their
troops might safely be withdrawn from the sea-board. He had, however,
considered every object of this sort as contingent. Having estimated
the difficulties to be encountered in such an enterprise he had found
them so considerable as to hesitate on the extent which might safely be
given to the expedition admitting the United States to be evacuated by
the British armies.

In this state of mind Washington received the magnificent plan already
prepared by Congress. He was forcibly struck with the impracticability
of executing that part of it which, was to be undertaken by the United
States should the British armies continue in the country and with the
serious mischief which would result to the common cause as well as from
diverting so considerable a part of the French force from other objects
to one which was, in his opinion, so unpromising as from the ill
impression which would be made on the court and nation by the total
failure of the American government to execute its part of a plan
originating with itself--a failure would most probably sacrifice the
troops and ships employed by France.

On comparing the naval force of England with that of France in
different parts of the world, the former appeared to Washington to
maintain a decided superiority and consequently to possess the power of
shutting up the ships of the latter which might be trusted into the St.
Lawrence. To suppose that the British government would not avail itself
of this superiority on such an occasion would be to impute to it a
blind infatuation or ignorance of the plans of its adversary, which
could not be safely assumed in calculations of such serious import.

A plan, too, consisting of so many parts to be prosecuted both from
Europe and America by land and by water--which, to be successful,
required such an harmonious cooperation of the whole, such a perfect
coincidence of events--appeared to him to be exposed to too many
accidents to risk upon it interests of such high value.

In a long and serious letter to Congress he apologized for not obeying
their orders to deliver the plan with his observations upon it to
Lafayette, and entering into a full investigation of all its parts
demonstrated the mischiefs and the dangers with which it was replete.
This letter was referred to a committee whose report admits the force
of the reasons urged by Washington against the expedition and their own
conviction that nothing important could be attempted unless the British
armies should be withdrawn from the United States and that even in that
event the present plan was far too complex.

Men, however, recede slowly and reluctantly from favorite and
flattering projects on which they have long meditated, and the
committee in their report proceeded to state the opinion that the posts
held by the British in the United States would probably be evacuated
before the active part of the ensuing campaign, and that, therefore,
eventual measures for the expedition ought to be taken.

This report concludes with recommending, "that the general should be
directed to write to the Marquis de Lafayette on that subject, and also
write to the minister of these States at the court of Versailles very
fully, to the end that eventual measures may be taken in case an
armament should be sent from France to Quebec for co-operating
therewith to the utmost degree which the finances and resources of
these States will admit."

This report also was approved by Congress and transmitted to Washington
who felt himself greatly embarrassed by it. While his objections to the
project retained all their force he found himself required to open a
correspondence for the purposes of soliciting the concurrence of France
in an expedition he disapproved, and of promising a cooperation he
believed to be impracticable. In reply to this communication he said:
"The earnest desire I have strictly to comply in every instance with
the views and instructions of Congress cannot but make me feel the
greatest uneasiness when I find myself in circumstances of hesitation
or doubt with respect to their directions. But the perfect confidence I
have in the justice and candor of that honorable body emboldens me to
communicate without reserve the difficulties which occur in the
execution of their present order, and the indulgence I have experienced
on every former occasion induces me to imagine that the liberty I now
take will not meet with disapprobation."

After reviewing the report of the committee and stating his objections
to the plan and the difficulties he felt in performing the duty
assigned to him, he added: "But if Congress still think it necessary
for me to proceed in the business I must request their more definite
and explicit instructions and that they will permit me, previous to
transmitting the intended dispatches, to submit them to their
determination. I could wish to lay before Congress more minutely the
state of the army, the condition of our supplies and the requisites
necessary for carrying into execution an undertaking that may involve
the most serious events. If Congress think this can be done more
satisfactorily in a personal conference I hope to have the army in such
a situation before I can receive their answer as to afford me an
opportunity of giving my attendance."

Congress acceded to his request for a personal interview, and on his
arrival in Philadelphia a committee was appointed to confer with him as
well on this particular subject as on the general state of the army and
of the country.

The result of these conferences was that the expedition against Canada
was entirely, though reluctantly, given up, and every arrangement
recommended by Washington received that attention which was due to his
judgment and experience and which his opinions were entitled to
receive.

If anything were necessary to be added to this ridiculous scheme for
the conquest of Canada in order to prove the inefficiency and folly of
the Congress of 1778 we have it in the fact that France was averse to
adding that province to the United States and did not desire to acquire
it for herself. She only sought the independence of this country and
its permanent alliance.

Mr. De Sevelinges in his introduction to Botta's History recites the
private instructions to Mr. Gerard on his mission to the United States.
One article was, "to avoid entering into any formal engagement relative
to Canada and other English possessions which Congress proposed to
conquer." Mr. De Sevelinges adds, that "the policy of the cabinet of
Versailles viewed the possession of those countries, especially of
Canada by England as a principle of useful inquietude and vigilance to
the Americans. The neighborhood of a formidable enemy must make them
feel more sensibly the price which they ought to attach to the
friendship and support of the King of France."

 [C.] REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONFER WITH WASHINGTON ON
THE SECOND SCHEME FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA, AND ON THE GENERAL STATE
OF THE ARMY AND THE COUNTRY.

"January I, 1779. The committee appointed to confer with the commander-
in-chief on the operations of the next campaign, report that the plan
proposed by Congress for the emancipation of Canada, in cooperation
with an army from France, was the principal subject of the said
conference. That, impressed with a strong sense of the injury and
disgrace which must attend an infraction of the proposed stipulations,
on the part of these States, your committee have taken a general view
of our finances, of the circumstances of our army, of the magazines of
clothes, artillery, arms and ammunition, and of the provisions in
store, and which can be collected in season.

"Your committee have also attentively considered the intelligence and
observations communicated to them by the commander-in-chief, respecting
the number of troops and strongholds of the enemy in Canada; their
naval force, and entire command of the water communication with that
country; the difficulties, while they possess such signal advantages,
of penetrating it with an army by land; the obstacles which are to be
surmounted in acquiring a naval superiority; the hostile temper of many
of the surrounding Indian tribes towards these States; and above all,
the uncertainty whether the enemy will not persevere in their system of
harassing and distressing our sea-coast and frontiers by a predatory
war.

"That on a most mature deliberation, your committee cannot find room for
a well grounded presumption that these States will be able to perform
their part of the proposed stipulations. That in a measure of such
moment, calculated to call forth, and direct to a single object, a
considerable portion of the force of our ally which may otherwise be
essentially employed, nothing else than the highest probability of
success could justify Congress in making the proposition.

"Your committee are therefore of opinion, that the negotiation in
question, however desirable and interesting, should be deferred until
circumstances render the cooperation of these States more certain,
practicable, and effectual.

"That the minister plenipotentiary of these States at the court of
Versailles, the minister of France in Pennsylvania, and the minister of
France, be respectively informed that the operations of the next
campaign must depend on such a variety of contingencies to arise, as
well from our own internal circumstances and resources as the progress
and movements of our enemy, that time alone can mature and point out
the plan which ought to be pursued. That Congress, therefore, cannot,
with a degree of confidence answerable to the magnitude of the object,
decide on the practicability of their cooperating the next campaign in
an enterprise for the emancipation of Canada; that every preparation in
our power will nevertheless be made for acting with vigor against the
common enemy, and every favorable incident embraced with alacrity to
facilitate and hasten the freedom and independence of Canada, and her
union with these States--events which Congress, from motives of policy
with respect to the United States, as well as of affection to their
Canadian brethren, have greatly at heart."

This report is evidently inspired by Washington, from beginning to end.

1. Footnote: This officer was not of the same family with the Tory
Butler.




CHAPTER XVII.


WASHINGTON'S OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN STATES. 1779.


We have seen that Washington had gone from his winter quarters near
Middlebrook in the Jerseys to hold a conference with Congress on the
subject of the invasion of Canada. When this matter had been disposed
of there still remained many subjects demanding the joint attention of
the supreme Legislature and the Commander-in-Chief, and accordingly he
spent a considerable part of the winter of 1778-9 at Philadelphia
consulting with Congress on measures for the general defense and
welfare of the country. Washington felt extreme anxiety at the
inadequate means at his disposal for conducting the campaign of 1779.
The state of Congress itself, as we have already shown, was
sufficiently embarrassing to him, but there were other causes of
uneasiness in the general aspect of affairs. The French alliance was
considered by the people as rendering the cause of independence
perfectly safe; with little or no exertion on our part England was
supposed to be already conquered in America, and, moreover, she was
threatened with a Spanish war. Hence the States were remiss in
furnishing their quotas of men and money. The currency, consisting of
Continental bills, was so much depreciated that a silver dollar was
worth forty dollars of the paper money. The effect of this last
misfortune was soon apparent in the conduct of the officers of the
Jersey brigade.

In pursuance of Washington's plan of chastising the Indians, to which
we referred in the last chapter, it was resolved to lead a force into
those villages of the Six Nations which were hostile to the United
States and destroy their settlements.

As the army destined for this expedition was about to move alarming
symptoms of discontent appeared in a part of it. The Jersey brigade,
which had been stationed during the winter at Elizabethtown, was
ordered early in May (1779) to march by regiments. This order was
answered by a letter from General Maxwell stating that the officers of
the First regiment had delivered a remonstrance to their colonel,
addressed to the Legislature of the State, declaring that unless their
complaints on the subjects of pay and support should obtain the
immediate attention of that body, they were, at the expiration of three
days, to be considered as having resigned, and requesting the
Legislature, in that event, to appoint other officers to succeed them.
They declared, however, their readiness to make every preparation for
obeying the orders which had been given, and to continue their
attention to the regiment until a reasonable time should elapse for the
appointment of their successors. "This," added the letter of General
Maxwell, "is a step they are extremely unwilling to take, but it is
such as I make no doubt they will all take; nothing but
necessity--their not being able to support themselves in time to come
and being loaded with debts contracted in time past--could have
induced them to resign at so critical a juncture."

The intelligence conveyed in this letter made a serious impression on
Washington. He was strongly attached to the army and to its interests,
had witnessed its virtues and its sufferings, and lamented sincerely
its present distresses. The justice of the complaints made by the
officers could no more be denied than the measure they had adopted
could be approved. Relying on their patriotism and on his own
influence, he immediately wrote a letter to General Maxwell to be laid
before them in which, mingling the sensibility of a friend with the
authority of a general, he addressed to their understanding and to
their love of country, observations calculated to invite their whole
attention to the consequences which must result from the step they were
about to take.

"The patience and perseverance of the army," proceeds the letter, "have
been, under every disadvantage, such as to do them the highest honor
both at home and abroad, and have inspired me with an unlimited
confidence of their virtue, which has consoled me amidst every
perplexity and reverse of fortune to which our affairs, in a struggle
of this nature, were necessarily exposed. Now that we have made so
great a progress to the attainment of the end we have in view, so that
we cannot fail without a most shameful desertion of our own interests,
anything like a change of conduct would imply a very unhappy change of
principles, and a forgetfulness as well of what we owe to ourselves as
to our country. Did I suppose it possible this could be the case, even
in a single regiment of the army, I should be mortified and chagrined
beyond expression. I should feel it as a wound given to my own honor,
which I consider as embarked with that of the army at large. But this I
believe to be impossible. Any corps that was about to set an example of
the kind would weigh well the consequences, and no officer of common
discernment and sensibility would hazard them. If they should stand
alone in it, independent of other consequences, what would be their
feelings on reflecting that they had held themselves out to the world
in a point of light inferior to the rest of the army? Or if their
example should be followed, and become general, how could they console
themselves for having been the foremost in bringing ruin and disgrace
upon their country? They would remember that the army would share a
double portion of the general infamy and distress, and that the
character of an American officer would become as infamous as it is now
glorious.

"I confess the appearances in the present instance are disagreeable,
but I am convinced they seem to mean more than they really do. The
Jersey officers have not been outdone by any others in the qualities
either of citizens or soldiers; and I am confident no part of them
would seriously intend anything that would be a stain on their former
reputation. The gentlemen cannot be in earnest; they have only reasoned
wrong about the means of obtaining a good end, and, on consideration, I
hope and flatter myself they will renounce what must appear to be
improper. At the opening of a campaign, when under marching orders for
an important service, their own honor, duty to the public and to
themselves, and a regard to military propriety, will not suffer them to
persist in a measure which would be a violation of them all. It will
even wound their delicacy, coolly to reflect that they have hazarded a
step which has an air of dictating terms to their country, by taking
advantage of the necessity of the moment."

This letter did not completely produce the desired effect. The officers
did not recede from their claims. In an address to Washington, they
expressed their unhappiness that any act of theirs should give him
pain, but proceeded to justify the step they had taken. Repeated
memorials had been presented to their Legislature which had been
received with promises of attention, but had been regularly neglected.
"At length," said they, "we have lost all confidence in our
Legislature. Reason and experience forbid that we should have any. Few
of us have private fortunes; many have families, who already are
suffering everything that can be received from an ungrateful country.
Are we then to suffer all the inconveniences, fatigues, and dangers of
a military life, while our wives and our children are perishing for
want of common necessaries at home--and that without the most distant
prospect of reward, for our pay is now only nominal? We are sensible
that your Excellency cannot wish nor desire this from us. We are sorry
that you should imagine we meant to disobey orders. It was and still is
our determination to march with our regiment and to do the duty of
officers until the Legislature should have a reasonable time to appoint
others, but no longer.

"We beg leave to assure your Excellency that we have the highest sense
of your ability and virtues; that executing your orders has ever given
us pleasure; that we love the service, and we love our country--but
when that country gets so lost to virtue and justice as to forget to
support its servants, it then becomes their duty to retire from its
service."

This letter was peculiarly embarrassing to Washington. To adopt a stern
course of proceeding might hazard the loss of the Jersey line, an event
not less injurious to the service than painful to himself. To take up
the subject without doing too much for the circumstances of the army
would be doing too little for the occasion. He therefore declined
taking any other notice of the letter than to declare through General
Maxwell, that while they continued to do their duty in conformity with
the determination they had expressed he should only regret the part
they had taken and should hope they would perceive its impropriety.

The Legislature of New Jersey, alarmed at the decisive step taken by
the officers, was at length induced to pay some attention to their
situation--they consenting on their part to withdraw their
remonstrance. In the meantime they continued to perform their duty and
their march was not delayed by this unpleasant altercation.

In communicating this transaction to Congress Washington took occasion
to remind that body of his having frequently urged the absolute
necessity of some general and adequate provision for the officers of
the army. "I shall only observe," continued the letter, "that the
distresses in some corps are so great, either where they were not until
lately attached to any particular State, or where the State has been
less provident, that the officers have solicited even to be supplied
with the clothing destined for the common soldiery, coarse and
unsuitable as it was. I had not power to comply with the request.

"The patience of men animated by a sense of duty and honor will support
them to a certain point, beyond which it will not go. I doubt not
Congress will be sensible of the danger of an extreme in this respect,
and will pardon my anxiety to obviate it."

Before the troops destined for the grand expedition were put in motion
an enterprise of less extent was undertaken which was completely
successful. A plan for surprising the towns of the Onondagas, one of
the nearest of the hostile tribes, having been formed by General
Schuyler and approved by Washington, Colonel Van Schaick assisted by
Lieutenant-Colonel Willet and Major Cochran marched from Fort Schuyler
on the morning of the 19th of April at the head of between five and six
hundred men and on the third day reached the point of destination. The
whole settlement was destroyed after which the detachment returned to
Fort Schuyler without the loss of a single man. For this handsome
display of talents as a partisan, the thanks of Congress were voted to
Colonel Van Schaick and the officers and soldiers under his command.

The cruelties exercised by the Indians in the course of the preceding
year had given a great degree of importance to the expedition now
meditated against them, and the relative military strength and
situation of the two parties rendered it improbable that any other
offensive operations could be carried on by the Americans in the course
of the present campaign. The army under the command of Sir Henry
Clinton, exclusive of the troops in the southern department, was
computed at between sixteen and seventeen thousand men. The American
army, the largest division of which lay at Middlebrook under the
immediate command of Washington, was rather inferior to that of the
British in real strength. The grand total, except those in the southern
and western country, including officers of every description amounted
to about 16,000. Three thousand of these were in New England under the
command of General Gates, and the remaining 13,000 were cantoned on
both sides of the North river.

After the destruction of Forts Clinton and Montgomery in 1777, it had
been determined to construct the fortifications intended for the future
defense of the North river at West Point, a position which being more
completely embosomed in the hills was deemed more defensible. The works
had been prosecuted with unremitting industry but were far from being
completed.

King's Ferry, some miles below West Point, where the great road, the
most convenient communication between the middle and eastern States,
crossed the North river, is completely commanded by two opposite points
of land. That on the west side, a rough and elevated piece of ground,
is denominated Stony Point; and the other, on the east side, a flat
neck of land projecting far into the water, is called Verplanck's
Point. The command of King's Ferry was an object worth the attention of
either army, and Washington had comprehended the points which protect
it within his plan of defense for the Highlands. A small but strong
work called Fort Fayette was completed at Verplanck's and was
garrisoned by a company commanded by Captain Armstrong. The works on
Stony Point were unfinished. As the season for active operations
approached Sir Henry Clinton formed a plan for opening the campaign
with a brilliant _coup de main_ up the North river and toward the
latter end of May made preparations for the enterprise.

These preparations were immediately communicated to Washington who was
confident that Clinton meditated an attack on the forts in the
Highlands or designed to take a position between those forts and
Middlebrook, in order to interrupt the communication between the
different parts of the American army, to prevent their reunion and to
beat them in detail. Measures were instantly taken to counteract either
of these designs. The intelligence from New York was communicated to
Generals Putnam and M'Dougal, who were ordered to hold themselves in
readiness to march, and on the 29th of May (1779) the army moved by
divisions from Middlebrook toward the Highlands. On the 30th the
British army commanded by Clinton in person and convoyed by Sir George
Collier proceeded up the river, and General Vaughan at the head of the
largest division, landed next morning about eight miles below
Verplanck's. The other division under the particular command of General
Patterson, but accompanied by Clinton, advancing further up, landed on
the west side within three miles of Stony Point.

That place being immediately abandoned, General Patterson took
possession of it on the same afternoon. He dragged some heavy cannon
and mortars to the summit of the hill in the course of the night (June
1, 1779), and at five next morning opened a battery on Fort Fayette at
the distance of about 1,000 yards. During the following night two
galleys passed the fort and anchoring above it prevented the escape of
the garrison by water while General Vaughan invested it closely by
land. No means of defending the fort or of saving themselves remaining
the garrisons became prisoners of war. Immediate directions were given
for completing the works at both posts and for putting Stony Point in
particular in a strong state of defense.

Washington determined to check any further advance of the enemy, and
before Clinton was in a situation to proceed against West Point,
General M'Dougal was so strengthened and the American army took such a
position on the strong grounds about the Hudson that the enterprise
became too hazardous to be further prosecuted.

After completing the fortifications on both sides of the river at
King's Ferry, Clinton placed a strong garrison in each fort and
proceeded down the river to Philipsburg. The relative situation of the
hostile armies presenting insuperable obstacles to any grand operation
they could be employed offensively only on detached expeditions.
Connecticut, from its contiguity to New York and its extent of sea
coast, was peculiarly exposed to invasion. The numerous small cruisers
which plied in the sound, to the great annoyance of British commerce,
and the large supplies of provisions drawn from the adjacent country
for the use of the Continental army, furnished great inducements to
Clinton to direct his enterprises particularly against that State. He
also hoped to draw Washington from his impregnable position on the
North river into the low country and thus obtain an opportunity of
striking at some part of his army or of seizing the posts which were
the great object of the campaign. With these views he planned an
expedition against Connecticut, the command of which was given to
Governor Tryon, who reached New Haven bay on the 5th of July (1779)
with about 2,600 men.

Washington was at the time on the lines examining in person the
condition of the works on Stony and Verplanck's Points, in consequence
of which the intelligence which was transmitted to headquarters that
the fleet had sailed could not be immediately communicated to the
Governor of Connecticut, and the first intimation which that State
received of its danger was given by the appearance of the enemy. The
militia assembled in considerable numbers with alacrity, but the
British effected a landing and took possession of the town. After
destroying the military and naval stores found in the place, they re-
embarked and proceeded westward to Fairfield which was reduced to
ashes. The spirited resistance made by the militia at this place is
attested by the apology made by General Tryon for the wanton
destruction of private property which disgraced his conduct. "The
village was burnt," he says, "to resent the fire of the rebels from
their houses and to mask our retreat."

From Fairfield the fleet crossed the sound to Huntington bay where it
remained until the 9th (July, 1779), when it recrossed that water. The
troops were landed in the night on a peninsula on the east side of the
Bay of Norwalk. About the same time a much larger detachment from the
British army directed its course towards Horse Neck and made
demonstrations of a design to penetrate into the country in that
direction.

On the first intelligence that Connecticut was invaded, General
Parsons, a native of that State, had been directed by Washington to
hasten to the scene of action. Placing himself at the head of about 150
Continental troops who were supported by considerable bodies of
militia, he attacked the British on the morning of the twelfth as soon
as they were in motion and kept up an irregular distant fire throughout
the day. But, being too weak to prevent the destruction of any
particular town on the coast, Norwalk was reduced to ashes, after which
the British re-embarked and returned to Huntington bay there to await
for reinforcements. At this place, however, Tryon received orders to
return to Whitestone where in a conference between Clinton and Sir
George Collier it was determined to proceed against New London with an
increased force.

On the invasion of Connecticut, Washington was prompt in his exertions
to send Continental troops from the nearest encampments to its aid, but
before they could afford any real service Clinton found it necessary to
recall Tryon to the Hudson.

Washington had planned an enterprise against the posts at King's Ferry,
comprehending a double attack to be made at the same time on both. But
the difficulty of a perfect cooperation of detachments, incapable of
communicating with each other, determined him to postpone the attack on
Verplanck's and to make that part of the plan dependent on the success
of the first. His whole attention, therefore, was turned to Stony Point
and the troops destined for this critical service proceeded on it as
against a single object.

The execution of the plan was entrusted by Washington to General Wayne
who commanded the light infantry of the army. His daring courage had
long since obtained for him the sobriquet of "Mad Anthony." He accepted
the command with alacrity. Secrecy was deemed so much more essential to
success than numbers that no addition was made to the force already on
the lines. One brigade was ordered to commence its march so as to reach
the scene of action in time to cover the troops engaged in the attack
should any unlooked-for disaster befall them, and Maj. Henry Lee of
the light dragoons, who had been eminently useful in obtaining the
intelligence which led to the enterprise, was associated with Wayne as
far as cavalry could be employed in such a service. The night of the
15th (July, 1779), and the hour of twelve, were chosen for the assault.

Stony Point is a commanding hill projecting far into the Hudson which
washes three-fourths of its base. The remaining fourth was in a great
measure covered by a deep marsh, commencing near the river on the upper
side and continuing into it below. Over this marsh there was only one
crossing place, but at its junction with the river was a sandy beach
passable at low tide. On the summit of this hill stood the fort which
was furnished with heavy ordnance. Several breastworks and strong
batteries were advanced in front of the main work, and about half way
down the hill were two rows of abattis. The batteries were calculated
to command the beach and the crossing place of the marsh, and to rake
and enfilade any column which might be advancing from either of those
points toward the fort. In addition to these defenses several vessels
of war were stationed in the river and commanded the ground at the foot
of the hill. The garrison consisted of about 600 men commanded by
Colonel Johnson.

Wayne arrived about eight in the evening at Springsteel's, one and a
half miles from the fort and made his dispositions for the assault.

It was intended to attack the works on the right and left flanks at the
same instant. The regiments of Febiger and of Meigs with Major Hull's
detachment formed the right column, and Butler's regiment, with two
companies under Major Murfree, formed the left. One hundred and fifty
volunteers led by Lieutenant-Colonel Fleury and Major Posey constituted
the van of the right, and 100 volunteers under Major Stewart composed
the van of the left. At 11:30 the two columns moved to the assault, the
van of each with unloaded muskets and fixed bayonets. They were each
preceded by a forlorn hope of twenty men, the one commanded by
Lieutenant Gibbon and the other by Lieutenant Knox. They reached the
marsh undiscovered and at 12:20 commenced the assault.

Both columns rushed forward under a tremendous fire of grape-shot and
musketry. Surmounting every obstacle, they entered the works at the
point of the bayonet and without discharging a single musket obtained
possession of the fort.

The humanity displayed by the conquerors was not less conspicuous nor
less honorable than their courage. Not an individual suffered after
resistance had ceased.

All the troops engaged in this perilous service manifested a degree of
ardor and impetuosity which proved them to be capable of the most
difficult enterprises, and all distinguished themselves whose situation
enabled them to do so. Colonel Fleury, who had distinguished himself in
defense of the forts on the Delaware in 1777, was the first to enter
the fort and strike the British standard. Major Posey mounted the works
almost at the same instant and was the first to give the watch-word,
"The fort's our own." Lieutenants Gibbon and Knox performed the service
allotted to them with a degree of intrepidity which could not be
surpassed. Of twenty men who constituted the party of the former,
seventeen were killed or wounded. [1] Sixty-three of the garrison were
killed, including two officers. The prisoners amounted to 543, among
whom were 1 lieutenant-colonel, 4 captains, and 20 subaltern officers.
The military stores taken in the fort were considerable.

The loss sustained by the assailants was not proportioned to the
apparent danger of the enterprise. The killed and wounded did not
exceed 100 men. Wayne, who marched with Febiger's regiment in the right
column received a wound in the head which stunned him. Recovering
consciousness, but believing the wound to be mortal, he said to his
aids, "Carry me into the fort and let me die at the head of my column."
Being supported by his aids he entered the fort with the regiment.
Lieutenant-Colonel Hay was also among the wounded.

Although the design upon Fort Fayette had yielded to the desire of
securing the success of the attack on Stony Point it had not been
abandoned. Two brigades under General M'Dougal had been ordered to
approach the works on Verplanck's, in which Colonel Webster commanded,
and be in readiness to attack them the instant Wayne should obtain
possession of Stony Point. That this detachment might not permit the
favorable moment to pass unimproved Wayne had been requested to direct
the messenger who should convey the intelligence of his success to
Washington to pass through M'Dougal's camp and give him advice of that
event. He was also requested to turn the cannon of the fort against
Verplanck's and the vessels in the river. The last orders were executed
and a heavy cannonade was opened on Fort Fayette and on the vessels,
which compelled them to fall down the river. Through some
misconception, never explained, the messenger dispatched by Wayne did
not call on M'Dougal, but proceeded directly to headquarters. Thus,
every advantage expected from the first impression made by the capture
of Stony Point was lost, and the garrison had full leisure to recover
from the surprise occasioned by that event and to prepare for an
attack. This change of circumstances made it necessary to change the
plan of operation. Washington ordered General Howe to take the command
of M'Dougal's detachment to which some pieces of heavy artillery were
to be annexed. He was directed, after effecting a breach in the walls,
to make the dispositions for an assault and to demand a surrender, but
not to attempt a storm until it should be dark. To these orders
explicit instructions were added not to hazard his party by remaining
before Verplanck's after the British should cross Croton river in
force.

Through some unaccountable negligence in the persons charged with the
execution of these orders the battering artillery was not accompanied
with suitable ammunition, and the necessary entrenching tools were not
brought. These omissions were supplied the next day, but it was then
too late to proceed against Verplanck's.

On receiving intelligence of the loss of Stony Point and of the danger
to which the garrison of Fort Fayette was exposed, Sir Henry Clinton
relinquished his views on Connecticut and made a forced march to Dobb's
Ferry. Some troops were immediately embarked to pass up the river and a
light corps was pushed forward to the Croton. This movement relieved
Fort Fayette.

The failure of the attempt to obtain possession of Verplanck's Point,
leaving that road of communication still closed, diminished the
advantages which had been expected to result from the enterprise so
much that it was deemed unadvisable to maintain Stony Point. On
reconnoitering the ground Washington believed that the place could not
be rendered secure with a garrison of less than 1,500 men--a number
which could not be spared from the army without weakening it too much
for further operations. He determined, therefore, to evacuate Stony
Point and retire to the Highlands. As soon as this resolution was
executed Clinton repossessed himself of that post, repaired the
fortifications, and placed a stronger garrison in it, after which he
resumed his former situation at Philipsburg.

The two armies watched each other for some time. At length, Clinton,
finding himself unable to attack Washington in the strong position he
had taken or to draw him from it, and being desirous of transferring
the theater of active war to the south, withdrew to New York and was
understood to be strengthening the fortifications erected for its
defense, as preparatory to the large detachments he intended making to
reinforce the southern army.

Although this movement was made principally with a view to southern
operations, it was in some degree hastened by the opinion that New York
required immediate additional protection during the absence of the
fleet, which was about to sail for the relief of Penobscot.

Scarcely had Sir George Collier, who had accompanied Clinton up the
Hudson to take possession of Stony Point, returned to New York, when he
was informed that a fleet of armed vessels with transports and troops
had sailed from Boston to attack a post which General M'Lean was
establishing at Penobscot in the eastern part of the province of
Massachusetts bay. He immediately got ready for sea that part of the
naval force which was at New York, and on the 3d of August sailed to
relieve the garrison of Penobscot.

In the month of June (1779) General M'Lean, who commanded the royal
troops in Nova Scotia, arrived in the bay of Penobscot with nearly 700
men, in order to establish a post which might at once be a means of
checking the incursions of the Americans into Nova Scotia and of
supplying the royal yards at Halifax with ship timber, which abounded
in that part of the country. This establishment alarmed the government
of Massachusetts bay, which resolved to dislodge M'Lean, and, with
great promptitude, equipped a fleet and raised troops for that purpose.
The fleet, which consisted of fifteen vessels of war, carrying from
thirty-two to twelve guns each with transports, was commanded by
Commodore Saltonstall; the army, amounting to between three and four
thousand militia, was under the orders of General Lovell.

General M'Lean chose for his post a peninsula on the east side of
Penobscot bay, which is about seven leagues wide and seventeen deep,
terminating at the point where the river Penobscot flows into it.
M'Lean's station was nine miles from the bottom of the bay. As that
part of the country was then an unbroken forest he cleared away the
wood on the peninsula and began to construct a fort in which he was
assisted and protected by the crews of three sloops-of-war which had
escorted him thither. M'Lean heard of the expedition against him on the
21st of July (1779), when he had made little progress in the erection
of his fort. On the 25th the American fleet appeared in the bay, but,
owing to the opposition of the British sloops-of-war and to the bold
and rugged nature of the shore, the troops did not effect a landing
until the 28th. This interval M'Lean improved with such laborious
diligence that his fortifications were in a state of considerable
forwardness. Lovell erected a battery within 750 yards of the works,
and for nearly a fortnight a brisk cannonade was kept up and
preparations were made to assault the fort. But, on the 13th of August
(1779), Lovell was informed that Sir George Collier with a superior
naval force had entered the bay; therefore in the night he silently
embarked his troops and cannon, unperceived by the garrison, which was
every moment in expectation of being assaulted.

On the approach of the British fleet the Americans, after some show of
preparation for resistance, betook themselves to flight. A general
pursuit and unresisted destruction ensued. The Warren, a fine new
frigate of thirty-two guns, and fourteen other vessels of inferior
force, were either blown up or taken. The transports fled in confusion
and, after having landed the troops in a wild and uncultivated part of
the country, were burnt. The men, destitute of provisions and other
necessaries, had to explore their way for more than 100 miles through
an uninhabited and pathless wilderness and many of them perished before
reaching the settled country. After this successful exploit Sir George
Collier returned to New York, where he resigned the command of the
fleet to Admiral Arbuthnot, who had arrived from England with some
ships of war and with provisions, stores, and reinforcements for the
army.

On descending the river, after replacing the garrison of Stony Point,
Sir Henry Clinton encamped above Harlem, with his upper posts at
Kingsbridge. Washington remained in his strong position in the
Highlands, but frequently detached numerous parties on both sides of
the river in order to check the British foragers and to restrain the
intercourse with the Loyalists. Major Lee ("Light Horse Harry"), who
commanded one of those parties, planned a bold and hazardous enterprise
against the British post at Paulus Hook on the Jersey bank of the
river, opposite New York. That post was strongly fortified and of
difficult access, and therefore the garrison thought themselves secure.
But Lee determined to make an attempt on the place and chose the
morning of the 20th of August (1779) for his enterprise, when part of
the garrison was absent on a foraging excursion. Advancing silently at
the head of 300 men the sentinel at the gate mistook his party for that
which had marched out the preceding day, and allowed them to pass
unchallenged, and almost in an instant they seized the blockhouse and
two redoubts before the alarm was given. Major Sutherland, commandant
of the post, with sixty Hessians, entered a redoubt and began a brisk
fire on the assailants. This gave an extensive notice of the attack,
and the firing of guns in New York, and by the shipping in the roads,
proved that the alarm was widely spread. In order, therefore, not to
hazard the loss of his party, Lee retreated with the loss of two men
killed and three wounded, carrying along with him about 150 prisoners.
Notwithstanding the difficulties and dangers which he had to encounter,
he effected his retreat. It was not his design to keep possession of
the place, but to carry off the garrison, reflect credit on the
American arms, and encourage a spirit of enterprise in the army. [2]

The expedition planned by Washington for chastising the Indians who had
committed such atrocities last year on the frontier and particularly at
Wyoming, was the most important of this campaign. Washington entrusted
the command of it to General Sullivan. The largest division of the army
employed on that service assembled at Wyoming. Another division, which
had wintered on the Mohawk, marched under the orders of Gen. James
Clinton and joined the main body at the confluence of the two great
sources of the Susquehanna. On the 22d. of August (1779), the united
force, amounting to nearly 5,000 men, under the command of General
Sullivan, proceeded up the Cayuga or western branch of the last-named
river which led directly into the Indian country. The preparations for
this expedition did not escape the notice of those against whom it was
directed, and the Indians seem fully to have penetrated Sullivan's plan
of operation. Formidable as his force was they determined to meet him
and try the fortune of a battle. They were about 1,000 strong,
commanded by the two Butlers, Guy Johnson, M'Donald, and Brandt. They
chose their ground with judgment and fortified their camp at some
distance above Chemung and within a mile of Newtown.

There Sullivan attacked them and, after a short but spirited
resistance, they retreated with precipitation. The Americans had thirty
men killed or wounded; the Indians left only eleven dead bodies on the
field, but they were so discouraged by this defeat that they abandoned
their villages and fields to the unresisted ravages of the victor, who
laid waste their towns and orchards, so that they might have no
inducement again to settle so near the settlements of the whites.

The severity of this proceeding has been censured by some writers, but
it requires no apology. Nothing could convince the savages of the
injustice and inhumanity of their usual system of warfare on the
frontier so effectually as to give them a specimen of it, even in a
milder form, in their own country. Sullivan desolated their villages
and farms, but we do not learn that he took any scalps or murdered any
women or children, or tortured any of his prisoners. The measure of
retaliation which he dealt to the miscreants who sacked Wyoming was
gentleness and humanity when compared with their proceedings. It is
only to be regretted that his retaliation could not have been applied
to the homes of the British and Tories who assisted the Indians at
Wyoming. Sullivan and his army received a vote of thanks from Congress,
but the general's health failing, he soon resigned his commission and
retired from the service.

Sullivan's orders from Washington exculpate him from all blame as to
the mode of punishing the Indians. "Of the expedition," Washington
says, in writing to him, "the immediate objects are the total
destruction and devastation of their settlements and the capture of as
many prisoners of every age and sex as possible." Washington knew that
this kind of warfare was the only possible means of putting an end to
Indian wars. Any other mode of proceeding, he was fully aware, was
treachery and cruelty to his own countrymen.

A few days after the surprise of Paulus Hook by Major Lee, the long-
expected fleet from Europe, under the command of Admiral Arbuthnot,
having on board a reinforcement for the British army, arrived at New
York. This reinforcement, however, did not enable Clinton to enter
immediately on that active course of offensive operations which he had
meditated. It was soon followed by the Count D'Estaing, who arrived on
the southern coast of America with a powerful fleet, after which
Clinton deemed it necessary to turn all his attention to his own
security. Rhode Island and the posts up the North river were evacuated
and the whole army was collected in New York, the fortifications of
which were carried on with unremitting industry.

The Count D'Estaing and Admiral Byron having sailed about the same time
from the coast of North America, met in the West Indies, where the war
was carried on with various success. St. Lucia surrendered to the
British in compensation for which the French took St. Vincent's and
Grenada. About the time of the capture of the latter island D'Estaing
received reinforcements which gave him a decided naval superiority,
after which a battle was fought between the two hostile fleets, in
which the count claimed the victory and in which so many of the British
ships were disabled that the admiral was compelled to retire into port
in order to refit.

Early in May (1779) Sir Henry Clinton had dispatched from New York a
squadron under Sir George Collier with 2,500 troops under General
Mathews, who entered Chesapeake Bay, and, after taking possession of
Portsmouth, sent out parties of soldiers to Norfolk, Suffolk, Gosport,
and other places in the neighborhood, where there were large deposits
of provisions and military and naval stores, and many merchant vessels,
some on the stocks and some laden with valuable cargoes. These were all
burnt and the whole neighborhood subjected to plunder and devastation.
This was a severe blow to the commerce on which Congress placed great
dependence for supplies to the army and for sustaining its own credit.

In compliance with the solicitations of General Lincoln and the
authorities of South Carolina, D'Estaing directed his course to the
coast of Georgia with twenty-two ships of the line and eleven frigates
having on board 6,000 soldiers, and arrived so suddenly on the southern
coast of America that the Experiment, of fifty guns, and three
frigates, fell into his hands. A vessel was sent to Charleston with
information of his arrival and a plan was concerted for the siege of
Savannah.

General Lincoln, who, after the fall of Savannah, had been sent to
Charleston to take command of the southern department of the army, was
to cooperate with D'Estaing's fleet and army in the siege. Instead of
assaulting the place at the earliest practicable moment, they granted
Prevost, the British commander at Savannah, an armistice of twenty-four
hours, during which he received reinforcements and set them at
defiance. They then commenced a siege by regular approaches on land and
cannonade and bombardment from D'Estaing's formidable fleet in the
harbor. This lasted for three weeks.

On the 9th of October (1779), without having effected a sufficient
breach, the united French and American forces stormed the works. Great
gallantry was displayed by the assailants. The French and American
standards were both planted on the redoubts. But it was all in vain.
They were completely repulsed, the French losing 700 and the Americans
340 men. Count Pulaski was among the slain.

The loss of the garrison was astonishingly small. In killed and wounded
it amounted only to fifty-five--so great was the advantage of the cover
afforded by their works. After this repulse the Count D'Estaing
announced to General Lincoln his determination to raise the siege. The
remonstrances of that officer were unavailing, and the removal of the
heavy ordnance and stores was commenced. This being accomplished, both
armies moved from their ground on the evening of the 18th of October
(1779). The Americans, recrossing the Savannah at Zubly's Ferry, again
encamped in South Carolina, and the French re-embarked. D'Estaing
himself sailed with a part of his fleet for France; the rest proceeded
to the West Indies.

Although the issue of this enterprise was the source of severe chagrin
and mortification the prudence of General Lincoln suppressed every
appearance of dissatisfaction, and the armies separated with
manifestations of reciprocal esteem. The hopes which had brought the
militia into the field being disappointed they dispersed, and the
affairs of the southern States wore a more gloomy aspect than at any
former period.

During the siege of Savannah an ingenious enterprise of partisan
warfare was executed by Colonel White of the Georgia line. Before the
arrival of the French fleet in the Savannah, a British captain with in
men had taken post near the river Ogeeche, twenty-five miles from
Savannah. At the same place were five British vessels, four of which
were armed, the largest with fourteen guns, the least with four, and
the vessels were manned with forty sailors. Late at night, on the 30th
of September (1779), White, who had only six volunteers, including his
own servant, kindled a number of fires in different places so as to
exhibit the appearance of a considerable encampment, practiced several
other corresponding artifices, and then summoned the captain instantly
to surrender. That officer, believing that he was about to be attacked
by a superior force and that nothing but immediate submission could
save him and his men from destruction, made no defense. The stratagem
was carried on with so much address that the prisoners, amounting to
141, were secured and conducted to the American post at Sunbury,
twenty-five miles distant.

On receiving intelligence of the situation of Lincoln, Congress passed
a resolution requesting Washington to order the North Carolina troops,
and such others as could be spared from the northern army, to the aid
of that in the South and assuring the States of South Carolina and
Georgia of the attention of government to their preservation, but
requesting them, for their own defense to comply with the
recommendations formerly made respecting the completion of their
Continental regiments, and the government of their militia while in
actual service.

Washington had already received (November 1779) intelligence of the
disastrous result of D'Estaing and Lincoln's attack on Savannah, and
had formed his plans of operation before Congress sent assurances of
aid to the South. Giving up all expectation of cooperation from the
French fleet, he disbanded the New York and Massachusetts militia and
made his arrangements for the winter. He ordered one division of the
army under General Heath to the Highlands to protect West Point and the
posts in that neighborhood, and with the other division he went into
winter quarters near Morristown, the army being quartered in huts, as
at Valley Forge. The cavalry were sent to Connecticut.

Washington had already penetrated the design of the enemy to make the
southern States their principal field of operation, and accordingly he
dispatched to Charleston the North Carolina brigade in November, and
the whole of the Virginia line in December. On the other hand, Clinton
and Cornwallis embarked with a large force in transports convoyed by
Admiral Arbuthnot with a fleet of five ships of the line and several
frigates, and sailed on the 26th of December 1779, for Savannah.
Knyphausen was left in command of the garrison of New York. [3]

Washington's own summary of the operations of this campaign (1779) is
contained in a letter to Lafayette in the following terms: "The
operations of the enemy this campaign have been confined to the
establishment of works of defense, taking a post at King's Ferry, and
burning the defenseless towns of New Haven, Fairfield, and Norwalk, on
the Sound, within reach of their shipping, where little else was or
could be opposed to them than the cries of distressed women and
children; but these were offered in vain. Since these notable exploits
they have never stepped out of their works or beyond their lines. How a
conduct of this kind is to effect the conquest of America, the wisdom
of a North, a Germaine, or a Sandwich can best decide. It is too deep
and refined for the comprehension of common understandings and the
general run of politicians."

1. Footnote: For their bravery and good conduct at Stony Point, Wayne
received a gold, and Stewart and Fleury silver medals, with the thanks
of Congress. A separate medal was designed and struck for each of them.

2. Footnote: Lee, for this exploit at Paulus Hook, was presented with a
gold medal by Congress.

3. Footnote: Irving




CHAPTER XVIII.


CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH-ARNOLD'S TREASON. 1780.


During the winter which followed the campaign of 1779, Washington, with
his army hutted on the heights of Morristown, was beset by pressing and
formidable difficulties. The finances of Congress were in a most
depressed condition, and the urgent wants of the army were but ill
supplied. The evils of short enlistment, though distinctly understood
and strongly felt, could not be remedied, and the places of those men
who were leaving the army on the expiration of their stipulated term of
service could not easily be filled up. Besides, the troops were in
danger of perishing by cold and famine. During the preceding year
General Greene and Colonel Wadsworth had been at the head of the
quartermaster and commissary departments, and notwithstanding their
utmost exertions, the wants of the army had been ill supplied. After
being put into winter quarters it was in great danger of being
dissolved by want of provisions or of perishing through famine. The
Colonial paper money was in a state of great and increasing
depreciation, and in order to check the alarming evil Congress, which,
like other popular assemblies had in it no small share of ignorance and
self-sufficiency, resolved to diminish the circulation and keep up the
value of their paper currency by withholding the necessary supplies
from the public agents. This foolish resolution threatened the ruin of
the army. Nobody was willing to make contracts with the public and some
of those entered into were not fulfilled.

Congress, jealous of the public agents, because ignorant of what was
really necessary, repeatedly changed the form of its engagements with
them, and, at length, by its fluctuating policy, real wants, and
imprudent parsimony, brought matters to such extremities that
Washington was compelled to require the several counties of the State
of New Jersey to furnish his army with certain quantities of provisions
within six days in order to prevent them from being taken by force.
Although the province was much exhausted, yet the people instantly
complied with the requisition and furnished a temporary supply to the
army. [1]

Soon after Clinton sailed on his expedition against Charleston a frost
of unexampled intensity began. The Hudson, East river, and all the
waters around New York were so completely frozen that an army with its
artillery and wagons might have crossed them in all directions with
perfect safety. New York lost all the advantages of its insular
situation and became easily accessible on every side. The city was
fortified by the British, but on account of its insular situation,
several parts being considered of difficult access were left
undefended. By the strength of the ice, however, every point became
exposed, and in that unforeseen emergency, Knyphausen who commanded in
the city with a garrison of 10,000 men took every prudent precaution
for his defense and fortified every vulnerable part, but the
inefficiency of the American army was his best security. Washington
easily perceived the advantages which the extraordinary frost gave him,
but from the destitute state of his army he was unable to avail himself
of them. The army under his immediate command was inferior in number to
the garrison of New York; it was also ill clad, scantily supplied with
provisions, and in no condition to undertake offensive operations.

The British had a post on Staten Island, and as the ice opened a free
communication between the island and the New Jersey coast, Washington,
notwithstanding the enfeebled condition of his army resolved to attack
the garrison, and appointed Lord Stirling to conduct the enterprise.
The night of the 14th of January (1780) was chosen for the attempt,
but, though the Americans used every precaution, the officer commanding
on Staten Island discovered their intention and took effectual measures
to defeat it. The attack was repulsed, but little loss was sustained on
either side.

The extreme cold occasioned much suffering in New York by want of
provisions and fuel, for as the communication by water was entirely
stopped the usual supplies, were cut off. The demand for fuel in
particular was so pressing that it was found expedient to break up some
old transports, and to pull down some uninhabited wooden houses for the
purpose of procuring that necessary article. As the British paid in
ready money for provisions or firewood carried within the lines many of
the country people, tempted by the precious metals, so rare among them,
tried to supply the garrison. The endeavors of the British to encourage
and protect this intercourse and the exertions of the Americans to
prevent it brought on a sort of partisan warfare in which the former
most frequently had the advantage. In one of the most important of
those encounters, early in February (1780), near White Plains, a
captain and 14 men of a Massachusetts regiment were killed on the spot,
17 were wounded, and 90, with Colonel Thompson, the officer who
commanded the party, were made prisoners. Washington, writing to
General Heath respecting this affair, says: "It is some consolation
that our officers and men appear to have made a brave resistance. I
cannot help suspecting that our officers in advance quarter too long in
a place. By these means the enemy by their emissaries gain a perfect
knowledge of their cantonments and form their attacks accordingly. Were
they to shift constantly the enemy could scarcely ever attain this
knowledge."

Congress found itself placed in very difficult circumstances. It always
contained a number of men of talents and manifested no small share of
vigor and activity. Many of the members were skilful in the management
of their private affairs, and having been successful in the world
thought themselves competent to direct the most important national
concerns, although unacquainted with the principles of finance,
legislation, or war. Animated by that blind presumption which generally
characterizes popular assemblies they often entered into resolutions
which discovered little practical wisdom. In pecuniary matters they
were dilatory and never anticipated trying emergencies, or made
provision for probable events, till they were overtaken by some urgent
necessity. Hence they were frequently deliberating about levying troops
and supplying the army when the troops ought to have been in the field,
and the army fully equipped for active service. This often placed
Washington in the most trying and perilous circumstances.

Congress had solemnly resolved not to exceed $200,000,000 in
Continental bills of credit. In November, 1779, the whole of that sum
was issued and expended also. The demand on the States to replenish the
treasury by taxes had not been fully complied with, and even although
it had been completely answered would not have furnished a sum adequate
to the expenses of government. Instead of maturely considering and
digesting a plan, adhering to it, and improving it by experience,
Congress often changed its measures, and even in the midst of those
distresses which had brought the army to the verge of dissolution, was
busy in devising new and untried expedients for supporting it. As the
treasury was empty and money could not be raised, Congress, on the 25th
of February (1780), resolved to call on the several States for their
proportion of provisions, spirits, and forage for the maintenance of
the army during the ensuing campaign, but specified no time within
which these were to be collected, and consequently the States were in
no haste in the matter. In order to encourage and facilitate compliance
with this requisition it was further resolved that any State which
should have taken the necessary measures for furnishing its quota, and
given notice thereof to Congress, should be authorized to prohibit any
Continental quartermaster or commissary from purchasing within its
limits.

Every man who had a practical knowledge of the subject easily perceived
the defective nature and dangerous tendency of this arrangement. It was
an attempt to carry on the war rather by separate provincial efforts
than by a combination of national strength, and if the army received
from any State where it was acting the appointed quantity of
necessaries it had no right, though starving, to purchase what it stood
in need of. Besides the carriage of provisions from distant parts was
troublesome, expensive, and sometimes impracticable.

The troops were ill clothed, their pay was in arrear, and that of the
officers, owing to the great depreciation of the paper currency, was
wholly unequal to their decent maintenance. These multiplied privations
and sufferings soured the temper of the men, and it required all the
influence of Washington to prevent many of the officers from resigning
their commissions. The long continuance of want and hardship produced
relaxation of discipline which at length manifested itself in open
mutiny. On the 25th of May (1780) two regiments belonging to
Connecticut paraded under arms, with the avowed intention of returning
home, or of obtaining subsistence at the point of the bayonet. The rest
of the soldiers, though they did not join in the mutiny, showed little
disposition to suppress it. At length the two regiments were brought
back to their duty, but much murmuring and many complaints were heard.
While the army was in such want the inhabitants of New Jersey, where
most of the troops were stationed, were unavoidably harassed by
frequent requisitions, which excited considerable discontent. Reports
of the mutinous state of the American army and of the dissatisfaction
of the people of New Jersey, probably much exaggerated, were carried to
General Knyphausen, who, believing the American soldiers ready to
desert their standards and the inhabitants of New Jersey willing to
abandon the Union, on the 6th of June (1780), passed from Staten Island
to Elizabethtown, in Jersey, with 5,000 men. That movement was intended
to encourage the mutinous disposition of the American troops, and to
fan the flame of discontent among the inhabitants of the province.
Early next morning he marched into the country toward Springfield by
the way of Connecticut Farms, a flourishing plantation, so named
because the cultivators had come from Connecticut. But even before
reaching that place which was only five or six miles from
Elizabethtown, the British perceived that the reports which they had
received concerning the discontent of the Americans were incorrect, for
on the first alarm the militia assembled with great alacrity and aided
by some small parties of regular troops, annoyed the British by an
irregular but galling fire of musketry, wherever the nature of the
ground presented a favorable opportunity, and although those parties
were nowhere strong enough to make a stand, yet they gave plain
indications of the temper and resolution which were to be encountered
in advancing into the country. At Connecticut Farms the British
detachment halted. The settlers were known to be zealous in the
American cause and therefore with a little spirit of revenge, the
British, among whom was General Tryon, laid the flourishing village,
with its church and the minister's house, in ashes. Here occurred one
of those affecting incidents which being somewhat out of the ordinary
course of the miseries of war make a deep impression on the public
mind. Mr. Caldwell, minister of the place, had withdrawn toward
Springfield, but had left his wife and family behind believing them to
be in no danger. The British advanced to the industrious and peaceful
village. Mrs. Caldwell, trusting to her sex for safety and unsuspicious
of harm, was sitting in her house with her children around her when a
soldier came up, leveled his musket at the window, and shot her dead on
the spot in the midst of her terrified family. On the intercession of a
friend the dead body was permitted to be removed when the house was set
on fire. This atrocious deed excited such general horror and
detestation that the British thought proper to disavow it, and to
impute the death of Mrs. Caldwell to a random shot from the retreating
militia, though the militia did not fire a musket in the village. The
wanton murder of the lady might be the unauthorized act of a savage
individual, but can the burning of the house after her death be
accounted for in the same way? Knyphausen was a veteran officer and
cannot be supposed capable of entering into local animosities or of
countenancing such brutality, but Tryon was present and his conduct on
other occasions was not unblemished.

Mr. Caldwell had rendered himself particularly obnoxious to the enemy,
and was cordially hated by Tryon for his zealous devotion to the
patriotic cause. He had served as a chaplain in the army, was
exceedingly popular among the patriots of New Jersey, had given up his
church to be used as a hospital, and had exerted himself by eloquent
appeals to arouse his countrymen to unflinching resistance against the
enemy. For this Tryon caused his church to be burnt and did not prevent
the soldiers from shooting his wife.

After destroying the Connecticut Farms, Knyphausen advanced toward
Springfield, where the Jersey brigade, under General Maxwell, and a
large body of militia had taken an advantageous position and seemed
resolved to defend it. General Knyphausen, however, had met with a
reception so different from what he expected that without making any
attempt on the American post he withdrew during the night to
Elizabethtown.

On being informed of the invasion of New Jersey, Washington put his
army in motion early on the morning of the day in which Knyphausen
marched from Elizabethtown and proceeded to the Short hills behind
Springfield, while the British were in the vicinity of that place.
Feeble as his army was, he made the necessary dispositions for
fighting, but the unexpected retreat of Knyphausen rendered a battle
unnecessary. The British were followed by an American detachment, which
attacked their rear guard next morning but was repulsed. Instead of
returning to New York, Knyphausen lingered in the vicinity of
Elizabethtown and on Staten Island, and Washington, unwilling with his
inadequate force to hazard an engagement except on advantageous ground,
remained on the hills near Springfield to watch the movements of the
British army. At that time the army under the immediate orders of
Washington did not exceed 4,000 effective men.

On the 18th of June (1780), Sir Henry Clinton returned from South
Carolina with about 4,000 men, and after receiving this reinforcement
the British force in New York and its dependencies amounted to 12,000
effective and regular troops, most of whom could be brought into the
field for any particular service; besides these, the British commander
had about 4,000 militia and refugees for garrison duty. The British
army directed on any one point would have been irresistible; therefore
Washington could only follow a wary policy, occupying strong ground,
presenting a bold front, and concealing the weakness of his army as far
as possible.

The embarkation of troops by Sir Henry Clinton awakened the
apprehensions of Washington lest he should sail up the Hudson and
attack the posts in the Highlands. Those posts had always been objects
of much solicitude to Washington, and he was extremely jealous of any
attack upon them. In order to be in readiness to resist any such
attack, he left General Greene at Springfield, with 700 Continentals,
the Jersey militia, and some cavalry, and proceeded toward Pompton with
the main body of the army. Sir Henry Clinton, after having perplexed
the Americans by his movements, early on the morning of the 23d of June
(1780), rapidly advanced in full force from Elizabethtown toward
Springfield. General Greene hastily assembled his scattered detachments
and apprised Washington of the march of the royal army, who instantly
returned to support Greene's division. The British marched in two
columns--one on the main road leading to Springfield and the other on
the Vauxhall road. Greene scarcely had time to collect his troops at
Springfield and make the necessary dispositions when the royal army
appeared before the town and a cannonade immediately began. A fordable
rivulet, with bridges corresponding to the different roads, runs in
front of the place. Greene had stationed parties to guard the bridges
and they obstinately disputed the passage, but after a smart conflict
they were overpowered and compelled to retreat.

Greene then fell back and took post on a range of hills, where he
expected to be again attacked. But the British, instead of attempting
to pursue their advantage, contented themselves with setting fire to
the village and laying the greater part of it in ashes. Discouraged by
the obstinate resistance they had received and ignorant of the weakness
of the detachment which opposed them, they immediately retreated to
Elizabethtown, pursued with the utmost animosity by the militia, who
were provoked at the burning of Springfield. They arrived at
Elizabethtown about sunset, and, continuing their march to Elizabeth
Point, began at midnight to pass over to Staten Island. Before 6 next
morning they had entirely evacuated the Jerseys and removed the bridge
of boats which communicated with Staten Island.

In the skirmish at Springfield the Americans had about 20 men killed
and 60 wounded. The British suffered a corresponding loss. Clinton's
object in this expedition seems to have been to destroy the American
magazines in that part of the country. But the obstinate resistance
which he met with at Springfield deterred him from advancing into a
district abounding in difficult passes, where every strong position
would be vigorously defended. He seems also to have been checked by the
apprehension of a fleet and army from France.

Washington was informed of Clinton's march soon after the British left
Elizabethtown, but, though he hastily returned, the skirmish at
Springfield was over before he reached the vicinity of that place.

After Clinton left the Jerseys, Washington planned an enterprise
against a British post at Bergen point, on the Hudson, opposite New
York, garrisoned by seventy Loyalists. It was intended to reduce the
post and also to carry off a number of cattle on Bergen Neck, from
which the garrison of New York occasionally received supplies of fresh
provisions. General Wayne was appointed to conduct the enterprise. With
a respectable force he marched against the post, which consisted of a
blockhouse covered by an abattis and palisade. Wayne pointed his
artillery against the blockhouse, but his field pieces made no
impression on the logs. Galled by the fire from the loopholes, some of
his men rushed impetuously through the abattis and attempted to storm
the blockhouse, but they were repulsed with considerable loss. Though
the Americans, however, failed in their attempt against the post, they
succeeded in driving off most of the cattle.

On the commencement of hostilities in Europe, Lafayette, as we have
seen, returned home in order to offer his services to his King, still,
however, retaining his rank in the army of Congress. His ardor in
behalf of the Americans remained unabated and he exerted all his
influence with the court of Versailles to gain its effectual support to
the United States. His efforts were successful and the King of France
resolved vigorously to assist the Americans both by sea and land.
Having gained this important point, and perceiving that there was no
need for his military services in Europe, he obtained leave from his
sovereign to return to America and join his former companions in arms.
He landed at Boston toward the end of April (1780), and, on his way to
Congress, called at the headquarters of Washington and informed him of
the powerful succor which might soon be expected from France. He met
with a most cordial reception both from Congress and Washington on
account of his high rank, tried friendship, and distinguished services.

The assistance expected from their powerful ally was very encouraging
to the Americans, but called for corresponding exertions on their part.
Washington found himself in the most perplexing circumstances; his army
was feeble, and he could form no plan for the campaign till he knew
what forces were to be put under his orders. His troops, both officers
and privates, were ill clothed and needed to be decently appareled
before they could be led into the field to cooperate with soldiers in
respectable uniforms, for his half-naked battalions would only have
been objects of contempt and derision to their better-dressed allies.
In order to supply these defects and to get his army in a state of due
preparation before the arrival of the European auxiliaries, Washington
made the most pressing applications to Congress and to the several
State Legislatures. Congress resolved and recommended, but the States
were dilatory, and their tardy proceedings ill accorded with the
exigencies of the case or with the expectations of those who best
understood the affairs of the Union. Even on the 4th of July (1780),
Washington had the mortification to find that few new levies had
arrived in camp and some of the States had not even taken the trouble
to inform him of the number of men they intended to furnish.

In the month of June the State of Massachusetts had resolved to send a
reinforcement, but no part of it had yet arrived. About the same time a
voluntary subscription was entered into in Philadelphia for the purpose
of providing bounties to recruits to fill up the Pennsylvania line, and
the President or Vice-President in council was empowered, if
circumstances required it, to put the State under martial law.

The merchants and other citizens of Philadelphia, with a zeal guided by
that sound discretion which turns expenditure to the best account,
established a bank, for the support of which they subscribed 315,000,
Pennsylvania money, to be paid, if required, in specie, the principal
object of which was to supply the army with provisions. By the plan of
this bank its members were to derive no emolument whatever from the
institution. For advancing their credit and their money they required
only that Congress should pledge the faith of the Union to reimburse
the costs and charges of the transaction in a reasonable time, and
should give such assistance to its execution as might be in their
power.

The ladies of Philadelphia, too, gave a splendid example of patriotism
by large donations for the immediate relief of the suffering army. [2]

This example was extensively followed, but it is not by the
contributions of the generous that a war can or ought to be maintained.
The purse of a nation alone can supply the expenditures of a nation,
and when all are interested in a contest all ought to contribute to its
support. Taxes and taxes only can furnish for the prosecution of a
national war means which are just in themselves or competent to the
object.

Notwithstanding these donations the distresses of the army, for
clothing especially, still continued and were the more severely felt
when a cooperation with French troops was expected. So late as the 20th
of June (1780) Washington informed Congress that he still labored under
the painful and humiliating embarrassment of having no shirts for the
soldiers, many of whom were destitute of that necessary article. "For
the troops to be without clothing at any time," he added, "is highly
injurious to the service and distressing to our feelings, but the want
will be more peculiarly mortifying when they come to act with those of
our allies. If it be possible, I have no doubt immediate measures will
be taken to relieve their distress.

"It is also most sincerely wished that there could be some supplies of
clothing furnished to the officers. There are a great many whose
condition is still miserable. This is, in some instances, the case with
the whole lines of the States. It would be well for their own sakes and
for the public good if they could be furnished. They will not be able,
when our friends come to cooperate with us, to go on a common routine
of duty, and if they should, they must, from their appearance, be held
in low estimation."

This picture presents in strong colors the real patriotism of the
American army. One heroic effort, though it may dazzle the mind with
its splendor, is an exertion most men are capable of making, but
continued patient suffering and unremitting perseverance in a service
promising no personal emolument and exposing the officer unceasingly
not only to wants of every kind, but to those circumstances of
humiliation which seem to degrade him in the eyes of others,
demonstrate a fortitude of mind, a strength of virtue, and a firmness
of principle which ought never to be forgotten.

Washington was greatly embarrassed by his uncertainty with respect to
the force which he might count upon to cooperate with the expected
succors from France. Writing to Congress on this subject he said: "The
season is come when we have every reason to expect the arrival of the
fleet, and yet, for want of this point of primary consequence, it is
impossible for me to form a system of cooperation. I have no basis to
act upon, and, of course, were this generous succor of our ally now to
arrive, I should find myself in the most awkward, embarrassing, and
painful situation. The general and the admiral, from the relation in
which I stand, as soon as they approach our coast, will require of me a
plan of the measures to be pursued, and there ought of right to be one
prepared; but, circumstanced as I am, I cannot even give them
conjectures. From these considerations I have suggested to the
committee, by a letter I had the honor of addressing them yesterday,
the indispensable necessity of their writing again to the States,
urging them to give immediate and precise information of the measures
they have taken and of the result. The interest of the States, the
honor and reputation of our councils, the justice and gratitude due to
our allies, all require that I should, without delay, be enabled to
ascertain and inform them what we can or cannot undertake. There is a
point which ought now to be determined, on the success of which all our
future operations may depend, on which, for want of knowing our
prospects, I can make no decision. For fear of involving the fleet and
army of our allies in circumstances which would expose them, if not
seconded by us, to material inconvenience and hazard, I shall be
compelled to suspend it, and the delay may be fatal to our hopes."

While this uncertainty still continued, the expected succors from
France, consisting of a fleet of eight ships of the line, with frigates
and other vessels, under the Chevalier de Ternay, having about 6,000
troops on board under General the Count de Rochambeau, reached Rhode
Island on the evening of the 10th of July (1780), and in a few days
afterward Lafayette arrived at Newport from Washington's headquarters
to confer with his countrymen.

At the time of the arrival of the French in Rhode Island, Admiral
Arbuthnot had only four sail of the line at New York, but in a few days
Admiral Graves arrived from England with six sail of the line, which
gave the British a decided superiority over the French squadron, and
therefore Sir Henry Clinton, without delay, prepared for active
operations. He embarked about 8,000 men and sailed with the fleet to
Huntington bay, in Long Island, with the intention of proceeding
against the French at Newport. The militia of Massachusetts and
Connecticut were ordered by Washington to join the French forces in
Rhode Island, and the combined army there thought itself able to give
the British a good reception.

As the garrison of New York was weakened by the sailing of the armament
under Clinton, Washington, having received considerable reinforcements,
suddenly crossed the North river and advanced toward New York; that
movement brought Clinton back to defend the place and consequently
Washington proceeded no further in his meditated enterprise.

The want of money and of all necessaries still continued in the
American camp, and the discontent of the troops, gradually increasing,
was matured into a dangerous spirit of insubordination. The men,
indeed, bore incredible hardships and privations with unexampled
fortitude and patience, but the army was in a state of constant
fluctuation; it was composed, in a great measure, of militia harassed
by perpetual service and obliged to neglect the cultivation of their
farms and their private interests in order to obey the calls of public
duty, and of soldiers on short enlistments, who never acquired the
military spirit and habits.

In consequence of an appointment, Washington and suite set out to a
conference with Count Rochambeau and Admiral de Ternay, and on the 21st
of September (1780) met them at Hartford, in Connecticut, where they
spent a few days together, and conversed about a plan for the next
campaign.

The conference was useful in making the respective commanders well
acquainted with each other, and promoting a spirit of harmony between
them; but it led to no settled plan for the next campaign. A plan of
operations for the combined forces, which had been drawn up by
Washington and sent to Rochambeau by Lafayette when he went to Newport,
had contemplated the superiority of the naval force of the French,
which had now ceased to exist in consequence of the arrival of Admiral
Graves with a fleet of six ships of the line. It was consequently
agreed that nothing could be done in the way of offensive movements
until the arrival of a second division of the French fleet and army
from Brest, which was expected, or that of the Count de Guichen from
the West Indies. In the sequel, neither of these arrivals took place.
The second French division was blockaded at Brest, and never came to
this country, and de Guichen sailed direct to France from the West
Indies. Meantime Admiral Arbuthnot blockaded the French fleet at
Newport, and Rochambeau's army remained there for its protection. Both
the parties remained watching each other's movements, and depending on
the operations of the British and French fleets. Washington crossed the
Hudson to Tappan and remained there till winter.

Washington did not relinquish without infinite chagrin the sanguine
expectations he had formed of rendering this campaign decisive of the
war. Never before had he indulged so strongly the hope of happily
terminating the contest. In a letter to an intimate friend, this
chagrin was thus expressed: "We are now drawing to a close an inactive
campaign, the beginning of which appeared pregnant with events of a
very favorable complexion. I hoped, but I hoped in vain, that a
prospect was opening which would enable me to fix a period to my
military pursuits and restore me to domestic life. The favorable
disposition of Spain, the promised succor from France, the combined
force in the West Indies, the declaration of Russia (acceded to by
other powers of Europe, humiliating the naval pride and power of Great
Britain), the superiority of France and Spain by sea in Europe, the
Irish claims and English disturbances, formed in the aggregate an
opinion in my breast (which is not very susceptible of peaceful
dreams), that the hour of deliverance was not far distant; for that,
however unwilling Great Britain might be to yield the point, it would
not be in her power to continue the contest. But, alas, these
prospects, flattering as they were, have proved delusive, and I see
nothing before us but accumulating distress. We have been half of our
time without provisions and are likely to continue so. We have no
magazines nor money to form them. We have lived upon expedients until
we can live no longer. In a word, the history of the war is a history
of false hopes and temporary devices, instead of system and economy. It
is in vain, however, to look back, nor is it our business to do so. Our
case is not desperate if virtue exists in the people, and there is
wisdom among our rulers. But to suppose that this great revolution can
be accomplished by a temporary army, that this army will be subsisted
by State supplies and that taxation alone is adequate to our wants is
in my opinion absurd, and as unreasonable as to expect an inversion of
the order of nature to accommodate itself to our views. If it were
necessary it could be easily proved to any person of a moderate
understanding that an annual army or any army raised on the spur of the
occasion besides being unqualified for the end designed is, in various
ways that could be enumerated, ten times more expensive than a
permanent body of men under good organization and military discipline,
which never was nor will be the case with raw troops. A thousand
arguments, resulting from experience and the nature of things, might
also be adduced to prove that the army, if it is to depend upon State
supplies, must disband or starve, and that taxation alone (especially
at this late hour) cannot furnish the means to carry on the war. Is it
not time to retract from error and benefit by experience? Or do we want
further proof of the ruinous system we have pertinaciously adhered to?"

While the respective armies were in the state of inaction to which we
have just referred, the whole country was astounded by the discovery of
Arnold's treason. The details of this sad affair disclosed traits in
the character of this officer which were previously unknown, and, by
the public generally, unsuspected.

The great service and military talents of General Arnold, his courage
in battle and patient fortitude under excessive hardships had secured
to him a high place in the opinion of the army and of his country. Not
having sufficiently recovered from the wounds received before Quebec
and at Saratoga to be fit for active service, and having large accounts
to settle with the government, which required leisure, he was, on the
evacuation of Philadelphia in 1778, appointed to the command in that
place.

Unfortunately that strength of principle and correctness of judgment
which might enable him to resist the various seductions to which his
fame and rank exposed him in the metropolis of the Union, were not
associated with the firmness which he had displayed in the field and in
the most adverse circumstances. Yielding to the temptations of a false
pride and forgetting that he did not possess the resources of private
fortune, he indulged in the pleasures of a sumptuous table and
expensive equipage, and soon swelled his debts to an amount which it
was impossible for him to discharge. Unmindful of his military
character, he engaged in speculations which were unfortunate, and with
the hope of immense profits took shares in privateers which were
unsuccessful. His claims against the United States were great and he
looked to them for the means of extricating himself from the
embarrassments in which his indiscretions had involved him; but the
commissioners to whom his accounts were referred for settlement had
reduced them considerably, and on his appeal from their decision to
Congress, a committee reported that the sum allowed by the
commissioners was more than he was entitled to receive.

He was charged with various acts of extortion on the citizens of
Philadelphia, and with peculating on the public funds. [3]

Not the less soured by these multiplied causes of irritation, from the
reflection that they were attributable to his own follies and vices, he
gave full scope to his resentments, and indulged himself in expressions
of angry reproach against what he termed the ingratitude of his
country, which provoked those around him, and gave great offense to
Congress. Having become peculiarly odious to the government of
Pennsylvania, the executive of that State (President Reed, formerly aid
to Washington) exhibited formal charges against him to Congress, who
directed that he should be arrested and brought before a court-martial.
His trial was concluded late in January, 1779, and he was sentenced to
be reprimanded by the Commander-in-Chief. This sentence was approved by
Congress and carried into execution. [4]

From the time the sentence against him was approved, if not sooner, his
proud unprincipled spirit revolted from the cause of his country and
determined him to seek an occasion to make the objects of his
resentment the victims of his vengeance.

Turning his eyes on West Point as an acquisition which would give value
to treason and inflict a mortal wound on his former friends, he sought
the command of that fortress for the purpose of gratifying both his
avarice and his hate.

To New York the safety of West Point was peculiarly interesting, and in
that State the reputation of Arnold was particularly high. To its
delegation he addressed himself; and one of its members had written a
letter to Washington, suggesting doubts respecting the military
character of General Robert Howe, to whom its defense was then
entrusted, and recommending Arnold for that service. This request was
not forgotten. Some short time afterward General Schuyler mentioned to
Washington a letter he had received from Arnold intimating his wish to
join the army, but stating his inability, in consequence of his wounds,
to perform the active duties of the field. Washington observed that, as
there was a prospect of a vigorous campaign he should be gratified with
the aid of General Arnold--that so soon as the operations against New
York should commence, he designed to draw his whole force into the
field, leaving even West Point to the care of invalids and a small
garrison of militia. Recollecting, however, the former application of a
member of Congress respecting this post, he added that "if, with this
previous information, that situation would be more agreeable to him
than a command in the field, his wishes should certainly be indulged."

This conversation being communicated to Arnold, he caught eagerly at
the proposition, though without openly discovering any solicitude on
the subject, and in the beginning of August (1780) repaired to camp,
where he renewed the solicitations which had before been made
indirectly.

At this juncture Clinton embarked on an expedition he meditated against
Rhode Island, and Washington was advancing on New York. He offered
Arnold the left wing of the army, which he declined under the pretexts
mentioned in his letter to Schuyler.

Incapable of suspecting a man who had given such distinguished proofs
of courage and patriotism, Washington was neither alarmed at his
refusal to embrace so splendid an opportunity of recovering the favor
of his countrymen nor at the embarrassment accompanying that refusal.
Pressing the subject no further, he assented to the request which had
been made and invested Arnold with the command of West Point. Previous
to his soliciting this station Arnold had, in a letter to Colonel
Robinson, of the British army, signified his change of principles, and
his wish to restore himself to the favor of his prince by some signal
proof of his repentance. This letter opened the way to a correspondence
with Clinton, the immediate object of which, after obtaining the
appointment he had solicited, was to concert the means of delivering
the important post he commanded to the British general.

Major John Andr, an aide-de-camp of Clinton, and adjutant-general of
the British army, was selected as the person to whom the maturing of
Arnold's treason, and the arrangements for its execution should be
entrusted. A correspondence was carried on between them under a
mercantile disguise in the feigned names of Gustavus and Anderson; and
at length, to facilitate their communications, the Vulture,
sloop-of-war, moved up the North river and took a station convenient
for the purpose, but not so near as to excite suspicion.

The time when Washington met Rochambeau at Hartford was selected for
the final adjustment of the plan, and as a personal interview was
deemed necessary Andr came up the river and went on board the Vulture.
The house of a Mr. Smith, without the American posts, was appointed for
the interview, and to that place both parties repaired in the
night--Andr being brought under a pass for John Anderson in a boat
dispatched from the shore. While the conference was yet unfinished,
daylight approached, and to avoid discovery Arnold proposed that Andr
should remain concealed until the succeeding night. They continued
together during the day, and when, in the following night, his return
to the Vulture was proposed, the boatmen refused to carry him because
she had shifted her station during the day, in consequence of a gun
which was moved to the shore without the knowledge of Arnold and
brought to bear upon her. This embarrassing circumstance reduced him to
the necessity of endeavoring to reach New York by land. To accomplish
this purpose, he reluctantly yielded to the urgent representations of
Arnold, and laying aside his regimentals, which he had hitherto worn
under a surtout, put on a plain suit of clothes and received a pass
from Arnold, authorizing him, under the name of John Anderson, to
proceed on the public service to White Plains or lower if he thought
proper.

With this permit he had passed all the guards and posts on the road
unsuspected and was proceeding to New York in perfect security, when
one of three militiamen who [5]

[missing text]

night, and the other troops lay on the field of battle with their arms
in their hands. Washington passed the night in his cloak in the midst
of his soldiers.
The British employed the early part of the morning in removing their
wounded, and about midnight marched away in such silence that their
retreat was not perceived until day.

As it was certain that they must gain the high grounds about Middletown
before they could be overtaken, as the face of the country afforded no
prospect of opposing their embarkation, and as the battle already
fought had terminated in a manner to make a general impression
favorable to the American arms, Washington decided to relinquish the
pursuit. Leaving a detachment to hover about the British rear, the main
body of the army moved towards the Hudson.

Washington was highly gratified with the conduct of his troops in this
action. Their behavior, he said, after recovering from the first
surprise occasioned by the unexpected retreat of the advanced corps,
could not be surpassed. Wayne he particularly mentioned, and spoke of
the artillery in terms of high praise.

The loss of the Americans in the battle of Monmouth was 8 officers and
61 privates killed, and about 160 wounded. Among the slain were
Lieutenant-Colonel Bonner, of Pennsylvania, and Major Dickinson, of
Virginia, both of whom were much regretted. One hundred and thirty were
missing, but a considerable number of these afterward rejoined their
regiments.

In his official letter, Sir Henry Clinton states his dead and missing
at 4 officers and 184 privates; his wounded, at 16 officers and 154
privates. This account, so far as it respects the dead, cannot be
correct, as 4 officers and 245 privates were buried on the field by
persons appointed for the purpose, who made their report to Washington;
and some few were afterward found, so as to increase the number to
nearly 300. The uncommon heat of the day proved fatal to several on
both sides.

As usual, when a battle has not been decisive, both parties claimed the
victory. In the early part of the day the advantage was certainly with
the British; in the latter part it may be pronounced with equal
certainty to have been with the Americans. They maintained their
ground, repulsed the enemy, were prevented only by the night and by the
retreat of the hostile army from renewing the action, and suffered less
in killed and wounded than their adversaries.

It is true that Sir Henry Clinton effected what he states to have been
his principal object--the safety of his baggage. But when it is
recollected that the American officers had decided against hazarding an
action, that this advice must have trammeled the conduct and
circumscribed the views of Washington, he will be admitted to have
effected no inconsiderable object in giving the American arms that
appearance of superiority which was certainly acquired by this
engagement.

Independent of the loss sustained in the action, the British army was
considerably weakened in its march from Philadelphia to New York. About
100 prisoners were made, and near 1,000 soldiers, chiefly foreigners,
deserted while passing through Jersey. Many of the soldiers had formed
attachments in Philadelphia, which occasioned their desertion.
Clinton's whole loss, including killed, wounded, prisoners, and
deserters, amounted to at least 2,000 men.

The conduct of Lee was generally disapproved. As, however, he had
possessed a large share of the confidence and good opinion of the
Commander-in-Chief, it

[missing text]

were employed between the lines of the two armies, springing suddenly
from his covert into the road, seized the reins of his bridle and
stopped his horse. Losing his accustomed self possession, Andr,
instead of producing the pass from Arnold, asked the man hastily where
he belonged. He replied, "To below," a term implying that he was from
New York. "And so," said Andr, not suspecting deception, "am I." He
then declared himself to be a British officer on urgent business, and
begged that he might not be detained. The appearance of the other
militiamen disclosed his mistake too late to correct it. He offered a
purse of gold and a valuable watch, with tempting promises of ample
reward from his government if they would, permit him to escape; but his
offers were rejected, and his captors proceeded to search him. They
found concealed in his stockings, in Arnold's handwriting, papers
containing all the information which could be important respecting West
Point. When carried before Lieutenant-Colonel Jameson, the officer
commanding the scouting parties on the lines, he maintained his assumed
character and requested Jameson to inform his commanding officer that
Anderson was taken. Jameson dispatched an express with this
communication. On receiving it, Arnold comprehended the full extent of
his danger, and flying from well-merited punishment took refuge on
board the Vulture.

When sufficient time for the escape of Arnold was supposed to have
elapsed, Andr, no longer effecting concealment, acknowledged himself
to be the adjutant-general of the British army. Jameson, seeking to
correct the mischief of his indiscreet communication to Arnold,
immediately dispatched a packet to the Commander-in-Chief containing
the papers which had been discovered, with a letter from Andr relating
the manner of his capture and accounting for the disguise he had
assumed.

The express was directed to meet the Commander-in-Chief, who was then
on his return from Hartford, but, taking different roads, they missed
each other, and a delay attended the delivery of the papers, which
ensured the escape of Arnold.

Washington, with Generals Lafayette and Knox, had turned from the
direct route in order to visit a redoubt. Colonels Hamilton and
M'Henry, the aides-de-camp of Washington and Lafayette, went forward to
request Mrs. Arnold not to wait breakfast. Arnold received Andr's
billet in their presence. He turned pale, left them suddenly, called
his wife, communicated the intelligence to her, and left her in a
swoon, without the knowledge of Hamilton and M'Henry. Mounting the
horse of his aide-de-camp, which was ready saddled, and directing him
to inform Washington on his arrival that Arnold was gone to receive him
at West Point, he gained the river shore, and was conveyed in a canoe
to the Vulture.

Washington, on his arrival, was informed that Arnold awaited him at
West Point. Taking it for granted that this step had been taken to
prepare for his reception he proceeded thither without entering the
house, and was surprised to find that Arnold was not arrived. On
returning to the quarters of that officer he received Jameson's
dispatch which disclosed the whole mystery.

Every precaution was immediately taken for the security of West Point,
after which the attention of the Commander-in-Chief was turned to
Andr. A board of general officers, of which General Greene was
president, and Lafayette and Steuben were members, was called, to
report a precise state of his case, and to determine the character in
which he was to be considered, and the punishment to which he was
liable.

The frankness and magnanimity with which Andr had conducted himself
from the time of his appearance in his real character had made a very
favorable impression on all those with whom he had held any
intercourse. From this cause he experienced every mark of indulgent
attention which was compatible with his situation, and, from a sense of
justice as well as of delicacy, was informed, on the opening of the
examination that he was at liberty not to answer any interrogatory
which might embarrass his own feelings. But, as if only desirous to
rescue his character from imputations which he dreaded more than death,
he confessed everything material to his own condemnation, but would
divulge nothing which might involve others.

The board reported the essential facts which had appeared, with their
opinion that Major Andr was a spy and ought to suffer death. The
execution of this sentence was ordered to take place on the day
succeeding that on which it was pronounced.

Superior to the terrors of death, but dreading disgrace, Andr was
deeply affected by the mode of execution which the laws of war decree
to persons in his situation. He wished to die like a soldier not as a
criminal. To obtain a mitigation of his sentence in this respect he
addressed a letter to Washington, replete with the feelings of a man of
sentiment and honor. But the occasion required that the example should
make its full impression, and this request could not be granted. He
encountered his fate with composure and dignity, and his whole conduct
interested the feelings of all who witnessed it.

The general officers lamented the sentence which the usages of war
compelled them to pronounce, and never perhaps did the Commander-in-
Chief obey with more reluctance the stern mandates of duty and policy.
The sympathy excited among the American officers by his fate was as
universal as it is unusual on such occasions, and proclaims alike the
merit of him who suffered, and the humanity of those who inflicted
the punishment.

Great exertions were made by Sir Henry Clinton, to whom Andr was
particularly dear, first, to have him considered as protected by a flag
of truce, and afterward as a prisoner of war.

Even Arnold had the hardihood to interpose. After giving a certificate
of facts tending, as he supposed, to exculpate the prisoner, exhausting
his powers of reasoning on the case, and appealing to the humanity of
Washington, he sought to intimidate that officer by stating the
situation of many of the most distinguished individuals of South
Carolina, who had forfeited their lives, but had hitherto been spared
through the clemency of the British general. This clemency, he said,
could no longer be extended to them should Major Andr suffer.

It may well be supposed that the interposition of Arnold could have no
influence on Washington. He caused Mrs. Arnold to be conveyed to her
husband in New York, and also transmitted his clothes and baggage, for
which he had written, but in every other respect his letters, which
were unanswered, were also unnoticed.

The night after Arnold's escape, when his letter respecting Andr was
received, the general directed one of his aides to wait on Mrs. Arnold,
who was convulsed with grief, and inform her that he had done
everything which depended on him to arrest her husband, but that, not
having succeeded, it gave him pleasure to inform her that her husband
was safe. It is honorable to the American character that, during the
effervescence of the moment, Mrs. Arnold was permitted to go to
Philadelphia to take possession of her effects, and to proceed to New
York under the protection of a flag without receiving the slightest
insult.

This treatment of Mrs. Arnold by Washington is the more remarkable for
its delicacy when we recollect that she was under very strong
suspicions at the time of being actively concerned in the treason of
her husband. Historians are still divided on the question of her guilt
or innocence.

The mingled sentiments of admiration and compassion excited in every
bosom for the unfortunate Andr, seemed to increase the detestation in
which Arnold was held. "Andr," said General Washington in a private
letter, "has met his fate with that fortitude which was to be expected
from an accomplished man and a gallant officer, but I am mistaken if at
this time Arnold is undergoing the torments of a mental hell. He wants
feeling. From some traits of his character which have lately come to my
knowledge, he seems to have been so hardened in crime, so lost to all
sense of honor and shame, that while his faculties still enable him to
continue his sordid pursuits, there will be no time for remorse."

The traits in his character above alluded to, were disclosed in a
private letter from Hamilton, who said: "This man (Arnold) is in every
sense despicable. In addition to the scene of knavery and prostitution
during his command in Philadelphia, which the late seizure of his
papers has unfolded, the history of his command at West Point is a
history of little as well as great villainies. He practiced every dirty
act of peculation, and even stooped to connections with the sutlers to
defraud the public." [6]

From motives of policy, or of respect for his engagements, Sir Henry
Clinton conferred on Arnold the commission of a brigadier-general in
the British service, which he preserved throughout the war. Yet it is
impossible that rank could have rescued him from the contempt and
detestation in which the generous, and honorable, and the brave could
not cease to hold him. It was impossible for men of this description to
bury the recollection of his being a traitor--a sordid traitor--first
the slave of his rage, then purchased with gold, and finally secured at
the expense of the blood of one of the most accomplished officers in
the British army.

His representations of the discontent of the country and of the army,
concurring with reports from other quarters, had excited the hope that
the Loyalists and the dissatisfied, allured by British gold and the
prospect of rank in the British service, would flock to his standard
and form a corps at whose head he might again display his accustomed
intrepidity. With this hope he published an address to the inhabitants
of America in which he labored to palliate his own guilt, and to
increase their dissatisfaction with the existing state of things.

This appeal to the public was followed by a proclamation addressed "To
the officers and soldiers of the Continental army, who have the real
interests of their country at heart, and who are determined to be no
longer the tools and dupes of Congress or of France."

The object of this proclamation was to induce the officers and soldiers
to desert the cause they had embraced from principle by holding up to
them the very flattering offers of the British general, and contrasting
the substantial emoluments of the British service with their present
deplorable condition. He attempted to cover this dishonorable
proposition with a decent garb, by representing the base step he
invited them to take as the only measure which could restore peace,
real liberty, and happiness to their country.

These inducements did not produce their intended effect. Although the
temper of the army might be irritated by real suffering, and by the
supposed neglect of government, no diminution of patriotism had been
produced. Through all the hardships, irritations, and vicissitudes of
the war Arnold remains the solitary instance of an American officer who
abandoned the side first embraced in this civil contest, and turned his
sword upon his former companions in arms.

In the whole course of this affair of Arnold's treason, Washington,
according to the habitually religious turn of his mind, distinctly
recognized the hand of Divine Providence. Writing to Col. John Laurens
he says: "In no instance since the commencement of the war has the
interposition of Providence appeared more remarkably conspicuous than
in the rescue of the post and garrison of West Point from Arnold's
villainous perfidy. How far he meant to involve me in the catastrophe
of this place does not appear by any indubitable evidence, and I am
rather inclined to think he did not wish to hazard the more important
object of his treachery by attempting to combine two events, the less
of which might have marred the greater. A combination of extraordinary
circumstances, an unaccountable deprivation of presence of mind in a
man of the first abilities, and the virtue of three militiamen, threw
the adjutant-general of the British forces, with full proofs of
Arnold's treachery, into our hands. But for the egregious folly, or the
bewildered conception, of Lieutenant-Colonel Jameson, who seemed lost
in astonishment and not to know what he was doing, I should undoubtedly
have got Arnold."

Arnold, however, had not yet displayed the whole of his character.
Savage revenge and ruthless cruelty were yet to become apparent in his
conduct as an officer in the British service. It seems to have been the
design of Providence that Americans, in all ages, should learn to
detest treason by seeing it exhibited in all its hideous deformity, in
the person of "ARNOLD, THE TRAITOR." [7]

1. Footnote: While Washington was in winter quarters at Morristown, he
requested Congress to send a committee to the camp, as had been
previously done at Valley Forge, for the purpose of giving effect to
the arrangements for the ensuing campaign, and drawing more
expeditiously from the States their respective quotas of soldiers and
supplies. General Schuyler, who had retired from the army and was then
in Congress, was a member of this committee. He rendered essential
service at this time by his judgment and experience. The committee
remained in camp between two and three months.

2. Footnote: It is pleasant to know that Mrs. Washington was at the head
of this movement. Dr. Spencer says: "In all parts of the country the women
displayed great zeal and activity, particularly in providing clothing for
the soldiers. In Philadelphia they formed a society, at the head of which
was Martha Washington, wife of the Commander-in-Chief. This lady was as
prudent in private affairs as her husband was in public. She alone
presided over their domestic finances, and provided for their common
household. Thus it was owing to the talents and virtues of his wife, that
Washington could give himself wholly to the dictates of that patriotism
which this virtuous pair mutually shared and reciprocally invigorated.
Mrs. Washington, Mrs. Reed, Mrs. Bache, the daughter of Dr. Franklin,
with the other ladies who had formed the society, themselves subscribed
considerable sums for the public; and having exhausted their own means,
they exerted their influence, and went from house to house to stimulate
the liberality of others."

3. Footnote: While these charges were hanging over his head, Arnold
courted and married Miss Shippen, a young lady, not yet eighteen, the
daughter of Mr. Edward Shippen, of Philadelphia.

4. Footnote: "Our service,"--such were his words,--"is the chastest of
all. Even the shadow of a fault tarnishes the lustre of our finest
achievements. The least inadvertence may rob us of the public favor, so
hard to be acquired. I reprimand you for having forgotten, that in
proportion as you had rendered yourself formidable to our enemies, you
should have been guarded and temperate in your deportment toward your
fellow-citizens.

"Exhibit anew those noble qualities which have placed you on the list of
our most valued commanders. I will myself furnish you, as far as it may
be in my power, with opportunities of gaining the esteem of your
country."

5. Footnote: The names of these militiamen were John Paulding, David
Williams, and Isaac Van Wart.

6. Footnote: "I am inclined to believe that Arnold was a finished
scoundrel from early manhood to his grave; nor do I believe that he had
any real and true-hearted attachment to the Whig cause. He fought as a
mere adventurer, and took sides from a calculation of personal gain,
and chances of plunder and advancement."--_Sabine's "American
Loyalists_," p. 131.

7. Footnote: On the third of November it was resolved, "That Congress
have a high sense of the virtuous and patriotic conduct of John
Paulding, David Williams, and Isaac Van Wart; in testimony whereof,
ordered, that each of them receive annually $200 in specie, or an
equivalent in the current money of these States, during life, and that
the Board of War be directed to procure for each of them a silver
medal, on one side of which shall be a shield, with this
inscription--FIDELITY: and on the other, the following motto--VINCIT
AMOR PATIAE, and forward them to the Commander-in-Chief, who is
requested to present the same, with a copy of this resolution, and the
thanks of Congress for their fidelity, and the eminent service they
have rendered their country."




CHAPTER XIX.


OPERATIONS AT THE SOUTH. 1780.


Although Washington was aware that the British were aiming at the
conquest of the southern States he still considered the middle States
to be the main theater of war, and felt the necessity of reserving his
main force for the defense of that portion of the Union. He did not
believe that the possession by the British of a few posts in the South
would contribute much to the purposes of the war, and he sent no more
troops to that part of the country than he could conveniently spare
from the main army. Writing to Lafayette in Paris, after the fall of
Savannah (8th March, 1779), he says: "Nothing of importance has
happened since you left us except the enemy's invasion of Georgia and
possession of its capital, which, though it may add something to their
supplies on the score of provisions, will contribute very little to the
brilliancy of their arms; for, like the defenseless Island of St.
Lucia, [1] it only required the appearance of force to effect the
conquest of it, as the whole militia of the State did not exceed 1,200
men, and many of them disaffected. General Lincoln is assembling a
force to dispossess them, and my only fear is that he will precipitate
the attempt before he is fully prepared for the execution."

As early as September 1778, General Lincoln had been appointed to
supersede Gen. Robert Howe in the command of the southern army. Lincoln
had baffled the attempts of General Prevost on South Carolina, and had
commanded the American forces in the unsuccessful siege of Savannah,
acting in concert with D'Estaing. He was still in command at Charleston
when Clinton, whose departure from New York on an expedition to the
South we have already noticed, made his descent on South Carolina. In
this command at Charleston General Lincoln unfortunately labored under
great disadvantages and discouragements.

The failure of the attack on Savannah (in which bombardment 1,000 lives
were lost, Count Pulaski, the Polish patriot, was mortally wounded, and
the simple-hearted Sergeant Jasper died grasping the banner presented
to his regiment at Fort Moultrie), with the departure of the French
fleet from the coast of America, presented a gloomy prospect and was
the forerunner of many calamities to the southern States. By their
courage and vigor the northern provinces had repelled the attacks of
the enemy and discouraged future attempts against them. And although
having bravely defended Sullivan's Island, in 1776, the southern
colonists were latterly less successful than their victorious brethren
in the North. The rapid conquest of Georgia and the easy march of
Prevost to the very gates of Charleston had a discouraging effect and
naturally rendered the southern section vulnerable to attack. In the
North the military operations of 1778 and 1779 had produced no
important results, and, therefore, the late transactions in Georgia and
South Carolina more readily attracted the attention of the British
Commander-in-Chief to those States.

Savannah, the chief town of Georgia, as we have already seen, was in
the hands of the British troops, and had been successfully defended
against a combined attack of the French and Americans, and therefore
Sir Henry Clinton resolved to gain possession of Charleston also, the
capital of South Carolina, which would give him the command of all the
southern parts of the Union. Having made the necessary preparations he
sailed, as we have seen, from New York on the 26th of December 1779,
under convoy of Admiral Arbuthnot, but did not arrive at Savannah till
the end of January (1780). The voyage was tempestuous; some of the
transports and victuallers were lost, others shattered, and a few taken
by the American cruisers. Most of the cavalry and draught horses
perished. One of the transports, which had been separated from the
fleet and captured by the Americans, was brought into Charleston on the
23d of January, and the prisoners gave the first certain notice of the
destination of the expedition.

As soon as it was known that an armament was fitting out at New York
many suspected that the southern States were to be assailed, and such
was the unhappy posture of American affairs at that time, that no
sanguine expectations of a successful resistance could be reasonably
entertained. The magazines of the Union were everywhere almost empty,
and Congress had neither money nor credit to replenish them. The army
at Morristown, under the immediate orders of Washington, was
threatened, as we have seen, with destruction by want of provisions,
and consequently could neither act with vigor in the North, nor send
reinforcements to the South.

General Lincoln, though aware of his danger,--was not in a condition to
meet it. On raising the siege of Savannah he had sent the troops of
Virginia to Augusta; those of South Carolina were stationed partly at
Sheldoa, opposite Port Royal, between thirty and forty miles north from
Savannah, and partly at Fort Moultrie, which had been allowed to fall
into decay; those of North Carolina were with General Lincoln at
Charleston. All these detachments formed but a feeble force, and to
increase it was not easy, for the Colonial paper money was in a state
of great depreciation; the militia, worn out by a harassing service,
were reluctant again to repair to the standards of their country, and
the brave defense of Savannah had inspired the people of the southern
provinces with intimidating notions of British valor. The patriotism of
many of the Colonists had evaporated; they contemplated nothing but the
hardships and dangers of the contest and recoiled from the protracted
struggle.

In these discouraging circumstances Congress recommended the people of
South Carolina to arm their slaves, a measure to which they were
generally averse; although, had they been willing to comply with the
recommendation, arms could not have been procured. Washington had, as
we have already seen, ordered the Continental troops of North Carolina
and Virginia to march to Charleston, and four American frigates, two
French ships of war; the one mounting twenty-six and the other eighteen
guns, with the marine force of South Carolina under Commodore Whipple,
were directed to cooperate in the defense of the town. No more aid
could be expected; yet, under these unpromising circumstances, a full
house of assembly resolved to defend Charleston to the last extremity.

Although Clinton had embarked at New York on the 26th of December,
1779, yet, as his voyage had been stormy and tedious, and as some time
had been necessarily spent at Savannah, it was the 11th of February,
1780, before he landed on John's Island, thirty miles south from
Charleston. Had he even then marched rapidly upon the town he would
probably have entered it without much opposition, but mindful of his
repulse in 1776 his progress was marked by a wary circumspection. He
proceeded by the islands of St. John and St. James, while part of his
fleet advanced to blockade the harbor. He sent for a reinforcement from
New York, ordered General Prevost to join him with 1,100 men from
Savannah, and neglected nothing that could insure success.

General Lincoln was indefatigable in improving the time which the slow
progress of the royal army afforded him. Six hundred slaves were
employed in constructing or repairing the fortifications of the town;
vigorous though not very successful measures were taken to bring the
militia into the field; and all the small detachments of regular troops
were assembled in the capital. The works which had been begun on
Charleston Neck when General Prevost threatened the place were resumed.
A chain of redoubts, lines, and batteries was formed between the Cooper
and Ashley rivers. In front of each flank the works were covered by
swamps extending from the rivers; those opposite swamps were connected
by a canal; between the canal and the works were two strong rows of
abattis, and a ditch double picketed, with deep holes at short
distances, to break the columns in case of an assault. Toward the
water, works were thrown up at every place where a landing was
practicable. The vessels intended to defend the bar of the harbor
having been found insufficient for that purpose, their guns were taken
out and planted on the ramparts, and the seamen were stationed at the
batteries. One of the ships, which was not dismantled, was placed in
the Cooper river to assist the batteries, and several vessels were sunk
at the mouth of the channel to prevent the entrance of the royal fleet.
Lincoln intended that the town should be defended until such
reinforcements would arrive from the North as, together with the
militia of the State, would compel Clinton to raise the siege. As the
regular troops in the town did not exceed 1,400, a council of war found
that the garrison was too weak to spare detachments to obstruct the
progress of the royal army. Only a small party of cavalry and some
light troops were ordered to hover on its left flank and observe its
motions.

While these preparations for defense were going on in Charleston the
British army was cautiously but steadily advancing toward the town. As
he proceeded Clinton erected forts and formed magazines at proper
stations, and was careful to secure his communications with those forts
and with the sea. All the horses of the British army had perished in
the tedious and stormy voyage from New York to Savannah, but on landing
in South Carolina Clinton procured others to mount his dragoons, whom
he formed into a light corps, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Tarleton. That officer was extremely active in covering the left wing
of the army and in dispersing the militia. In one of his excursions he
fell in with Lieut.-Col. William Washington, who commanded the remnant
of Baylor's regiment, and who beat him back with loss.

On the 20th of March (1780) the British fleet, under Admiral Arbuthnot,
consisting of 1 ship of 50 guns, 2 of 44 each, 4 of 32 each, and an
armed vessel, passed the bar in front of Rebellion Road, and anchored
in Five Fathom Hole.

It being now thought impossible to prevent the fleet from passing Fort
Moultrie, and taking such stations in Cooper river as would enable them
to rake the batteries on shore, and to close that communication between
the town and country, the plan of defense was once more changed, and
the armed vessels were carried into the mouth of Cooper river, and sunk
in a line from the town to Shute's Folly.

This was the critical moment for evacuating the town. The loss of the
harbor rendered the defense of the place, if not desperate, so
improbable, that the hope to maintain it could not have been rationally
entertained by a person who was not deceived by the expectation of aids
much more considerable than were actually received.

When this state of things was communicated to Washington by
Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens he said in reply: "The impracticability of
defending the bar, I fear, amounts to the loss of the town and
garrison. At this distance it is impossible to judge for you. I have
the greatest confidence in General Lincoln's prudence, but it really
appears to me that the propriety of attempting to defend the town
depended on the probability of defending the bar, and that when this
ceased, the attempt ought to have been relinquished. In this, however,
I suspend a definitive judgment, and wish you to consider what I say as
confidential." Unfortunately this letter did not arrive in time to
influence the conduct of the besieged.

On the 4th of April (1780), Admiral Arbuthnot, taking advantage of a
strong southerly wind and a flowing tide, passed Fort Moultrie [2] and
anchored just without reach of the guns of Charleston. The fort kept up
a heavy fire on the fleet while passing which did some damage to the
ships and killed or wounded twenty-seven men.

On the 29th of March the royal army reached Ashley river and crossed it
ten miles above the town without opposition, the garrison being too
weak to dispute the passage. Sir Henry Clinton having brought over his
artillery, baggage, and stores marched down Charleston Neck, and on the
night of the 1st of April, broke ground at the distance of 800 yards
from the American works. The fortifications of Charleston were
constructed under the direction of Mr. Laumoy, a French engineer of
reputation in the American service, and, although not calculated to
resist a regular siege, were by no means contemptible; and Clinton made
his approaches in due form. Meanwhile the garrison received a
reinforcement of 700 Continentals under General Woodford, and, after
this accession of strength, amounted to somewhat more than 2,000
regular troops, besides 1,000 militia of North Carolina, and the
citizens of Charleston.

On the 9th of April (1780) Clinton finished his first parallel, forming
an oblique line between the two rivers, from 600 to 1,100 yards from
the American works, and mounted his guns in battery. He then, jointly
with the admiral, summoned Lincoln to surrender the town. Lincoln's
answer was modest and firm: "Sixty days," said he, "have passed since
it has been known that your intentions against this town were hostile,
in which time was afforded to abandon it, but duty and inclination
point to the propriety of supporting it to the last extremity."

On receiving this answer Clinton immediately opened his batteries, and
his fire was soon felt to be superior to that of the besieged. Hitherto
the communication with the country north of the Cooper was open and a
post was established to prevent the investiture of the town on that
side. After the summons, Governor Rutledge, with half of his council,
left the town for the purpose of exercising the functions of the
executive government in the State, and in the hope of being able to
bring a large body of the militia to act on the rear or left flank of
the besieging army, but the militia were as little inclined to embody
themselves as to enter the town.

For the purpose of maintaining the communication with the country north
of the Cooper, of checking the British foragers, and of protecting
supplies on their way to the town, the American cavalry, under General
Huger, had passed the river and taken post at Monk's Corner, thirty
miles above Charleston. Posts of militia were established between the
Cooper and Santee and at a ferry on the last-named river, where boats
were ordered to be collected in order to facilitate the passage of the
garrison, if it should be found necessary to evacuate the town. But
Clinton defeated all these precautions. For as the possession of the
harbor rendered the occupation of the forts to the southward
unnecessary, he resolved to call in the troops which had been employed
in that quarter, to close the communication of the garrison with the
country to the northward, and to complete the investiture of the town.
For these purposes, as the fleet was unable to enter the Cooper river,
he deemed it necessary to dislodge the American posts and employed
Tarleton to beat up the quarters of General Huger's cavalry at Monk's
Corner. Conducted during the night by a negro slave through
unfrequented paths, Tarleton proceeded toward the American post, and,
although General Huger had taken the precaution of placing sentinels a
mile in front of his station and of keeping his horses saddled and
bridled, yet Tarleton advanced so rapidly that, notwithstanding the
alarm was given by the outposts, he began the attack before the
Americans could put themselves in a posture of defense, killed or took
about thirty of them, and dispersed the rest. General Huger, Colonel
Washington, and many others made good their retreat through the woods.
Such as escaped concealed themselves for several days in the swamps.
The horses taken by the British fell very seasonably into their hands,
as they were not well mounted. After this decisive blow it was some
time before any armed party of the Americans ventured to show
themselves south of the Santee. That part of the country was laid open
to the British, who established posts in such a way as completely to
enclose the garrison. The arrival of 3,000 men from New York greatly
increased the strength of the besiegers.

The second parallel was completed, and it daily became more apparent
that the garrison must ultimately submit. An evacuation of the town was
proposed and Lincoln seems to have been favorable to the measure, but
the garrison could scarcely have escaped, and the principal inhabitants
entreated the general not to abandon them to the fury of the enemy.

The British troops on the north of the Cooper were increased, and
Cornwallis was appointed to command in that quarter. On the 20th April
(1780) General Lincoln again called a council of war to deliberate on
the measures to be adopted. The council recommended a capitulation;
terms were offered, but rejected, and hostilities recommenced. After
the besiegers had begun their third parallel, Colonel Henderson made a
vigorous sally on their right, which was attended with some success;
but, owing to the weakness of the garrison, this was the only attempt
of the kind during the siege.

After the fleet passed it, Fort Moultrie became of much less importance
than before, and part of the garrison was removed to Charleston. The
admiral, perceiving the unfinished state of the works on the west side,
prepared to storm it. On the 7th of May, everything being ready for the
assault, he summoned the garrison, consisting of 200 men, who, being
convinced of their inability to defend the place, surrendered
themselves prisoners of war without firing a gun. On the same day the
cavalry which had escaped from Monk's Corner, and which had reassembled
under the command of Colonel White, were again surprised and defeated
by Colonel Tarleton. After Cornwallis had passed the Cooper and made
himself master of the peninsula between that river and the Santee, he
occasionally sent out small foraging parties. Apprised of that
circumstance, Colonel White repassed the Santee, fell in with and took
one of those parties, and dispatched an express to Colonel Buford, who
commanded a regiment of new levies from Virginia, requesting him to
cover his retreat across the Santee at Lanneau's ferry, where he had
ordered some boats to be collected to carry his party over the river.
Colonel White reached the ferry before Buford's arrival, and, thinking
himself in no immediate danger, halted to refresh his party.
Cornwallis, having received notice of his incursion, dispatched
Tarleton in pursuit, who, overtaking him a few minutes after he had
halted, instantly charged him, killed or took about thirty of the
party, and dispersed the rest.

Charleston was now completely invested, all hopes of assistance had
been cruelly disappointed, and the garrison and inhabitants were left
to their own resources. The troops were exhausted by incessant duty and
insufficient to man the lines. Many of the guns were dismounted, the
shot nearly expended, and the bread and meat almost entirely consumed.
The works of the besiegers were pushed very near the defenses of the
town, and the issue of an assault was extremely hazardous to the
garrison and inhabitants. In these critical circumstances, General
Lincoln summoned a council of war, which recommended a capitulation.
Terms were accordingly proposed, offering to surrender the town and
garrison on condition that the militia and armed citizens should not be
prisoners of war, but should be allowed to return home without
molestation. These terms were refused, hostilities were recommenced,
and preparations for an assault were in progress. The citizens, who had
formerly remonstrated against the departure of the garrison, now became
clamorous for a surrender. In this hopeless state Lincoln offered to
give up the place on the terms which Clinton had formerly proposed. The
offer was accepted and the capitulation was signed on the 12th of May
(1780).

The town and fortifications, the shipping, artillery, and all public
stores were to be given up as they then were; the garrison, consisting
of the Continental troops, militia, sailors, and citizens who had borne
arms during the siege, were to be prisoners of war; the garrison were
to march out of the town and lay down their arms in front of the works,
but their drums were not to beat a British march, and their colors were
not to be uncased; the Continental troops and sailors were to be
conducted to some place afterward to be agreed on, where they were to
be well supplied with wholesome provisions until exchanged; the militia
were to be allowed to go home on parole; the officers were to retain
their arms, baggage, and servants, and they might sell their horses,
but were not permitted to take them out of Charleston; neither the
persons nor property of the militia or citizens were to be molested so
long as they kept their parole. [3]

On these terms the garrison of Charleston marched out and laid down
their arms, and General Leslie was appointed by Clinton to take
possession of the town. The siege was more obstinate than bloody. The
besiegers had 76 men killed and 189 wounded; the besieged had 92 killed
and 148 wounded; about 20 of the inhabitants were killed in their
houses by random shots. The number of prisoners reported by Clinton
amounted to upward of 5,000, exclusive of sailors, but in that return
all the freemen of the town capable of bearing arms, as well as the
Continental soldiers and militia, were included. The number of
Continental troops in the town amounted only to 1,777, about 500 of
whom were in the hospital. The effective strength of the garrison was
between 2,000 and 3,000 men. The besieging army consisted of about
9,000 of the best of the British troops.

After the British got possession of the town the arms taken from the
Americans, amounting to 5,000 stand, were lodged in a laboratory near a
large quantity of cartridges and loose powder. By incautiously snapping
the muskets and pistols the powder ignited and blew up the house, and
the burning fragments, which were scattered in all directions, set fire
to the workhouse, jail, and old barracks, and consumed them. The
British guard stationed at the place, consisting of fifty men, was
destroyed, and about as many other persons lost their lives on the
disastrous occasion.

Clinton carried on the siege in a cautious but steady and skilful
manner. Lincoln was loaded with undeserved blame by many of his
countrymen, for he conducted the defense as became a brave and
intelligent officer. The error lay in attempting to defend the town,
but, in the circumstances in which Lincoln was placed, he was almost
unavoidably drawn into that course. It was the desire of the State that
the capital should be defended, and Congress, as well as North and
South Carolina, had encouraged him to expect that his army would be
increased to 9,000 men--a force which might have successfully resisted
all the efforts of the royal army. But neither Congress nor the
Carolinas were able to fulfill the promises which they had made, for
the militia were extremely backward in taking the field, and the
expected number of Continentals could not be furnished. Lincoln,
therefore, was left to defend the place with only about one-third of
the force which he had been encouraged to expect. At any time before
the middle of April he might have evacuated the town, but the civil
authority then opposed his retreat, which soon afterward became
difficult, and ultimately impracticable.

At General Lincoln's request Congress passed a resolve directing the
Commander-in-Chief to cause an inquiry to be made concerning the loss
of Charleston and the conduct of General Lincoln while commanding in
the southern department. Washington, who knew Lincoln's merit well,
determined to give Congress time for reflection before adopting any
measure which had the least appearance of censure. The following
extract from his letter to the President of Congress (10th July, 1780)
points out clearly the impropriety of the hasty proceedings which had
been proposed in regard to this able and deserving officer:

"At this time," Washington writes, "I do not think that the
circumstances of the campaign would admit, at any rate, an inquiry to
be gone into respecting the loss of Charleston, but, if it were
otherwise, I do not see that it could be made so as to be completely
satisfactory either to General Lincoln or to the public, unless some
gentlemen could be present who have been acting in that quarter. This,
it seems, would be necessary on the occasion, and the more so as I have
not a single document or paper in my possession concerning the
department, and a copy of the instructions and orders which they may
have been pleased to give General Lincoln from time to time and of
their correspondence. And besides the reasons against the inquiry at
this time, General Lincoln being a prisoner of war, his situation, it
appears to me, must preclude one till he is exchanged, supposing every
other obstacle were out of the question. If Congress think proper, they
will be pleased to transmit to me such papers as they may have which
concern the matters of inquiry, that there may be no delay in
proceeding in the business when other circumstances will permit."

The fall of Charleston was matter of much exultation to the British and
spread a deep gloom over the aspect of American affairs. The southern
army was lost, and, although small, it could not soon be replaced. In
the southern parts of the Union there had always been a considerable
number of persons friendly to the claims of Britain. The success of her
arms roused all their lurking partialities, gave decision to the
conduct of the wavering, encouraged the timid, drew over to the British
cause all those who are ever ready to take part with the strongest, and
discouraged and intimidated the friends of Congress.

Clinton was perfectly aware of the important advantage which he had
gained, and resolved to keep up and deepen the impression on the public
mind by the rapidity of his movements and the appearance of his troops
in different parts of the country. For that purpose he sent a strong
detachment under Cornwallis over the Santee toward the frontier of
North Carolina. He dispatched an inferior force into the center of the
province, and sent a third up the Savannah to Augusta. These
detachments were instructed to disperse any small parties that still
remained in arms, and to show the people that the British troops were
complete masters of South Carolina and Georgia.

Soon after passing the Santee, Cornwallis was informed that Colonel
Buford was lying, with 400 men, in perfect security, near the border of
North Carolina. He immediately dispatched Colonel Tarleton, with his
cavalry, named the Legion, to surprise that party. After performing a
march of 104 miles in fifty-four hours, Tarleton, at the head of 700
men, overtook Buford on his march, at the Waxhaws, and ordered him to
surrender, offering him the same terms which had been granted to the
garrison of Charleston. On Buford's refusal, Tarleton instantly charged
the party, who were dispirited and unprepared for such an onset. Most
of them threw down their arms and made no resistance, but a few
continued firing, and an indiscriminate slaughter ensued of those who
had submitted as well as of those who had resisted. Many begged for
quarter, but no quarter was given. Tarleton's quarter became proverbial
throughout the Union and certainly rendered some subsequent conflicts
more fierce and bloody than they would otherwise have been. Buford and
a few horsemen forced their way through the enemy and escaped; some of
the infantry, also, who were somewhat in advance, saved themselves by
flight, but the regiment was almost annihilated. Tarleton stated that
113 were killed on the spot, 150 left on parole, so badly wounded that
they could not be removed, and 53 brought away as prisoners. So feeble
was the resistance made by the Americans that the British had only 12
men killed and 5 wounded. The slaughter on this occasion excited much
indignation in America. The British endeavored to justify their conduct
by asserting that the Americans resumed their arms after having
pretended to submit, but such of the American officers as escaped from
the carnage denied the allegation. For this exploit, Tarleton was
highly praised by Cornwallis.

After the defeat of Buford there were no parties in South Carolina or
Georgia capable of resisting the royal detachments. The force of
Congress in those provinces seemed annihilated and the spirit of
opposition among the inhabitants was greatly subdued. Many, thinking it
vain to contend against a power which they were unable to withstand,
took the oath of allegiance to the King or gave their parole not to
bear arms against him.

In order to secure the entire submission of that part of the country,
military detachments were stationed at the most commanding points, and
measures were pursued for settling the civil administration and for
consolidating the conquest of the provinces. So fully was Clinton
convinced of the subjugation of the country and of the sincere
submission of the inhabitants, or of their inability to resist, that,
on the 3d of June (1780), he issued a proclamation, in which, after
stating that all persons should take an active part in settling and
securing his majesty's government and in delivering the country from
that anarchy which for some time had prevailed, he discharged from
their parole the militia who were prisoners, except those only who had
been taken in Charleston and Fort Moultrie, and restored them to all
the rights and duties of inhabitants; he also declared that such as
should neglect to return to their allegiance should be treated as
enemies and rebels.

This proclamation was unjust and impolitic. Proceeding on the
supposition that the people of those provinces were subdued rebels,
restored by an act of clemency to the privileges and duties of
citizens, and forgetting that for upward of four years they had been
exercising an independent authority, and that the issue of the war only
could stamp on them the character of patriots or rebels. It might
easily have been foreseen that the proclamation was to awaken the
resentment and alienate the affections of those to whom it was
addressed. Many of the Colonists had submitted in the fond hope of
being released, under the shelter of the British government, from that
harassing service to which they had lately been exposed, and of being
allowed to attend to their own affairs in a state of peaceful
tranquility; but the proclamation dissipated this delusion and opened
their eyes to their real situation. Neutrality and peace were what they
desired, but neutrality and peace were denied them. If they did not
range themselves under the standards of Congress, they must, as British
subjects, appear as militia in the royal service. The people sighed for
peace, but, on finding that they must fight on one side or the other,
they preferred the banners of their country and thought they had as
good a right to violate the allegiance and parole which Clinton had
imposed on them as he had to change their state from that of prisoners
to that of British subjects without their consent. They imagined that
the proclamation released them from all antecedent obligations. Not a
few, without any pretense of reasoning on the subject, deliberately
resolved to act a deceitful part and to make professions of submission
and allegiance to the British government so long as they found it
convenient, but with the resolution of joining the standards of their
country on the first opportunity. Such duplicity and falsehood ought
always to be reprobated, but the unsparing rapacity with which the
inhabitants were plundered made many of them imagine that no means of
deception and vengeance were unjustifiable.

Hitherto the French fleets and troops had not afforded much direct
assistance to the Americans, but they had impeded and embarrassed the
operations of the British Commander-in-Chief. He had intended to sail
against Charleston so early as the month of September, 1779, but the
unexpected appearance of Count D'Estaing on the southern coast had
detained him at New York till the latter part of December. It was his
intention, after the reduction of Charleston, vigorously to employ the
whole of his force in the subjugation of the adjacent provinces, but
information, received about the time of the surrender of the town, that
Monsieur de Ternay, with a fleet and troops from France, was expected
on the American coast, deranged his plan and induced him to return to
New York with the greater part of his army, leaving Cornwallis at the
head of 4,000 men to prosecute the southern conquests. Clinton sailed
from Charleston on the 5th of June.

After the reduction of Charleston and the entire defeat of all the
American detachments in those parts, an unusual calm ensued for six
weeks. Imagining that South Carolina and Georgia were reannexed to the
British empire in sentiment as well as in appearance, Cornwallis now
meditated an attack on North Carolina. Impatient, however, as he was of
repose, he could not carry his purpose into immediate execution. The
great heat, the want of magazines, and the impossibility of subsisting
his army in the field before harvest, compelled him to pause. But the
interval was not lost. He distributed his troops in such a manner in
South Carolina and the upper parts of Georgia as seemed most favorable
to the enlistment of young men who could be prevailed on to join the
royal standard; he ordered companies of royal militia to be formed; and
he maintained a correspondence with such of the inhabitants of North
Carolina as were friendly to the British cause. He informed them of the
necessity he was under of postponing the expedition into their country,
and advised them to attend to their harvest and to remain quiet till
the royal army advanced to support them. Eager, however, to manifest
their zeal and entertaining sanguine hopes of success, certain Tories
disregarded his salutary advice and broke out into premature
insurrections, which were vigorously resisted and generally suppressed
by the patriots, who were the more numerous and determined party. But
one band of Tories, amounting to 800 men, under a Colonel Bryan,
marched down the Yadkin to a British post at the Cheraws and afterward
reached Camden.

The people of North Carolina were likely to prove much more intractable
than those of South Carolina and Georgia. They were chiefly descendants
of Scotch-Irish settlers--stern Presbyterians and ardent lovers of
liberty. When Tryon was their governor, they had resisted his tyranny
under the name of Regulators, and at Mecklenburg had published a
declaration of independence more than a year before Congress took the
same attitude of defiance. Such were the North Carolinians; and their
State was destined to be the scene of many battles in which the power
of Britain was bravely resisted.

Having made the necessary dispositions Cornwallis entrusted the command
on the frontier to Lord Rawdon and returned to Charleston in order to
organize the civil government of the province and to establish such
regulations as circumstances required. But Cornwallis showed himself
more a soldier than a politician, and more a tyrant than either.
Instead of endeavoring to regain, by kindness and conciliation, the
good will of a people whose affections were alienated from the cause in
which he was engaged, Cornwallis attempted to drive them into
allegiance by harshness and severity. Indeed, many of the British
officers viewed the Americans merely in the light of rebels and
traitors, whose lives it was indulgence to spare; treated them not only
with injustice, but with insolence and insult more intolerable than
injustice itself; and exercised a rigor which greatly increases the
miseries without promoting the legitimate purposes of war.

By the capitulation of Charleston, the citizens were prisoners on
parole, but successive proclamations were published, each abridging the
privileges of prisoners more than that which had gone before. A board
of police was established for the administration of justice, and before
that board British subjects were allowed to sue for debts, but
prisoners were denied that privilege; they were liable to prosecution
for debts, but had no security for what was owing them, except the
honor of their debtors, and that, in many instances, was found a feeble
guarantee. If they complained they were threatened with close
confinement; numbers were imprisoned in the town and others consigned
to dungeons at a distance from their families. In short, every method,
except that of kindness and conciliation, was resorted to in order to
compel the people to become British subjects. A few, who had always
been well affected to the royal cause, cheerfully returned to their
allegiance, and many followed the same course from convenience. To
abandon their families and estates and encounter all the privations of
fugitives required a degree of patriotism and fortitude which few
possessed.

In that melancholy posture of American affairs, many of the ladies of
Charleston displayed a remarkable degree of zeal and intrepidity in the
cause of their country. They gloried in the appellation of rebel
ladies, and declined invitations to public entertainments given by the
British officers, but crowded to prison ships and other places of
confinement to solace their suffering countrymen. While they kept back
from the concerts and assemblies of the victors they were forward in
showing sympathy and kindness toward American officers whenever they
met them. They exhorted their brothers, husbands, and sons to an
unshrinking endurance in behalf of their country, and cheerfully became
the inmates of their prison and the companions of their
exile--voluntarily renouncing affluence and ease and encountering
labor, penury, and privation.

For some time the rigorous measures of the British officers in South
Carolina seemed successful and a deathlike stillness prevailed in the
province. The clangor of arms ceased and no enemy to British authority
appeared. The people of the lower parts of South Carolina were
generally attached to the revolution, but many of their most active
leaders were prisoners. The fall of Charleston and the subsequent
events had sunk many into despondency, and all were overawed. This
gloomy stillness continued about six weeks when the symptoms of a
gathering storm began to show themselves. The oppression and insults to
which the people were exposed highly exasperated them; they repented
the apathy with which they had seen the siege of Charleston carried on,
and felt that the fall of their capital, instead of introducing safety
and rural tranquility, as they had fondly anticipated, was only the
forerunner of insolent exactions and oppressive services. Peaceful and
undisturbed neutrality was what they desired and what they had
expected; but when they found themselves compelled to fight, they chose
to join the Provincial banners, and the most daring only waited an
opportunity to show their hostility to their new masters.

Such an opportunity soon presented itself. In the end of March (1780)
Washington dispatched the troops of Maryland and Delaware, with a
regiment of artillery, under the Baron de Kalb, to reinforce the
southern army. That detachment met with many obstructions in its
progress southward. Such was the deranged state of the American
finances that it could not be put in motion when the order was given.
After setting out it marched through Jersey and Pennsylvania, embarked
at the head of Elk river, was conveyed by water to Petersburgh in
Virginia, and proceeded thence towards the place of its destination.
But as no magazines had been provided, and as provisions could with
difficulty be obtained, the march of the detachment through North
Carolina was greatly retarded. Instead of advancing rapidly, the troops
were obliged to spread themselves over the country in small parties, in
order to collect corn and to get it ground for their daily subsistence.
In this way they proceeded slowly through the upper and more fertile
parts of North Carolina to Hillsborough, and were preparing to march by
Cross creek to Salisbury, where they expected to be joined by the
militia of North Carolina.

The approach of this detachment, together with information that great
exertions were making to raise troops in Virginia, encouraged the
irritation which the rigorous measures of the British officers had
occasioned in South Carolina; and numbers of the inhabitants of that
State, who had fled from their homes and taken refuge in North Carolina
and Virginia, informed of the growing discontents in their native
State, and relying on the support of regular troops, assembled on the
frontier of North Carolina.

About 200 of these refugees chose Colonel Sumter, an old Continental
officer, called by his comrades the "Gamecock," as their leader. On the
advance of the British into the upper parts of South Carolina, this
gentleman had fled into North Carolina, but had left his family behind.
Soon after his departure a British party arrived, turned his wife and
family out of door, and burned his house and everything in it. This
harsh and unfeeling treatment excited his bitterest resentment, which
operated with the more virulence by being concealed under the fair veil
of patriotism.

At the head of his little band, without money or magazines, and but ill
provided with arms and ammunition, Sumter made an irruption into South
Carolina. Iron implements of husbandry were forged by common
blacksmiths into rude weapons of war; and pewter dishes, procured from
private families and melted down, furnished part of their supply of
balls.

This little band skirmished with the royal militia and with small
parties of regular troops, sometimes successfully, and always with the
active courage of men fighting for the recovery of their property.

Sometimes they engaged when they had not more than three rounds of shot
each, and occasionally some of them were obliged to keep at a distance
till, by the fall of friends or foes, they could be furnished with arms
and ammunition. When successful, the field of battle supplied them with
materials for the next encounter.

This party soon increased to 600 men, and, encouraged by its daring
exertions, a disposition manifested itself throughout South Carolina
again to appeal to arms. Some companies of royal militia, embodied
under the authority of Cornwallis, deserted to Sumter and ranged
themselves under his standard.

Cornwallis beheld this change with surprise: he had thought the
conflict ended, and the southern provinces completely subdued; but, to
his astonishment, saw that past victories were unavailing, and that the
work yet remained to be accomplished. He was obliged to call in his
outposts and to form his troops into larger bodies.

But Cornwallis was soon threatened by a more formidable enemy than
Sumter, who, though an active and audacious leader, commanded only an
irregular and feeble band, and was capable of engaging only in
desultory enterprises. Congress, sensible of the value and importance
of the provinces which the British had overrun, made every effort to
reinforce the southern army; and, fully aware of the efficacy of public
opinion and of the influence of high reputation, on the 13th of June
(1780) appointed General Gates to command it. He had acquired a
splendid name by his triumphs over Burgoyne, and the populace, whose
opinions are formed by appearances and fluctuate with the rumors of the
day, anticipated a success equally brilliant. [4]

On receiving notice of his appointment to the command of the southern
army, Gates, who had been living in retirement on his estate in
Virginia, proceeded southward without delay, and on the 25th of July
(1780) reached the camp at Buffalo ford, on Deep river, where he was
received by De Kalb with respect and cordiality. The army consisted of
about 2,000 men, and considerable reinforcements of militia from North
Carolina and Virginia were expected. In order that he might lead his
troops through a more plentiful country, and for the purpose of
establishing magazines and hospitals at convenient points, De Kalb had
resolved to turn out of the direct road to Camden. But Gates, in
opposition to De Kalb's advice, determined to pursue the straight route
toward the British encampment, although it lay through a barren
country, which afforded but a scanty subsistence to its inhabitants.

On the 27th of July (1780) he put his army in motion and soon
experienced the difficulties and privations which De Kalb had been
desirous to avoid. The army was obliged to subsist chiefly on poor
cattle, accidentally found in the woods, and the supply of all kinds of
food was very limited. Meal and corn were so scarce that the men were
compelled to use unripe corn and peaches instead of bread. That
insufficient diet, together with the intense heat and unhealthy
climate, engendered disease, and threatened the destruction of the
army. Gates at length emerged from the inhospitable region of
pine-barrens, sand hills, and swamps, and, after having effected a
junction with General Caswell, at the head of the militia of North
Carolina, and a small body of troops under Lieutenant-Colonel
Porterfield, he arrived at Clermont, or Rugely's Mills, on the 13th of
August (1780), and next day was joined by the militia of Virginia,
amounting to 700 men, under General Stevens.

On the day after Gates arrived at Rugley's Mills, he received an
express from Sumter, stating that a number of the militia of South
Carolina had joined him on the west side of the Wateree, and that an
escort of clothes, ammunition, and other stores for the garrison at
Camden was on its way from Ninety-Six and must pass the Wateree at a
ford covered by a small fort nor far from Camden.

Gates immediately detached 100 regular infantry and 300 militia of
North Carolina to reinforce Sumter, whom he ordered to reduce the fort
and intercept the convoy. Meanwhile he advanced nearer Camden, with the
intention of taking a position about seven miles from that place. For
that purpose he put his army in motion at 10 in the evening of the 15th
of August, having sent his sick, heavy baggage, and military stores not
immediately wanted, under a guard to Waxhaws. On the march Colonel
Armand's [5] legion composed the van; Porterfield's light infantry,
reinforced by a company of picked men from Stevens' brigade, marching
in Indian files, two hundred yards from the road, covered the right
flank of the legion, while Major Armstrong's light infantry of North
Carolina militia, reinforced in like manner by General Caswell, in the
same order, covered the left. The Maryland division, followed by the
North Carolina and Virginia militia, with the artillery, composed the
main body and rear guard; and the volunteer cavalry were equally
distributed on the flanks of the baggage. The American army did not
exceed 4,000 men, only about 900 of whom were regular troops, and 70
cavalry.

On the advance of Gates into South Carolina, Lord Rawdon had called in
his outposts, and concentrated his force at Camden. Informed of the
appearance of the American army, and of the general defection of the
country between the Pedee and the Black river, Cornwallis quitted
Charleston and repaired to Camden, where he arrived on the same day
that Gates reached Clermont.

The British force was reduced by sickness, and Cornwallis could not
assemble more than two thousand men at Camden. That place, though
advantageous in other respects, was not well adapted for resisting an
attack; and as the whole country was rising against him, Cornwallis
felt the necessity of either retreating to Charleston, or of instantly
striking a decisive blow. If he remained at Camden, his difficulties
would daily increase, his communication with Charleston be endangered,
and the American army acquire additional strength. A retreat to
Charleston would be the signal for the whole of South Carolina and
Georgia to rise in arms; his sick and magazines must be left behind;
and the whole of the two provinces, except the towns of Charleston and
Savannah, abandoned. The consequences of such a movement would be
nearly as fatal as a defeat. Cornwallis, therefore, although he
believed the American army considerably stronger than what it really
was, determined to hazard a battle; and, at 10 at night, on the 15th of
August, the very hour when Gates proceeded from Rugely's Mills, about
thirteen miles distant, he marched towards the American camp.

About 2 in the morning of the 16th of August (1780) the advanced guards
of the hostile armies unexpectedly met in the woods, and the firing
instantly began. Some of the cavalry of the American advanced guard
being wounded by the first discharge, the party fell back in confusion,
broke the Maryland regiment which was at the head of the column, and
threw the whole line of the army into consternation. From that first
impression, deepened by the gloom of night, the raw and ill-disciplined
militia seem not to have recovered. In the reencounter several
prisoners were taken on each side, and from them the opposing generals
acquired a more exact knowledge of circumstances than they had hitherto
possessed. Several skirmishes happened during the night, which merely
formed a prelude to the approaching battle, and gave the commanders
some notion of the position of the hostile armies.

Cornwallis, perceiving that the Americans were on ground of no great
extent, with morasses on their right and left, so that they could not
avail themselves of their superior numbers to outflank his little army,
impatiently waited for the returning light, which would give every
advantage to his disciplined troops. [6]

Both armies prepared for the conflict. Cornwallis formed his men in two
divisions; that on the right was under the command of Lieutenant-
Colonel Webster, that on the left under Lord Rawdon. In front were four
field pieces. The Seventy-first regiment, with two cannon, formed the
reserve; and the cavalry, about 300 in number, were in the rear, ready
to act as circumstances might require.

In the American army the second Maryland brigade, under General Gist,
formed the right of the line; the militia of North Carolina, commanded
by General Caswell, occupied the center; and the militia of Virginia,
with the light infantry and Colonel Armand's corps, composed the left;
the artillery was placed between the divisions. The First Maryland
brigade was stationed as a reserve 200 or 300 yards in the rear. Baron
de Kalb commanded on the right; the militia generals were at the head
of their respective troops, and General Gates resolved to appear
wherever his presence might be most useful.

At dawn of day Cornwallis ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Webster, with the
British right wing, to attack the American left. As Webster advanced he
was assailed by a desultory discharge of musketry from some volunteer
militia who had advanced in front of their countrymen, but the British
soldiers, rushing through that loose fire, charged the American line
with a shout. The militia instantly threw down their arms and fled,
many of them without even discharging their muskets, and all the
efforts of the officers were unable to rally them. A great part of the
center division, composed of the militia of North Carolina, imitated
the example of their comrades of Virginia; few of either of the
divisions fired a shot, and still fewer carried their arms off the
field. Tarleton with his legion pursued and eagerly cut down the
unresisting fugitives. Gates, with some of the militia general
officers, made several attempts to rally them, but in vain. The further
they fled the more they dispersed, and Gates in despair hastened with a
few friends to Charlotte, eighty miles from the field of battle.

De Kalb at the head of the Continentals, being abandoned by the
militia, which had constituted the center and left wing of the army,
and being forsaken by the general also, was exposed to the attack of
the whole British army. De Kalb and his troops, however, instead of
imitating the disgraceful example of their brethren in arms, behaved
with a steady intrepidity and defended themselves like men. Rawdon
attacked them about the time when Webster broke the left wing, but the
charge was firmly received and steadily resisted, and the conflict was
maintained for some time with equal obstinacy on both sides. The
American reserve covered the left of De Kalb's division, but its own
left flank was entirely exposed by the flight of the militia, and,
therefore, Webster, after detaching some cavalry and light troops in
pursuit of the fugitive militia, with the remainder of his division
attacked them at once in front and flank. A severe contest ensued. The
Americans, in a great measure intermingled with British, maintained a
desperate conflict. Cornwallis brought his whole force to bear upon
them; they were at length broken and began to retreat in confusion. The
brave De Kalb, while making a vigorous charge at the head of a body of
his men, fell pierced with eleven wounds. His aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-
Colonel de Buysson, embraced the fallen general, announced his rank and
nation to the surrounding enemy, and while thus generously exposing his
own life to save his bleeding friend, he received several severe
wounds, and was taken prisoner with him. De Kalb met with all possible
attention and assistance from the victorious enemy, but that gallant
officer expired in a few hours. Congress afterward ordered a monument
to be erected to his memory.

Never was victory more complete or defeat more total. Every regiment
was broken and dispersed through the woods, marshes, and brushwood,
which at once saved them from their pursuers and separated them more
entirely from each other. The officers lost sight of their men and
every individual endeavored to save himself in the best way he was
able. The British cavalry pursued; and for many miles the roads were
strewed with the wrecks of a ruined army. Wagons or fragments of
wagons, arms, dead or maimed horses, dead or wounded soldiers, were
everywhere seen. General Rutherford, of the North Carolina militia, was
made prisoner, but the other general officers reached Charlotte at
different times and by different routes.

About 200 wagons, a great part of the baggage, military stores, small
arms, and all the artillery fell into the hands of the conquerors. This
decisive victory cost the British only 80 men killed and 245 wounded.
Eight hundred or 900 of the Americans were killed or wounded, and about
1,000 taken prisoners. The militia endeavored to save themselves by
flight; the Continentals alone fought, and almost half their number
fell.

While the army under Gates was completely defeated and dispersed
Colonel Sumter was successful in his enterprise. On the evening in
which Cornwallis marched from Camden he reduced the redoubt on the
Wateree, took the stores on their way to Camden, and made about 100
prisoners. On hearing, however, of the disastrous fate of the army
under Gates, Sumter, fully aware of his danger, retreated hastily with
his stores and prisoners up the south side of the Wateree. On the
morning of the 17th (September, 1780) Cornwallis sent Tarleton, with
the legion and a detachment of infantry, in pursuit of him. That
officer proceeded with his usual rapidity. Finding many of his infantry
unable to keep pace with him he advanced with about 100 cavalry and
sixty of the most vigorous of the infantry, and on the 18th (September,
1780) suddenly and unexpectedly came upon the Americans.

Sumter, having marched with great diligence, thought himself beyond the
reach of danger, and his men being exhausted by unremitting service and
want of sleep, he halted near the Catawba ford to give them some repose
during the heat of the day. In order to prevent a surprise he had
placed sentinels at proper stations to give warning of approaching
danger, but overcome by fatigue and equally regardless of duty and
safety the sentinels fell asleep at their post and gave no alarm.
Tarleton suddenly burst into the encampment of the drowsy and
unsuspecting Americans, and, though some slight resistance was at first
made from behind the baggage, soon gained a complete victory. The
Americans fled precipitately toward the river or the woods. Between 300
and 400 of them were killed or wounded. Sumter escaped, galloping off
on horseback, without coat, hat, or saddle, but all his baggage fell
into the hands of the enemy, while the prisoners and stores which he
had taken were recovered. About 150 of his men made good their retreat.

By the complete defeat and dispersion of the army under Gates and of
Sumter's corps, South Carolina and Georgia appeared to be again laid
prostrate at the feet of the royal army, and the hope of maintaining
their independence seemed more desperate than ever.

Affairs did not seem desperate, however, to Washington. He knew the
defensible nature of the country--intersected in every direction by
rivers and swamps, and affording every facility for partisan warfare
against regular troops, and he knew that the infamous conduct of the
British in the South had thoroughly roused the indignation of the
people. While Gates was gathering together a new army and stationing
detachments in different posts near Hillsborough, Washington received
intelligence of the disastrous battle of Camden. The sad news came
unexpectedly, as the previous reports had given hopes of some brilliant
feat on the part of Gates. The unlooked-for disaster, however, did not
for a moment dishearten Washington. He was fully aware of the
determination of the British to conquer the South, and if possible to
detach it from the confederacy, and he was determined on his part to
defeat their purpose. This was to be done chiefly by rousing the South
itself to action, since the position of affairs at the North did not
admit of large detachments from the force under his own immediate
command. He ordered, however, that some regular troops enlisted in
Maryland for the war should be sent to the southward. To show how
attentive he was to all the details of the necessary measures for
defending the South we copy his letter of September 12th (1780) to
Governor Rutledge, of South Carolina, who had been armed with
dictatorial power by the Legislature of that State. [7]

"I am fully impressed," he writes, "with the importance of the southern
States, and of course with the necessity of making every effort to
expel the enemy from them. The late unlucky affair near Camden renders
their situation more precarious and calls for every exertion to stop at
least the further progress of the British army. It is to be wished that
the composition of our force in this quarter, our resources, and the
present situation of the fleet and army of our ally would admit of an
immediate and sufficient detachment, not only to answer the purpose I
have just mentioned, but to carry on operations of a more serious and
extensive nature. But this not being the case, for reasons which must
be obvious to you, let it suffice that your Excellency be informed that
our views tend ultimately to the southward.

"In the meantime our endeavors in that quarter should be directed
rather to checking the progress of the enemy by a permanent, compact,
and well-organized body of men, than attempting immediately to recover
the State of South Carolina by a numerous army of militia, who, besides
being inconceivably expensive, are too fluctuating and undisciplined to
oppose one composed chiefly of regular troops. I would recommend to
you, therefore, to make use of your influence with the States from
Maryland southward, to raise without delay at least 5,000 men for the
war, if it can be effected; if not, for as long a time as possible.
These, with the militia in the vicinity, would answer the purpose I
have last mentioned, and would in proper time make a useful body,
either to form a diversion in favor of, or to cooperate with, a force
upon the coast.

"I have hinted the outlines of a plan to your Excellency which for many
reasons should be in general kept to yourself. You will oblige me by
informing yourself as accurately as possible, what may be the present
resources of the country as to meat, corn, wheat, or rice, and
transportation, as I suppose circumstances may have occasioned a
considerable change. And if it is possible to form magazines of either,
it should be done, especially of salt meat, which is an article so
essential to military operations, that the States of Virginia and North
Carolina should be requested to lay up, as soon as the weather will,
permit, at least 4,000 barrels in proportion to their respective
ability. You will also be pleased to endeavor to gain a knowledge of
the force of the enemy, the posts they occupy, the nature and state of
those posts, and the reinforcements they may probably derive from the
people of the country. As you receive these several intelligences you
will be pleased to communicate them to me with your opinion of the best
place for debarking troops, in case of an expedition against the enemy
in the southern States, and the names of the persons in that quarter
whose opinion and advice may be serviceable in such an event."

In the following extract from a letter to Count de Guichen in the West
Indies, September 12, 1780, we have from Washington a view of the
general state of affairs after the battle of Camden. Its object was to
induce the French admiral to come immediately to the United States. The
letter did not reach the West Indies until De Guichen had sailed to
France.

"The situation of America," Washington writes, "at this time is
critical. The government is without finances. Its paper credit is sunk
and no expedients can be adopted capable of retrieving it. The
resources of the country are much diminished by a five years' war in
which it has made efforts beyond its ability. Clinton, with an army of
10,000 regular troops (aided by a considerable body of militia, whom
from motives of fear and attachment he has engaged to take arms), is in
possession of one of the capital towns and a large part of the State to
which it belongs. The savages are desolating the frontier. A fleet
superior to that of our allies not only protects the enemy against any
attempt of ours, but facilitates those which they may project against
us. Lord Cornwallis, with seven or eight thousand men, is in complete
possession of two States, Georgia and South Carolina, and by recent
misfortunes North Carolina is at his mercy. His force is daily
increasing by an accession of adherents, whom his successes naturally
procure in a country inhabited by emigrants from England and Scotland
who have not been long enough transplanted to exchange their ancient
habits and attachments in favor of their new residence.

"By a letter received from General Gates we learn that in attempting to
penetrate and regain the State of South Carolina he met with a total
defeat near Camden in which many of his troops have been cut off and
the remainder dispersed with the loss of all their cannon and baggage.
The enemy are said to be now making a detachment from New York for a
southern destination. If they push their successes in that quarter we
cannot predict where their career may end. The opposition will be
feeble unless we can give succor from hence, which, from a variety of
causes must depend on a naval superiority."

The remainder of the letter gives more details and urges the admiral to
give his aid to the United States.

It will be recollected by the reader that Gates when in the height of
his glory did not make any report to Washington of the surrender of
Burgoyne. This was in the days of the Conway Cabal. He then slighted
and almost insulted the great commander, whom, it is not improbable he
hoped to supersede. But in the hour of disaster and defeat it was to
Washington himself that he turned for help, protection, and
countenance. He is prompt enough with his official report now although
he writes his first dispatch to Congress in order that his apology may
be published. The following letter to Washington is dated at
Hillsborough, August 30, 1780: [8]

"My public letter to Congress has surely been transmitted to your
Excellency. Since then I have been able to collect authentic returns of
the killed, wounded, and missing of the officers of the Maryland line,
Delaware regiment, artillerists, and those of the legion under Colonel
Armand. They are enclosed. The militia broke so early in the day, and
scattered in so many directions upon their retreat, that very few have
fallen into the hands of the enemy.

"By the firmness and bravery of the Continental troops the victory is
far from bloodless on the part of the foe, they having upwards of 500
men, with officers in proportion, killed and wounded. I do not think
Lord Cornwallis will be able to reap any advantage of consequence from
his victory as this State seems animated to reinstate and support the
army. Virginia, I am confident, will not be less patriotic. By the
joint exertions of these two States there is good reason to hope that
should the events of the campaign be prosperous to your Excellency all
South Carolina might be again recovered. Lord Cornwallis remained with
his army at Camden when I received the last accounts from thence. I am
cantoning ours at Salisbury, Guilford, Hillsborough, and Cross creek.
The Marylanders and artillerists, with their general hospital, will be
here; the cavalry near Cross creek, and the militia to the westward.
This is absolutely necessary as we have no magazine of provisions and
are only supplied from hand to mouth. Four days after the action of the
16th, fortune seemed determined to distress us; for Colonel Sumter
having marched near forty miles up the river Wateree halted with the
wagons and prisoners he had taken the 15th; by some indiscretion the
men were surprised, cut off from their arms, the whole routed, and the
wagons and prisoners retaken.

"What encouragement the numerous disaffected in this State may give
Lord Cornwallis to advance further into the country I cannot yet say.
Colonel Sumter, since his surprise and defeat upon the west side of the
Wateree, has reinstated and increased his corps to upwards of 1,000
men. I have directed him to continue to harass the enemy upon that
side. Lord Cornwallis will therefore be cautious how he makes any
considerable movement to the eastward while his corps remains in force
upon his left flank, and the main body is in a manner cantoned in his
front. Anxious for the public good I shall continue my unwearied
endeavors to stop the progress of the enemy, to reinstate our affairs,
to recommence an offensive war and recover all our losses in the
southern States. But if being unfortunate is solely reason sufficient
for removing me from command, I shall most cheerfully submit to the
orders of Congress and resign an office few generals would be anxious
to possess, and where the utmost skill and fortitude are subject to be
baffled by the difficulties which must for a time surround the chief in
command here. That your Excellency may meet with no such difficulties,
that your road to fame and fortune may be smooth and easy is the
sincere wish of, sir, your Excellency's most obedient, etc."

In the following extract from a letter of the 3d of September (1780),
he again calls Washington's attention to his own pitiable case: "If I
can yet render good service to the United States," he writes, "it will
be necessary it should be seen that I have the support of Congress and
your Excellency; otherwise some men may think they please my superiors
by blaming me, and thus recommend themselves to favor. But you, sir,
will be too generous to lend an ear to such men, if such there be, and
will show your greatness of soul rather by protecting than slighting
the unfortunate. If, on the contrary, I am not supported and
countenance is given to everyone who will speak disrespectfully of me
it will be better for Congress to remove me at once from where I shall
be unable to render them any good service. This, sir, I submit to your
candor and honor, and shall cheerfully await the decision of my
superiors. With the warmest wishes for your prosperity, and the
sincerest sentiments of esteem and regard, I am, sir, your Excellency's
most obedient, humble servant."

Notwithstanding these letters and any friendly help which Washington
may have rendered to his fallen rival, the fickle Congress, as we shall
presently see, deserted at his utmost need the man who they had
advanced against Washington's advice.

After the battle of Camden, Cornwallis was unable to follow up the
victory with his usual activity. His little army was diminished by the
sword and by disease. He had not brought with him from Charleston the
stores necessary for a long march, and he did not deem it expedient to
leave South Carolina till he had suppressed that spirit of resistance
to his authority which had extensively manifested itself in the
province. In order to consummate, as he thought, the subjugation of the
State, he resorted to measures of great injustice and cruelty. He
considered the province as a conquered country, reduced to
unconditional submission and to allegiance to its ancient sovereign,
and the people liable to the duties of British subjects and to
corresponding penalties in case of a breach of those duties. He forgot,
or seemed to forget, that many of them had been received as prisoners
of war on parole; that, without their consent, their parole had been
discharged, and that, merely by a proclamation, they had been declared
British subjects instead of prisoners of war.

In a few days after the battle of Camden, when Cornwallis thought the
country was lying prostrate at his feet, he addressed the following
letter to the commandant of the British garrison at Ninety-six: "I have
given orders that all the inhabitants of this province who have
subscribed and taken part in the revolt should be punished with the
utmost rigor; and also those who will not turn out, that they may be
imprisoned and their whole property taken from them or destroyed. I
have also ordered that compensation should be made out of these estates
to the persons who have been injured or oppressed by them. I have
ordered, in the most positive manner, that every militiaman who has
borne arms with us and afterward joined the enemy shall be immediately
hanged. I desire you will take the most vigorous measures to punish the
rebels in the district you command and that you obey, in the strictest
manner, the directions I have given in this letter relative to the
inhabitants of the country." Similar orders were given to the
commanders of other posts. [9]

In any circumstances, such orders given to officers often possessing
little knowledge and as little prudence or humanity could not fail to
produce calamitous effects. In the case under consideration, where all
the worst passions of the heart were irritated and inflamed, the
consequences were lamentable. The orders were executed in the spirit in
which they were given. Numbers of persons were put to death; many were
imprisoned and their property was destroyed or confiscated. The country
was covered with blood and desolation, rancor and grief.

The prisoners on parole thought they had a clear right to take arms,
for from their parole they had been released by the proclamation of the
20th of June (1780), which indeed called them to the duty of subjects,
a condition to which they had never consented, and therefore they
reckoned that they had as good a right to resume their arms as the
British commander had to enjoin their allegiance. The case of those who
had taken British protections in the full persuasion that they were to
be allowed to live peaceably on their estates, but who, on finding that
they must fight on one side or the other, had repaired to the standards
of their country, was equally hard. Deception and violence were
practiced against both. So long as the struggle appeared doubtful the
Colonists met with fair promises and kind treatment, but at the moment
when resistance seemed hopeless and obedience necessary they were
addressed in the tone of authority, heard stern commands and bloody
threatenings, and received harsh usage. Hence the province, which for
some time presented the stillness of peace, again put on the ruthless
aspect of war.

A number of persons of much respectability remained prisoners of war in
Charleston since the capitulation of that town, but, after the battle
of Camden, Cornwallis ordered them to be carried out of the province.
Accordingly, early in the morning of the 27th of August (1780), some of
the principal citizens of Charleston were taken out of bed, put on
board a guard-ship, and soon afterward transported to St. Augustine.
They remonstrated with Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour, the commandant of
Charleston, but experienced only the insolence of authority from that
officer.

While Cornwallis endeavored by severe measures to break the spirits of
the people and to establish the royal authority in South Carolina, he
did not lose sight of his ulterior projects. He sent emissaries into
North Carolina to excite the Loyalists there, and to assure them of the
speedy march of the British army into that province. On the 8th of
September (1780) he left Camden, and toward the end of the month
arrived at Charlottetown, in North Carolina, of which place he took
possession after a slight resistance from some volunteer cavalry under
Colonel Davie. Though symptoms of opposition manifested themselves at
Charlotte yet he advanced toward Salisbury and ordered his militia to
cross the Yadkin. But Cornwallis was suddenly arrested in his
victorious career by an unexpected disaster. He made every exertion to
embody the Tory inhabitants of the country and to form them into a
British militia. For that purpose he employed Major Ferguson of the
Seventy-first regiment with a small detachment in the district of
Ninety-six, to train the Loyalists and to attach them to his own party.
From the operations of that officer he expected the most important
services.

Ferguson executed his commission with activity and zeal, collected a
large number of Loyalists, and committed great depredations on the
friends of independence in the back settlements. When about to return
to the main army in triumph he was detained by one of those incidents
which occasionally occur in war and influence the course of events and
the destiny of nations. Colonel Clarke, of Georgia, who had fled from
that province on its reduction by Campbell in 1779, had retired to the
northward, and having collected a number of followers in the Carolinas,
he returned to his native province at the head of about 700 men, and
while Cornwallis was marching from Camden to Charlottetown, attacked
the British post at Augusta. Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, who commanded at
that place with a garrison of about 150 Provincials, aided by some
friendly Indians, finding the town untenable, retired toward an
eminence on the banks of the Savannah, named Garden Hill. But the
Americans occupied it before his arrival; by bringing his artillery,
however, to bear upon them, after a desperate conflict he succeeded in
dislodging them and in gaining possession of the hill, but with the
loss of his cannon. There Clarke besieged him till informed of the near
approach of a British detachment from Ninety-six, under Colonel Kruger.
He then retreated, abandoning the cannon which he had taken, and,
though pursued, effected his escape. Notice was instantly sent to
Ferguson of Clarke's retreat and of his route, and high hopes of
intercepting him were entertained. For that purpose Ferguson remained
longer in those parts and approached nearer the mountains than he would
otherwise have done. As he had collected about 1,500 men he had no
apprehension of any force assembling in that quarter able to embarrass
him.

Meanwhile the depredations committed by Ferguson exasperated many of
the inhabitants of the country, some of whom, fleeing across the
Allegheny mountains, gave their western brethren an alarming account of
the evils with which they were threatened. Those men, living in the
full enjoyment of that independence for which the Atlantic States were
struggling, resolved to keep the war at a distance from their
settlements. The hardy mountaineers of the western parts of Virginia
and North Carolina assembled under Colonels Campbell, Shelby,
Cleveland, and Sevier. Other parties, under their several leaders,
hastened to join them. They were all mounted and unencumbered with
baggage. Each man had his blanket, knapsack, and rifle, and set out in
quest of Ferguson, equipped in the same manner as when they hunted the
wild beasts of the forest. At night the earth afforded them a bed and
the heavens a covering; the flowing stream quenched their thirst; their
guns, their knapsacks, or a few cattle driven in their rear, supplied
them with food. Their numbers made them formidable, and the rapidity of
their movements rendered it difficult to escape them. They amounted to
nearly 3,000 men.

On hearing of their approach Ferguson began to retreat toward Charlotte
and sent messengers to Cornwallis to apprise him of his danger. But the
messengers were intercepted, and Cornwallis remained ignorant of the
perilous situation of his detachment. In the vicinity of Gilbert town
the Americans, apprehensive of Ferguson's escape, selected 1,000 of
their best riflemen, mounted them on their fleetest horses, and sent
them in pursuit. Their rapid movements rendered his retreat
impracticable, and Ferguson, sensible that he would inevitably be
overtaken, chose his ground on King's mountain on the confines of North
and South Carolina, and waited the attack.

On the 7th of October (1780) the Americans came up with him. Campbell
had the command, but his authority was merely nominal, for there was
little military order or subordination in the attack. They agreed to
divide their forces in order to assail Ferguson from different
quarters, and the divisions were led on by Colonels Cleveland, Shelby,
Sevier, and Williams. Cleveland, who conducted the party which began
the attack, addressed his men as follows:

"My brave fellows! we have beaten the Tories and we can beat them. When
engaged you are not to wait for the word of command from me. I will
show you by my example how to fight; I can undertake no more. Every man
must consider himself an officer and act on his own judgment. Though
repulsed, do not run off; return and renew the combat. If any of you
are afraid you have not only leave to withdraw, but are requested to do
so."

Cleveland instantly began the attack, but was soon compelled to retire
before the bayonet. But Ferguson had no time to continue the pursuit,
for Shelby came forward from an unexpected quarter and poured in a
destructive fire. Ferguson again resorted to the bayonet and was again
successful. But at that moment Campbell's division advanced on another
side and a new battle began. Campbell, like his comrades, was obliged
to retreat. But Cleveland had now rallied his division and advanced
anew to the combat. The Royalists wheeled and met this returning
assailant. In this way there was an unremitting succession of attacks
for about fifty minutes. Ferguson obstinately defended himself and
repulsed every assailant, but at last he fell mortally wounded, and the
second in command, seeing the contest hopeless, surrendered. Ferguson
and 150 of his men lay dead on the field; as many were wounded; nearly
700 laid down their arms, and upwards of 400 escaped. Among the
prisoners the number of regular British soldiers did not amount to 100.
The Americans lost about twenty men, who were killed on the field, and
they had many wounded. They took 1,500 stand of arms. Major Ferguson's
position was good, but the hill abounded with wood and afforded the
Americans, who were all riflemen, an opportunity of fighting in their
own way and of firing from behind trees.

The Americans hanged ten of their prisoners on the spot, pleading the
guilt of the individuals who suffered and the example of the British,
who had executed a great number of Americans. One of the victims was a
militia officer, who accepted a British commission, although he had
formerly been in the American service. Those rude warriors, whose
enterprise was the spontaneous impulse of their patriotism or revenge,
who acknowledged no superior authority, and who were guided by no
superior counsels, having achieved their victories and attained their
object, dispersed and returned home. Most of the prisoners were soon
afterward released on various conditions.

The ruin of Ferguson's detachment, from which so much had been
expected, was a severe blow to Cornwallis; it disconcerted his plans
and prevented his progress northward. On the 14th of October (1780), as
soon after obtaining certain information of the fall of Major Ferguson
as the army could be put in motion, he left Charlotte, where Ferguson
was to have met him and began his retreat toward South Carolina. In
that retrograde movement the British army suffered severely; for
several days it rained incessantly; the roads were almost impassable;
the soldiers had no tents, and at night encamped in the woods in an
unhealthy climate. The army was ill supplied with provisions; sometimes
the men had beef, but no bread; at other times bread, but no beef. Once
they subsisted during five days on Indian corn collected as it stood in
the fields. Five ears were the daily allowance of two men, but the
troops bore their toils and privations without a murmur.

In these trying circumstances the American Loyalists who had joined the
royal standard were of great service, but their services were ill
requited, and several of them, disgusted by the abusive language and
even blows, which they received from some of the officers, left the
British army forever. At length the troops passed the Catawba, and on
the 29th of October (1780) reached Wynnesborough, an intermediate
station between Camden and Ninety-six. During this difficult march
Cornwallis was ill and Lord Rawdon had the command.

Washington directed the operations of this southern campaign as far as
it was in his power. But he was interfered with by the pragmatical,
imbecile, and conceited Congress. Had Greene been appointed to take
command of the southern army, according to Washington's desire, instead
of Gates, he would soon have assembled around him that "permanent,
compact, and well-organized body of men," referred to in Washington's
letter to Governor Rutledge, which we have quoted, and would have given
a very different account of the British from that of Gates. Greene was
second only to the Commander-in-Chief in ability--second to none in
courage, coolness, and perseverance. His campaign in the South, as we
shall presently see, was one of the most remarkable performances of the
war. But Congress would not send him to the South till repeated
disasters compelled them to listen to Washington's advice. The old
virus of the Conway Cabal must have been still lurking among the
members or they would scarcely have preferred Gates to Greene. We must
now leave the South for a season and turn to the course of events in
the northern States.

1. Footnote: This was a recent conquest of the British fleet in the
West Indies.

2. Footnote: The reader will recollect that Fort Moultrie received its
name from its defense by Colonel Moultrie in 1776.

3. Footnote: The reader will recollect that Fort Moultrie received its
name from its defense by Colonel Moultrie in 1776.

4. Footnote: Washington, who had long ago taken the measure of Gates'
capacity, was desirous that Greene should receive the appointment to
the command of the southern army at this time; but his wishes were
overruled by Congress. Had Greene been appointed, or even had De Kalb
been left in command, the campaign of 1780 would have been quite
another affair.

5. Footnote: Charles Armand, Marquis de la Rouerie, was a French
officer of note when he entered our army as colonel in 1777, and was
ordered to raise a corps of Frenchmen not exceeding 200 men. He served
in Jersey and Pennsylvania in 1777, and in Westchester county, New
York, in 1778, where he captured Major Baremore and his Loyalists, as
mentioned in Washington's certificate below. In 1779 he was stationed
at Ridgefield, Connecticut, under Gen. Robert Howe. He was sent with a
legion composed of his own and Pulaski's cavalry to aid in Gates'
southern expedition, as mentioned in the text. In 1781 he went to France
to obtain clothes and equipments, and returned soon enough to assist at
the siege of Yorktown. Washington recommended him strongly to
Congress, who gave him the commission of brigadier-general in the
spring of 1783. He returned to France in 1784, engaged in the French
revolution, and took an active part. He died January 30th, 1793.
On the occasion of Colonel Armand's going to join the southern army
under Gates, Washington gave him the following certificate under his
own hand:

CERTIFICATE.

I certify that the Marquis de la Rouerie has served in the army of
the United States since the beginning of 1777, with the rank of
colonel, during which time he has commanded an independent corps
with much honor to himself and usefulness to the service. He has
upon all occasions conducted himself as an officer of distinguished
merit, of great zeal, activity, vigilance, intelligence, and
bravery. In the last campaign, particularly, he rendered very
valuable services, and towards the close of it made a brilliant
partisan stroke, by which, with much enterprise and address, he
surprised a major and some men of the enemy in quarters, at a
considerable distance within their pickets, and brought them off
without loss to his party. I give him this certificate In testimony
of my perfect approbation of his conduct, and esteem for himself
personally.


6. Footnote: Colonel Armand censured Gates' conduct on this occasion
severely. It is clear that he chose the ground best suited for the
enemy's purpose. "I will not say," Armand remarked, "that the general
contemplated treason, but I will say, that if he had desired to betray
his army, he could not have chosen a more judicious course."

7. Footnote: Sparks, "Writings of Washington," vol. VII, p.201. 8.
Footnote: Sparks, "Correspondence of the Revolution," vol. III, P.66.

9. Footnote: The orders of Rawdon and Cornwallis to the subordinates to
treat the Americans in this cruel manner were intercepted and sent to
Washington, who transmitted them, with a sharp letter, to Sir Henry
Clinton. His reply sustained Rawdon and Cornwallis. The original
letters and the whole correspondence may be found in the 7th volume of
Sparks, "Writings of Washington."




CHAPTER XX.


PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 1781.


The contest between Great Britain and her revolted Colonies had
involved her in other wars. Spain had already joined with France in the
alliance against her, and the Dutch were now drawn into the contest.
Great Britain had claimed and exercised what she called the "right of
search," which included the right to seize the property of an enemy,
wherever found, at sea. The Dutch, who had an extensive carrying trade
with France, being plundered by the British under their insolent "right
of search," were already preparing to join the other allies and
commence open hostilities.

The next act in the drama was the formation of the armed neutrality
denying the "right of search," and declaring that free ships made free
goods. Catharine II. of Russia was at its head. Sweden and Denmark
immediately joined it. It was resolved that neutral ships should enjoy
a free navigation even from port to port and on the coasts of the
belligerent powers; that all effects belonging to the subjects of the
said belligerent powers should be looked upon as free on board such
neutral ships, except only such goods as were stipulated to be
contraband, and that no port should be considered under blockade unless
there should be a sufficient force before it to render the blockade
effectual. The other European powers were invited to join this
confederacy. France and Spain agreed to do so at once; Portugal
hesitated and declined, and the United Provinces delayed for a time
their answer. The Emperor of Germany and the King of Prussia joined the
armed neutrality in 1781.

Meanwhile, Henry Laurens having been taken prisoner on his way to
Holland (1780) to solicit a loan for the United States, and his papers
having made the British ministry acquainted with the fact that
overtures for a treaty between Holland and America were under
consideration, England, at the close of 1780, resolved upon a war with
the States General. Thus England, by this step, without friend or
allies, prepared to wage, single-handed, the contest with enemies in
every quarter of the globe.

In the beginning of the year 1781, the affairs of the American Union
wore a gloomy and alarming aspect. Vigorous and united efforts were
needful; but all seemed feeble and irresolute. The people were heartily
tired of the war; and, though no better affected to the parent State
than before, yet they earnestly desired deliverance from the multiplied
miseries of the protracted struggle.

The alliance with France had promised a speedy termination to the war;
but hitherto, while its existence made the Americans comparatively
remiss in their own exertions to prosecute hostilities, the French
fleet and army had performed no important service.

Congress had called for an army of 37,000 men, to be in camp on the 1st
of January (1781). The resolution, as usual, was too late, but even
although it had been promulgated in due time, so large a force could
not have been brought into the field. The deficiencies and delays on
the part of the several States exceeded all reasonable anticipation. At
no time during this active and interesting campaign did the regular
force, drawn from Pennsylvania to Georgia inclusive, amount to 3,000
men. So late as the month of April (1781), the States, from New Jersey
to New Hampshire inclusive, had furnished only 5,000 infantry, but this
force was slowly and gradually increased, till, in the month of May,
including cavalry and artillery which never exceeded 1,000 men, it
presented a total of about 7,000, of whom upwards of 4,000 might have
been relied on in active service. A considerable part of this small
force arrived in camp too late to acquire during the campaign that
discipline which is essential to military success. Inadequate as this
army was for asserting the independence of the country, the prospect of
being unable to support it was still more alarming. The men were in
rags; clothing had long been expected from Europe but had not yet
arrived and the disappointment was severely felt.

The magazines were ill supplied, the troops were often almost starving
and the army ready to be dissolved for want of food. The arsenals were
nearly empty. Instead of having the requisites of a well-appointed army
everything was deficient and there was little prospect of being better
provided, for money was as scarce as food and military stores. Congress
had resolved to issue no more bills on the credit of the Union, and the
care of supplying the army was devolved upon the several States
according to a rule established by that body. Even when the States had
collected the specified provisions, the quartermaster-general had no
funds to pay for the transportation of them to the army to accomplish
which military impressment was resorted to in a most offensive degree.
Congress was surrounded with difficulties, the several States were
callous and dilatory, and affairs generally wore an aspect of debility
and decay.

To deepen the general gloom there were portentous rumors of
preparations for savage warfare along the whole extent of the western
frontier and of an invasion on the side of Canada. In the midst of
financial difficulties and apprehensions of attack both from foreign
and domestic enemies, a new and alarming danger appeared in a quarter
where it was little expected and which threatened to consummate the
ruin of American independence. The privations and sufferings of the
troops had been uncommonly great. To the usual hardships of a military
life were added nakedness and hunger, under that rigor of climate which
whets the appetite and renders clothing absolutely necessary. By the
depreciation of the paper currency their pay was little more than
nominal, and it was many months in arrear.

Besides those evils which were common to the whole army the troops of
Pennsylvania imagined that they labored under peculiar grievances.
Their officers had engaged them for three years or during the war. On
the expiration of three years the soldiers thought themselves entitled
to a discharge; the officers alleged that they were engaged for the
war. The large bounties given to those who were not bound by previous
enlistment heightened the discontent of the soldiers, and made them
more zealous in asserting what they thought their rights. In the first
transports of their patriotism they had readily enlisted, but men will
not long willingly submit to immediate and unprofitable hardships in
the prospect of distant and contingent rewards.

The discontents engendered by the causes now mentioned had for some
time been increasing and on the 1st of January, 1781, broke out into
the open and almost universal mutiny of the troops of Pennsylvania. On
a signal given, the greater part of the noncommissioned officers and
privates paraded under arms, declaring their intention of marching to
the seat of Congress at Philadelphia to obtain a redress of grievances,
or to abandon the service. The officers made every exertion to bring
them back to their duty, but in vain; in the attempt, a captain was
killed and several other persons wounded. General Wayne interposed,
but, on cocking his pistols at some of the most audacious of the
mutineers, several bayonets were at his breast, the men exclaiming, "We
respect you--we love you; but you are a dead man if you fire! Do not
mistake us: we are not going to the enemy, on the contrary, were they
to come out, you should see us fight under you with as much resolution
and alacrity as ever, but we wish a redress of grievances and will no
longer be trifled with." Such of the Pennsylvania troops as had at
first taken no part in the disturbance were prevailed on to join the
mutineers and the whole, amounting to 1,300 men, with six field pieces,
marched from Morristown under temporary officers of their own election.
Washington's headquarters were then at New Windsor on the North river.

Next day (Jan. 2, 1781), General Wayne and Colonels Butter and Stewart,
officers who in a high degree enjoyed the confidence and affection of
the troops, followed the mutineers, but though civilly received, they
could not succeed in adjusting the differences or in restoring
subordination. On the third day the mutineers resumed their march and
in the morning arrived at Princeton. Congress and the Pennsylvania
government, as well as Washington, were much alarmed by this mutiny
fearing the example might be contagious and lead to the dissolution of
the whole army. Therefore a committee of Congress, with President Reed
[1] at their head and some members of the executive council of
Pennsylvania, set out from Philadelphia for the purpose of allaying
this dangerous commotion.

Sir Henry Clinton, who heard of the mutiny on the morning of the 3d
(January 1781), was equally active in endeavoring to turn it to the
advantage of his government. He ordered a large corps to be in
readiness to march on a moment's notice and sent two American spies by
way of Amboy and two by way of Elizabethtown, as agents from himself to
treat with the mutineers. But two of the persons employed were actually
spies on himself and soon disclosed his proposals to the American
authorities. The two real spies on reaching Princeton were seized by
the mutineers and afterwards delivered up to General Wayne who had them
tried and executed on the 10th.

At first the mutineers declined leaving Princeton, but finding their
demands would be substantially complied with they marched to Trenton on
the 9th, and before the 15th (January 1781), the matter was so far
settled that the committee of Congress left Trenton and returned to
Philadelphia. All who had enlisted for three years or during the war
were to be discharged, and in cases where the terms of enlistment could
not be produced the oath of the soldier was to be received as evidence
on the point. They were to receive immediate certificates for the
depreciation on their pay, and their arrears were to be settled as soon
as circumstances would admit. On those terms about one-half of the
Pennsylvania troops obtained their discharge, numbers of them having,
as afterwards appeared, made false declarations concerning the terms of
their enlistment.

Intelligence of this mutiny was communicated to Washington at New
Windsor before any accommodation had taken place. Though he had been
long accustomed to decide in hazardous and difficult situations yet it
was no easy matter in this delicate crisis to determine on the most
proper course to be pursued. His personal influence had several times
extinguished rising mutinies. The first scheme that presented itself
was to repair to the camp of the mutineers and try to recall them to a
sense of their duty, but on mature reflection this was declined. He
well knew that their claims were founded in justice, but he could not
reconcile himself to wound the discipline of his army by yielding to
their demands while they were in open revolt with arms in their hands.
He viewed the subject in all its relations and was well apprised that
the principal grounds of discontent were not peculiar to the
Pennsylvania line, but common to all the troops.

If force was requisite he had none to spare without hazarding West
Point. If concessions were unavoidable they had better be made by any
person than the Commander-in-Chief. After that due deliberation which
he always gave to matters of importance he determined against a
personal interference and to leave the whole to the civil authorities
which had already taken it up, but at the same time prepared for those
measures which would become necessary if no accommodation took place.
This resolution was communicated to Wayne, with a caution to regard the
situation of the other lines of the army in any concessions which might
be made and with a recommendation to draw the mutineers over the
Delaware, with a view to increase the difficulty of communicating with
the enemy in New York. The result, however, showed that this last was
an unnecessary precaution.

The success of the Pennsylvania troops in exacting from their country
by violence what had been denied to the claims of equity produced a
similar spirit of insubordination in another division of the army. On
the night of the 20th of January (1781), about 160 of the Jersey
brigade, which was quartered at Pompton, complaining of grievances
similar to those of the Pennsylvania line and hoping for equal success,
rose in arms, and marched to Chatham with the view of prevailing on
some of their comrades stationed there to join them. Their number was
not formidable and Washington, knowing that he might depend on the
fidelity of the greater part of his troops detached Gen. Robert Howe
against the mutineers, with orders to force them to unconditional
submission and to execute some of the most turbulent of them on the
spot. These orders were promptly obeyed and two of the ringleaders were
put to death.

Sir Henry Clinton, as in the case of the Pennsylvanians, endeavored to
take advantage of the mutiny of the Jersey brigade. He sent emissaries
to negotiate with them, and detached General Robertson with 3,000 men
to Staten Island to be in readiness to support them if they should
accede to his proposals, but the mutiny was so speedily crushed that
his emissaries had no time to act.

The situation of Congress at this time was trying in the extreme. The
contest was now one for very existence. A powerful foe was in full
strength in the heart of the country; they had great military
operations to carry on, but were almost without an army and wholly
without money. Their bills of credit had ceased to be of any worth; and
they were reduced to the mortifying necessity of declaring by their own
acts that this was the fact, as they no longer made them a legal tender
or received them in payment of taxes. Without money of some kind an
army could neither be raised nor maintained. But the greater the
exigency the greater were the exertions of Congress. They directed
their agents abroad to borrow, if possible, from France, Spain, and
Holland. They resorted to taxation, although they knew that the measure
would be unpopular and that they had not the power to enforce their
decree. The tax laid they apportioned among the several States, by
whose authority it was to be collected. Perceiving that there was great
disorder and waste, or peculation, in the management of the fiscal
concerns they determined on introducing a thorough reform and the
strictest economy. They accordingly appointed as treasurer Robert
Morris of Philadelphia, a man whose pure morals, ardent patriotism, and
great knowledge of financial concerns eminently fitted him for this
important station. The zeal and genius of Morris soon produced the most
favorable results. By means of the "Bank of North America," to which in
the course of the year he obtained the approbation of Congress, he
contrived to draw out the funds of wealthy individuals. By borrowing in
the name of the government from this bank and pledging for payment the
taxes not yet collected, he was enabled to anticipate them and command
a ready supply. He also used his own private credit which was good
though that of the government had failed, and at one time bills signed
by him individually, were in circulation to the amount of $581,000.

The establishment of a revenue subject to the exclusive control and
direction of the Continental government was connected inseparably with
the restoration of credit. The efforts, therefore, to negotiate a
foreign loan were accompanied by resolutions requesting the respective
States to place a fund under the control of Congress which should be
both permanent and productive. A resolution was passed recommending the
respective States to vest a power in Congress to levy for the use of
the United States a duty of five per centum ad valorem on all goods
imported into any of them, and also on all prizes condemned in any of
the American courts of admiralty.

This fund was to be appropriated to the payment of both the principal
and interest of all debts contracted in the prosecution of the war, and
was to continue until those debts should be completely discharged.

Congress at that time contained several members who perceived the
advantages which would result from bestowing on the government of the
nation the full power of regulating commerce, and consequently, of
increasing the imports as circumstances might render advisable; but
State influence predominated and they were overruled by great
majorities. Even the inadequate plan which they did recommend was never
adopted. Notwithstanding the greatness of the exigency and the pressure
of the national wants, never during the existence of the Confederation
did all the States unite in assenting to this recommendation, so
unwilling are men possessed of power to place it in the hands of
others.

About the same time a reform was introduced into the administration the
necessity of which had been long perceived. From a misplaced prejudice
against institutions sanctioned by experience all the great executive
duties had been devolved either on committees of Congress or on boards
consisting of several members. This unwieldy and expensive system had
maintained itself against all the efforts of reason and public utility.
But the scantiness of the national means at length prevailed over
prejudice, and the several committees and boards yielded to a secretary
for foreign affairs, a superintendent of finance, a secretary of war,
and a secretary of marine. But so miserably defective was the
organization of Congress as an executive body that the year (1781) had
far advanced before this measure, the utility of which all
acknowledged, could be carried into complete operation by making all
the appointments.

The war had continued much longer than was originally anticipated, and
the natural resources of the country, mismanaged by the inexperience of
the government and its ignorance of the principles of political economy
were so much exhausted that it became apparent the war could not be
carried on without a foreign loan and France, sufficiently embarrassed
with her own affairs, was the only country to which Congress could look
for pecuniary aid. Accordingly, Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, who had
been one of Washington's aids, was employed on this mission, and
besides endeavoring to negotiate a loan was instructed to press on the
French monarch the advantage of maintaining a naval superiority in the
American seas. While the energies of America were thus paralyzed by the
financial difficulties of Congress, the mutinous spirit of part of the
army and the selfishness and apathy of several of the States, the
British interest in the Provinces seemed in a prosperous condition.
General Greene, as we shall presently see, was maintaining a doubtful
and hazardous struggle against Cornwallis on the northern frontier of
North Carolina. A British detachment from New York had made a deep
impression on Virginia where the resistance was neither so prompt nor
so vigorous as had been expected from the strength of that State and
the unanimity of its citizens.

On the 1st of May, 1781, Washington commenced a military journal. The
following statement is extracted from it: "I begin at this epoch a
concise journal of military transactions, &c. I lament not having
attempted it from the commencement of the war in aid of my memory, and
wish the multiplicity of matter which continually surrounds me and the
embarrassed state of our affairs which is momentarily calling the
attention to perplexities of one kind or another may not defeat
altogether or so interrupt my present intention and plan as to render
it of little avail.

"To have the clearer understanding of the entries which may follow it
would be proper to recite in detail our wants and our prospects, but
this alone would be a work of much time and great magnitude. It may
suffice to give the sum of them, which I shall do in a few words, viz.:

"Instead of having magazines filled with provisions we have a scanty
pittance scattered here and there in the distant States.

"Instead of having our arsenals well supplied with military stores they
are poorly provided, and the workmen all leaving them. Instead of
having the various articles of field equipage in readiness the
quartermaster-general is but now applying to the several States to
provide these things for their troops respectively. Instead of having a
regular system of transportation established upon credit, or funds in
the quartermaster's hands to defray the contingent expenses thereof we
have neither the one nor the other; and all that business, or a great
part of it being done by impressment, we are daily and hourly
oppressing the people, souring their tempers, and alienating their
affections. Instead of having the regiments completed agreeable to the
requisitions of Congress, scarce any State in the Union has at this
hour one-eighth part of its quota in the field, and there is little
prospect of ever getting more than half. In a word, instead of having
anything in readiness to take the field, we have nothing; and, instead
of having the prospect of a glorious offensive campaign before us we
have a bewildered and gloomy prospect of a defensive one, unless we
should receive a powerful aid of ships, troops, and money from our
generous allies, and these at present are too contingent to build
upon."

While the Americans were suffering the complicated calamities which
introduced the year 1781 their adversaries were carrying on the most
extensive plan of operations against them which had ever been
attempted. It had often been objected to the British commanders that
they had not conducted the war in the manner most likely to effect the
subjugation of the revolted provinces. Military critics found fault
with them for keeping a large army idle at New York, which, they said,
if properly applied, would have been sufficient to make successful
impressions at one and the same time on several of the States. The
British seemed to have calculated the campaign of 1781 with a view to
make an experiment of the comparative merit of this mode of conducting
military operations. The war raged in that year not only in the
vicinity of the British headquarters at New York, but in Georgia, South
Carolina, North Carolina, and in Virginia.

In this extensive warfare Washington could have no immediate agency in
the southern department. His advice in corresponding with the officers
commanding in Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia, was freely and
beneficially given, and as large detachments sent to their aid as could
be spared consistently with the security of West Point. In conducting
the war his invariable maxim was to suffer the devastation of property
rather than hazard great and essential objects for its preservation.
While the war raged in Virginia, Thomas Jefferson, the Governor, its
representatives in Congress, and other influential citizens, urged his
return to the defense of his native State. But considering America as
his country and the general safety as his object, he deemed it of more
importance to remain on the Hudson. There he was not only securing the
most important post in the United States but concerting a grand plan of
combined operations which, as shall soon be related, not only delivered
Virginia but all the States from the calamities of the war. In
Washington's disregard of property when in competition with national
objects he was in no respect partial to his own. While the British were
in the Potomac they sent a flag to Mount Vernon requiring a supply of
fresh provisions. Refusals of such demands were often followed by
burning the houses and other property near the river. To prevent this
catastrophe the person entrusted with the management of the estate went
on board with the flag and carrying a supply of provisions, requested
that the buildings and improvements might be spared. For this he
received a severe reprimand in a letter to him in which Washington
observed: "It would have been a less painful circumstance to me to have
heard that in consequence of your noncompliance with the request of the
British they had burned my house and laid my plantation in ruins. You
ought to have considered yourself as my representative, and should have
reflected on the bad example of communicating with the enemy and making
a voluntary offer of refreshment to them with a view to prevent a
conflagration."

To the other difficulties with which Washington had to contend in the
preceding years of the war a new one was about this time added. While
the whole force at his disposal was unequal to the defense of the
country against the common enemy, a civil war was on the point of
breaking out among his fellow-citizens. The claims of Vermont to be a
separate, independent State, and of the State of New York to their
country, as within its chartered limits, together with open offers from
the royal commanders to establish and defend them as a British
province, produced a serious crisis which called for the interference
of the American chief. This was the more necessary, as the governments
of New York and Vermont were both resolved on exercising a jurisdiction
over the same people and the same territory. Congress, wishing to
compromise the controversy, on middle ground, resolved, in August,
1781, to accede to the independence of Vermont on certain conditions
and within certain specified limits which they supposed would satisfy
both parties. Contrary to their expectations this mediatorial act of
the national Legislature was rejected by Vermont, and yet was so
disagreeable to the Legislature of New York as to draw from them a
spirited protest against it. Vermont complained that Congress
interfered in their internal police; New York viewed the resolve as a
virtual dismemberment of their State, which was a constituent part of
the Confederacy. Washington, anxious for the peace of the Union, sent a
message to Governor Chittenden of Vermont desiring to know "what were
the real designs, views, and intentions of the people of Vermont;
whether they would be satisfied with the independence proposed by
Congress, or had it seriously in contemplation to join with the enemy
and become a British province." The Governor returned an unequivocal
answer: "That there were no people on the continent more attached to
the cause of America than the people of Vermont, but they were fully
determined not to be put under the government of New York; that they
would oppose this by force of arms and would join with the British in
Canada rather than submit to that government." While both States were
dissatisfied with Congress, and their animosities, from increasing
violence and irritation, became daily more alarming, Washington, aware
of the extremes to which all parties were tending, returned an answer
to Governor Chittenden in which were these expressions: "It is not my
business, neither do I think it necessary now to discuss the origin of
the right of a number of inhabitants to that tract of country formerly
distinguished by the name of the New Hampshire grants, and now known by
that of Vermont. I will take it for granted that their right was good,
because Congress by their resolve of the 17th of August imply it, and
by that of the 21st are willing fully to confirm it, provided the new
State is confined to certain described bounds. It appears, therefore,
to me that the dispute of boundary is the only one that exists, and
that being removed all other difficulties would be removed also and the
matter terminated to the satisfaction of all parties. You have nothing
to do but withdraw your jurisdiction to the confines of your old limits
and obtain an acknowledgment of independence and sovereignty under the
resolve of the 21st of August (1781), for so much territory as does not
interfere with the ancient established bounds of New York, New
Hampshire, and Massachusetts. In my private opinion, while it behooves
the delegates to do ample justice to a body of people sufficiently
respectable by their numbers and entitled by other claims to be
admitted into that confederation, it becomes them also to attend to the
interests of their constituents and see that under the appearance of
justice to one they do not materially injure the rights of others. I am
apt to think this is the prevailing opinion of Congress."

The impartiality, moderation, and good sense of this letter, together
with a full conviction of the disinterested patriotism of the writer,
brought round a revolution in the minds of the Legislature of Vermont,
and they accepted the propositions of Congress though they had rejected
them four months before. A truce among the contending parties followed
and the storm blew over. Thus the personal influence of one man,
derived from his pre-eminent virtues and meritorious services,
extinguished the sparks of civil discord at the time they were kindling
into flame. [2]

While Washington, during the early part of the year 1781, was thus
contending with every species of discouragement and difficulty,
prevented from acting offensively by want of means, and thus apparently
wasting away the fighting season in comparative inaction the war was
actively raging in the southern States. To this grand theater of
hostilities, as interesting as they are terrible, we must now call the
reader's attention.

 1. Footnote: Gen. Joseph Reed, formerly secretary to Washington.

2. Footnote: It was during this dispute between New York and Vermont
that Gen. Ethan Allen, then residing in the latter State, received
large offers from the British to use his influence to detach Vermont
from the Union and annex it to Canada. Of course these offers were
indignantly rejected.




CHAPTER XXI.


THE CAMPAIGN AT THE SOUTH. 1781.


In our last notice of the movements and operations of the contending
armies in the southern States, we left Cornwallis, after a dreary and
disastrous retreat, at Wynnsborough. The Americans, in the meantime,
were not idle. Defeated, but not subdued, they were active in preparing
to renew the struggle. After the defeat and dispersion of his army at
Camden, General Gates retreated to Charlotte, eighty miles from the
field of battle. There he halted to collect the straggling fugitives
and to endeavor from the wreck of his discomfited army to form a force
with which he might check or impede the advancing foe. He was soon
joined by Generals Smallwood and Gist, and about 150 dispirited
officers and soldiers. Most of the militia who escaped returned home,
and General Caswell was ordered to assemble those of the neighboring
counties. Major Anderson of the Third Maryland regiment, who had
collected a number of fugitives not far from the field of battle,
proceeded toward Charlotte by easy marches in order to give stragglers
time to join him. But as Charlotte was utterly indefensible and as no
barrier lay between it and the victorious enemy Gates retreated to
Salisbury and sent Colonel Williams, accompanied by another officer, on
the road leading to Camden to gain information of the movements of
Cornwallis, and to direct such stragglers as he met to hasten to
Salisbury. From Salisbury Gates proceeded to Hillsborough, where he
intended to assemble an army with which he might contend for the
southern Provinces.

It was from Hillsborough that he wrote the letter to Washington, which
we have already quoted, desiring the exertion of his influence to
prevent his being superseded in the command of the southern army.

At Hillsborough every exertion was made to collect and organize a
military force and ere long Gates was again at the head of 1,400 men.
Even before the royal army entered North Carolina that State had called
out the second division of its militia, under Generals Davidson and
Sumner, and they were joined by the volunteer cavalry under Colonel
Davie.

When Cornwallis entered Charlotte, Gates ordered General Smallwood to
take post at the fords of the Yadkin in order to dispute the passage of
the river, and Morgan, who had joined the southern army with the rank
of brigadier-general, was employed with a light corps to harass the
enemy.

When Cornwallis retreated Gates advanced to Charlotte; he stationed
General Smallwood further down the Catawba on the road to Camden and
ordered Morgan to some distance in his front. Such was the position of
the troops when Gates was superseded in the command of the southern
army.

On the 5th of October (1780) Congress, without any previous indications
of dissatisfaction, had passed a resolution requiring Washington to
order a court of inquiry into the conduct of Major-General Gates, as
commander of the southern army, and to appoint another officer to that
command till such inquiry should be made. The order of Congress to
inquire into the conduct of Gates was unsatisfactory, as we have
already seen, to Washington. It was afterward dispensed with and Gates
restored to a command in the army.

Meanwhile Washington recommended Major-General Greene to Congress as a
person qualified to command the southern army. Greene, by his activity,
intrepidity, and good conduct, had gained the confidence of Washington
long ago; he had desired him to have the command when Gates was
appointed, as we have already seen, and he now again recommended him as
an officer in whose ability, fortitude, and integrity he could trust.
On the 2d of December (1780) Greene arrived at Charlotte and informed
Gates of his commission. That was the first official notice which
Gates, the former favorite of Congress, received of his removal from
the command of the southern army. Next day Gates resigned the command
of the army with becoming dignity and patriotism, and Greene, who was
dissatisfied with the treatment which he had received, behaved toward
him with the most polite attention.

In a few hours after Greene entered on his command he received the
report of one of Morgan's foraging parties, not far from Camden. The
party advanced to the vicinity of the British posts at Clermont, which
was viewed by Col. William A. Washington, who saw that it was too
strong to be taken by small arms and cavalry, the only weapons and
force present; he therefore had recourse to stratagem. Having made an
imposing show of part of his men and having placed the trunk of a pine
tree in such a situation as, at a distance, to have the appearance of a
cannon, he summoned the post to surrender, and it yielded without
firing a shot. The Tory Colonel Rugely and 112 men whom he had
collected in the place were made prisoners. This inconsiderable event
elated Greene's army and was considered by them as a good omen of
success under their new leader.

General Greene's situation was embarrassing. His army was feeble,
consisting, on the 8th of December (1780), of 2,029 infantry, of whom
1,482 were in camp and 547 in detachments; 821 were Continentals and
1,208 were militia. Besides these there were 90 cavalry, 60
artillerymen, and 128 Continentals on extra service, constituting in
all a force of 2,307 men.

In North Carolina there were many Loyalists, and hostilities were
carried on between them and their republican neighbors with the most
rancorous animosity. The country was thinly inhabited and abounded in
woods and swamps. The cultivated parts were laid waste by hostile
factions, and no magazines for the army were provided. The troops were
almost naked, and Greene obliged to procure subsistence for them day by
day.

He found that he could not long remain at Charlotte for the country
between that place and Camden, having been traversed by the contending
armies, was quite exhausted. In order, therefore, to procure
subsistence for his troops, as well as to distract and harass the
enemy, Greene, though fully aware of the danger of such a measure, felt
himself constrained to divide his little army.

General Morgan had been invested with the command of the light troops
by Gates, and Greene placed him at the head of one of the divisions of
his army, consisting of nearly 400 infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel
Howard, 170 Virginia riflemen under Major Triplett, and 80 light
dragoons under Lieut.-Col. William A. Washington. With this small force
Morgan was sent to the south of the Catawba to observe the British at
Wynnsborough and Camden and to shift for himself, but was directed to
risk as little as possible. On the 25th of December (1780) he took a
position toward the western frontier of South Carolina, not far from
the confluence of the Pacolet and Broad rivers, and about fifty miles
northwest from Wynnsborough. With the other division of his army Greene
left Charlotte on the 20th of the same month (December, 1780), and on
the 29th arrived at Hick's Corner on the east side of the Pedee,
opposite the Cheraw hills, about seventy miles northeast from
Wynnsborough, where he remained some time. He marched to that place in
the hope of finding more plentiful subsistence for his troops, but his
difficulties in that respect were not much diminished, for the country
was almost laid waste by the cruel feuds of the hostile factions.

General Morgan did not long remain inactive. On the 27th of December
(1780) he detached Colonel Washington with his dragoons and 200
militia, who next day marched forty miles, surprised a body of
Loyalists at Ninety-six, killed or wounded 150 of them, and took 40
prisoners, without sustaining any loss. At that time Morgan was joined
by Major M'Dowell with 200 North Carolina, and by Colonel Pickens with
70 South Carolina militia.

The British had to contend not only with the force under Greene and
Morgan, but were also obliged to watch other adversaries not less
active and enterprising. Sumter had been defeated by Tarleton on the
18th of August (1780), and his followers dispersed, but that daring and
indefatigable partisan did not long remain quiet. He was soon again at
the head of a considerable band and had frequent skirmishes with his
adversaries. Always changing his position about Enoree, Broad, and
Tiger rivers, he often assailed the British posts in that quarter. On
the 12th of November (1780) he was attacked at Broad river by Major
Wemyss, but repulsed the party and made the major prisoner. On the 20th
of the same month he was attacked by Tarleton at Black Stocks, near
Tiger river; the encounter was sharp and obstinate; Tarleton was
repulsed with loss, but Sumter was wounded in the battle, and, being
unfitted for active service, his followers dispersed. Sumter showed
much humanity to his prisoners. Although Wemyss had deliberately hanged
Mr. Cusack in the Cheraw district, and although he had in his pocket a
list of several houses burned by his orders, yet he met with every
indulgence. At Black Stocks the wounded were kindly treated.

Other partisan chiefs arose and among them General Marion held a
distinguished place. He had commanded a regiment in Charleston at the
time of the siege, but having received a wound which fractured his leg,
and being incapable of discharging the [1] active duties of his office,
he withdrew from the town. On the advance of Gates, having procured a
band of followers, he penetrated to the Santee, harassed the British
detachments, and discouraged the Loyalists. After the defeat of the
Americans at Camden he rescued a party of Continental prisoners who
were under a British guard. So ill was he provided with arms that he
was obliged to forge the saws of the sawmills into rude swords for his
horsemen, and so scanty was his ammunition that at times he engaged
when he had not three cartridges to each of his party. He secured
himself from pursuit in the recesses of the forest and in deep swamps.
[2]

Cornwallis impatiently waited the arrival of reinforcements. After the
victory at Camden, when he was flushed with the sanguine hope not only
of overrunning North Carolina, but of invading Virginia, General Leslie
was detached from New York to the southward with a considerable body of
troops, and, according to orders, landed in Virginia, expecting to meet
the southern army in that State. On finding himself unable to
accomplish his lofty schemes, and obliged to fall back into South
Carolina, Cornwallis ordered Leslie to re-embark and sail for
Charleston. He arrived there on the 13th of December (1780), and on the
19th began his march with 1,500 men to join Cornwallis. His lordship
resolved to begin offensive operations immediately on the arrival of
his reinforcements, but, in the meantime, alarmed by the movements of
Morgan for the safety of the British post at Ninety-six, he detached
Tarleton with the light and legion infantry, the fusiliers or Seventh
regiment, the first battalion of the Seventy-first regiment, 350
cavalry, 2 field pieces, and an adequate number of the royal artillery,
in all about 1,100 men, with orders to strike a blow at Morgan and
drive him out of the province. As Tarleton's force was known to be
superior to that under Morgan, no doubt whatever was entertained of the
precipitate flight or total discomfiture of the Americans.

Meanwhile Cornwallis left Wynnsborough and proceeded toward the
northwest, between the Broad and Catawba rivers. General Leslie, who
had halted at Camden in order to conceal as long as possible the road
which the British army was to take, was now ordered to advance up the
Catawba and join the main body on its march. By this route Cornwallis
hoped to intercept Morgan if he should escape Tarleton, or perhaps to
get between General Greene and Virginia and compel him to fight before
the arrival of his expected reinforcements. The British generals
encumbered with baggage and military stores, marching through bad
roads, and a country intersected by rivulets which were often swollen
by the rains, advanced but slowly. Tarleton, however, with his light
troops, proceeded with great celerity and overtook Morgan probably
sooner than was expected.

On the 14th of January (1781) Morgan was informed of the movements of
the British army and got notice of the march of Tarleton and of the
force under his command. Sensible of his danger he began to retreat,
and crossed the Pacolet, the passage of which he was inclined to
dispute, but, on being told that Tarleton had forded the river six
miles above him, he made a precipitate retreat, and at ten at night on
the 16th of January the British took possession of the ground which the
Americans had left a few hours before.

Although his troops were much fatigued by several days' hard marching
through a difficult country, yet, determined that Morgan should not
escape, Tarleton resumed the pursuit at three next morning, leaving his
baggage behind under a guard with orders not to move till break of day.
Morgan, though retreating, was not disinclined to fight. By great
exertions he might have crossed Broad river or reached a hilly tract of
country before he could have been overtaken. He was inferior to
Tarleton in the number of his troops, but more so in their quality, as
a considerable part of his force consisted of militia, and the British
cavalry were three times more numerous than the American. But Morgan,
who had great confidence both in himself and in his men, was
apprehensive of being overtaken before he could pass Broad river, and
he chose rather to fight voluntarily than to be forced to a battle.
Therefore, having been joined by some militia under Colonel Pickens, he
halted at a place called the Cowpens, about three miles from the line
of separation between North and South Carolina. Before daylight on the
morning of the 17th of January (1781), he was informed of the near
approach of Tarleton, and instantly prepared to receive him.

The ground on which Morgan halted had no great advantages, but his
dispositions were judicious. On rising ground, in an open wood, he drew
up his Continental troops and Triplett's corps, amounting together to
nearly 500 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard. Colonel Washington
with his cavalry was posted in their rear, behind the eminence, ready
to act as occasion might require. At a small distance in front of his
Continentals was a line of militia under Colonel Pickens and Major
M'Dowell, and 150 yards in front of Pickens was stationed a battalion
of North Carolina and Georgia volunteers under Major Cunningham, with
orders to give one discharge on the approaching enemy, and then to
retreat and join the militia. Pickens was directed, when he could no
longer keep his ground, to fall back with a retreating fire and form on
the right of the Continentals.

Scarcely were those dispositions made when the British van appeared.
Tarleton, who had been informed by two prisoners of Morgan's position
and strength, instantly formed his troops. The light and legion
infantry and the Seventh regiment, and a captain with fifty dragoons on
each flank, constituted his first line; the first battalion of the.
Seventy-first regiment and the rest of the cavalry composed the
reserve. Formerly Tarleton had succeeded by sudden and impetuous
assaults, and, entertaining no doubt of speedy and complete victory on
the present occasion, he led on his men to the attack with
characteristic ardor, even before his troops were well formed. The
British rushed forward impetuously, shouting and firing as they
advanced. The American volunteers, after a single discharge, retreated
to the militia under Pickens. The British advanced rapidly, and
furiously attacked the militia, who soon gave way and sought shelter in
the rear of the Continentals. Tarleton eagerly pressed on, but the
Continentals, undismayed by the retreat of the militia, received him
firmly, and an obstinate conflict ensued. Tarleton ordered up his
reserve, and the Continental line was shaken by the violence of the
onset. Morgan ordered his men to retreat to the summit of the eminence
and was instantly obeyed. The British, whose ranks were somewhat
thinned, exhausted by the previous march and by the struggle in which
they had been engaged, and believing the victory won, pursued in some
disorder, but, on reaching the top of the hill, Howard ordered his men
to wheel and face the enemy; they instantly obeyed and met the pursuing
foe with a well-directed and deadly fire. This unexpected and
destructive volley threw the British into some confusion, which Howard
observing, ordered his men to charge them with the bayonet. Their
obedience was as prompt as before, and the British line was soon
broken. About the same moment Washington routed the cavalry on the
British right, who had pursued the flying militia and were cutting them
down on the left and even in the rear of the Continentals. Ordering his
men not to fire a pistol, Washington charged the British cavalry sword
in hand. The conflict was sharp, but not of long duration. The British
were driven from the ground with considerable loss and closely pursued.
Howard and Washington pressed the advantage which they had gained; many
of the militia rallied and joined in the battle. In a few minutes after
the British had been pursuing the enemy, without a doubt of victory,
the fortune of the day entirely changed; their artillerymen were
killed, their cannon taken, and the greater part of the infantry
compelled to lay down their arms. Tarleton, with about forty horse,
made a furious charge on Washington's cavalry, but the battle was
irrecoverably lost, and he was reluctantly obliged to retreat. Upwards
of 200 of his cavalry, who had not been engaged, fled through the woods
with the utmost precipitation, bearing away with them such of the
officers as endeavored to oppose their flight. The only part of the
infantry which escaped was the detachment left to guard the baggage,
which they destroyed when informed of the defeat, and, mounting the
wagons and spare horses, hastily retreated to the army. The cavalry
arrived in camp in two divisions; one in the evening, with the tidings
of their disastrous discomfiture, and the other, under Tarleton
himself, appeared next morning. In this battle the British had ten
commissioned officers and upwards of 100 privates killed. More than 500
were made prisoners, nearly 200 of whom, including twenty-nine
commissioned officers, were wounded. Two pieces of artillery, two
standards, 800 muskets, thirty-five baggage wagons and about 100 horses
fell into the hands of the Americans whose loss amounted only to 12 men
killed and 60 wounded. The British force under Tarleton has been
commonly estimated at 1,100 men, and the American army at 1,000,
although Morgan, in his official report to Greene, written two days
after the battle, states it to have been only 800. [3]

Cornwallis was at Turkey creek, twenty-five miles from the Cowpens,
confident of the success of his detachment or at least without the
slightest apprehension of its defeat. He was between Greene and Morgan
and it was a matter of much importance to prevent their junction and to
overthrow the one of them while he could receive no support from the
other. For that purpose he had marched up Broad river and instructed
General Leslie to proceed on the banks of the Catawba in order to keep
the Americans in a state of uncertainty concerning the route which he
intended to pursue, but the unexpected defeat of his detachment was an
occurrence equally mortifying and perplexing and nothing remained but
to endeavor to compensate the disaster by the rapidity of his movements
and the decision of his conduct.

He was as near the fords of the Catawba as Morgan and flattered himself
that, elated with victory and encumbered with prisoners and baggage,
that officer might yet be overtaken before he could pass those fords.
Accordingly, on the 18th of January, (1781) he formed a junction with
General Leslie and on the 19th began his remarkable pursuit of Morgan.
In order the more certainly to accomplish his end at Ramsour's Mills he
destroyed the whole of his superfluous baggage. He set the example by
considerably diminishing the quantity of his own and was readily
imitated by his officers although some of them suffered much less by
the measure. He retained no wagons except those loaded with hospital
stores and ammunition and four empty ones for the accommodation of the
sick and wounded. But notwithstanding all his privations and exertions
he ultimately missed his aim for Morgan displayed as much prudence and
activity after his victory as bravery in gaining it. Fully aware of his
danger he left behind him, under a flag of truce, such of the wounded
as could not be moved with surgeons to attend them, and scarcely giving
his men time to breathe he sent off his prisoners under an escort of
militia and followed with his regular troops and cavalry, bringing up
the rear in person. He crossed Broad river at the upper fords, hastened
to the Catawba, which he reached on the evening of the 28th, and safely
passed it with his prisoners and troops next day--his rear having
gained the northern bank only about two hours before the van of the
British army appeared on the opposite side.

Much rain had fallen on the mountains a short time before and it rained
incessantly during the night. The river rose and in the morning was
impassable. Morgan made a hair-breadth escape, for had the river risen
a few hours sooner he would have been unable to pass and probably would
have been overtaken and overwhelmed by his pursuers and had the flood
in the river been a little later Cornwallis might have forced a passage
and entirely discomfited the American division. But it was two days
before the inundation subsided, and in that interval Morgan sent off
his prisoners towards Charlottesville, in Virginia, under an escort of
militia and they were soon beyond the reach of pursuit. The Americans
regarded the swelling of the river with pious gratitude as an
interposition of Heaven in their behalf and looked forward with
increased confidence to the day of ultimate success.

Morgan called for the assistance of the neighboring militia, and
prepared to dispute the passage of the river; but on the 31st of
January (1781), while he lay at Sherwood's ford, General Greene
unexpectedly appeared in camp and took on himself the command. Toward
the end of December, (1781) Greene, as already mentioned, took a
position at Hick's creek on the east side of the Peedee, and had in
camp 1,100 Continental and State troops fit for service. On the 12th of
January (1781) he was joined by Col. Henry Lee's partisan legion which
arrived from the North and consisted of 100 well-mounted horsemen and
120 infantry. This reinforcement was next day dispatched on a secret
expedition and in order to divert the attention of the enemy from the
movements of the legion, Major Anderson, with a small detachment was
sent down the Peedee. On the night of the 24th, Lee surprised
Georgetown and killed some of the garrison, but the greater part fled
into the fort which Lee was not in a condition to besiege.

Although Cornwallis perceived that he would meet with opposition yet he
determined to force the passage. The river was about 500 yards wide,
three feet deep, and the stream rapid. The light infantry of the guards
under Colonel Hall, accompanied by a guide, first entered the ford;
they were followed by the grenadiers who were succeeded by the
battalions. As soon as Davidson perceived the direction of the British
column he led his men to the point where it was about to land. But
before he arrived the light infantry had overcome all difficulties and
were ascending the bank and forming. While passing the river, in
obedience to orders, they reserved their fire, and, on gaining the
bank, soon put the militia to flight. Davidson was the last to retreat
and on mounting his horse to retire he received a mortal wound.

The defeat of Davidson opened the passage of the river. All the
American parties retreated, and on the same day the rest of the British
army crossed at Beattie's ford. Tarleton, with the cavalry and the
Twenty-third regiment, was sent in pursuit of the militia, and being
informed on his march that the neighboring militia were assembling at
Tarrant's tavern, about ten miles distant, he hastened with the cavalry
to that place. About 500 militia were assembled and seemed not
unprepared to receive him. He attacked them with his usual impetuosity
and soon defeated and dispersed them with considerable slaughter. The
passage of the river and the total discomfiture of the party at
Tarrant's tavern so much intimidated the inhabitants of the country
that the royal army received no further trouble from the militia till
it had passed the Yadkin.

A grand military race now began between the retreating Americans under
Greene and the pursuing British under Cornwallis. Greene marched so
rapidly that he passed the Yadkin at the trading ford on the night
between the 2d and 3d of February (1781), partly by fording and partly
by means of boats and flats. So closely was he pursued that the British
van was often in sight of the American rear and a sharp conflict
happened not far from the ford, between a body of American riflemen and
the advanced guard of the British army, when the latter obtained
possession of a few wagons. Greene secured all the boats on the south
side and here it again happened as at the Catawba--the river suddenly
rose by reason of the preceding rains and the British were unable to
pass. This second escape by the swelling of the waters was interpreted
by the Americans as a visible interposition of Heaven in their behalf
and inspired then with a lofty enthusiasm in that cause which seemed to
be the peculiar care of Omnipotence.

Greene, released from the immediate pressure of his pursuers, continued
his march northward and on the 7th of February joined his division
under Huger and Williams near Guilford Courthouse.

In order to cover his retreat and to check the pursuing enemy Greene
formed a light corps out of Lee's legion, Howard's infantry,
Washington's cavalry, and some Virginia riflemen under Major Campbell,
amounting to 700 men, the flower of the southern army. As General
Morgan was severely indisposed the command of these light troops was
given to Col. Otho Holland Williams, formerly adjutant-general.

Having refreshed his troops, and made the necessary arrangements on the
morning of the 10th of February (1781), Greene left Guilford Courthouse
on his march towards the Dan, and was pursued by Cornwallis, who had
been detained by the long circuit which he was obliged to make in order
to pass the Yadkin. The retreat and pursuit were equally rapid, but the
boldness and activity of the American light troops compelled the
British to march compactly and with caution, for on one occasion
Colonel Lee charged the advanced cavalry of the British army suddenly
and furiously, killed a number, and made some prisoners. On this
occasion Cornwallis felt the loss of the light troops who had been
killed or taken at the Cowpens. He was destined to regret their loss
through the rest of the campaign.

Greene's precautions and preparations for passing the Dan were
successful and on the 14th of February he crossed that river at Boyd's
and Irwin's ferries with his army, baggage, and stores. Although his
light troops had marched forty miles that day, yet the last of them had
scarcely reached the northern bank when the advanced guard of the
British army appeared on the other side of the river.

The escape of Greene into Virginia without a battle and without any
loss except a few wagons at the Yadkin, was a severe disappointment to
Cornwallis. He had entirely failed in his attempts against Greene, but
he was consoled by the reflection that he had completely driven him out
of North Carolina, and that now there was nothing to hinder the loyal
inhabitants from openly espousing the British cause and reinforcing the
royal army.

Cornwallis now gave up the pursuit and repaired to Hillsborough with
the view of calling out and organizing the Royalist forces. His
adherents, though here particularly strong, did not come forward to the
extent expected. The larger portion, as elsewhere, regarded the cause
with that passive and inert attachment which we have remarked to be
generally prevalent and even the more zealous having suffered severely
by former premature displays, dreaded lest the republican cause should
regain the ascendancy. The view also of the distress and exhaustion of
the British troops after so long a march was by no means alluring. Yet
seven companies were formed and detachments began to come in from
different quarters.

On the other hand, Greene, having obtained a reinforcement of Virginia
militia, repassed the Dan and with his light troops endeavored to annoy
the British army and prevent recruiting. Major Lee surprised a
detachment of Royalists who mistook him for Tarleton and cut them
nearly to pieces. On account of the exhausted state of the country at
Hillsborough, Cornwallis soon withdrew to a position on the Allimance
creek between Haw and Deep rivers, where he could be better supplied
and support his friends who were numerous there. Greene, however, by an
active use of his cavalry and light troops, severely harassed his
opponent and by changing his own position every night, eluded the
attempt to bring him to an engagement.

At length General Greene, having received reinforcements which raised
his army to above 4,200 men, of whom about a third were regulars,
determined to offer battle. This was what Cornwallis had eagerly
sought, yet his own effective force being reduced to somewhat under
2,000 he felt now some hesitation, and probably would have acted more
wisely in maintaining the defensive. Even the enterprising Tarleton
observes that in his circumstances defeat would have been total ruin,
while any victory he might expect to gain could yield little fruit. All
the habits and views of Cornwallis, however, being directed to an
active campaign, he formed his resolution and, on the 15th of March
(1781), proceeded to the attack. Greene had drawn up his army very
judiciously near Guilford Courthouse mostly on a range of hills covered
with trees and brushwood.

Greene made disposition of his troops in the following order: The first
line was composed of North Carolina militia, the right under General
Eaton and the left under General Butler, with two pieces of artillery
under Captain Singleton. The right flank was supported by Kirkwood's
Delawareans, Lynch's riflemen, and the cavalry, all under Lieutenant-
Colonel Washington, and the left in like manner by Lieutenant-Colonel
Campbell's riflemen and the infantry of the legion, all under
Lieutenant-Colonel Lee. The second line, which was formed 300 yards in
the rear of the first, consisted of two brigades of Virginia militia,
the right under General Lawson and the left under General Stevens. The
third, 400 yards in reserve was formed upon the brow of the hill near
the courthouse. The right of this line was composed of Hawes's and
Greene's Virginia regiments under General Huger; the left of the first
and second Maryland regiments, the former under Gunby, the latter under
Ford--the whole commanded by Colonel Williams. In the center of the
last line was placed the remainder of the artillery.

Captain Singleton commenced his fire, which was returned by the enemy,
who had formed their line of battle--the right wing under General
Leslie and the left under Lieutenant-Colonel Webster, with the
artillery in the center under Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod. The first
battalion of the guards, under Lieutenant-Colonel Norton, served as a
support for the right, and the second, with one company of grenadiers
under General O'Hara, for the left wing. Tarleton's dragoons were held
in reserve. The British commander having made all his dispositions
advanced, fired one round, and charged bayonets. Our militia having
given a few shots while the enemy was at a distance were seized by a
panic when they saw him coming down upon them. Many of them threw away
their muskets, and the entreaties of Butler, Eaton, and Davie, with the
threats of Lee, were of no avail. Almost the entire body fled. The
artillery now retired to the left of the Marylanders. At this crisis
the enemy considered victory as already within his grasp and continued
to push on when he was attacked on his right and left by Lee and
Washington. Cornwallis perceiving this threw one regiment out to engage
Lee, and one regiment together with his light infantry and yagers to
resist Washington, filling up the breach thus created by advancing the
grenadiers with two battalions of the guards, which had formed the
supports to the flanks. Lee and Washington fell back in good order,
delivering their fire until they came up with the second line which
gave battle in good earnest. The right flank was supported by
Washington, who ordered Lynch's riflemen to fall upon the left of
Webster, who had to be supported by O'Hara. Here Webster ordered the
Thirty-third regiment to attack Lynch and was thereby in a measure
relieved. O'Hara charged the Virginia right wing, which was obliged to
yield ground. Lee on the left nobly did his duty and firmly held his
position. When the militia on the right gave way those on the left fell
back and were not rallied until they came up on the left of the third
line. Campbell's riflemen and Lee's legion stood perfectly firm and
continued the contest against one regiment, one battalion, and a body
of infantry and riflemen. The American reserve, with the artillery
posted in a most favorable position, was fresh and ready for the word
of command. Webster having overcome the Americans of the second line in
his front advanced upon the third and was received by Gunby's Maryland
regiment with a most galling fire which made his troops falter. Gunby
advanced, charging bayonets, when the enemy was completely routed.

Leslie, after the left of the Virginia militia gave way, advanced to
the support of O'Hara, who had forced the American right wing, and the
combined commands of these generals charged the Second Maryland
regiment of the third line. This regiment, panic-stricken, fled.
Gunby, coming up at the time, held the enemy in check and a deadly
conflict ensued. Gunby having his horse shot under him,
Lieutenant-Colonel Howard assumed the command. Washington seeing how
hot was the battle at this point pushed forward and charged the enemy,
and Howard advancing with his bayonets leveled, the British were
completely routed.

The pursuit was continued for some distance when Cornwallis came up and
determined to gain the victory at any cost. He opened the fire of his
artillery alike on friend and foe, causing an indiscriminate slaughter
of British and Americans.

The British were rallied at all points, and Greene, considering it
better to preserve the advantages he had gained, withdrew his forces.
This was done in good order and Cornwallis continued the pursuit but a
short distance. The loss of the Americans was about 400 in killed and
wounded; that of the British about 800. The enemy retained the field,
but his victory was both empty, and disastrous.

Notwithstanding Cornwallis claimed a victory he resolved to fall back
on Wilmington, near the mouth of Cape Fear river, where he could
recruit his troops and obtain supplies and reinforcements by sea.

Greene retreated about fifteen miles, taking post behind a small stream
called Troublesome creek, where he expected and awaited an attack.


1. Footnote: Marion was a strict temperance man. Being at a dinner
party where the guests, determined on a hard drinking bout, had locked
the door to prevent his exit, he jumped out of a second-story window,
and broke his leg. This was the wound above referred to. It occasioned
him to leave the city. He thus escaped surrendering when Charleston
fell, and his temperance preserved to the country one of its bravest
defenders.

2. Footnote: Marion, on account of his successful stratagems and sudden
surprises of the British, was called by them the _Swamp-Fox_. His own
countrymen styled him the _Bayard_ of the South.

3. Footnote: The action at the Cowpens was one of the medal victories.
Congress had separate gold medals struck in honor of it, and presented
to Morgan, Howard, and Col. William A. Washington. The name Cowpens,
according to Irving, comes from the old designation of Hannah's
Cowpens, the place being part of a grazing establishment belonging to a
man named Hannah. The worthy grazier could hardly have foreseen the
immortality which was destined to attach to his Cowpens.




CHAPTER XXII.


THE CAMPAIGN AT THE SOUTH CONCLUDED. 1781.


While the events recorded in the last chapter were passing Washington
was by no means a passive spectator. He held a constant correspondence
with Greene and sent him all the aid he could. Writing to him on the
9th of January, 1781, he says: "It is impossible for anyone to
sympathize more feelingly with you in the sufferings and distresses of
the troops than I do, and nothing could aggravate my unhappiness so
much as the want of ability to remedy or alleviate the calamities which
they suffer and in which we participate but too largely.

"The brilliant action of General Sumter and the stratagem of Colonel
Washington deserve great commendation. It gives me inexpressible
pleasure to find that such a spirit of enterprise and intrepidity still
prevails." [1]

Writing to Greene again (on the 21st of March, 1781), he says: "You may
be assured that your retreat before Lord Cornwallis is highly applauded
by all ranks and reflects much honor on your military abilities." Such
words, from such a man, must have inspirited Greene amidst his toils
and perils.

Greene, writing to Washington three days after the battle of Guilford
Courthouse, says: "In my former letters I enclosed to your Excellency
the probable strength of the British army, since which they have been
constantly declining. Our force, as you will see by the returns, was
respectable, and the probability of not being able to keep it long in
the field, and the difficulty of subsisting men in this exhausted
country, together with the great advantages which would result from the
action if we were victorious, and the little injury if we were
otherwise, determined me to bring on an action as soon as possible.
When both parties are agreed in a matter all obstacles are soon
removed. I thought the determination warranted by the soundest
principles of good policy and I hope events will prove it so though we
were unfortunate. I regret nothing so much as the loss of my artillery,
though it was of little use to us, nor can it be in this great
wilderness. However, as the enemy have it, we must also."

"Lord Cornwallis," he writes in the same letter, "will not give up this
country without being roundly beaten. I wish our force was more
competent to the business. But I am in hopes, by little and little, to
reduce him in time. His troops are good, well found, and fight with
great obstinacy.

"Virginia has given me every support I could wish or expect since Lord
Cornwallis has been in North Carolina, and nothing has contributed more
to this than the prejudice of the people in favor of your Excellency
which has been extended to me from the friendship you have been pleased
to honor me with."

The reader will not fail to observe the soundness of Greene's judgment
as to the beneficial effect of the battle of Guilford Courthouse. It
was truly a disastrous victory for Cornwallis and a fortunate defeat
for Greene, whose subsequent operations we must now notice.

When Greene took his position at the ironworks on Troublesome creek
after the battle of Guilford Courthouse he expected that Cornwallis
would follow up his advantage and attack him without delay. He
therefore prepared again to fight. His army, indeed, was much
diminished, but he had lost more in numbers than in effective strength.
The militia, many of whom had returned home, had shown themselves very
inefficient in the field. As soon as he received certain information
that instead of pursuing, Cornwallis was retreating, he resolved to
follow him and advanced accordingly.

Greene was now in his turn the pursuer and followed Cornwallis so
closely that skirmishes occasionally happened between his advanced
parties and the rear guard of the British army, but no conflict of
importance ensued. On the morning of the 28th of March he arrived at
Ramsay's Mills, on Deep river, a strong post which the British had
evacuated a few hours before, crossing the river by a bridge erected
for the purpose. There Greene paused and meditated on his future
movements. His army, like that of the British, for some time past had
suffered much from heavy rains, deep roads, and scarcity of provisions.
On reaching Ramsay's Mills his men were starving with hunger and fed
voraciously on some fresh quarters of beef left behind by the British
army. The troops were much exhausted and stood in need of repose and
refreshment. Besides in that critical state of the campaign he found
himself reduced to a handful of Continentals. Most of the militia had
left him. Small as his army was he found great difficulty in procuring
subsistence for it.

Cornwallis had fairly the start of the Americans and was advancing to a
place where he would find more plentiful supplies and easily
communicate with the sea; so that Greene was sensible that with the
force then under his command he could make no impression on him. He
resolved, therefore, instead of following his opponent, to proceed to
South Carolina. That step, he thought, would oblige Cornwallis either
to follow him or to abandon his posts in the upper parts of the
southern States. If he followed him North Carolina would be relieved
and enabled to raise its quota of men for the Continental service, but
if he remained in that State or proceeded to the northward it was
likely that the greater part of the British posts in South Carolina and
Georgia would be reduced and that those States would be restored to the
Union. He entertained little apprehension of Cornwallis being able with
the force then under his command to make any permanent impression on
the powerful State of Virginia.

Having refreshed his troops and collected provisions for a few days
Greene moved from Ramsay's Mills, on Deep river, on the 5th of April
(1781), toward Camden, and on the morning of the 20th of the same month
encamped at Logtown in sight of the British works at that place.

Soon after his arrival at Wilmington, Cornwallis received certain
information that Greene was proceeding to South Carolina, and it threw
him into much perplexity. He was alarmed for the safety of Lord Rawdon,
but, though desirous of assisting him, he was convinced that the
Americans were already so far advanced that it was impossible for him
to arrive at Camden in time to succor Rawdon if he should need it. His
lordship's fate and that of his garrison would probably be decided long
before he could reach them, and if Greene should be successful at
Camden, he, by attempting to relieve it, might be hemmed in between the
great rivers and exposed to the most imminent hazard. On the other
hand, if Rawdon should defeat Greene there would be no need of his
assistance. A movement so perilous in the execution and promising so
little in the result was abandoned and Rawdon left to his own
resources.

Greene, without regard to the movements of his opponent, pushed on and
established himself at Hobkirk's Hill, about a mile from Rawdon's
headquarters at Camden. The militia having either deserted or their
term of service being expired his force was reduced to 1,800 men, but
those in fact included all on whom he could ever place much dependence.
Camden was occupied by Rawdon with about 800 men, the other troops
being employed upon the defense of detached posts, yet his position was
judged so strong as to afford no hope of success in a direct attack.
The object aimed at was, by throwing out detachments which might
capture the forts and cut off the supplies in his rear, to compel him
gradually to fall back. Lee, for this purpose, was sent with a strong
party to cooperate with Marion and Sumter. The English general seeing
the hostile troops thus reduced to about 1,500, formed the bold
resolution of attacking them. Making a large circuit round a swamp he
came upon their left flank quite unexpectedly, while the soldiers were
busied in cooking and washing. This first surprise was never wholly
recovered, yet they quickly stood to their arms and formed in order of
battle. They had even gained some advantages when the First Maryland
regiment, considered the flower of the army and which had highly
distinguished itself both at Cowpens and Guilford, fell into confusion,
and when ordered to make a retrograde movement, converted it into a
complete retreat. The other corps also, beginning to give ground,
Greene thought it expedient to cause the whole to retire. The loss on
each side was about 260 killed and wounded, and the Americans carried
off fifty prisoners, including six officers.

This battle, commonly called the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, reflected
much honor on Lord Rawdon considering the disproportion of force which
was, in fact, greater than at Guilford, yet it did not change
materially the relative situation of the armies. Greene could still
maintain his position and support the detachments operating in the rear
of his adversary.

Lee and Marion proceeded next against Fort Watson on the Santee which
commanded in a great measure the communication with Charleston. Having
neither artillery nor besieging tools they reared a tower above the
level of the rampart whence their rifle fire drove the defenders, and
themselves then mounted and compelled the garrison to surrender. They
could not, however, prevent Colonel Watson from leading 500 men to
reinforce Lord Rawdon, who then advanced with the intention of bringing
Greene again to action, but found him fallen back upon so strong a
position as to afford no reasonable hope of success. His lordship
finding his convoys intercepted and viewing the generally insecure
state of his posts in the lower country, considered himself under at
least the temporary necessity of retreating thither. He had first in
view the relief of Mott's House, on the Congaree, but before reaching
it had the mortification to find that with the garrison of 165 it had
fallen into the hands of Marion and Lee. He continued his march to
Monk's Corner, where he covered Charleston and the surrounding country.

The partisan chiefs rapidly seized this opportunity of attacking the
interior posts and reduced successively Orangeburg and Granby on the
Congaree, and early in June, Augusta, the key of upper Georgia,
surrendered to Lee and Pickens. In these five forts they made 1,100
prisoners. The most important one, however, was that named Ninety-Six,
on the Saluda, defended by a garrison of 500 men. Orders had been sent
to them to quit and retire downward but the messenger was intercepted
and Colonel Cruger, the commander, made the most active preparations
for its defense. Greene considered the place of such importance that he
undertook the siege in person with 1,000 regulars. He broke ground
before it on the night of the 23d of May (1781), and though much
impeded by a successful sally on the following day, proceeded with such
energy that by the 3d of June the second parallel was completed and the
garrison summoned, but in vain, to surrender. On the 8th, he was
reinforced by Lee from the capture of Augusta and though he encountered
a most gallant and effective resistance trusted that the place must in
due time fall. Three days after, however, he learned that Rawdon,
having received a reinforcement from Ireland, was in full march to
relieve it and had baffled the attempts of Sumter to impede his
progress. The American leader, therefore, feeling himself unable to
give battle saw no prospect of carrying the fortress unless by storm.
On the 18th (June, 1781), an attack against the two most commanding
outworks was led by Lee and Campbell, the former of whom carried his
point, but the latter, though he penetrated into the ditch and
maintained his party there for three-quarters of an hour, found them
exposed to so destructive a fire as compelled a general retreat. [2]
The siege was immediately raised and Lord Rawdon, on the 21st, entered
the place in triumph. Being again master of the field, he pressed
forward in the hope of bringing his antagonist to battle but the latter
rather chose to fall back towards the distant point of Charlotte in
Virginia, while Rawdon did not attempt to pursue him beyond the
Ennoree.

Notwithstanding this present superiority his lordship, having failed in
his hopes of a decisive victory and viewing the general aspect of the
country, considered it no longer possible to attempt more than covering
the lower districts, of South Carolina. He therefore fell back to
Orangeburg on the Edisto and though he attempted at first to maintain
Cruger with a strong body at Ninety-Six was soon induced to recall him.
Greene, being reinforced by 1,000 men under Marion and Sumter,
reconnoitered his position but, judging it imprudent to attack, retired
to the high hills of the Santee, July the 15th (1781), and both armies,
exhausted by such a series of active movements, took an interval of
repose during the heat of the season.

Lord Rawdon being at this time obliged by ill health to return to
England left the army under the command of Colonel Stuart, who, to
cover the lower country, occupied a position at the point where the
Congaree and Wateree unite in forming the Santee. Greene, having
received reinforcements from the North and collected all his partisan
detachments soon found himself strong enough to try the chance of
battle. His approach on the 7th of September (1781) with this evident
view induced the British to retire down the river to the strong post of
Eutaw Springs, whither the American army immediately followed.

On the 8th of September, Greene determined to attack the British camp,
placing as usual his militia in front, hoping that the English in
charging them would get into confusion, but from apprehension of this
the latter had been warned to keep their posts till ordered to move.
The American front, however, maintained their ground better than usual
and the British having become heated and forgetting the warnings given
pushed forward irregularly. They were then charged by the veterans of
the second line and after a very desperate struggle driven off the
field. There lay in their way, however, a large brick building and
adjacent garden, where Stuart had placed a strong corps which could not
be dislodged and which kept up a deadly fire which checked the victors,
enabling the retreating troops to be formed anew. At the same time
Colonel Washington attacked the British flank, but finding it strongly
posted amongst the woods he was repulsed with great loss and himself
taken prisoner. The American general seeing no hope of making any
further impression, retreated to his previous position. The conflict
lasted four hours and great bravery was shown on both sides. Colonel
Campbell was mortally wounded. Learning the British were dispersing he
exclaimed, like Wolfe at Quebec, "Then I die contented!" and
immediately expired.

In this bloody and doubtful battle both parties claimed the victory
though the Americans with most reason as the general result was greatly
to their advantage. It was certainly far from decisive and the British
loss in killed and wounded was much greater than that of the Americans,
who also carried off above 500 prisoners. The British commander,
prompted as well probably by the result of the day as by the general
state of the country and the numbers and activity of the American light
troops, conceiving himself unable to maintain so advanced a position,
retired during the evening of the 9th (September 1781), and proceeded
down to Monk's Corner, where he covered Charleston and its vicinity. To
this and to Savannah were now limited that proud British authority
which had lately extended so widely over the southern States. [3]

Thus ended the campaign of 1781 in South Carolina. At its commencement
the British were in force all over the State. History affords but a few
instances of commanders who have achieved so much with equal means as
was done by General Greene in the short space of twelve months. He
opened the campaign with gloomy prospects but closed it with glory. His
unpaid and half-naked army had to contend with veteran soldiers,
supplied with everything that the wealth of Great Britain or the
plunder of Carolina could procure. Under all these disadvantages he
compelled superior numbers to retire from the extremity of the State,
and confine themselves in the capital and its vicinity. Had not his
mind been of the firmest texture he would have been discouraged, but
his enemies found him as formidable on the evening of a defeat as on
the morning after a victory.

The reader will not fail to perceive how important a bearing the
operations of Greene in the South had upon those of Washington in the
North. Before recovering North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia,
Greene had partly led and partly driven Cornwallis into Virginia, where
he was destined to be conquered by Washington and the war was thus to
be virtually terminated. How this was accomplished will now be the
object of our attention. Virginia had insensibly, as it were, become
the principal theater of war. General Leslie had been sent thither to
reinforce Cornwallis, who it was hoped might penetrate through the
Carolinas, but after Ferguson's disaster he was ordered to go round by
Charleston. With the view, however, of creating a diversion in favor of
the southern army, Clinton, in December, 1780, sent Arnold with 1,600
men to the Chesapeake. That infamous traitor, displaying all his wonted
activity, overran a great extent of country and captured Richmond, the
capital, destroying great quantities of stores. Washington, most
anxious to strike a blow against him, prevailed upon Destouches, the
French admiral to proceed thither with a land force but the latter was
overtaken by Arbuthnot and endured a hard battle which though not
admitted to be a defeat obliged him to return to Newport; thus Arnold
escaped the danger of falling into the hands of his enraged countrymen.
Clinton, still with the same view, sent another force of 2,000 men
under General Phillips which arrived in the Chesapeake on the 26th of
March (1781). This officer being complete master of the field, overran
the country between the James and York rivers, seized the town of
Petersburg, as also Chesterfield Courthouse, the militia rendezvous,
and other stations, destroying great quantities of shipping and stores,
with all the warehoused tobacco. Lafayette, then in command of about
3,000 men for the defense of Virginia, succeeded by skilful maneuvering
in securing Richmond.

Operations seemed at a stand, when, late in April, intelligence was
received of Cornwallis' march from South Carolina toward Virginia and,
in spite of every effort of Lafayette, he, at the end of May (1781),
joined Phillips at Petersburg, taking the command of the whole army.
Being then decidedly superior he took possession of Richmond and began
a hot pursuit of Lafayette, who retreated into the upper country so
rapidly and so skillfully that he could not be overtaken. The English
general then turned back and sent a detachment under Colonel Simcoe,
who destroyed the chief magazine at the junction of the two branches of
James river. Tarleton pushed his cavalry so swiftly upon
Charlotteville, where the State Assembly was met, that seven members
were taken and the rest very narrowly escaped. Lafayette, however, now
returned with a considerable force and by his maneuvers induced the
British commander to retire to Williamsburg. He afterward continued his
retreat to Portsmouth in the course of which the former made an attack
but was repulsed and would have been totally routed had not his
strength been estimated above its real amount.

The movement of Cornwallis into Virginia had been wholly disapproved by
Clinton who complained that, contrary to all his views and intentions,
the main theater of war had been transferred to a territory into which
he never proposed more than partial inroads, considering it very
difficult to subdue and maintain. His grand object had always been
first to secure New York and, if sufficient strength was afforded, to
push offensive operations thence into the interior. Hoping, therefore,
that the Carolinas, once subdued, might be retained by a small force,
he had repeatedly solicited the partial return of the troops.
Cornwallis defended the movement by observing that his situation at
Wilmington, allowing no time to send for instructions, obliged him to
act on his own responsibility. Communicating also with the government
at home he urged that the Carolinas could not be securely held without
the possession also of Virginia; that this might be attained by a
vigorous effort, and would make Britain mistress of all the southern
Colonies, whose resources could be then employed in conquering the more
stubborn regions of the North. These arguments, recommended by his
lordship's brilliant achievements at Camden and elsewhere, convinced
the ministry, and Lord Germaine wrote to the Commander-in-Chief to
direct his principal attention to the war in Virginia and to the plan
of conquest from south to north. The latter, considering himself thus
slighted, solicited permission to resign and leave the command to an
officer who enjoyed greater confidence, but his merits being highly
estimated this tender was not accepted.

Under the apprehension inspired by the threatening movements of
Washington and the French army against New York, he had ordered a
considerable reinforcement from Virginia, but countermanded it on
receiving the above instructions, along with an additional body of
troops. He had formed, apparently, a favorite plan somewhat of a
compromise between the two. It is nowhere distinctly developed in his
letters, but by a passage in one very active operations were proposed
at the head of the Chesapeake, to be combined probably with a movement
from New York and comprehending Philadelphia and Baltimore. Aware that
this plan required the maritime command of that great inlet, he
inquired if ministers would insure its maintenance, and they made this
engagement without duly considering its difficulties. Under these views
he directed Cornwallis to occupy and fortify a naval position at the
entrance of the bay, specially recommending Old Point Comfort, at the
mouth of James river. This measure did not harmonize with Cornwallis'
views; however, he obeyed, but, the above position being declared by
the engineers indefensible, he recommended, in preference, Yorktown on
the York river, which was agreed to and operations actively commenced
at the latter end of August. The whole British force at this time in
Virginia was about 7,000 men.

1. Footnote: Referring to the affair at Rugely's Mills, where Colonel
Washington frightened the militia colonel into a surrender by means of
a pine log mounted like a cannon.

2. Footnote: On this occasion Kosciusko, the Polish general,
particularly distinguished himself.

3. Footnote: In the southern provinces the campaign of 1781 was
uncommonly active. The exertions and sufferings of the army were great.
But the troops were not the only sufferers; the inhabitants were
exposed to many calamities. The success of Colonel Campbell at Savannah
laid Georgia and the Carolinas open to all the horrors which attend the
movements of conflicting armies and the rage of civil dissensions for
two years.

In those provinces the inhabitants were nearly divided between the
British and American interests, and, under the names of Tories and
Whigs, exercised a savage hostility against each other, threatening the
entire depopulation of the country. Besides, each of the contending
armies, claiming the provinces as its own, showed no mercy to those
who, in the fluctuations of war, abandoned its cause or opposed its
pretensions. Numbers were put to death as deserters and traitors at the
different British posts. One of those executions, that of Colonel
Hayne, happened at Charleston on the 4th of August, while Lord Rawdon
was in that town, preparing to sail for Europe, and threatened to
produce the most sanguinary consequences.

Colonel Hayne had served in the American militia during the siege of
Charleston, but, after the capitulation of that place and the expulsion
of the American army from the province, he was, by several concurring
circumstances, constrained, with much reluctance, to subscribe a
declaration of allegiance to the British government being assured that
his services against his country would not be required. He was allowed
to return to his family, but, in violation of the special condition on
which he had signed the declaration, he was soon called on to take up
arms against his countrymen, and was at length threatened with close
confinement in case of further refusal. Colonel Hayne considered this
breach of contract on the part of the British, and their inability to
afford him the protection promised in reward of his allegiance, as
absolving him from the obligations into which he had entered, and
accordingly he returned to the American standard. In the month of July
he was taken prisoner, confined in a loathsome dungeon, and, by the
arbitrary mandate of Lord Rawdon and Colonel Balfour, without trial,
hanged at Charleston. He behaved with much firmness and dignity, and
his fate awakened a strong sensation.




CHAPTER XXIII.


WASHINGTON CAPTURES CORNWALLIS. 1781.


We have already seen, by the quotation from Washington's journal, how
gloomy was the prospect presented to him at this time. He evidently saw
little to encourage a hope of the favorable termination of the campaign
of that year. Indeed, it is quite apparent that our national affairs
were then at a lower ebb than they had ever been since the period
immediately preceding the battle of Trenton. But by the merciful
interposition of divine Providence, the course of events took a
favorable turn much sooner than he had anticipated. His letter to Col.
John Laurens, on the occasion, already mentioned, of that gentleman's
mission to France to obtain a loan, had been productive of remarkable
effects.

In this paper he detailed the pecuniary embarrassments of the
government, and represented with great earnestness the inability of the
nation to furnish a revenue adequate to the support of the war. He
dwelt on the discontents which the system of impressment had excited
among the people, and expressed his fears that the evils felt in the
prosecution of the war, might weaken the sentiments which began it.

From this state of things he deduced the vital importance of an
immediate and ample supply of money, which might be the foundation for
substantial arrangements of finance, for reviving public credit, and
giving vigor to future operations, as well as of a decided effort of
the allied arms on the continent to effect the great objects of the
alliance in the ensuing campaign.

Next to a supply of money he considered a naval superiority in the
American seas as an object of the deepest interest. To the United
States it would be of decisive importance, and France also might derive
great advantages from transferring the maritime war to the coast of her
ally. The future ability of the United States to repay any loan which
might now be obtained was displayed, and he concluded with assurances
that there was still a fund of inclination and resource in the country,
equal to great and continued exertions, provided the means were
afforded of stopping the progress of disgust by changing the present
system and adopting another more consonant with the spirit of the
nation, and more capable of infusing activity and energy into public
measures, of which a powerful succor in money must be the basis. "The
people were discontented, but it was with the feeble and oppressive
mode of conducting the war, not with the war itself."

With great reason did Washington urge on the cabinet of Versailles the
policy of advancing a sum of money to the United States which might be
adequate to the exigency. Deep was the gloom with which the political
horizon was then overcast. The British in possession of South Carolina
and Georgia had overrun the greater part of North Carolina also, and it
was with equal hazard and address that Greene maintained himself in the
northern frontier of that State.

A second detachment from New York was making a deep impression on
Virginia, where the resistance had been neither so prompt nor so
vigorous as the strength of that State and the unanimity of its
citizens had given reason to expect.

Such were the facts and arguments urged by Washington in his letter to
Colonel Laurens. Its able exposition of the actual state of the
country, and his arguments in support of the application of Congress
for a fleet and army as well as money, when laid before the King and
the ministry, decided them to afford the most ample aid to the American
cause. A loan of $6,000,000 was granted, which was to be placed at
Washington's disposal, but he was happy to be relieved from that
responsibility. A loan from Holland was also guaranteed by the French
government, and large reinforcements of ships and men were sent to the
United States. The intelligence of these succors followed within a few
days after the desponding tone of Washington's journal, to which we
have just referred.

Early in May (1781) the Count de Barras, who had been appointed to the
command of the French fleet on the American coast, arrived at Boston,
accompanied by the Viscount de Rochambeau, commander of the land
forces. An interview between Washington and the French commanders was
immediately appointed to be held at Wethersfield, near Hartford, on the
21st (May, 1781), but some movements of the British fleet made de
Barras repair to Newport, while the two generals met at the appointed
place and agreed on a plan of the campaign. It was resolved to unite
the French and American armies on the Hudson and to commence vigorous
operations against New York. The regular army at that station was
estimated at only 4,500 men, and though Sir Henry Clinton might be able
to reinforce it with 5,000 or 6,000 militia, yet it was believed he
could not maintain the post without recalling a considerable part of
his troops from the southward and enfeebling the operations of the
British in that quarter; in which case it was resolved to make a
vigorous attack on the point which presented the best prospect of
success.

In a letter to General Greene, dated June 1, 1781, Washington thus
gives the result of the conference with Rochambeau: "I have lately had
an interview with Count de Rochambeau at Weathersfield. Our affairs
were very attentively considered in every point of view and it was
finally determined to make an attempt upon New York, with its present
garrison, in preference to a southern operation, as we had not the
decided command of the water. You will readily suppose the reasons
which induced this determination were the inevitable loss of men from
so long a march, more especially in the approaching hot season, and the
difficulty, I may say impossibility, of transporting the necessary
baggage, artillery, and stores by land. If I am supported as I ought to
be by the neighboring States in this operation, which, you know, has
always been their favorite one, I hope that one of these consequences
will follow--either that the enemy will be expelled from the most
valuable position which they hold upon the continent or be obliged to
recall part of their force from the southward to defend it. Should the
latter happen you will be most essentially relieved by it. The French
troops will begin their march this way as soon as certain circumstances
will admit. I can only give you the outlines of our plan. The dangers
to which letters are exposed make it improper to commit to paper the
particulars, but, as matters ripen, I will keep you as well informed as
circumstances will allow."

Washington immediately required the States of New England to have 6,000
militia in readiness to march wherever they might be called for, and
sent an account of the conference at Wethersfield to Congress. His
dispatch was intercepted in the Jerseys and carried to Clinton, who,
alarmed by the plan which it disclosed, made the requisition, already
mentioned, of part of the troops under Cornwallis. and took diligent
precautions for maintaining his post against the meditated attack.

Meanwhile the several States of the Union were extremely dilatory in
furnishing their contingents of troops, and it was found difficult to
procure subsistence for the small number of men already in the field.
The people and their rulers talked loudly of liberty, but each was
anxious to sacrifice as little as possible to maintain it and to
devolve on his neighbor the expense, dangers, and privations of the
struggle.

In consequence of this dilatory spirit, when the troops left their
winter quarters in the month of June (1781), and encamped at Peekskill,
the army under Washington did not amount to 5,000 men. This force was
so much inferior to what had been contemplated when the plan of
operations was agreed on at Wethersfield that it became doubtful
whether it would be expedient to adhere to that plan. But the
deficiency of the American force was in some measure compensated by the
arrival at Boston of a reinforcement of 1,500 men to the army under
Rochambeau.

The hope of terminating the war in the course of the campaign
encouraged the States to make some exertions. Small as was their
military force it was difficult to find subsistence for the troops, and
even after the army had taken the field there was reason to apprehend
that it would be obliged to abandon the objects of the campaign for
want of provisions. It was at that critical juncture of American
affairs that the finances of the Union were entrusted to Robert Morris,
a member of Congress for Pennsylvania, a man of considerable capital
and of much sagacity and mercantile enterprise. He, as we have already
seen, extensively pledged his personal credit for articles of the first
necessity to the army, and, by an honorable fulfillment of his
engagements, did much to restore public credit and confidence. It was
owing mainly to his exertions that the active and decisive operations
of the campaign were not greatly impeded or entirely defeated by want
of subsistence to the army and of the means of transporting military
stores.

By his plan of a national bank, already referred to, Mr. Morris
rendered still more important service. Its notes were to be received as
cash into the treasuries of the several States, and also as an
equivalent for the necessaries which the States were bound to provide
for the army. In this way, and by a liberal and judicious application
of his own resources, an individual afforded the supplies which
government was unable to furnish.

The French troops, under Rochambeau, marched from Newport and Boston
toward the Hudson. Both in quarters and on the route their behavior was
exemplary, and gained the respect and good will of the inhabitants.
Toward the end of June (1781) Washington put his army in motion, and,
learning that a royal detachment had passed into the Jerseys, he formed
a plan to surprise the British posts on the north end of York Island,
but it did not succeed, and General Lincoln, who commanded the
Americans, being attacked by a strong British party, a sharp conflict
ensued. Washington marched with his main body to support his
detachment, but on his advance the British retired into their works at
Kingsbridge. Rochambeau, then on his march to join Washington, detached
the Duke de Lauzun with a body of men to support the attack, who
advanced with his troops within supporting distance, but the British
had retreated before they could be brought into action.

Having failed in his design of surprising the British posts Washington
withdrew to Valentine's Hill, and afterward to Dobb's Ferry. While
encamped there, on the 6th of July (1781), the van of the long-expected
French reinforcements under Rochambeau was seen winding down the
neighboring heights. The arrival of these friendly strangers elevated
the minds of the Americans, who received them with sincere
congratulations. Washington labored, by personal attentions, to
conciliate the good will of his allies, and used all the means in his
power to prevent those mutual jealousies and irritations which
frequently prevail between troops of different nations serving in the
same army. An attack on New York was still meditated, and every
exertion made to prepare for its execution, but with the determination,
if it should prove impracticable, vigorously to prosecute some more
attainable object. [1]

On the evening of the 21st of July (1781), the greater part of the
American, and part of the French troops, left their encampment, and
marching rapidly during the night, appeared in order of battle before
the British works at Kingsbridge, at 4 next morning. Washington and
Rochambeau, with the general officers and engineers, viewed the British
lines in their whole extent from right to left, and the same was again
done next morning. But, on the afternoon of the 23d they returned to
their former encampment without having made any attempt on the British
works.

At that time the new levies arrived slowly in the American camp, and
many of those who were sent were mere boys utterly unfit for active
service. The several States discovered much backwardness in complying
with the requisitions of Congress, so that there was reason to
apprehend that the number of troops necessary for besieging New York
could not be procured. This made Washington turn his thoughts more
seriously to the southward than he had hitherto done, but all his
movements confirmed Clinton in the belief that an attack on New York
was in contemplation. As the British Commander-in-Chief, however, at
that time received about 3,000 troops from Europe, he thought himself
able to defend his post without withdrawing any part of the force from
Virginia. Therefore he countermanded the requisition which he had
before sent to Cornwallis for part of the troops under his command. The
troops were embarked before the arrival of the counter order, and of
their embarkation Lafayette sent notice to Washington. On the reception
of new instructions, however, as formerly mentioned they were relanded
and remained in Virginia.

No great operation could be undertaken against the British armies so
long as their navy had undisputed command of the coast and of the great
navigable rivers. Washington, as we have seen, had already, through
Colonel Laurens, made an earnest application to the court of France for
such a fleet as might be capable of keeping in check the British navy
in those seas and of affording effectual assistance to the land forces.
That application was not unsuccessful, and towards the middle of the
month of August the agreeable information was received of the approach
of a powerful French fleet to the American coast.

Early in March (1781) the Count de Grasse had sailed from Brest with
twenty-five ships-of-the-line, five of which were destined for the
East, and twenty for the West Indies. After an indecisive encounter in
the Straits of St. Lucie with Sir Samuel Hood, whom Sir George Rodney,
the British admiral in the West Indies had detached to intercept him,
Count de Grasse formed a junction with the ships of his sovereign on
that station and had a fleet superior to that of the British in the
West Indies. De Grasse gave the Americans notice that he would visit
their coast in the month of August and take his station in Chesapeake
Bay, but that his continuance there could only be of short duration.
This dispatch at once determined Washington's resolution with respect
to the main point of attack, and as it was necessary that the projected
operation should be accomplished within a very limited time prompt
decision and indefatigable exertion were indispensable. Though it was
now finally resolved that Virginia should be the grand scene of action,
yet it was prudent to conceal till the last moment this determination
from Sir Henry Clinton, and still to maintain the appearance of
threatening New York.

The defense of the strong posts on the Hudson or North river was
entrusted to General Heath who was instructed to protect the adjacent
country as far as he was able, and for that purpose a respectable force
was put under his command. Every preparation of which circumstances
admitted was made to facilitate the march to the southward. Washington
was to take the command of the expedition and to employ in it all the
French troops and a strong detachment of the American army.

On the 19th of August (1781) a considerable corps was ordered to cross
the Hudson at Dobbs' Ferry and to take a position between Springfield
and Chatham, where they were directed to cover some bakehouses which it
was rumored were to be immediately constructed in the vicinity of those
places in order to encourage the belief that there the troops intended
to establish a permanent post. On the 20th and 21st the main body of
the Americans passed the river at King's ferry, but the French made a
longer circuit and did not complete the passage till the 25th. Desirous
of concealing his object as long as possible, Washington continued his
march some time in such a direction as still to keep up the appearance
of threatening New York. When concealment was no longer practicable he
marched southward with the utmost celerity. His movements had been of
such a doubtful nature that Sir Henry Clinton, it is said, was not
fully convinced of his real destination till he had crossed the
Delaware.

Great exertions had been made to procure funds for putting the army in
motion, but, after exhausting every other resource, Washington was
obliged to have recourse to Rochambeau for a supply of cash, which he
received. [2]

On the 2d and 3d of September (1781) the combined American and French
armies passed through Philadelphia, where they were received with
ringing of bells, firing of guns, bonfires, illuminations, and every
demonstration of joy. Meanwhile Count de Grasse, with 3,000 troops on
board, sailed from Cape Francois with a valuable fleet of merchantmen,
which he conducted out of danger, and then steered for Chesapeake Bay
with twenty-eight sail-of-the-line and several frigates. Toward the end
of August (1781) he cast anchor just within the capes, extending across
from Cape Henry to the middle ground. There an officer from Lafayette
waited on the count, and gave him full information concerning the
posture of affairs in Virginia, and the intended plan of operations
against the British army in that State.

Cornwallis was diligently fortifying himself at York and Gloucester.
Lafayette was in a position on James river to prevent his escape into
North Carolina, and the combined army was hastening southward to attack
him. In order to cooperate against Cornwallis De Grasse detached four
ships-of-the-line and some frigates to block up the entrance of York
river, and to carry the land forces which he had brought with him,
under the Marquis de St. Simon, to Lafayette's camp. The rest of his
fleet remained at the entrance of the bay.

Sir George Rodney, who commanded the British fleet in the West Indies,
was not ignorant that the count intended to sail for America, but
knowing that the merchant vessel which he convoyed from Cape Francois
were loaded with valuable cargoes the British admiral believed that he
would send the greater part of his fleet along with them to Europe and
would visit the American coast with a small squadron only.

Accordingly, Rodney detached Sir Samuel Hood with fourteen
sail-of-the-line to America as a sufficient force to counteract the
operations of the French in that quarter. Admiral Hood reached the
capes of Virginia on the 25th of August (1781), a few days before de
Grasse entered the bay and finding no enemy there sailed for Sandy
Hook, where he arrived on the 28th of August.

Admiral Graves, who had succeeded Admiral Arbuthnot in the command of
the British fleet on the American station, was then lying at New York
with seven sail-of-the-line; but two of his ships had been damaged in a
cruise near Boston and were under repair. At the same time that Admiral
Hood gave information of the expected arrival of de Grasse on the
American coast, notice was received of the sailing of de Barras with
his fleet from Newport. Admiral Graves, therefore, without waiting for
his two ships which were under repair, put to sea on the 31st of August
with nineteen sail-of-the-line and steered to the southward.

On reaching the capes of the Chesapeake, early on the morning of the
5th of September (1781), he discovered the French fleet, consisting of
twenty-four ships-of-the-line, lying at anchor in the entrance of the
bay. Neither admiral had any previous knowledge of the vicinity of the
other till the fleets were actually seen. The British stretched into
the bay and soon as Count de Grasse ascertained their hostile character
he ordered his ships to slip their cables, form the line as they could
come up without regard to their specified stations and put to sea. The
British fleet entering the bay and the French leaving it, they were
necessarily sailing in different directions, but Admiral Graves put his
ships on the same tack with the French and about four in the afternoon
a battle began between the van and centre of the fleets which continued
till night. Both sustained considerable damage. The fleets continued in
sight of each other for five days, but de Grasse's object was not to
fight unless to cover Chesapeake Bay, and Admiral Graves, owing to the
inferiority of his force and the crippled state of several of his
ships, was unable to compel him to renew the engagement.

On the 10th (September, 1781), de Grasse bore away for the Chesapeake
and anchored within the capes next day when he had the satisfaction to
find that Admiral de Barras with his fleet from Newport and fourteen
transports laden with heavy artillery and other military stores for
carrying on a siege had safely arrived during his absence. That officer
sailed from Newport on the 25th of August, and making a long circuit to
avoid the British, entered the bay while the contending fleets were at
sea. Admiral Graves followed the French fleet to the Chesapeake, but on
arriving there he found the entrance guarded by a force with which he
was unable to contend. He then sailed for New York and left de Grasse
in the undisputed possession of the bay.

While these naval operations were going on the land forces were not
less actively employed in the prosecution of their respective purposes.
The immediate aim of Washington was to overwhelm Cornwallis and his
army at Yorktown; that of Clinton, to rescue him from his grasp. As
soon as Clinton was convinced of Washington's intention of proceeding
to the southward with a view to bring him back, he employed the
infamous traitor Arnold, with a sufficient naval and military force, on
an expedition against New London. The "parricide," as Jefferson calls
him, had not the slightest objection to fill his pockets with the
plunder of his native State. He passed from Long Island and on the
forenoon of the 6th of September (1781) landed his troops on both sides
of the harbor; those on the New London side being under his own
immediate orders and those on the Groton side commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre. As the works at New London were very
imperfect, no vigorous resistance was there made, and the place was
taken possession of with little loss. But Fort Griswold, on the Groton
side, was in a more finished state and the small garrison made a
desperate defense. The British entered the fort at the point of the
bayonet.

Col. William Ledyard, brother of the celebrated traveler, commanded the
fort. Colonel Eyre and Major Montgomery having fallen in the assault,
the command had devolved on Major Bromfield, a New Jersey Tory. After
the works had been carried, Ledyard ordered his men to lay down their
arms. Bromfield called out, "Who commands in this fort?" Ledyard
advanced and presenting his sword, replied, "I did, but you do now."
Bromfield seized the sword and ran Ledyard through the body. This was
the signal for an indiscriminate massacre of a greater part of the
garrison by the Tories, refugees, and Hessians, of which the army of
Arnold was very appropriately composed. Seventy were killed and
thirty-five desperately wounded. The enemy lost 2 officers and 46 men
killed, 8 officers and 135 soldiers wounded. Few Americans had fallen
before the British entered the works.

The loss sustained by the Americans at New London was great, but that
predatory incursion had no effect in diverting Washington from his
purpose or in retarding his march southward. From Philadelphia the
allied armies pursued their route, partly to the head of Elk river,
which falls into the northern extremity of Chesapeake Bay, and partly
to Baltimore, at which places they embarked on board transports
furnished by the French fleet, and the last division of them landed at
Williamsburgh on the 25th of September (1781). Washington, Rochambeau,
and their attendants proceeded to the same place by land, and reached
it ten days before the troops. Virginia had suffered extremely in the
course of the campaign; the inhabitants were clamorous for the
appearance of Washington in his native State, and hailed his arrival
with acclamations of joy.

Washington and Rochambeau immediately repaired on board de Grasse's
ship in order to concert a joint plan of operations against Cornwallis.
De Grasse, convinced that every exertion would be made to relieve his
lordship, and being told that Admiral Digby had arrived at New York
with a reinforcement of six ships-of-the-line, expected to be attacked
by a force little inferior to his own, and, deeming the station which
he then occupied unfavorable to a naval engagement, he was strongly
inclined to leave the bay and to meet the enemy in the open sea.
Washington, fully aware of all the casualties which might occur to
prevent his return and to defeat the previous arrangements, used every
argument to dissuade the French admiral from his purpose, and prevailed
with him to remain in the bay.

As de Grasse could continue only a short time on that station, every
exertion was made to proceed against Cornwallis at Yorktown. Opposite
Yorktown is Gloucester point, which projects considerably into the
river, the breadth of which at that place does not exceed a mile.
Cornwallis had taken possession of both these places and diligently
fortified them. The communication between them was commanded by his
batteries and by some ships-of-war which lay in the river under cover
of his guns. The main body of his army was encamped near Yorktown,
beyond some outer redoubts and field works calculated to retard the
approach of an enemy. Colonel Tarleton, with six or seven hundred men,
occupied Gloucester point.

The combined army, amounting to upwards of 11,000 men, exclusive of the
Virginia militia, under the command of the patriotic Governor Nelson,
was assembled in the vicinity of Williamsburgh, and on the morning of
the 28th of September (1781), marched by different routes toward
Yorktown. About midday the heads of the columns reached the ground
assigned them, and, after driving in the outposts and some cavalry,
encamped for the night. The next day was employed in viewing the
British works and in arranging the plan of attack. At the same time
that the combined army encamped before Yorktown the French fleet
anchored at the mouth of the river and completely prevented the British
from escaping by water as well as from receiving supplies or
reinforcements in that way. The legion of Lauzun and a brigade of
militia, amounting to upwards of 4,000 men, commanded by the French
general de Chois, were sent across the river to watch Gloucester Point
and to enclose the British on that side.

On the 30th (September, 1781) Yorktown was invested. The French troops
formed the left wing of the combined army, extending from the river
above the town to a morass in front of it; the Americans composed the
right wing and occupied the ground between the morass and the river
below the town. Till the 6th of October the besieging army was
assiduously employed in disembarking its heavy artillery and military
stores and in conveying them to camp from the landing place in James
river, a distance of six miles. On the night of the 6th the first
parallel was begun, under the direction of General du Portail, the
chief engineer, 600 yards from the British works. The night was dark,
rainy, and well adapted for such a service; and in the course of it the
besiegers did not lose a man. Their operations seem not to have been
suspected by the besieged till daylight disclosed them in the morning,
when the trenches were so far advanced as in a good measure to cover
the workmen from the fire of the garrison. By the afternoon of the 9th
the batteries were completed, notwithstanding the most strenuous
opposition from the besieged, and immediately opened on the town. From
that time an incessant cannonade was kept up, and the continual
discharge of shot and shells from twenty-four and eighteen pounders and
ten-inch mortars, damaged the unfinished works on the left of the town,
silenced the guns mounted on them and occasioned a considerable loss of
men. Some of the shot and shells from the batteries passed over the
town, reached the shipping in the harbor, and set on fire the Charon of
forty-four guns and three large transports, which were entirely
consumed.

"From the bank of the river," says Dr. Thacher, "I had a fine view of
this splendid conflagration. The ships were enwrapped in a torrent of
fire, which, spreading with vivid brightness among the combustible
rigging and running with amazing rapidity to the tops of the several
masts, while all around was thunder and lightning from our numerous
cannon and mortars, and in the darkness of night presented one of the
most sublime and magnificent spectacles that can be imagined. Some of
our shells, overreaching the town, are seen to fall into the river, and
bursting, throw up columns of water, like the spouting of the monsters
of the deep."

On the night of the 11th (October, 1781), the besiegers, laboring with
indefatigable perseverance, began their second parallel, 300 yards
nearer the British works than the first; and the three succeeding days
were assiduously employed in completing it.

During that interval the fire of the garrison was more destructive than
at any other period of the siege. The men in the trenches were
particularly annoyed by two redoubts toward the left of the British
works, and about 200 yards in front of them. Of these it was necessary
to gain possession, and on the 14th preparations were made to carry
them both by storm. In order to avail himself of the spirit of
emulation which existed between the troops of the two nations, and to
avoid any cause of jealousy to either, Washington committed the attack
of the one redoubt to the French and that of the other to the
Americans. The latter were commanded by Lafayette, attended by Col.
Alexander Hamilton, who led the advance, and the former by the Baron de
Viomenil.

On the evening of the 14th, as soon as it was dark, the parties marched
to the assault with unloaded arms. The redoubt which the Americans
under Lafayette attacked was defended by a major, some inferior
officers, and forty-five privates. The assailants advanced with such
rapidity, without returning a shot to the heavy fire with which they
were received, that in a few minutes they were in possession of the
work, having had 8 men killed and 7 officers and 25 men wounded in the
attack. Eight British privates were killed; Major Campbell, a captain,
an ensign, and seventeen privates were made prisoners. The rest
escaped. Although the Americans were highly exasperated by the recent
massacre of their countrymen in Fort Griswold by Arnold's detachment,
yet not a man of the British was injured after resistance ceased.
Retaliation had been talked of but was not exercised. [3]

The French advanced with equal courage, but not with equal rapidity.
The American soldiers had removed the abattis themselves. The French
waited for the sappers to remove them according to military rule. While
thus waiting a message was brought from Lafayette to Viomenil,
informing him that he was in his redoubt, and wished to know where the
baron was. "Tell the marquis," replied Viomenil, "that I am not in
mine, but will be in five minutes." The abattis being removed, the
redoubt was carried in very nearly the time prescribed by the baron.
There were 120 men in this redoubt, of whom 18 were killed and 42 taken
prisoners; the rest made their escape. The French lost nearly 100 men
killed or wounded. During the night these two redoubts were included in
the second parallel, and, in the course of next day, some howitzers
were placed on them, which, in the afternoon, opened on the besieged.

"During the assault," says Dr. Thacher, "the British kept up an
incessant firing of cannon and musketry from their whole line. His
Excellency, General Washington, Generals Lincoln and Knox, with their
aids, having dismounted, were standing in an exposed situation, waiting
the result. Colonel Cobb, one of Washington's aids, solicitous for his
safety, said to his Excellency, 'Sir, you are too much exposed here;
had you not better step a little back?' 'Colonel Cobb,' replied his
Excellency, 'if you are afraid, you have liberty to step back.'

"Cornwallis and his garrison had done all that brave men could do to
defend their post. But the industry of Laurens, and to each and all the
officers and men, are above expression. Not one gun was fired, and the
ardor of the troops did not give time for the sappers to derange the
abattis; and owing to the conduct of the commanders and the bravery of
the men, the redoubt was stormed with uncommon rapidity."

[missing text]

the besiegers was persevering and their approaches rapid. The condition
of the British was becoming desperate. In every quarter their works
were torn to pieces by the fire of the assailants. The batteries
already playing upon them had nearly silenced all their guns, and the
second parallel was about to open on them, which in a few hours would
render the place untenable.

Owing to the weakness of his garrison, occasioned by sickness and the
fire of the besiegers, Cornwallis could not spare large sallying
parties, but, in the present distressing crisis, he resolved to make
every effort to impede the progress of the besiegers, and to preserve
his post to the last extremity. For this purpose, a little before
daybreak on the morning of the 16th of October (1781), about 350 men,
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Abercrombie, sallied out
against two batteries, which seemed in the greatest state of
forwardness. They attacked with great impetuosity, killed or wounded a
considerable number of the French troops, who had charge of the works,
spiked eleven guns, and returned with little loss. This exploit was of
no permanent advantage to the garrison, for the guns, having been
hastily spiked, were soon again rendered fit for service.

About 4 in the afternoon of the 16th of October, several batteries of
the second parallel opened on the garrison, and it was obvious that, in
the course of next day, all the batteries of that parallel, mounting a
most formidable artillery, would be ready to play on the town. The
shattered works of the garrison were in no condition to sustain such a
tremendous fire. In the whole front which was attacked the British
could not show a single gun, and their shells were nearly exhausted. In
this extremity Cornwallis formed the desperate resolution of crossing
the river during the night with his effective force and attempting to
escape to the northward. His plan was to leave behind his sick,
baggage, and all encumbrances; to attack de Chois, who commanded on
the Gloucester side, with his whole force; to mount his own infantry,
partly with the hostile cavalry which he had no doubt of seizing, and
partly with such horses as he might find by the way; to hasten toward
the fords of the great rivers in the upper country, and then, turning
northward, to pass through Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Jerseys, and
join the army at New York. The plan was hazardous, and presented little
prospect of success; but in the forlorn circumstances of the garrison
anything that offered a glimpse of hope was reckoned preferable to the
humiliation of an immediate surrender.

In prosecution of this perilous enterprise the light infantry, most of
the guards, and a part of the Twenty-third regiment embarked in boats,
passed the river, and landed at Gloucester point before midnight. A
storm then arose, which rendered the return of the boats and the
transportation of the rest of the troops equally impracticable. In that
divided state of the British forces the morning of the 17th of October
(1781) dawned, when the batteries of the combined armies opened on the
garrison at Yorktown. As the attempt to escape was entirely defeated by
the storm, the troops that had been carried to Gloucester point were
brought back in the course of the forenoon without much loss, though
the passage was exposed to the artillery of the besiegers. The British
works were in ruins, the garrison was weakened by disease and death,
and exhausted by incessant fatigue. Every ray of hope was extinguished.
It would have been madness any longer to attempt to defend the post and
to expose the brave garrison to the danger of an assault, which would
soon have been made on the place.

At 10 in the forenoon of the 17th Cornwallis sent a flag of truce with
a letter to Washington, proposing a cessation of hostilities for
twenty-four hours, in order to give time to adjust terms for the
surrender of the forts at Yorktown and Gloucester point. To this letter
Washington immediately returned an answer, expressing his ardent desire
to spare the further effusion of blood and his readiness to listen to
such terms as were admissible, but that he could not consent to lose
time in fruitless negotiations, and desired that, previous to the
meeting of commissioners, his lordship's proposals should be
transmitted in writing, for which purpose a suspension of hostilities
for two hours should be granted.

The terms offered by Cornwallis, although not all deemed admissible,
were such as induced the opinion that no great difficulty would occur
in adjusting the conditions of capitulation, and the suspension of
hostilities was continued through the night. Meanwhile, in order to
avoid the delay of useless discussion, Washington drew up and
transmitted to Cornwallis such articles as he was willing to grant,
informing his lordship that, if he approved of them, commissioners
might be immediately appointed to reduce them to form. Accordingly,
Viscount Noailles and Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, whose father was then
a prisoner in the Tower of London, on the 18th met Colonel Dundas and
Major Ross of the British army at Moore's house, in the rear of the
first parallel. They prepared a rough draft, but were unable
definitively to arrange the terms of capitulation.

The draught was to be submitted to Cornwallis, but Washington, resolved
to admit of no delay, directed the articles to be transcribed; and, on
the morning of the 19th, sent them to his lordship, with a letter
expressing his expectation that they would be signed by 11 and that the
garrison would march out at 2 in the afternoon. [4] Finding that no
better terms could be obtained, Cornwallis submitted to a painful
necessity, and, on the 19th of October, surrendered the posts of
Yorktown and Gloucester point to the combined armies of America and
France, on condition that his troops should receive the same honors of
war which had been granted to the garrison of Charleston when it
surrendered to Sir Henry Clinton. The army, artillery, arms,
accoutrements, military chest, and public stores of every description
were surrendered to Washington; the ships in the harbor and the seamen
to Count de Grasse.

Cornwallis wished to obtain permission for his European troops to
return home, on condition of not serving against America, France, or
their allies during the war, but this was refused, and it was agreed
that they should remain prisoners of war in Virginia, Maryland, and
Pennsylvania, accompanied by a due proportion of officers for their
protection and government. The British general was also desirous of
securing from punishment such Americans as had joined the royal
standard, but this was refused, on the plea that it was a point which
belonged to the civil authority and on which the military power was not
competent to decide. But the end was gained in an indirect way, for
Cornwallis was permitted to send the Bonetta sloop-of-war unsearched to
New York, with dispatches to the Commander-in-Chief and to put on board
as many soldiers as he thought proper, to be accounted for in any
subsequent exchange. This was understood to be a tacit permission to
send off the most obnoxious of the Americans, which was accordingly
done.

The officers and soldiers were allowed to retain their private
property. Such officers as were not required to remain with the troops
were permitted to return to Europe or to reside in any part of America
not in possession of the British troops.

Dr. Thacher, who was present during the whole siege, thus describes the
surrender: "At about 12 o'clock the combined army was arranged and
drawn up in two lines, extending more than a mile in length. The
Americans were drawn up in a line on the right side of the road, and
the French occupied the left. At the head of the former the great
American commander, mounted on his noble courser, took his station,
attended by his aides. At the head of the latter was posted the
excellent Count Rochambeau and his suite. The French troops, in
complete uniform, displayed a noble and martial appearance; their band
of music, of which the timbrel formed a part, is a delightful novelty,
and produced, while marching to the ground, a most enchanting effect.
The Americans, though not all in uniform nor their dress so neat, yet
exhibited an erect, soldierly air and every countenance beamed with
satisfaction and joy. The concourse of spectators from the country was
prodigious, in point of numbers nearly equal to the military, but
universal silence and order prevailed. It was about 2 o'clock when the
captive army advanced through the line formed for their reception.
Every eye was prepared to gaze on Lord Cornwallis, the object of
peculiar interest and solicitude, but he disappointed our anxious
expectations. Pretending indisposition, he made General O'Hara his
substitute as the leader of his army. This officer was followed by the
conquered troops in a slow and solemn step, with shouldered arms,
colors cased, and drums beating a British march. Having arrived at the
head of the line, General O'Hara, elegantly mounted, advanced to his
Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, taking off his hat and apologizing
for the nonappearance of Earl Cornwallis. With his usual dignity and
politeness, his Excellency pointed to Major-General Lincoln for
directions, by whom the British army was conducted into a spacious
field, where it was intended they should ground their arms. The royal
troops, while marching through the line formed by the allied army,
exhibited a decent and neat appearance as respects arms and clothing,
for their commander opened his store and directed every soldier to be
furnished with a new suit complete prior to the capitulation. But in
their line of march we remarked a disorderly and unsoldierlike conduct;
their step was irregular and their ranks frequently broken. But it was
in the field, when they came to the last act of the drama, that the
spirit and pride of the British soldier was put to the severest test.
Here their mortification could not be concealed. Some of the platoon
officers appeared to be exceedingly chagrined when giving the word,
'Ground arms!' and I am a witness that they performed this duty in a
very unofficerlike manner and that many of the soldiers manifested a
sullen temper, throwing their arms on the pile with violence, as if
determined to render them useless. This irregularity, however, was
checked by the authority of General Lincoln. After having grounded
their arms and divested themselves of their accoutrements, the captive
troops were conducted back to Yorktown and guarded by our troops until
they could be conducted to the place of their destination."

Congress bestowed its thanks freely and fully upon the
Commander-in-Chief, Count de Rochambeau, Count de Grasse, and the
various officers of the different corps, and the brave soldiers under
their command. Two stands of colors, trophies of war, were voted to
Washington and two pieces of cannon to Rochambeau and de Grasse, and it
was also voted that a marble column to commemorate the alliance and the
victory should be erected in Yorktown. On the day after the surrender
the general orders closed as follows: "Divine service shall be
performed tomorrow in the different brigades and divisions. The
Commander-in-Chief recommends that all the troops that are not upon
duty do assist at it with a serious deportment and that sensibility of
heart which the recollection of the surprising and particular
interposition of Providence in our favor claims." A proclamation was
also issued by Congress appointing the 13th of December as a day of
thanksgiving and prayer, on account of this signal and manifest favor
of Divine Providence in behalf of our country.

The news of Cornwallis' surrender was received throughout the country
with the most tumultuous expressions of joy. The worthy New England
Puritans considered it, as Cromwell did the victory at Worcester, "the
crowning mercy." It promised them a return of peace and prosperity. The
people of the middle States regarded it as a guarantee for their speedy
deliverance from the presence of a hated enemy. But to the southern
States it was more than this. It was the retributive justice of Heaven
against a band of cruel and remorseless murderers and robbers, who had
spread desolation and sorrow through their once happy homes. It is
asserted in Gordon's "History of the War" that wherever Cornwallis'
army marched the dwelling-houses were plundered of everything that
could be carried off. The stables of Virginia were plundered of the
horses on which his cavalry rode in their ravaging march through that
State. Millions of property, in tobacco and other merchandise and in
private houses and public buildings, were destroyed by Arnold, Philips,
and Cornwallis in Virginia alone. The very horse which Tarleton had the
impudence to ride on the day of the surrender was stolen from a
planter's stable, who recognized it on the field and compelled Tarleton
to give it up and mount a sorry hack for the occasion.

It was computed at the time that 1,400 widows were made by the war in
the single district of Ninety-Six. The whole devastation occasioned by
the British army, during six months previous to the surrender at
Yorktown, amounted to not less than 3,000,000 sterling, an immense
loss for so short a time, falling, as it did, chiefly on the rural
population. No wonder that they assembled in crowds to witness the
humiliation of Cornwallis and his army. To them it was not only a
triumph, but a great deliverance. Well might the Virginians triumph.
The return of their favorite commander, a son of the soil, had speedily
released their State from ravage and destruction and restored them to
comparative peace and repose.

On the very day of Cornwallis' surrender, Clinton sailed from New York
with reinforcements. He had been perfectly aware of Cornwallis' extreme
peril and was anxious to relieve him, but the fleet had sustained
considerable damage in the battle with de Grasse and some time was
necessarily spent in repairing it. During that interval four
ships-of-the-line arrived from Europe and two from the West Indies. At
length Clinton embarked with 7,000 of his best troops, but was unable
to sail from Sandy Hook till the 19th (1781), the day on which
Cornwallis surrendered. The fleet, consisting of twenty-five ships-of-
the-line, two vessels of fifty guns each, and eight frigates, arrived
off the Chesapeake on the 24th (October, 1781), when Clinton had the
mortification to be informed of the event of the 19th. He remained on
the coast, however, till the 29th, when, every doubt being removed
concerning the capitulation of Cornwallis, whose relief was the sole
object of the expedition, he returned to New York.

While Clinton continued off the Chesapeake, the French fleet,
consisting of thirty-six sail-of-the-line, satisfied with the advantage
already gained, lay at anchor in the bay without making any movement
whatever.

Washington, considering the present a favorable opportunity for
following up his success by an expedition against the British army in
Charleston, wrote a letter to Count de Grasse on the day after the
capitulation, requesting him to unite his fleet to the proposed
armament and assist in the expedition. He even went on board the
admiral's fleet to thank him for his late services in the siege and to
urge upon him the feasibility and importance of this plan of
operations. But the orders of his court, ulterior projects, and his
engagements with the Spaniards put it out of the power of the French
admiral to continue so long in America as was required. He, however,
remained some days in the bay in order to cover the embarkation of the
troops and of the ordnance to be conveyed by water to the head of the
Elk. [5]

Some brigades proceeded by land to join their companions at that place.
Some cavalry marched to join General Greene, but the French troops,
under Count Rochambeau, remained in Virginia to be in readiness to
march to the south or north, as the circumstances of the next campaign
might require. On the 27th the troops of St. Simon began to embark, in
order to return to the West Indies, and early in November Count de
Grasse sailed for that quarter.

Part of the prisoners were sent to Winchester in Virginia and
Fredericktown, Maryland, the remainder to Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Lord
Cornwallis and the principal officers were paroled and sailed for New
York. During their stay at Yorktown, after the surrender, they received
the most delicate attentions from the conquerors. Dr. Thacher, in his
"Military Journal," notices particularly some of these attentions:
"Lord Cornwallis and his officers," he says, "since their capitulation,
have received all the civilities and hospitality which is in the power
of their conquerors to bestow. General Washington, Count Rochambeau,
and other general officers have frequently invited them to
entertainments, and they have expressed their grateful acknowledgments
in return. They cannot avoid feeling the striking contrast between the
treatment which they now experience and that which they have bestowed
on our prisoners who have unfortunately fallen into their hands. It is
a dictate of humanity and benevolence, after sheathing the sword, to
relieve and meliorate the condition of the vanquished prisoner.

"On one occasion, while in the presence of General Washington, Lord
Cornwallis was standing with his head uncovered. His Excellency said to
him, politely, 'My lord, you had better be covered from the cold.' His
lordship, applying his hand to his head, replied, 'It matters not, sir,
what becomes of this head now.'" The reader will not have failed to
notice that the capture of Cornwallis was effected solely by the able
and judicious strategy of Washington. It was he that collected from
different parts of the country the forces that were necessary to
enclose that commander and his hitherto victorious army as it were in a
net, from which there was no possibility of escape. It was he who, by
personal influence and exertion, brought de Grasse to renounce his
expected triumphs at sea and zealously assist in the siege by
preventing Cornwallis from receiving any aid from British naval forces.
It was he who detained de Grasse at a critical moment of the siege,
when he was anxious to go off with the chief part of his force and
engage the British at sea. In short, it was he who provided all,
oversaw all, directed all, and having, by prudence and forethought, as
well as by activity and perseverance, brought all the elements of
conquest together, combined them into one mighty effort with glorious
success. It was the second siege on a grand scale which had been
brought to a brilliant and fortunate conclusion by the wisdom and
prudence as well as the courage and perseverance of Washington. In the
first he expelled the enemy and recovered Boston uninjured, freeing the
soil for a time from the presence of the enemy. In the second, he
captured the most renowned and successful British army in America and
dictated his own terms of surrender to a commander who, from his
marquee, had recently given law to three States of the Union.

1. Footnote: Dr. Thacher, in his Military Journal, has an entry:
"July 7th. Our army was drawn up in a line and reviewed by General
Rochambeau, with his Excellency, General Washington, and other general
officers.--July 10th. Another review took place in presence of the
French ambassador from Philadelphia, after which the French army passed
a review in presence of the general officers of both armies." Speaking
of the French army, Dr. Thacher says: "In the officers we recognize the
accomplished gentlemen, free and affable in their manners. Their
military dress and side-arms are elegant. The troops are under the
strictest discipline, and are amply provided with arms and
accoutrements, which are kept in the neatest order. They are in
complete uniform--coats of white broadcloth, trimmed with green, and
white under-dress, and on their heads they wear a singular kind of hat
or chapeau. It is unlike our cocked hats, in having but two corners
instead of three, which gives them a very novel appearance."

2. Footnote: The amount was $20,000 in specie, to be refunded by Robert
Morris on the 1st of October. On the 31st of August, Dr. Thacher says:
"Colonel Laurens arrived at headquarters, camp, Trenton, on his way
from Boston to Philadelphia. He brought two and a half millions of
livres in cash, a part of the French subsidy,--a most seasonable
supply, as the troops were discontented and almost mutinous for want of
pay."

3. Footnote: Lafayette (letter to Washington, 16th October, 1781) says
"Your Excellency having personally seen our dispositions, I shall only
give you an account of what passed in the execution. Colonel Gimat's
battalion led the van, and was followed by that of Colonel Hamilton,
who commanded the whole advanced corps. At the same time a party of
eighty men, under Colonel Laurens, turned the redoubt. I beg leave to
refer your Excellency to the report I have received from Colonel
Hamilton, whose well-known talents and gallantry were, on this
occasion, most conspicuous and serviceable. Our obligations to him, to
Colonel Gimat, to Colonel

[missing footnote text]

4. Footnote: The whole number of prisoners, exclusive of seamen, was
over 7,000, and the British loss during the siege was between five and
six hundred. The army of the allies consisted of 7,000 American regular
troops, upward of 5,000 French, and 4,000 militia. The loss in killed
and wounded was about 300. The captured property consisted of a large
train of artillery--viz., 75 brass and 69 iron cannon, howitzers, and
mortars; also a large quantity of arms, ammunition, military stores,
and provisions fell to the Americans. One frigate, 2 ships of twenty
guns each, a number of transports and other vessels, and 1,500 seamen
were surrendered to de Grasse.

5. Footnote: On his departure, the Count de Grasse received from
Washington a present of two elegant horses as a token of his friendship
and esteem.




CHAPTER XXIV.


CLOSE OF THE WAR. 1782-1783.


After the surrender of Cornwallis, the combined forces were distributed
in different parts of the country, in the manner we have described at
the close of the last chapter. Having personally superintended the
distribution of the ordnance and stores, and the departure of the
prisoners as well as the embarkation of the troops, who were to go
northward under General Lincoln, Washington left Yorktown on the 5th of
November (1781) for Eltham, the seat of his friend, Colonel Basset. He
arrived there the same day, but he came to a house of mourning. His
stepson, John Parke Custis, was just expiring when he reached the
house. Washington was just in time to be present, with Mrs. Washington
and Mrs. Custis, her daughter-in-law, at the last painful moment of the
young man's departure to the world of spirits. Mr. Custis had been an
object of peculiar affection and care to Washington, who had
superintended his education and introduction to public life. He had
entered King's college in New York, in 1773, but soon after left that
institution and married the daughter of Mr. Benedict Calvert, February
3, 1774. He had passed the winter of 1775 at headquarters in Cambridge
with his wife and Mrs. Washington. He had subsequently been elected a
member of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, in which office he
acquitted himself with honor, and he was now cut off on the very
threshold of life being only twenty-eight years of age at the time of
his decease. He left a widow and four young children. The two youngest
of these children, one less than two and the other four years old, were
adopted by Washington, and thenceforward formed a part of his immediate
family. During the last year of Mr. Custis' life, Washington, writing
to General Greene, took occasion to cite a passage from his
correspondence. He says, "I have received a letter from Mr. Custis,
dated the 29th ultimo (March, 1781), in which are these words: 'General
Greene has by his conduct gained universal esteem, and possesses, in
the fullest degree, the confidence of all ranks of people.'" He had
just then returned from the Assembly at Richmond. Washington remained
for several days at Eltham to comfort the family in their severe
affliction, and then proceeded to Mount Vernon, where he arrived on the
13th of November. From this home of his early affections he wrote to
Lafayette on the 15th (1781), accounting for his not having joined him
in Philadelphia, by the pressure of private and public duties. In this
letter, ever attentive to the interests of his country, Washington
expresses his views with respect to the next campaign; and as
Lafayette, after the expedition with de Grasse to the South was
abandoned, had determined to pass the winter in France, Washington
takes occasion in this letter to impress upon his mind the absolute
necessity of a strong naval force in order to conduct the next campaign
to a successful termination. In concluding his letter, Washington says:
"If I should be deprived of the pleasure of a personal interview with
you before your departure, permit me to adopt this method of making you
a tender of my ardent vows for a prosperous voyage, a gracious
reception from your prince, an honorable reward for your services, a
happy meeting with your lady and friends, and a safe return in the
spring to, my dear marquis, your affectionate friend, etc.--

"WASHINGTON."


Washington had given Lafayette leave to proceed to Philadelphia, where
he obtained from Congress permission to visit his family in France for
such a period as he should think proper. Congress at the same time
passed resolutions doing justice to the zeal and military conduct of
Lafayette. Among them were the following:

"Resolved, that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs acquaint the ministers
plenipotentiary of the United States, that it is the desire of Congress
that they confer with the Marquis de Lafayette, and avail themselves of
his information relative to the affairs of the United States.

"Resolved, that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs further acquaint the
minister plenipotentiary at the court of Versailles, that he will
conform to the intention of Congress by consulting with and employing
the assistance of the Marquis de Lafayette in accelerating the supplies
which may be afforded by his most Christian majesty for the use of the
United States."

Lafayette was also commended by Congress to the notice of Louis XVI in
very warm terms. Having received his instructions from Congress and
completed his preparations, he went to Boston, where the American
frigate Alliance awaited his arrival. His farewell letter to Congress
is dated on board this vessel, December 23, 1781, and immediately after
writing it he set sail for his native country.

Before proceeding to Philadelphia Washington visited Alexandria, where
he was honored with a public reception and an address from a committee
of the citizens, in replying to which he was careful to remind them,
when referring to the late success at Yorktown, that "a vigorous
prosecution of this success would, in all probability," procure peace,
liberty, and independence. He also visited Annapolis, where the
Legislature was in session. A vote of thanks was passed by that body
(22d November, 1781), and in replying to it Washington also reminded
the legislators of Maryland that the war was by no means finished, and
that further exertions were required to be made by the States.

The splendid success of the allied arms in Virginia, and the great
advantages obtained still further south, produced no disposition in
Washington to relax those exertions which might yet be necessary to
secure the great object of the contest. "I shall attempt to stimulate
Congress," said he in a letter to General Greene, written at Mount
Vernon, "to the best improvement of our late success, by taking the
most vigorous and effectual measures to be ready for an early and
decisive campaign the next year. My greatest fear is that viewing this
stroke in a point of light which may too much magnify its importance
they may think our work too nearly closed and fall into a state of
languor and relaxation. To prevent this error I shall employ every
means in my power, and, if unhappily we sink into this fatal mistake,
no part of the blame shall be mine."

On the 27th of November (1781) Washington reached Philadelphia, and
Congress passed a resolution granting him an audience on the succeeding
day. On his appearance the President addressed him in a short speech,
informing him that a committee was appointed to state the requisitions
to be made for the proper establishment of the army, and expressing the
expectation that he would remain in Philadelphia, in order to aid the
consultations on that important subject.

The Secretary of War, the financier, Robert Morris, and the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, Robert R. Livingston, assisted at these
deliberations, and the business was concluded with unusual celerity.

A revenue was scarcely less necessary than an army, and it was obvious
that the means for carrying on the war must be obtained either by
impressments or by a vigorous course of taxation. But both these
alternatives depended on the States, and the government of the Union
resorted to the influence of Washington in aid of its requisitions.

But no exertions on the part of America alone could expel the invading
army. A superiority at sea was indispensable to the success of
offensive operations against the posts which the British still held
within the United States. To obtain this superiority Washington pressed
its importance on the Chevalier de la Luzerne, the minister of France,
and commanding officers of the French troops, as he had on Lafayette
when he was about to return to his native country.

The first intelligence from Europe was far from being conciliatory. The
Parliament of Great Britain reassembled in November (1781). The speech
from the throne breathed a settled purpose to continue the war, and the
addresses from both houses, which were carried by large majorities,
echoed the sentiment.

In the course of the animated debates which these addresses occasioned,
an intention was indeed avowed by some members of the administration to
direct the whole force of the nation against France and Spain, and to
suspend offensive operations in the interior of the United States until
the strength of those powers should be broken. In the meantime the
posts then occupied by their troops were to be maintained.

This development of the views of the administration furnished
additional motives to the American government for exerting all the
faculties of the nation to expel the British garrisons from New York
and Charleston. The efforts of Washington to produce these exertions
were earnest and unremitting, but not successful. The State
Legislatures declared the inability of their constituents to pay taxes.
Instead of filling the Continental treasury some were devising means to
draw money from it, and some of those which passed bills imposing heavy
taxes directed that the demands of the State should be first satisfied,
and that the residue only should be paid to the Continental receiver.
By the unwearied attention and judicious arrangements of Robert Morris,
the minister of finance, the expenses of the nation had been greatly
reduced. The bank established in Philadelphia, and his own high
character, had enabled him to support in some degree a system of
credit, the advantages of which were incalculably great. He had,
through the Chevalier de la Luzerne, obtained permission from the King
of France to draw for half a million of livres monthly, until 6,000,000
should be received. To prevent the diversion of any part of this sum
from the most essential objects, he had concealed the negotiation even
from Congress, and had communicated it only to Washington; yet after
receiving the first installment it was discovered that Dr. Franklin had
anticipated the residue of the loan and had appropriated it to the
purposes of the United States. At the commencement of the year 1782 not
a dollar remained in the treasury, and although Congress had required
the payment of 2,000,000 on the 1st of April not a cent had been
received on the 23d of that month, and so late as the 1st of June
(1782) not more than $20,000 had reached the treasury. Yet to Robert
Morris every eye was turned, to him the empty hand of every public
creditor was stretched for, and against him, instead of the State
governments, the complaints and imprecations of every unsatisfied
claimant were directed. In July (1782), when the second quarter annual
payment of taxes ought to have been received, Morris was informed by
some of his agents, that the collection of the revenue had been
postponed in some of the States, in consequence of which the month of
December would arrive before any money could come into the hands of the
Continental receivers. In a letter communicating this unpleasant
intelligence to Washington, he added: "With such gloomy prospects as
this letter affords I am tied here to be baited by continual clamorous
demands; and for the forfeiture of all that is valuable in life, and
which I hoped at this moment to enjoy, I am to be paid by invective.
Scarce a day passes in which I am not tempted to give back into the
hands of Congress the power they have delegated, and to lay down a
burden which presses me to the earth. Nothing prevents me but a
knowledge of the difficulties I am obliged to struggle under. What may
be the success of my efforts God only knows, but to leave my post at
present would, I know, be ruinous. This candid state of my situation
and feelings I give to your bosom, because you, who have already felt
and suffered so much, will be able to sympathize with me."

Fortunately for the United States the temper of the British nation on
the subject of continuing the war did not accord with that of its
Sovereign. That war, into which the people had entered with at least as
much eagerness as the minister, had become almost universally
unpopular. Motions against the measures of administration respecting
America were repeated by the opposition, and, on every experiment, the
strength of the minority increased. At length, on the 27th of February
(1782), General Conway moved in the House of Commons, "that it is the
opinion of this house that a further prosecution of offensive war
against America would, under present circumstances, be the means of
weakening the efforts of this country against her European enemies, and
tend to increase the mutual enmity so fatal to the interests both of
Great Britain and America." The whole force of administration was
exerted to get rid of this resolution, but was exerted in vain, and it
was carried. An address to the King, in the words of the resolution,
was immediately voted, and was presented by the whole house. The answer
of the Crown being deemed inexplicit it was, on the 4th of March
(1782), resolved "that the house will consider as enemies to his
Majesty and the country, all those who should advise or attempt a
further prosecution of offensive war on the continent of North
America."

These votes were soon followed by a change of ministers and by
instructions to the officers commanding the forces in America, which
conformed to them.

While Washington was employed in addressing circular letters to the
State governments, suggesting all those motives which might stimulate
them to exertions better proportioned to the exigency, English papers,
containing the debates in Parliament on the various propositions
respecting America, reached the United States. Alarmed at the
impression these debates might make, he introduced the opinions it was
deemed prudent to inculcate respecting them into the letters he was
then about to transmit to the Governors of the several States. "I have
perused these debates," he said, "with great attention and care, with a
view, if possible, to penetrate their real design, and upon the most
mature deliberation I can bestow I am obliged to declare it as my
candid opinion that the measure, in all its views, so far as it
respects America, is merely delusory, having no serious intention to
admit our independence upon its true principles, but is calculated to
produce a change of ministers to quiet the minds of their own people
and reconcile them to a continuance of the war, while it is meant to
amuse this country with a false idea of peace, to draw us from our
connection with France, and to lull us into a state of security and
inactivity; which taking place, the ministry will be left to prosecute
the war in other parts of the world with greater vigor and effect. Your
Excellency will permit me on this occasion to observe that, even if the
nation and Parliament are really in earnest to obtain peace with
America, it will undoubtedly be wisdom in us to meet them with great
caution and circumspection, and by all means to keep our arms firm in
our hands, and instead of relaxing one iota in our exertions, rather to
spring forward with redoubled vigor, that we may take the advantage of
every favorable opportunity until our wishes are fully obtained. No
nation yet suffered in treaty by preparing (even in the moment of
negotiation) most vigorously for the field.

"The industry which the enemy is using to propagate their pacific
reports appears to me a circumstance very suspicious, and the eagerness
with which the people, as I am informed, are catching at them, is, in
my opinion, equally dangerous."

While Washington was still residing at Philadelphia, in conference with
the committees of Congress, a spirited naval action took place near the
capes of the Delaware, which must have afforded him much gratification.

The Delaware bay was, at this period, says Peterson, [1] infested with
small cruisers of the enemy, which not only captured the river craft,
but molested the neighboring shores. To repress these marauders, the
State of Pennsylvania determined to fit out a vessel or two at its own
expense, and with this view a small merchant ship, called the Hyder
All, then lying outward-bound with a cargo of flour, was purchased. It
took but a few days to discharge her freight, to pierce her for sixteen
guns, and to provide her with an armament. Volunteers flocked to offer
themselves for her crew. The command was given to Barney, and, at the
head of a convoy of outward-bound merchantmen, he stood down the bay,
and anchored, on the 8th of April (1782), in the roads off Cape May,
where he awaited a proper wind for the traders to go to sea. Suddenly
two ships and a brig, one of the former a frigate, were seen rounding
the cape, obviously with the intention of attacking him, on which he
signaled the convoy to stand up the bay, the wind being at the
southward, himself covering their rear, and the enemy in hot pursuit.

In order to head off the fugitives, the frigate took one channel and
her consorts the other, the ship and brig choosing that which the Hyder
Ali had selected. The brig, being a very fast vessel, soon overhauled
Barney, but, contenting herself with giving him a broadside as she
passed, pressed on in pursuit of the convoy. The Hyder Ali declined to
return this fire, holding herself in reserve for the ship, a
sloop-of-war mounting twenty guns, which was now seen rapidly
approaching. When the Englishman drew near, Barney suddenly luffed,
threw in his broadside, and immediately righting his helm, kept away
again. This staggered the enemy, who, being so much the superior and
having a frigate within sustaining distance, had expected the Hyder Ali
to surrender. The two vessels were now within pistol shot of each
other, and the forward guns of the British were just beginning to bear,
when Barney, in a loud voice, ordered his quartermaster "to port his
helm." The command was distinctly heard on board the enemy, as indeed
Barney had intended it should be, and the Englishman immediately
prepared to maneuver his ship accordingly. But the quartermaster of the
Hyder Ali had, prior to this, received his instructions, and, instead
of obeying Barney's pretended order, whirled his wheel in the contrary
direction, luffing the American ship athwart the hawse of her
antagonist. The jib-boom of the enemy, in consequence of this, caught
in the forerigging of the Hyder Ali, giving the latter the raking
position which Barney had desired.

Not a cheer rose from the American vessel, even at this welcome
spectacle, for the men knew that victory against such odds was still
uncertain, and they thought as yet only of securing it. Nor did the
British, at a sight so dispiriting to them, yield in despair. On the
contrary, both crews rushed to their guns, and, for half an hour, the
combat was waged on either side with desperate fury. The two vessels
were soon enveloped in smoke. The explosions of the artillery were like
continuous claps of thunder. In twenty-six minutes not less than twenty
broadsides were discharged. Nor was the struggle confined to the
batteries. Riflemen, posted in the tops of the Hyder Ali, picked off
one by one the crew of the enemy, until his decks ran slippery with
blood and 56 out of his crew of 140 had fallen. All this while Barney
stood on the quarter-deck of his ship, a mark for the enemy's
sharpshooters, until they were driven from their stations by the
superior aim of the Americans. At length, finding further resistance
hopeless, the Englishman struck his colors. Huzza on huzza now rose
from the deck of the victor. Barney, on taking possession, discovered
that the vessel he had captured was the General Monk, and that her
weight of metal was nearly twice his own. Notwithstanding the presence
of the frigate, the young hero succeeded in bringing off his prize in
safety and in a few hours had moored her by the Hyder Ali's side,
opposite Philadelphia, with the dead of both ships still on their
decks. In this action Barney lost but 4 killed and 11 wounded. For the
victory, conceded to be the most brilliant of the latter years of the
war, Barney was rewarded by the State of Pennsylvania with a
gold-hilted sword. In consequence of the capture of the General Monk,
the Delaware ceased to be infested with the enemy.

About the middle of April (1782), Washington left Philadelphia, where
he had remained since November (1781), and joined the army, his
headquarters being at Newburg. He was directly informed of a very
shameful proceeding on the part of some refugees from New York, and
felt compelled to give the matter his serious attention. The
circumstances were these: Captain Huddy, who commanded a body of troops
in Monmouth county, New Jersey, was attacked by a party of refugees,
was made prisoner, and closely confined in New York. A few days
afterward they led him out and hanged him, with a label on his breast
declaring that he was put to death in retaliation for some of their
number, who, they said, had suffered a similar fate. Taking up the
matter promptly, Washington submitted it to his officers, laid it
before Congress, and wrote to Clinton demanding that Captain Lippencot,
the perpetrator of the horrid deed, should be given up. The demand not
being complied with, Washington, in accordance with the opinion of the
council of officers, determined upon retaliation. A British officer, of
equal rank with Captain Huddy, was chosen by lot. Captain Asgill, a
young man just nineteen years old, and the only son of his parents, was
the one upon whom the lot fell. The whole affair was in suspense for a
number of months. Both Clinton and Carleton, his successor, reprobated
the act of Lippencot with great severity, yet he was not given up, it
being considered by a court-martial that he had only obeyed the orders
of the Board of Associated Loyalists in New York. Great interest was
made to save Asgill's life; his mother begged the interference of the
Count de Vergennes, who wrote to Washington in her behalf. Early in
November Washington performed the grateful task of setting Captain
Asgill at liberty.

Meantime the army, by whose toils and sufferings the country had been
carried through the perils of the Revolution, remained unpaid,
apparently disregarded by Congress and by the people whom they had
delivered from oppression. It seemed probable that they would speedily
be disbanded, without any adequate provision being made by Congress for
the compensation which was due to them, and which had been solemnly
promised by repeated acts of legislation. They were very naturally
discontented. Their complaints and murmurs began to be ominous of very
serious consequences. They even began to question the efficiency of the
form of government, which appeared to be unfitted for meeting the first
necessities of the country--the maintenance and pay of its military
force. They began to consider the propriety of establishing a more
energetic form of government, while they still had their arms in their
hands. Colonel Nicola, an able and experienced officer, who stood high
in Washington's estimation, and had frequently been made the medium of
communication between him and the officers, was chosen as the organ for
making known their sentiments to him on the present occasion. In a
letter carefully written, after commenting upon the gloomy state of
public affairs, the disordered finances, and other embarrassments
occasioned by the war, all caused by defective political organization,
he proceeded to say: "This must have shown to all, and to military men
in particular, the weakness of republics, and the exertions the army
have been able to make by being under a proper head. Therefore, I
little doubt that, when the benefits of a mixed government are pointed
out and duly considered, such will be readily adopted. In this case it
will, I believe, be uncontroverted that the same abilities which have
led us through difficulties, apparently insurmountable by human power,
to victory and glory, those qualities that have merited and obtained
the universal esteem and veneration of an army, would be most likely to
conduct and direct us in the smoother paths of peace. Some people have
so connected the ideas of tyranny and monarchy as to find it very
difficult to separate them. It may, therefore, be requisite to give the
head of such a constitution as I propose some title apparently more
moderate; but, if all things were once adjusted, I believe strong
arguments might be produced for admitting the name of King, which I
conceive would be attended with some material advantages."

The answer of Washington to this communication was in the following
terms:

"NEWBURG, 22d _May_, 1782.

"SIR.--With a mixture of great surprise and astonishment, I have read
with attention the sentiments you have submitted to my perusal. Be
assured, sir, no occurrence in the course of the war has given me more
painful sensations than your information of there being such ideas
existing in the army as you have expressed, and I must view with
abhorrence and reprehend with severity. For the present, the
communication of them will rest in my own bosom, unless some further
agitation of the matter shall make a disclosure necessary.

"I am much at a loss to conceive what part of my conduct could have
given encouragement to an address, which to me seems big with the
greatest mischiefs that can befall my country. If I am not deceived in
the knowledge of myself, you could not have found a person to whom your
schemes are more disagreeable. At the same time, in justice to my own
feelings, I must add, that no man possesses a more sincere wish to see
ample justice done to the army than I do; and as far as my powers and
influence, in a constitutional way, extend, they shall be employed, to
the utmost of my abilities, to effect it, should there be any occasion.
Let me conjure you, then, if you have any regard for your country,
concern for yourself or posterity, or respect for me, to banish these
thoughts from your mind, and never communicate, as from yourself or any
one else, a sentiment of the like nature.

"I am, sir, &c.,

"GEORGE WASHINGTON."

       *       *       *       *       *

This was the language of Washington at a time when the army was
entirely devoted to him, when his popularity was equal to that of
Cromwell or Napoleon in their palmiest days. Certain officers of the
army were ready, at a word, to make him king; and the acknowledged
inefficiency of the existing government would have furnished a
plausible reason for the act. But Washington was not formed of the
material that kings are made of. Personal ambition he despised. To be,
not to seem great and good was his aim. To serve, and not to rule his
country was his object. He was too true a patriot to assume the power
and title of a monarch.

Early in May (1782) Sir Guy Carleton, who had succeeded Sir Henry
Clinton in the command of all the British forces in the United States,
arrived at New York. Having been also appointed, in conjunction with
Admiral Digby, a commissioner to negotiate a peace, he lost no time in
conveying to Washington copies of the votes of the British Parliament,
and of a bill which had been introduced on the part of the
administration, authorizing the King to conclude a peace or truce with
those who were still denominated "the revolted Colonies of North
America." These papers, he said, would manifest the dispositions
prevailing with the government and people of England toward those of
America, and, if the like pacific temper should prevail in this
country, both inclination and duty would lead him to meet it with the
most zealous concurrence. He had addressed to Congress, he said, a
letter containing the same communications, and he solicited a passport
for the person who should convey it.

At this time (1782) the bill enabling the British monarch to conclude a
peace or truce with America had not become a law, nor was any assurance
given that the present commissioners were empowered to offer other
terms than those which had been formerly rejected. General Carleton,
therefore, could not hope that negotiations would commence on such a
basis, nor be disappointed at the refusal of the passports he requested
by Congress, to whom the application was, of course, referred by
Washington. The letter may have been written for the general purpose of
conciliation, but the situation of the United States justified a
suspicion of different motives, and prudence required that their
conduct should be influenced by that suspicion. The repugnance of the
King to a dismemberment of the empire was understood, and it was
thought probable that the sentiments expressed in the House of Commons
might be attributable rather to a desire of changing ministers than to
any fixed determination to relinquish the design of reannexing America
to the Crown.

Under these impressions, the overtures now made were considered as
opiates administered to lull the spirit of vigilance, which Washington
and his friends in Congress labored to keep up, into a state of fatal
repose, and to prevent those measures of security which it might yet be
necessary to adopt.

This jealousy was nourished by all the intelligence received from
Europe. The utmost address of the British cabinet had been employed to
detach the belligerents from each other. The mediation of Russia had
been accepted to procure a separate peace with Holland; propositions
had been submitted both to France and Spain, tending to an
accommodation of differences with each of those powers singly, and
inquiries had been made of Mr. Adams, the American minister at the
Hague in place of Mr. Laurens, which seemed to contemplate the same
object with regard to the United States. These political maneuvers
furnished additional motives for doubting the sincerity of the English
cabinet. Whatever views might actuate the court of St. James on this
subject, the resolution of the American government to make no separate
treaty was unalterable.

But the public votes which have been stated, and probably his private
instructions, restrained Sir Guy Carleton from offensive war, and the
state of the American army disabled Washington from making any attempt
on the posts in possession of the British. The campaign of 1782
consequently passed away without furnishing any military operations of
moment between the armies under the immediate direction of the
respective Commanders-in-Chief.

Early in August (1782) a letter was received by Washington from Sir Guy
Carleton and Admiral Digby, which, among other communications
manifesting a pacific disposition on the part of England, contained the
information that Mr. Grenville was at Paris, invested with full powers
to treat with all the parties at war, that negotiations for a general
peace were already commenced and that his Majesty had commanded his
minister to direct Mr. Grenville that the independence of the thirteen
provinces should be proposed by him in the first instance instead of
being made a condition of a general treaty. But that this proposition
would be made in the confidence that the Loyalists would be restored to
their possessions, or a full compensation made them for whatever
confiscations might have taken place.

This letter was, not long afterward, followed by one from Sir Guy
Carleton, declaring that he could discern no further object of contest,
and that he disapproved of all further hostilities by sea or land,
which could only multiply the miseries of individuals, without a
possible advantage to either nation. In pursuance of this opinion, he
had, soon after his arrival in New York, restrained the practice of
detaching parties of Indians against the frontiers of the United States
and had recalled those which were previously engaged in those bloody
incursions.

These communications appear to have alarmed the jealousy of the
minister of France. To quiet his fears Congress renewed the resolution
"to enter into no discussion of any overtures for pacification, but in
confidence and in concert with his most Christian Majesty," and again
recommended to the several States to adopt such measures as would most
effectually guard against all intercourse with any subjects of the
British Crown during the war.

In South Carolina the American army under General Greene maintained its
position in front of Jacksonborough, and that of the British under
General Leslie was confined to Charleston and its immediate vicinity.
Both were inactive for a long period, and during this time Greene's
army suffered so much for want of provisions that he was under the
necessity of authorizing the seizure of them by the odious measure of
impressment.

Privations, which had been borne without a murmur under the excitement
of active military operations, produced great irritation during the
leisure which prevailed after the enemy had abandoned the open field,
and, in the Pennsylvania line, which was composed chiefly of
foreigners, the discontent was aggravated to such a point as to produce
a treasonable intercourse with the enemy, in which a plot is understood
to have been laid for seizing General Greene and delivering him to a
detachment of British troops which would move out of Charleston for the
purpose of favoring the execution of the design. It was discovered when
it is supposed to have been on the point of execution, and a Sergeant
Gornell, believed to be the chief of the conspiracy, was condemned to
death by a court-martial, and executed on the 22d of April. Some
others, among whom were two domestics in the general's family, were
brought before the court on suspicion of being concerned in the plot,
but the testimony was not sufficient to convict them, and twelve
deserted the night after it was discovered. There is no reason to
believe that the actual guilt of this transaction extended further.

Charleston was held until the 14th of December. Previous to its
evacuation General Leslie had proposed a cessation of hostilities, and
that his troops might be supplied with fresh provisions, in exchange
for articles of the last necessity in the American camp. The policy of
government being adverse to this proposition, General Greene was under
the necessity of refusing his assent to it, and the British general
continued to supply his wants by force. This produced several
skirmishes with foraging parties, to one of which importance was given
by the untimely death of the intrepid Laurens, whose loss was
universally lamented.

This gallant and accomplished young gentleman had entered into the
military family of Washington at an early period of the war and had
always shared a large portion of his esteem. Brave to excess, he sought
every occasion to render service to his country and to acquire that
military fame which he pursued with the ardor of a young soldier, whose
courage seems to have partaken largely of that romantic spirit which
youth and enthusiasm produce in a fearless mind. No small addition to
the regrets occasioned by his loss was derived from the reflection that
he fell unnecessarily, in an unimportant skirmish, in the last moments
of the war, when his rash exposure to the danger which proved fatal to
him could no longer be useful to his country.

From the arrival of Sir Guy Carleton at New York, the conduct of the
British armies on the American continent was regulated by the spirit
then recently displayed in the House of Commons, and all the sentiments
expressed by their general were pacific and conciliatory. But to these
flattering appearances it was dangerous to yield implicit confidence.
With a change of men a change of measures might also take place, and,
in addition to the ordinary suggestions of prudence, the military
events in the West Indies were calculated to keep alive the attention,
and to continue the anxieties of the United States.

After the surrender of Lord Cornwallis the arms of France and Spain in
the American seas had been attended with such signal success that the
hope of annihilating the power of Great Britain in the West Indies was
not too extravagant to be indulged. Immense preparations had been made
for the invasion of Jamaica, and, early in April, Admiral Count de
Grasse sailed from Martinique with a powerful fleet, having on board
the land forces and artillery which were to be employed in the
operations against that island. His intention was to form a junction
with the Spanish Admiral Don Solano, who lay at Hispaniola; after which
the combined fleet, whose superiority promised to render it
irresistible, was to proceed on the important enterprise which had been
concerted. On his way to Hispaniola de Grasse was overtaken by Rodney,
and brought to an engagement in which he was totally defeated and made
a prisoner. This decisive victory disconcerted the plans of the
combined powers and gave security to the British islands. In the United
States it was feared that this alteration in the aspect of affairs
might influence the councils of the English cabinet on the question of
peace, and these apprehensions increased the uneasiness with which all
intelligent men contemplated the state of the American finances.

It was then in contemplation to reduce the army by which many of the
officers would be discharged. While the general declared, in a
confidential letter to the Secretary of War, his conviction of the
alacrity with which they would retire into private life, could they be
placed in a situation as eligible as they had left to enter into the
service, he added--"Yet I cannot help fearing the result of the
measure, when I see such a number of men goaded by a thousand stings of
reflection on, the past, and of anticipation on the future, about to be
turned on the world, soured by penury, and what they call the
ingratitude of the public; involved in debts, without one farthing of
money to carry them home, after having spent the flower of their days,
and many of them their patrimonies, in establishing the freedom and
independence of their country; and having suffered everything which
human nature is capable of enduring on this side of death. I repeat it,
when I reflect on these irritating circumstances, unattended by one
thing to soothe their feelings or brighten the gloomy prospect, I
cannot avoid apprehending that a train of evils will follow of a very
serious and distressing nature.

"I wish not to heighten the shades of the picture so far as the real
life would justify me in doing, or I would give anecdotes of patriotism
and distress which have scarcely ever been paralleled, never surpassed,
in the history of mankind. But you may rely upon it, the patience and
long-sufferance of this army are almost exhausted, and there never was
so great a spirit of discontent as at this instant. While in the field
I think it may be kept from breaking out into acts of outrage, but when
we retire into winter quarters (unless the storm be previously
dissipated) I cannot be at ease respecting the consequences. It is high
time for a peace."

"To judge rightly," says Marshall, "of the motives which produced this
uneasy temper in the army it will be necessary to recollect that the
resolution of October, 1780, granting half-pay for life to the officers
stood on the mere faith of a government possessing no funds enabling it
to perform its engagements. From requisitions alone, to be made on
sovereign States, the supplies were to be drawn which should satisfy
these meritorious public creditors, and the ill success attending these
requisitions while the dangers of war were still impending, furnished
melancholy presages of their unproductiveness in time of peace. In
addition to this reflection, of itself sufficient to disturb the
tranquility which the passage of the resolution had produced, were
other considerations of decisive influence. The dispositions manifested
by Congress itself were so unfriendly to the half-pay establishment as
to extinguish the hope that any funds the government might acquire
would be applied to that object. Since the passage of the resolution
the articles of confederation, which required the concurrence of nine
States to any act appropriating public money, had been adopted, and
nine States had never been in favor of the measure. Should the
requisitions of Congress therefore be respected, or should permanent
funds be granted by the States, the prevailing sentiment of the nation
was too hostile to the compensation which had been stipulated to leave
a probability that it would be substantially made. This was not merely
the sentiment of the individuals then administering the government
which might change with a change of men; it was known to be the sense
of the States they represented, and consequently the hope could not be
indulged that, on this subject, a future Congress would be more just or
would think more liberally. As, therefore, the establishment of that
independence for which they had fought and suffered appeared to become
more certain as the end of their toils approached--the officers became
more attentive to their own situation, and the inquietude of the army
increased with the progress of the negotiation."

In October (1782) the French troops marched to Boston, in order to
embark for the West Indies, and the Americans retired into winter
quarters. The apparent indisposition of the British general to act
offensively, the pacific temper avowed by the cabinet of London, and
the strength of the country in which the American troops were cantoned,
gave ample assurance that no military operations would be undertaken
during the winter which would require the continuance of Washington in
camp. But the irritable temper of the army furnished cause for serious
apprehension, and he determined to forego every gratification to be
derived from a suspension of his toils, in order to watch the progress
of its discontent.

The officers who had wasted their fortunes and the prime of their lives
in unrewarded service, fearing, with reason, that Congress possessed
neither the power nor the inclination to comply with its engagements to
the army, could not look with unconcern at the prospect which was
opening to them. In December, soon after going into winter quarters,
they presented a petition to Congress respecting the money actually due
to them, and proposing a commutation of the half-pay stipulated by the
resolutions of October, 1780, for a sum in gross, which, they flattered
themselves, would encounter fewer prejudices than the half-pay
establishment. Some security that the engagements of the government
would be complied with was also requested. A committee of officers was
deputed to solicit the attention of Congress to this memorial, and to
attend its progress through the house.

Among the most distinguished members of the Federal government were
persons sincerely disposed to do ample justice to the public creditors
generally, and to that class of them particularly whose claims were
founded in military service. But many viewed the army with jealous
eyes, acknowledged its merit with unwillingness, and betrayed,
involuntarily, their repugnance to a faithful observance of the public
engagements. With this question another of equal importance was
connected, on which Congress was divided almost in the same manner. One
party was attached to a State, the other to a Continental system. The
latter labored to fund the public debts on solid Continental security,
while the former opposed their whole weight to measures calculated to
effect that object.

In consequence of these divisions on points of the deepest interest,
the business of the army advanced slowly, and the important question
respecting the commutation of their half-pay remained undecided (March,
1783), when intelligence was received of the signature of the
preliminary and eventual articles of peace between the United States
and Great Britain.

The officers, soured by their past sufferings, their present wants, and
their gloomy prospects--exasperated by the neglect which they
experienced and the injustice which they apprehended, manifested an
irritable and uneasy temper, which required only a slight impulse to
give it activity. To render this temper the more dangerous, an opinion
had been insinuated that the Commander-in-Chief was restrained, by
extreme delicacy, from supporting their interests with that zeal which
his feelings and knowledge of their situation had inspired. Early in
March a letter was received from their committee in Philadelphia,
showing that the objects they solicited had not been obtained. On the
10th of that month (1783) an anonymous paper was circulated, requiring
a meeting of the general and field officers at the public building on
the succeeding day at 11 in the morning, and announcing the expectation
that an officer from each company, and a delegate from the medical
staff would attend. The object of the meeting was avowed to be, "to
consider the late letter from their representatives in Philadelphia,
and what measures (if any) should be adopted to obtain that redress of
grievances which they seemed to have solicited in vain."

On the same day an address to the army was privately circulated, which
was admirably well calculated to work on the passions of the moment,
and to lead to the most desperate resolutions. This was the first of
the celebrated "Newburg Addresses," since acknowledged to have been
written by Gen. John Armstrong, at the request of several of the
officers in camp. The following were the concluding passages of the
first address:

"After a pursuit of seven long years, the object for which we set out
is at length brought within our reach. Yes, my friends, that suffering
courage of yours was active once. It has conducted the United States of
America through a doubtful and a bloody war. It has placed her in the
chair of independency; and peace returns again to bless--whom? A
country willing to redress your wrongs, cherish your worth, and reward
your services? A country courting your return to private life with
tears of gratitude and smiles of admiration--longing to divide with you
that independency which your gallantry has given, and those riches
which your wounds have preserved? Is this the case? Or is it rather a
country that tramples upon your rights, disdains your cries, and
insults your distresses? Have you not more than once suggested your
wishes and made known your wants to Congress? Wants and wishes which
gratitude and policy would have anticipated rather than evaded; and
have you not lately, in the meek language of entreating memorials,
begged from their justice what you could no longer expect from their
favor? How have you been answered? Let the letter which you are called
to consider tomorrow reply.

"If this, then, be your treatment while the swords you wear are
necessary for the defense of America, what have you to expect from
peace, when your voice shall sink and your strength dissipate by
division? When those very swords, the instruments and companions of
your glory, shall be taken from your sides, and no remaining mark of
military distinction left but your wants, infirmities, and scars? Can
you then consent to be the only sufferers by this Revolution, and,
retiring from the field, grow old in poverty, wretchedness, and
contempt? Can you consent to wade through the vile mire of dependency,
and owe the miserable remnant of that life to charity which has
hitherto been spent in honor? If you can, go; and carry with you the
jest of Tories and the scorn of Whigs, the ridicule, and, what is
worse, the pity of the world. Go--starve and be forgotten. But if your
spirit should revolt at this, if you have sense enough to discover, and
spirit enough to oppose, tyranny under whatever garb it may assume,
whether it be the plain coat of republicanism or the splendid robe of
royalty; if you have yet learned to discriminate between a people and a
cause, between men and principles, awake; attend to your situation and
redress yourselves. If the present moment be lost, every future effort
is in vain, and your threats then will be as empty as your entreaties
now.

"I would advise you, therefore, to come to some final opinion upon what
you can bear and what you will suffer. If your determination be in any
proportion to your wrongs, carry your appeal from the justice to the
fears of the government. Change the milk-and-water style of your last
memorial. Assume a bolder tone, decent, but lively; spirited and
determined; and suspect the man who would advise to more moderation and
longer forbearance. Let two or three men who can feel as well as write
be appointed to draw up your last remonstrance; for I would no longer
give it the suing, soft, unsuccessful epithet of memorial. Let it be
represented in language that will neither dishonor you by its rudeness
nor betray you by its fears, what has been promised by Congress and
what has been performed; how long and how patiently you have suffered;
how little you have asked, and how much of that little has been denied.
Tell them that, though you were the first, and would wish to be the
last to encounter danger; though despair itself can never drive you
into dishonor it may drive you from the field; that the wound often
irritated and never healed may at length become incurable, and that the
slightest mark of indignity from Congress now must operate like the
grave, and part you forever; that in any political event, the army has
its alternative--if peace, that nothing shall separate you from your
arms but death; if war, that, courting the auspices and inviting the
directions of your illustrious leader, you will retire to some
unsettled country, smile in your turn, and 'mock when their fear cometh
on.' But let it represent also that should they comply with the request
of your late memorial, it would make you more happy and them more
respectable. That while war should continue you would follow their
standard into the field, and when it came to an end, you would withdraw
into the shade of private life, and give the world another subject of
wonder and applause--an army victorious over its enemies, victorious
over itself."

Persuaded as the officers in general were of the indisposition of
government to remunerate their services, this eloquent and impassioned
address, dictated by genius and by feeling, found in almost every bosom
a kindred though latent sentiment prepared to receive its impression.
Quick as the train to which a torch is applied, the passions caught its
flame and nothing seemed to be required but the assemblage proposed for
the succeeding day to communicate the conflagration to the combustible
mass and to produce an explosion ruinous to the army and to the nation.

Accustomed as Washington had been to emergencies of great delicacy and
difficulty, yet none had occurred which called more pressingly than the
present for the utmost exertion of all his powers. He knew well that it
was much easier to avoid intemperate measures than to recede from them
after they have been adopted. He therefore considered it as a matter of
the last importance to prevent the meeting of the officers on the
succeeding day, as proposed in the anonymous summons. The sensibilities
of the army were too high to admit of this being forbidden by
authority, as a violation of discipline; but the end was answered in
another way and without irritation. Washington, in general orders,
noticed the anonymous summons, as a disorderly proceeding, not to be
countenanced; and the more effectually to divert the officers from
paying any attention to it, he requested them to meet for the same
nominal purpose, but on a day four days subsequent to the one proposed
by the anonymous writer. On the next day (March 12th), the second
"Newburg Address" appeared, affecting to consider Washington as
approving the first, and only changing the day of meeting. But this
artifice was defeated. The intervening period was improved in preparing
the officers for the adoption of moderate measures. Washington sent for
one officer after another, and enlarged in private on the fatal
consequences, and particularly the loss of character, which would
result from the adoption of intemperate resolutions. His whole personal
influence was exerted to calm the prevailing agitation. When the
officers assembled (March 15, 1783), General Gates was called to the
chair. Washington rose and apologized for being present, which had not
been his original intention; but the circulation of anonymous addresses
had imposed on him the duty of expressing his opinion of their
tendency. He had committed it to writing, and, with the indulgence of
his brother officers, he would take the liberty of reading it to them;
and then proceeded as follows:

"GENTLEMEN.--By an anonymous summons an attempt has been made to
convene you together. How inconsistent with the rules of propriety, how
unmilitary, and how subversive of all order and discipline, let the
good sense of the army decide.

"In the moment of this summons, another anonymous production was sent
into circulation, addressed more to the feelings and passions than to
the reason and judgment of the army. The author of the piece is
entitled to much credit for the goodness of his pen, and I could wish
he had as much credit for the rectitude of his heart; for, as men see
through different optics, and are induced, by the reflecting faculties
of the mind, to use different means to attain the same end, the author
of the address should have had more charity than to mark for suspicion
the man who should recommend moderation and longer forbearance; or, in
other words, who should not think as he thinks, and act as he advises.
But he had another plan in view, in which candor and liberality of
sentiment, regard to justice, and love of country have no part; and he
was right to insinuate the darkest suspicion to effect the blackest
design. That the address is drawn with great art and is designed to
answer the most insidious purposes; that it is calculated to impress
the mind with an idea of premeditated injustice in the sovereign power
of the United States, and rouse all those resentments which must
unavoidably flow from such a belief that the secret mover of this
scheme, whoever he may be, intended to take advantage of the passions,
while they were warmed by the recollection of past distresses, without
giving time for cool, deliberate thinking, and that composure of mind
which is so necessary to give dignity and stability to measures, is
rendered too obvious, by the mode of conducting the business, to need
other proof than a reference to the proceeding. Thus much, gentlemen, I
have thought it incumbent on me to observe to you, to show upon what
principles I opposed the irregular and hasty meeting which was proposed
to have been held on Tuesday last, and not because I wanted a
disposition to give you every opportunity, consistent with your own
honor and the dignity of the army, to make known your grievances. If my
conduct heretofore has not evinced to you that I have been a faithful
friend to the army, my declaration of it at this time would be equally
unavailing and improper. But as I was among the first who embarked in
the cause of our common country; as I have never left your side one
moment, but when called from you on public duty; as I have been the
constant companion and witness of your distresses, and not among the
last to feel and acknowledge your merits; as I have ever considered my
own military reputation as inseparably connected with that of the army;
as my heart has ever expanded with joy when I have heard its praises,
and my indignation has arisen when the mouth of detraction has been
opened against it, it can scarcely be supposed, at this late stage of
the war, that I am indifferent to its interests. But how are they to be
promoted? The way is plain, says the anonymous addresser. If war
continues, remove into the unsettled country; there establish
yourselves and leave an ungrateful country to defend itself. But who
are they to defend? Our wives, our children, our farms and other
property, which we leave behind us? Or, in this state of hostile
separation, are we to take the two first (the latter cannot be
removed), to perish in a wilderness with hunger, cold, and nakedness?
If peace takes place, never sheathe your swords, says he, until you
have obtained full and ample justice. This dreadful alternative of
either deserting our country in the extremist hour of her distress, or
turning our arms against it, which is the apparent object, unless
Congress can be compelled into instant compliance, has something so
shocking in it that humanity revolts at the idea. My God! What can this
writer have in view, by recommending such measures? Can he be a friend
to the army? Can he be a friend to this country? Rather is he not an
insidious foe? some emissary, perhaps, from New York, plotting the ruin
of both, by sowing the seeds of discord and separation between the
civil and military powers of the continent? And what a compliment does
he pay to our understandings, when he recommends measures, in either
alternative, impracticable in their nature!

"But here, gentlemen, I will drop the curtain, because it would be as
imprudent in me to assign my reasons for this opinion as it would be
insulting to your conception to suppose you stood in need of them. A
moment's reflection will convince every dispassionate mind of the
physical impossibility of carrying either proposal into execution.
There might, gentlemen, be an Impropriety in my taking notice, in this
address to you, of an anonymous production, but the manner in which
that performance has been introduced to the army, the effect it was
intended to have, together with some other circumstances, will amply
justify my observations on the tendency of that writing. With respect
to the advice given by the author, to suspect the man who shall
recommend moderate measures and longer forbearance, I spurn it, as
every man who regards that liberty and reveres that justice for which
we contend, undoubtedly must; for, if men are to be precluded from
offering their sentiments on a matter which may involve the most
serious and alarming consequences that can invite the consideration of
mankind, reason is of no use to us. The freedom of speech may be taken
away, and, dumb and silent, we may be led like sheep to the slaughter.

"I cannot, in justice to my own belief and what I have great reason to
conceive is the intention of Congress, conclude this address without
giving it as my decided opinion that that honorable body entertain
exalted sentiments of the services of the army, and from a full
conviction of its merits and sufferings will do it complete justice;
that their endeavors to discover and establish funds for this purpose
has been unwearied, and will not cease till they have succeeded, I have
not a doubt. But, like all other large bodies where there is a variety
of different interests to reconcile, their determinations are slow.
Why, then, should we distrust them, and, in consequence of that
distrust, adopt measures which may cast a shade over that glory which
has been so justly acquired, and tarnish the reputation of an army
which is celebrated through all Europe for its fortitude and
patriotism? And for what is this done? To bring the object we seek
nearer? No; most certainly, in my opinion, it will cast it at a greater
distance. For myself--and I take no merit in giving the assurance,
being induced to it from principles of gratitude, veracity, and
justice--a grateful sense of the confidence you have ever placed in me,
a recollection of the cheerful assistance and prompt obedience I have
experienced from you under every vicissitude of fortune, and the
sincere affection I feel for an army I have so long had the honor to
command, will oblige me to declare in this public and solemn manner
that in the attainment of complete justice for all your toils and
dangers, and in the gratification of every wish, so far as may be done
consistently with the great duty I owe my country, and those powers we
are bound to respect, you may freely command my services to the utmost
extent of my abilities. While I give you these assurances, and pledge
myself in the most unequivocal manner to exert whatever ability I am
possessed of in your favor, let me entreat you, gentlemen, on your
part, not to take any measure, which, viewed in the calm light of
reason, will lessen the dignity and sully the glory you have hitherto
maintained. Let me request you to rely on the plighted faith of your
country, and place a full confidence in the purity of the intentions of
Congress, that, previous to your dissolution as an army, they will
cause all your accounts to be fairly liquidated, as directed in the
resolutions which were published to you two days ago; and that they
will adopt the most effectual measures in their power to render ample
justice to you for your faithful and meritorious services. And let me
conjure you, in the name of our common country, as you value your own
sacred honor, as you respect the rights of humanity, and as you regard
the military and national character of America, to express your utmost
horror and detestation of the man who wishes, under any specious
pretenses, to overturn the liberties of our country, and who wickedly
attempts to open the floodgates of civil discord and deluge our rising
empire in blood.

"By thus determining and thus acting, you will pursue the plain and
direct road to the attainment of your wishes; you will defeat the
insidious designs of our enemies, who are compelled to resort from open
force to secret artifice. You will give one more distinguished proof of
unexampled patriotism and patient virtue, rising superior to the
pressure of the most complicated sufferings; and you will, by the
dignity of your conduct, afford occasion for posterity to say, when
speaking of the glorious example you have exhibited to mankind--'Had
this day been wanting, the world had never seen the last stage of
perfection to which human nature is capable of attaining.'"

After concluding this address, Washington read to the meeting a letter
from one of his frequent correspondents in Congress, the Hon. Joseph
Jones, pointing out the difficulties Congress had to contend with, but
expressing the opinion that the claims of the army would, at all
events, be paid. When he got through with the first paragraph of the
letter he made a short pause, took out his spectacles, and craved the
indulgence of the audience while he put them on, remarking, while he
was engaged in that operation, that "he had grown gray in their
service, and now found himself growing blind." The effect of such
remark from Washington, at such a moment, may be imagined. It brought
tears to the eyes of many a veteran in that illustrious assemblage.
When he had finished reading the letter he retired, leaving the
officers to deliberate and act as the crisis demanded.

On the present occasion, as on previous ones, Washington's appeal to
the officers was successful. The sentiments uttered in his address,
from a person whom the army had been accustomed to love, to revere, and
to obey--the solidity of whose judgment and the sincerity of whose zeal
for their interests were alike unquestioned--could not fail to be
irresistible. No person was hardy enough to oppose the advice he had
given, and the general impression was apparent. A resolution, moved by
General Knox and seconded by Brigadier-General Putnam, "assuring him
that the officers reciprocated his affectionate expressions with the
greatest sincerity of which the human heart is capable," was
unanimously voted. On the motion of General Putnam, a committee
consisting of General Knox, Colonel Brooks, and Captain Howard was then
appointed to prepare resolutions on the business before them, and to
report in half an hour. The report of the committee being brought in
and considered, resolutions were passed declaring that no circumstances
of distress should induce the officers to sully, by unworthy conduct,
the reputation acquired in their long and faithful service; that they
had undiminished confidence in the justice of Congress and of their
country; and that the Commander-in-Chief should be requested to write
to the President of Congress, earnestly entreating a speedy decision on
the late address forwarded by a committee of the army. In compliance
with the request of the officers, expressed in the above mentioned
resolution, and with the pledge which he had voluntarily given,
Washington forthwith addressed the following letter to the President of
Congress:

"The result of the proceedings of the grand convention of the officers,
which I have the honor of enclosing to your Excellency for the
inspection of Congress, will, I flatter myself, be considered as the
last glorious proof of patriotism which could have been given by men
who aspired to the distinction of a patriot army, and will not only
confirm their claim to the justice but will increase their title to the
gratitude of their country. Having seen the proceedings on the part of
the army terminate with perfect unanimity and in a manner entirely
consonant to my wishes; being impressed with the liveliest sentiments
of affection for those who have so long, so patiently, and so
cheerfully suffered and fought under my immediate direction; having,
from motives of justice, duty, and gratitude, spontaneously offered
myself as an advocate for their rights, and, having been requested to
write to your Excellency, earnestly entreating the most speedy decision
of Congress upon the subjects of the late address from the army to that
honorable body, it now only remains for me to perform the task I have
assumed, and to intercede in their behalf, as I now do, that the
sovereign power will be pleased to verify the predictions I have
pronounced of, and the confidence the army have reposed in, the justice
of their country. And here I humbly conceive it is altogether
unnecessary (while I am pleading the cause of an army which have done
and suffered more than any other army ever did in the defense of the
rights and liberties of human nature) to expatiate on their claims to
the most ample compensation for their meritorious services, because
they are known perfectly to the whole world, and because (although the
topics are inexhaustible) enough has already been said on the subject.
To prove these assertions, to evince that my sentiments have ever been
uniform, and to show what my ideas of the rewards in question have
always been, I appeal to the archives of Congress, and call on those
sacred deposits to witness for me. And in order that my observations
and arguments in favor of a future adequate provision for the officers
of the army may be brought to remembrance again and considered in a
single point of view, without giving Congress the trouble of having
recourse to their files, I will beg leave to transmit herewith an
extract from a representation made by me to a committee of Congress, so
long ago as the 29th of January, 1778, and also the transcript of a
letter to the President of Congress, dated near Passaic Falls, October
11, 1780.

"That in the critical and perilous moment when the last-mentioned
communication was made there was the utmost danger a dissolution of the
army would have taken place unless measures similar to those
recommended had been adopted, will not admit a doubt. That the adoption
of the resolution granting half-pay for life has been attended with all
the happy consequences I had foretold, so far as respected the good of
the service, let the astonishing contrast between the state of the army
at this instant and at the former period determine. And that the
establishment of funds and security of the payment of all the just
demands of the army will be the most certain means of preserving the
national faith and future tranquility of this extensive continent, is
my decided opinion.

"By the preceding remarks it will readily be imagined that instead of
retracting and reprehending (from further experience and reflection)
the mode of compensation so strenuously urged in the enclosures, I am
more and more confirmed in the sentiment, and if in the wrong, suffer
me to please myself with the grateful delusion.

"For if, besides the simple payment of their wages, a further
compensation is not due to the sufferings and sacrifices of the
officers, then have I been mistaken indeed. If the whole army have not
merited whatever a grateful people can bestow, then have I been
beguiled by prejudice and built opinion on the basis of error. If this
country should not in the event perform everything which has been
requested in the late memorial to Congress, then will my belief become
vain, and the hope that has been excited void of foundation. And if (as
has been suggested for the purpose of inflaming their passions) the
officers of the army are to be the only sufferers by this revolution;
'if, retiring from the field, they are to grow old in poverty,
wretchedness, and contempt; if they are to wade through the vile mire
of dependency and owe the miserable remnant of that life to charity
which has hitherto been spent in honor,' then shall I have learned what
ingratitude is--then shall I have realized a tale which will embitter
every moment of my future life.

"But I am under no such apprehensions; a country rescued by their arms
from impending ruin will never leave unpaid the debt of gratitude.

"Should any intemperate or improper warmth have mingled itself amongst
the foregoing observations, I must entreat your Excellency and Congress
it may be attributed to the effusion of an honest zeal in the best of
causes, and that my peculiar situation may be my apology, and I hope I
need not on this momentous occasion make any new protestations of
personal disinterestedness, having ever renounced for myself the idea
of pecuniary reward. The consciousness of having attempted faithfully
to discharge my duty and the approbation of my country will be a
sufficient recompense for my services."

This energetic letter, connected with recent events, induced Congress
to decide on the claims of the army. These were liquidated, and the
amount acknowledged to be due from the United States. Thus the country
was once more indebted to the wisdom and moderation of Washington for
its preservation from imminent danger.

Soon after these events intelligence of a general peace was received.
The news came by a French vessel from Cadiz, with a letter from
Lafayette, who was then at that place preparing for an expedition to
the West Indies, under Count d'Estaing. Shortly after, Sir Guy Carleton
gave official information to the same effect and announced a cessation
of hostilities. The joyful intelligence was notified by proclamation of
Washington to the army, in the camp at Newburg, on the 19th of April
(1783), exactly eight years after the commencement of hostilities at
Lexington. In general orders a public religious service and
thanksgiving was directed by him to take place on the evening of the
same day, when the proclamation was read at the head of every regiment
and corps of the army. The immediate reduction of the army was resolved
upon, but the mode of effecting it required deliberation. To avoid the
inconveniences of dismissing a great number of soldiers in a body,
furloughs were freely granted on the application of individuals, and
after their dispersion they were not enjoined to return. By this
arrangement a critical moment was got over. A great part of an unpaid
army was dispersed over the States without tumult or disorder.

At the instance of Washington the soldiers were permitted to carry home
their arms, to be preserved and transmitted to their posterity as
memorials of the glorious war of independence.

While the veterans serving under the immediate eye of their beloved
Commander-in-Chief manifested the utmost good temper and conduct, a
mutinous disposition broke out among some new levies stationed at
Lancaster, in Pennsylvania. About eighty of this description marched in
a body to Philadelphia, where they were joined by some other troops, so
as to amount in the whole to 300. They marched with fixed bayonets to
the statehouse, in which Congress and the State Executive Council held
their sessions. They placed guards at every door and threatened the
President and Council of the State with letting loose an enraged
soldiery upon them, unless they granted their demands in twenty
minutes. As soon as this outrage was known to Washington, he detached
General Howe with a competent force to suppress the mutiny. This was
effected without bloodshed before his arrival. The mutineers were too
inconsiderable to commit extensive mischief, but their disgraceful
conduct excited the greatest indignation in the breast of the
Commander-in-Chief, which was expressed in a letter to the President of
Congress in the following words:

"While I suffer the most poignant distress in observing that a handful
of men, contemptible in numbers, and equally so in point of service (if
the veteran troops from the southward have not been seduced by their
example), and who are not worthy to be called soldiers, should disgrace
themselves and their country, as the Pennsylvania mutineers have done,
by insulting the sovereign authority of the United States, and that of
their own, I feel an inexpressible satisfaction that even this behavior
cannot stain the name of the American soldiery.

"It cannot be imputable to or reflect dishonor on the army at large,
but, on the contrary, it will, by the striking contrast it exhibits,
hold up to public view the other troops in the most advantageous point
of light. Upon taking all the circumstances into consideration, I
cannot sufficiently express my surprise and indignation at the
arrogance, the folly, and the wickedness of the mutineers; nor can I
sufficiently admire the fidelity, the bravery, and patriotism which
must forever signalize the unsullied character of the other corps of
our army. For when we consider that these Pennsylvania levies who have
now mutinied are recruits and soldiers of a day, who have not borne the
heat and burden of war, and who can have in reality very few hardships
to complain of, and when we at the same time recollect that those
soldiers who have lately been furloughed from this army, are the
veterans who have patiently endured hunger, nakedness, and cold; who
have suffered and bled without a murmur, and who, with perfect good
order have retired to their homes without a settlement of their
accounts or a farthing of money in their pockets, we shall be as much
astonished at the virtues of the latter as we are struck with
detestation at the proceedings of the former."

On the occasion of disbanding the army, Washington addressed a circular
letter to the governors of all the States, in which he gave his views
of the existing state of the country and the principles upon which the
future fabric of united government should be founded. It is one of the
most remarkable state papers ever produced in this country.

Meantime Sir Guy Carleton was preparing to evacuate the city of New
York. On the 27th of April (1783) a fleet had sailed for Nova Scotia
with 7,000 persons and their effects. These were partly soldiers and
partly Tories exiled by the laws of the States.

On the 6th of May Washington had a personal interview with Carleton at
Orangetown respecting the delivery of the British ports in the United
States, and of property directed to be surrendered by an article of the
treaty.

The independence of his country being established, Washington looked
forward with anxiety to its future destinies. These might greatly
depend on the systems to be adopted on the return of peace, and to
those systems much of his attention was directed. The future peace
establishment of the United States was one of the many interesting
subjects which claimed the consideration of Congress. As the experience
of Washington would certainly enable him to suggest many useful ideas
on this important point, his opinions respecting it were requested by
the committee of Congress to whom it was referred. His letter on this
occasion will long deserve the attention of those to whom the interests
of the United States may be confided. His strongest hopes of securing
the future tranquility, dignity, and respectability of his country were
placed on a well-regulated and well-disciplined militia; and his
sentiments on this subject are entitled to the more regard as a long
course of severe experience had enabled him to mark the total
incompetence of the existing system to the great purposes of national
defense.

At length the British troops evacuated New York, and on the 25th of
November (1783) a detachment from the American army took possession of
that city.

Guards being posted for the security of the citizens, Washington,
accompanied by Governor George Clinton, and attended by many civil and
military officers and a large number of respectable inhabitants on
horseback, made his public entry into the city, where he was received
with every mark of respect and attention. His military course was now
on the point of terminating, and he was about to bid adieu to his
comrades in arms. This affecting interview took place on the 4th of
December. At noon the principal officers of the army assembled at
Frances' tavern, soon after which their belove'd Commander entered the
room. His emotions were too strong to be concealed. Filling a glass, he
turned to them and said, "With a heart full of love and gratitude, I
now take leave of you; I most devoutly wish that your latter days may
be as prosperous and happy as your former ones have been glorious and
honorable." Having drunk, he added, "I cannot come to each of you to
take my leave, but shall be obliged if each of you will come and take
me by the hand." General Knox, being nearest, turned to him.
Washington, incapable of utterance, grasped his hand and embraced him.
In the same affectionate manner he took leave of each succeeding
officer. The tear of manly sensibility was in every eye, and not a word
was articulated to interrupt the dignified silence and the tenderness
of the scene. Leaving the room, he passed through the corps of light
infantry and walked to Whitehall, where a barge waited to convey him to
Paulus Hook. The whole company followed in mute and solemn procession,
with dejected countenances, testifying feelings of delicious melancholy
which no language can describe. Having entered the barge he turned to
the company and, waving his hat, bid them a silent adieu. They paid him
the same affectionate compliment, and, after the barge had left them,
returned in the same solemn manner to the place where they had
assembled.

Congress was then in session at Annapolis, in Maryland, to which place
Washington repaired for the purpose of resigning into their hands the
authority with which they had invested him. He arrived on the 19th of
December (1783). The next day he informed that body of his intention to
ask leave to resign the commission he had the honor of holding in their
service, and requested to know whether it would be their pleasure that
he should offer his resignation in writing or at an audience.

To give the more dignity to the act, they determined that it should be
offered at a public audience on the following Tuesday, 23d of December,
at 12.

When the hour arrived for performing a ceremony so well calculated to
recall the various interesting scenes which had passed since the
commission now to be returned was granted, the gallery was crowded with
spectators and several persons of distinction were admitted on the
floor of Congress. The members remained seated and covered. The
spectators were standing and uncovered. Washington was introduced by
the secretary and conducted to a chair. After a short pause the
President, General Mifflin, informed him that "the United States in
Congress assembled were prepared to receive his communications." With
native dignity, improved by the solemnity of the occasion, Washington
rose and delivered the following address:

"MR. PRESIDENT.--The great events on which my resignation depended
having at length taken place, I have now the honor of offering my
sincere congratulations to Congress, and of presenting myself before
them, to surrender into their hands the trust committed to me, and to
claim the indulgence of retiring from the service of my country.

"Happy in the confirmation of our independence and sovereignty, and
pleased with an opportunity afforded the United States of becoming a
respectable nation, I resign with satisfaction the appointment I
accepted with diffidence; a diffidence in my abilities to accomplish so
arduous a task, which, however, was superseded by a confidence in
rectitude of our cause, the support of the supreme power of the Union,
and the patronage of Heaven.

"The successful termination of the war has verified the most sanguine
expectations, and my gratitude for the interposition of Providence, and
the assistance I have received from my countrymen increases with every
review of the momentous contest. While I repeat my obligations to the
army in general, I should do injustice to my own feelings not to
acknowledge in this place the peculiar services and distinguished
merits of the gentlemen who have been attached to my person during the
war. It was impossible the choice of confidential officers to compose
my family should have been more fortunate. Permit me, sir, to recommend
in particular, those who have continued in the service to the present
moment, as worthy of the favorable notice and patronage of Congress.

"I consider it as an indispensable duty to close this last act of my
official life, by commending the interests of our dearest country to
the protection of Almighty God, and those who have the superintendence
of them to His holy keeping.

"Having now finished the work assigned me, I retire from the great
theater of action, and, bidding an affectionate farewell to this august
body, under whose orders I have so long acted, I here offer my
commission and take my leave of all the employments of public life."

After advancing to the chair and delivering his commission to the
President, he returned to his place and received, standing, the
following answer of Congress, which was delivered by the President:

"SIR.--The United States, in Congress assembled, receive with emotions
too affecting for utterance, the solemn resignation of the authorities
under which you have led their troops with success through a perilous
and a doubtful war. Called upon by your country to defend its invaded
rights, you accepted the sacred charge before it had formed alliances
and whilst it was without funds or a government to support you. You
have conducted the great military contest with wisdom and fortitude,
invariably regarding the rights of the civil power through all
disasters and changes. You have, by the love and confidence of your
fellow citizens, enabled them to display their martial genius and
transmit their fame to posterity. You have persevered until these
United States, aided by a magnanimous King and nation, have been
enabled, under a just Providence, to close the war in freedom, safety,
and independence, on which happy event we sincerely join you in
congratulations.

"Having defended the standard of liberty in this new world, having
taught a lesson useful to those who inflict and to those who feel
oppression, you retire from the great theater of action with the
blessings of your fellow-citizens. But the glory of your virtues will
not terminate with your military command; it will continue to animate
remotest ages.

"We feel with you our obligations to the army in general and will
particularly charge ourselves with the interests of those confidential
officers who have attended your person to this affecting moment.

"We join you in commending the interests of our dearest country to the
protection of Almighty God, beseeching Him to dispose the hearts and
minds of its citizens to improve the opportunity afforded them of
becoming a happy and respectable nation. And for you we address to Him
our earnest prayers that a life so beloved may be fostered with all his
care; that your days may be as happy as they have been illustrious, and
that he will finally give you that reward which this world cannot
give."

This scene being closed, a scene rendered peculiarly interesting by the
personages who appeared in it, by the great events it recalled to the
memory, and by the singularity of the circumstances under which it was
displayed, the American chief withdrew from the hall of Congress,
leaving the silent and admiring spectators deeply impressed with those
sentiments which its solemnity and dignity were calculated to inspire.

Divested of his military character, Washington, on the following day,
set out for Mount Vernon to which favorite residence he now retired,
followed by the enthusiastic love, esteem, and admiration of his
countrymen. Relieved from the agitations of a doubtful contest and from
the toils of an exalted station he returned with increased delight to
the duties and the enjoyments of a private citizen. He indulged the
hope that in the shade of retirement, under the protection of a free
government and the benignant influence of mild and equal laws, he might
taste that felicity which is the reward of a mind at peace with itself
and conscious of its own purity. [2]

"Though General Washington was not stayed in his progress to
Philadelphia, by the Congress, who, on the 1st of November, had elected
the Honorable Thomas Mifflin President, and three days after had
adjourned to meet at Annapolis in Maryland on the 26th; yet it was the
8th of December, at noon, before General Washington arrived at the
Capital of Pennsylvania. When his intention of quitting the army was
known he was complimented and received with the utmost respect and
affection, by all orders of men, both civil and military. He remained
some days in Philadelphia. While in the city he delivered in his
accounts to the comptroller, down to December the 13th, all in his own
handwriting, and every entry made in the most particular manner,
stating the occasion of each charge, so as to give the least trouble in
examining and comparing them with the vouchers with which they were
attended.

"The heads are as follows, copied from the folio manuscript paper book,
in the file of the treasury office, No. 3700, being a black box of tin
containing, under lock and key, both that and the vouchers:

"Total of expenditures from 1775 to 1783, exclusive    .  s. d.
of provisions from commissaries and contractors,
and of liquors, &c., from them and others............ 3387 14 4
Secret intelligence and service...................... 1982 10 0
Spent in reconnoitering and traveling................  874  8 8
Miscellaneous charges ............................... 2952 10 1
Expended besides, dollars according to the scale of
depreciation ........................................ 6114 14 0
                                                    ___________

                                                   16,311 17 1

[3] "(General Washington's account) from June, 1775,    .  s. d.
to the end of June, 1783............................ 16,311 17 1
Expenditure from July 1, 1783, to Dec. 13...........   1717  5 4
(Added afterwards) from thence to Dec. 28...........    213  8 4
Mrs. Washington's traveling expenses in coming
to the General and returning........................   1064  1 0

                                                    19,306 11 9

"Lawful money of Virginia,
the same as the Massachusetts, or 14,479 18 9 3/4 sterling.

"The General entered in his book--'I find upon the final adjustment of
these accounts, that I am a considerable loser--my disbursements
falling a good deal short of my receipts, and the money I had upon hand
of my own; for besides the sums I carried with me to Cambridge in 1775,
I received moneys afterward on private account in 1777 and since, which
(except small sums that I had occasion now and then to apply to private
uses) were all expended in the public service: through hurry, I
suppose, and the perplexity of business (for I know not how else to
account for the deficiency) I have omitted to charge the same, whilst
every debit against me is here credited. July 1, 1783.'" [4]

"Happy would it have been for the United States had each person who has
handled public money been equally exact and punctual!

"General Washington, after delivering in his accounts, hastened to
Annapolis, where he arrived on the evening of the 19th December."

A facsimile of the original account, filling many foolscap pages, has
been published; and copies were eagerly ordered by collectors in Europe
as well as the United States.

The document through which Washington, at the close of the Revolution,
left to the States whose trust he had held, and whose work he had done,
does not yield in interest and importance to even the more famous
Farewell Address. It was sent to each of the Governors of the several
States, and was as follows:

WASHINGTON'S CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS OF ALL THE STATES ON
DISBANDING THE ARMY.

"Headquarters, Newburg, June 18, 1783. Sir:--The object for which I
had the honor to hold an appointment in the service of my country being
accomplished, I am now preparing to resign it into the hands of
Congress, and return to that domestic retirement, which, it is well
known, I left with the greatest reluctance; a retirement for which I
have never ceased to sigh through a long and painful absence, in which
(remote from the noise and trouble of the world) I meditate to pass the
remainder of life, in a state of undisturbed repose: but, before I
carry this resolution into effect, I think it a duty incumbent on me to
make this my last official communication, to congratulate you on the
glorious events which Heaven has been pleased to produce in our favor;
to offer my sentiments respecting some important subjects, which appear
to me to be intimately connected with the tranquility of the United
States; to take my leave of your Excellency as a public character; and
to give my final blessing to that country in whose service I have spent
the prime of my life, for whose sake I have consumed so many anxious
days and watchful nights, and whose happiness, being extremely dear to
me, will always constitute no inconsiderable part of my own.

"Impressed with the liveliest sensibility on this pleasing occasion, I
will claim the indulgence of dilating the more copiously on the subject
of our mutual felicitation. When we consider the magnitude of the prize
we contended for, the doubtful nature of the contest, and the favorable
manner in which it has terminated, we shall find the greatest possible
reason for gratitude and rejoicing. This is a theme that will afford
infinite delight to every benevolent and liberal mind, whether the
event in contemplation be considered as a source of present enjoyment,
or the parent of future happiness; and we shall have equal occasion to
felicitate ourselves on the lot which Providence has assigned us,
whether we view it in a natural, a political, or moral point of light.

"The citizens of America, placed in the most enviable condition, as the
sole lords and proprietors of a vast tract of continent, comprehending
all the various soils and climates of the world, and abounding with all
the necessaries and conveniences of life, are now, by the late
satisfactory pacification, acknowledged to be possessed of absolute
freedom and independency: they are from this period to be considered as
the actors on a most conspicuous theatre, which seems to be peculiarly
designed by Providence for the display of human greatness and felicity.
Here they are not only surrounded with every thing that can contribute
to the completion of private and domestic enjoyment; but Heaven has
crowned all its other blessings, by giving a surer opportunity for
political happiness, than any other nation has ever been favored with.
Nothing can illustrate these observations more forcibly than a
recollection of the happy conjuncture of times and circumstances under
which our republic assumed its rank among the nations. The foundation
of our empire was not laid in a gloomy age of ignorance and
superstition, but at an epoch when the rights of mankind were better
understood and more clearly defined, than at any former period.
Researches of the human mind after social happiness have been carried
to a great extent; the treasures of knowledge acquired by the labors of
philosophers, sages, and legislators, through a long succession of
years, are laid open for us, and their collected wisdom may be happily
applied in the establishment of our forms of government. The free
cultivation of letters, the unbounded extension of commerce, the
progressive refinement of manners, the growing liberality of sentiment;
and, above all, the pure and benign light of revelation, have had a
meliorating influence on mankind, and increased the blessings of
society. At this auspicious period, the United States came into
existence as a nation; and if their citizens should not be completely
free and happy, the fault will be entirely their own.

"Such is our situation, and such are our prospects. But notwithstanding
the cup of blessing is thus reached out to us; notwithstanding
happiness is ours, if we have a disposition to seize the occasion, and
make it our own; yet it appears to me there is an option still left to
the United States of America, whether they will be respectable and
prosperous, or contemptible and miserable as a nation. This is the time
of their political probation; this is the moment when the eyes of the
whole world are turned upon them; this is the time to establish or ruin
their national character forever; this is the favorable moment to give
such a tone to the federal government, as will enable it to answer the
ends of its institution; or, this may be the ill-fated moment for
relaxing the powers of the union, annihilating the cement of the
confederation, and exposing us to become the sport of European
politics, which may play one State against another, to prevent their
growing importance, and to serve their own interested purposes. For,
according to the system of policy the States shall adopt at this
moment, they will stand or fall; and, by their confirmation or lapse,
it is yet to be decided, whether the Revolution must ultimately be
considered as a blessing or a curse:--a blessing or a curse, not to the
present age alone, for with our fate will the destiny of unborn
millions be involved.

"With this conviction of the importance of the present crisis, silence
in me would be a crime; I will therefore speak to your Excellency the
language of freedom and sincerity, without disguise. I am aware,
however, those who differ from me in political sentiments may, perhaps,
remark, I am stepping out of the proper line of my duty; and they may
possibly ascribe to arrogance or ostentation, what I know alone is the
result of the purest intention. But the rectitude of my own heart,
which disdains such unworthy motives; the part I have hitherto acted in
life; the determination I have formed of not taking any share in public
business hereafter; the ardent desire I feel, and shall continue to
manifest, of quietly enjoying in private life, after all the toils of
war, the benefits of a wise and liberal government, will, I flatter
myself, sooner or later, convince my countrymen, that I could have no
sinister views in delivering with so little reserve the opinions
contained in this address.

"There are four things which I humbly conceive are essential to the
well-being, I may even venture to say to the existence, of the United
States as an independent power.

"1st. An indissoluble union of the States under one federal head.

"2dly. A sacred regard to public justice.

"3dly. The adoption of a proper peace establishment. And,

"4thly. The prevalence of that pacific and friendly disposition among
the people of the United States, which will induce them to forget their
local prejudices and policies; to make those mutual concessions which
are requisite to the general prosperity; and, in some instances, to
sacrifice their individual advantages to the interest of the community.

"These are the pillars on which the glorious fabric of our independency
and national character must be supported. Liberty is the basis; and
whoever would dare to sap the foundation, or overturn the structure,
under whatever specious pretext he may attempt it, will merit the
bitterest execration, and the severest punishment, which can be
inflicted by his injured country.

"On the three first articles I will make a few observations; leaving
the last to the good sense and serious consideration of those
immediately concerned.

"Under the first head, although it may not be necessary or proper for
me in this place to enter into a particular disquisition of the
principles of the union, and to take up the great question which has
been frequently agitated, whether it be expedient and requisite for the
States to delegate a larger portion of power to Congress, or not; yet
it will be a part of my duty, and that of every true patriot, to
assert, without reserve, and to insist upon the following
positions:--That unless the States will suffer Congress to exercise
those prerogatives they are undoubtedly invested with by the
Constitution, every thing must very rapidly tend to anarchy and
confusion: That it is indispensable to the happiness of the individual
States, that there should be lodged, somewhere, a supreme power to
regulate and govern the general concerns of the confederated Republic,
without which the union cannot be of long duration: That there must be
a faithful and pointed compliance on the part of every State with the
late proposals and demands of Congress, or the most fatal consequences
will ensue: That whatever measures have a tendency to dissolve the
union, or contribute to violate or lessen the sovereign authority,
ought to be considered as hostile to the liberty and independence of
America, and the authors of them treated accordingly. And, lastly, that
unless we can be enabled by the concurrence of the States to
participate of the fruits of the Revolution, and enjoy the essential
benefits of civil society, under a form of government so free and
uncorrupted, so happily guarded against the danger of oppression, as
has been devised and adopted by the articles of confederation, it will
be a subject of regret that so much blood and treasure have been
lavished for no purpose; that so many sufferings have been encountered
without a compensation; and that so many sacrifices have been made in
vain. Many other considerations might here be adduced to prove, that
without an entire conformity to the spirit of the union, we cannot
exist as an independent power. It will be sufficient for my purpose to
mention but one or two, which seem to me of the greatest importance. It
is only in our united character, as an empire, that our independence is
acknowledged that our power can be regarded, or our credit supported
among foreign nations. The treaties of the European powers with the
United States of America, will have no validity on a dissolution of the
union. We shall be left nearly in a state of nature; or we may find, by
our own unhappy experience, that there is a natural and necessary
progression from the extreme of anarchy to the extreme of tyranny; and
that arbitrary power is most easily established on the ruins of liberty
abused to licentiousness.

"As to the second article, which respects the performance of public
justice, Congress have, in their late address to the United States,
almost exhausted the subject; they have explained their ideas so fully,
and have enforced the obligations the States are under to render
complete justice to all the public creditors, with so much dignity and
energy, that, in my opinion, no real friend to the honor and
independency of America can hesitate a single moment respecting the
propriety of complying with the just and honorable measures proposed.
If their arguments do not produce conviction, I know of nothing that
will have greater influence, especially when we reflect that the system
referred to, being the result of the collected wisdom of the continent,
must be esteemed, if not perfect, certainly the least objectionable of
any that could be devised; and that, if it should not be carried into
immediate execution, a national bankruptcy, with all its deplorable
consequences, will take place before any different plan can possibly be
proposed or adopted; so pressing are the present circumstances, and
such is the alternative now offered to the States.

"The ability of the country to discharge the debts which have been
incurred in its defense, is not to be doubted; and inclination, I
flatter myself, will not be wanting. The path of our duty is plain
before us; honesty will be found, on every experiment to be the best
and only true policy. Let us then, as a nation, be just; let us fulfill
the public contracts which Congress had undoubtedly a right to make for
the purpose of carrying on the war, with the same good faith we suppose
ourselves bound to perform our private engagements. In the mean time,
let an attention to the cheerful performance of their proper business,
as individuals, and as members of society, be earnestly inculcated on
the citizens of America; then will they strengthen the bands of
government, and be happy under its protection. Every one will reap the
fruit of his labors: every one will enjoy his own acquisitions, without
molestation and without danger.

"In this state of absolute freedom and perfect security, who will
grudge to yield a very little of his property to support the common
interests of society, and insure the protection of government? Who does
not remember the frequent declarations at the commencement of the war,
that we should be completely satisfied, if, at the expense of one half,
we could defend the remainder of our possessions? Where is the man to
be found, who wishes to remain in debt for the defense of his own
person and property, to the exertions, the bravery, and the blood of
others, without making one generous effort to pay the debt of honor and
of gratitude? In what part of the continent shall we find any man, or
body of men, who would not blush to stand up and propose measures
purposely calculated to rob the soldier of his stipend, and the public
creditor of his due? And were it possible that such a flagrant instance
of injustice could ever happen, would it not excite the general
indignation, and tend to bring down upon the authors of such measures
the aggravated vengeance of Heaven? If, after all, a spirit of
disunion, or a temper of obstinacy and perverseness should manifest
itself in any of the States; if such an ungracious disposition should
attempt to frustrate all the happy effects that might be expected to
flow from the union; if there should be a refusal to comply with
requisitions for funds to discharge the annual interest of the public
debts; and if that refusal should revive all those jealousies, and
produce all those evils, which are now happily removed, Congress, who
have in all their transactions shown a great degree of magnanimity and
justice, will stand justified in the sight of God and man! and that
State alone, which puts itself in opposition to the aggregate wisdom of
the continent, and follows such mistaken and pernicious councils, will
be responsible for all the consequences.

"For my own part, conscious of having acted, while a servant of the
public, in the manner I conceived best suited to promote the real
interests of my country; having, in consequence of my fixed belief, in
some measure pledged myself to the army that their country would
finally do them complete and ample justice; and not wishing to conceal
any instance of my official conduct from the eyes of the world, I have
thought proper to transmit to your Excellency the enclosed collection
of papers, relative to the half-pay and commutation granted by
Congress to the officers of the army. From these communications my
decided sentiment will be clearly comprehended, together with the
conclusive reasons which induced me, at an early period, to recommend
the adoption of this measure in the most earnest and serious manner. As
the proceedings of Congress, the army, and myself, are open to all, and
contain, in my opinion, sufficient information to remove the prejudices
and errors which may have been entertained by any, I think it
unnecessary to say any thing more than just to observe, that the
resolutions of Congress now alluded to, are as undoubtedly and
absolutely binding upon the United States, as the most solemn acts of
confederation or legislation.

"As to the idea which, I am informed, has in some instances prevailed,
that the half-pay and commutation are to be regarded merely in the
odious light of a pension, it ought to be exploded forever: that
provision should be viewed, as it really was, a reasonable compensation
offered by Congress, at a time when they had nothing else to give to
officers of the army, for services then to be performed. It was the
only means to prevent a total dereliction of the service. It was a part
of their hire; I may be allowed to say, it was the price of their
blood, and of your independency. It is therefore more than a common
debt; it is a debt of honor: it can never be considered as a pension,
or gratuity, nor cancelled until it is fairly discharged.

"With regard to the distinction between officers and soldiers, it is
sufficient that the uniform experience of every nation of the world,
combined with our own, proves the utility and propriety of the
discrimination. Rewards in proportion to the aid the public draws from
them, are unquestionably due to all its servants. In some lines, the
soldiers have perhaps, generally, had as ample compensation for their
services, by the large bounties which have been paid them, as their
officers will receive in the proposed commutation; in others, if,
besides the donation of land, the payment of arrearages of clothing and
wages (in which articles all the component parts of the army must be
put upon the same footing), we take into the estimate the bounties many
of the soldiers have received, and the gratuity of one year's full pay,
which is promised to all, possibly their situation (every circumstance
being duly considered) will not be deemed less eligible than that of
the officers. Should a further reward, however, be judged equitable, I
will venture to assert, no man will enjoy greater satisfaction than
myself,--in an exemption from taxes for a limited time (which has been
petitioned for in some instances), or any other adequate immunity or
compensation granted to the brave defenders of their country's cause.
But neither the adoption or rejection of this proposition will, in any
manner, affect, much less militate against, the act of Congress by
which they have offered five years' full pay in lieu of the half-pay
for life, which had been before promised to the officers of the army.

"Before I conclude the subject on public justice, I cannot omit to
mention the obligations this country is under to the meritorious class
of veterans, the non-commissioned officers and privates, who have been
discharged for inability, in consequence of the resolution of Congress
of the 23d of April, 1782, on an annual pension for life. Their
peculiar sufferings, their singular merits and claims to that
provision, need only to be known to interest the feelings of humanity
in their behalf. Nothing but a punctual payment of their annual
allowance can rescue them from the most complicated misery; and nothing
could be a more melancholy and distressing sight than to behold those
who have shed their blood, or lost their limbs in the service of their
country, without a shelter, without a friend, and without the means of
obtaining any of the comforts or necessaries of life, compelled to beg
their bread daily from door to door. Suffer me to recommend those of
this description, belonging to your State, to the warmest patronage of
your Excellency and your legislature.

"It is necessary to say but a few words on the third topic which was
proposed, and which regards particularly the defense of the
republic--as there can be little doubt but Congress will recommend a
proper peace establishment for the United States, in which a due
attention will be paid to the importance of placing the militia of the
Union upon a regular and respectable footing. If this should be the
case, I should beg leave to urge the great advantage of it in the
strongest terms.

"The militia of this country must be considered as the palladium of our
security, and the first effectual resort in case of hostility. It is
essential, therefore, that the same system should pervade the whole;
that the formation and discipline of the militia of the continent
should be absolutely uniform; and that the same species of arms,
accoutrements, and military apparatus should be introduced in every
part of the United States. No one, who has not learned it from
experience, can conceive the difficulty, expense, and confusion which
result from a contrary system, or the vague arrangements which have
hitherto prevailed.

"If, in treating of political points, a greater latitude than usual has
been taken in the course of the address, the importance of the crisis,
and the magnitude of the objects in discussion, must be my apology. It
is, however, neither my wish nor expectation that the preceding
observations should claim any regard, except so far as they shall
appear to be dictated by a good intention, consonant to the immutable
rules of justice, calculated to produce a liberal system of policy, and
founded on whatever experience may have been acquired by a long and
close attention to public business. Here I might speak with more
confidence, from my actual observations; and if it would not swell this
letter (already too prolix) beyond the bounds I had prescribed myself,
I could demonstrate to every mind, open to conviction, that in less
time, and with much less expense than has been incurred, the war might
have been brought to the same happy conclusion, if the resources of the
continent could have been properly called forth; that the distresses
and disappointments which have very often occurred have, in too many
instances, resulted more from a want of energy in the continental
government, than a deficiency of means in the particular States; that
the inefficiency of the measures, arising from the want of an adequate
authority in the supreme power, from a partial compliance with the
requisitions of Congress in some of the States, and from a failure of
punctuality in others, while they tended to damp the zeal of those who
were more willing to exert themselves, served also to accumulate the
expenses of the war, and to frustrate the best concerted plans; and
that the discouragement occasioned by the complicated difficulties and
embarrassments in which our affairs were by this means involved, would
have long ago produced the dissolution of any army, less patient, less
virtuous, and less persevering than that which I have had the honor to
command. But while I mention those things which are notorious facts, as
the defects of our federal constitution, particularly in the
prosecution of a war, I beg it may be understood, that as I have ever
taken a pleasure in gratefully acknowledging the assistance and support
I have derived from every class of citizens, so shall I always be happy
to do justice to the unparalleled exertions of the individual States,
on many interesting occasions.

"I have thus freely disclosed what I wished to make known, before I
surrendered up my public trust to those who committed it to me. The
task is now accomplished. I now bid adieu to your Excellency, as the
chief magistrate of your State; at the same time, I bid a last farewell
to the cares of office, and all the employments of public life.

"It remains, then, to be my final and only request, that your
Excellency will communicate these sentiments to your legislature at
their next meeting; and that they may be considered as the legacy of
one who has ardently wished, on all occasions, to be useful to his
country, and who, even in the shade of retirement, will not fail to
implore the divine benediction upon it.

"I now make it my earnest prayer, that God would have you, and the
State over which you preside, in his holy protection; that he would
incline the hearts of the citizens to cultivate a spirit of
subordination and obedience to government; to entertain a brotherly
affection and love for one another; for their fellow-citizens of the
United States at large, and particularly for their brethren who have
served in the field; and, finally, that he would most graciously be
pleased to dispose us all to do justice, to love mercy, and to demean
ourselves with that charity, humility, and pacific temper of the mind,
which were the characteristics of the divine Author of our blessed
religion; without an humble imitation of whose example, in these
things, we can never hope to be a happy nation.

"I have the honor to be, with much esteem and respect, sir, your
Excellency's most obedient and most humble servant,

"GEO. WASHINGTON."


NOTE.--On the 3d of September, 1783, the Definitive Treaty of Peace,
between Great Britain and the United States of America, was signed at
Paris, by David Hartley, Esq., on the part of his Britannic Majesty,
and by John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay, Esqs., on the part
of the United States. The treaty was ratified by Congress early in
January, 1784.


IN THE NAME OF THE MOST HOLY AND UNDIVIDED TRINITY.

It having pleased the Divine Providence to dispose the hearts of the
most serene and most potent prince, George the Third, by the grace of
God King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith,
Duke of Brunswick and Lunenburg, Arch-Treasurer and Prince Elector of
the holy Roman empire, etc., and of the United States of America, to
forget all past misunderstandings and differences that have unhappily
interrupted the good correspondence and friendship which they mutually
wish to restore, and to establish such a beneficial and satisfactory
intercourse between the two countries, upon the ground of reciprocal
advantages and mutual convenience, as may promote and secure to both
perpetual peace and harmony; and having for this desirable end already
laid the foundation of peace and reconciliation, by the provisional
articles signed at Paris, on the 30th of November, 1782, by the
commissioners empowered on each part; which articles were agreed to be
inserted in, and to constitute the treaty of peace proposed to be
concluded between the crown of Great Britain and the said United
States, but which treaty was not to be concluded until the terms of
peace should be agreed upon between Great Britain and France, and his
Britannic majesty should be ready to conclude such treaty accordingly;
and the treaty between Great Britain and France having since been
concluded, his Britannic majesty and the United States of America, in
order to carry into full effect the provisional articles above
mentioned, according to the tenor thereof, have constituted and
appointed, that is to say, his Britannic majesty on his part, David
Hartley, Esq., member of the Parliament of Great Britain; and the said
United States on their part, John Adams, Esq., late a commissioner of
the United States of America at the court of Versailles, late delegate
in Congress from the State of Massachusetts, and chief-justice of the
said State, and minister plenipotentiary of the said United States to
their high mightinesses the States General of the United Netherlands;
Benjamin Franklin, Esq., late delegate in Congress from the State of
Pennsylvania, president of the Convention of the said State, and
minister plenipotentiary from the United States of America at the court
of Versailles; and John Jay, Esq., late president of Congress, and
chief-justice of the State of New York, and minister plenipotentiary
from the said United States at the court of Madrid; to be the
plenipotentiaries for the concluding and signing the present definitive
treaty; who, after having reciprocally communicated their respective
full powers, have agreed upon and confirmed the following articles.

ART. I.--His Britannic majesty acknowledges the said United States,
viz., New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, to be
free, sovereign, and independent States; that he treats them as such,
and for himself, his heirs, and successors, relinquishes all claim to
the government, proprietary, and territorial right of the same, and
every part thereof.

ART. II.-And that all disputes which might arise in future on the
subject of the boundaries of the said United States may be prevented,
it is hereby agreed and declared that the following are and shall be
their boundaries, viz.: from the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, viz.,
that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of
St. Croix River to the high lands which divide those rivers that empty
themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the
Atlantic Ocean, to the northwestern most head of Connecticut River;
thence drawn along the middle of that river to the forty-fifth degree
of north latitude; from thence by a line due west on said latitude,
until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraquy; thence along the
middle of said river into Lake Ontario; through the middle of said lake
until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and Lake
Erie; thence along the middle of the said communication into Lake Erie,
through the middle of said lake, until it arrives at the water
communication between that lake and Lake Huron; thence through the
middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and
Lake Superior; thence through Lake Superior northward to the isles
Royal and Philipeaux, to the Long Lake; thence through the middle of
said Long Lake, and the water communication between it and the Lake of
the Woods, to the said Lake of the Woods; thence through the said lake
to the most northwestern most point thereof, and from thence a due west
course to the river Mississippi; thence by a line to be drawn along the
middle of the said river Mississippi, until it shall intersect the
northernmost part of the thirty-first degree of north latitude; south,
by a line to be drawn due east from the determination of the line last
mentioned, in the latitude of thirty-one degrees north of the equator,
to the middle of the river Apalachicola or Catahouche; thence along the
middle thereof, to its junction with the Flint River; thence straight
to the head of St. Mary's River, and thence down the middle of St.
Mary's River to the Atlantic Ocean; east, by a line to be drawn along
the middle of the River St. Croix, from its mouth in the Bay of Fundy
to its source, and from its source directly north to the aforesaid high
lands, which divide the rivers that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from
those which fall into the river St. Lawrence, comprehending all islands
within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States,
and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points where the
aforesaid boundaries between Nova Scotia on the one part, and east
Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the
Atlantic Ocean, excepting such islands as now are or heretofore have
been within the limits of the said province of Nova Scotia.

ART. III.--It is agreed, that the people of the United States shall
continue to enjoy, unmolested, the right to take fish of every kind on
the Great Bank, and on all the other banks of Newfoundland; also in the
Gulf of St. Lawrence, and at all other places in the sea where the
inhabitants of both countries used at any time heretofore to fish; and
also that the inhabitants of the United States shall have liberty to
take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as
British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on that
island), and also on the coasts, bays, and creeks of all other of his
Britannic majesty's dominions in America; and that the American
fishermen shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the
unsettled bays, harbors, and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands,
and Labrador, so long as the same shall remain unsettled; but as soon
as the same shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for the said
fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement, without a previous
agreement for that purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors, or
possessors of the ground.

ART. IV.--It is agreed, that the creditors, on either side, shall meet
with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling
money of all _bona fide_ debts heretofore contracted.

ART. V.--It is agreed, that Congress shall earnestly recommend it to
the legislatures of the respective States, to provide for the
restitution of all estates, rights, and properties, which have been
confiscated, belonging to real British subjects; and also of the
estates, rights, and properties of persons resident in districts in the
possession of his majesty's arms, and who have not borne arms against
the United States; and that persons of any other description shall have
free liberty to go to any part or parts of any of the thirteen United
States, and therein to remain twelve months unmolested in their
endeavors to obtain the restitution of such of their estates, rights,
and properties as may have been confiscated; and that Congress shall
also earnestly recommend to the several States a reconsideration and
revision of all acts or laws regarding the premises, so as to render
the said laws or acts perfectly consistent, not only with justice and
equity, but with that spirit of conciliation which, on the return of
the blessings of peace, should invariably prevail; and that Congress
shall also earnestly recommend to the several States, that the estates,
rights, and properties of such last-mentioned persons shall be restored
to them, they refunding to any persons who may be now in possession,
the _bona fide_ price (where any has been given) which such persons may
have paid on purchasing any of the said lands, rights, or properties,
since the confiscation. And it is agreed, that all persons who have any
interest in confiscated lands, either by debts, marriage settlements,
or otherwise, shall meet with no lawful impediment in the prosecution
of their just rights.

ART. VI.--That there shall be no future confiscations made, nor any
prosecutions commenced against any person or persons, for or by reason
of the part which he or they may have taken in the present war; and
that no person shall on that account suffer any future loss or damage,
either in his person, liberty, or property; and that those who may be
in confinement on such charges, at the time of the ratification of the
treaty in America, shall be immediately set at liberty, and the
prosecutions so commenced be discontinued.

ART. VII.--There shall be a firm and perpetual peace between his
Britannic majesty and the said United States, and between the subjects
of the one and the citizens of the other; wherefore all hostilities,
both by sea and land, shall from henceforth cease; all prisoners, on
both sides, shall be set at liberty; and his Britannic majesty shall,
with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or
carrying away any negroes or other property of the American
inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from the
said United States, and from every post, place, and harbor within the
same, leaving in all fortifications the American artillery that may be
therein; and shall also order and cause all archives, records, deeds,
and papers belonging to any of the said States, or their citizens,
which in the course of the war may have fallen into the hands of his
officers, to be forthwith restored, and delivered to the proper States
and persons to whom they belong.

ART. VIII.--The navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to
the ocean, shall forever remain free and open to the subjects of Great
Britain and the citizens of the United States.

Art. IX.--In case it should so happen that any place or territory,
belonging to Great Britain or to the United States, should have been
conquered by the arms of either from the other, before the arrival of
the said provisional articles in America, it is agreed that the same
shall be restored without difficulty and without requiring any
compensation.

Art. X.--The solemn ratifications of the present treaty, expedited in
good and due form, shall be exchanged between the contracting parties
in the space of six months, or sooner, if possible, to be computed from
the day of the signature of the present treaty.

1. Footnote: C. J. Peterson, "History of the Navy of the United
States."

2. Footnote: Gordon thus notices the settlement of Washington's
accounts with the government.

3. Footnote: Two hundred guineas advanced to General M'Dougat are not
included in the 1982 10, not being yet settled, but included in some
of the other charges, and so reckoned in the general sum.

4. Footnote: 104,364, of the dollars were received after March, 1780,
and although credited forty for one, many did not fetch at the rate of
a hundred for one, while 27,775 of them are returned without deducting
anything from the above account (and therefore actually made a present
to the public).

       *       *       *       *       *

PART V. WASHINGTON A PRIVATE CITIZEN.




CHAPTER I.


WASHINGTON'S RETURN TO PRIVATE LIFE. 1783-1784.


When Washington retired from the command of the army it was undoubtedly
his intention to devote the remainder of his life to his favorite
pursuit of agriculture. His estate had suffered considerably from his
devotion to public duties, and his private affairs now demanded all his
attention. The Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania instructed the
delegates of that State in Congress to propose a public remuneration
for his services, but when the proposition was submitted for his
approbation he promptly declined it. This was in strict consistency
with his uniform character of disinterestedness. A liberal grant would
have been voted by Congress and sanctioned by the nation, but
Washington would not consent to receive it.

His feelings on finding himself a private citizen are expressed in his
correspondence. In a letter to Governor Clinton, written only three
days after his arrival at Mount Vernon, he says: "The scene is at
length closed. I feel myself eased of a load of public care and hope to
spend the remainder of my days in cultivating the affections of good
men, and in the practice of the domestic virtues."

"At length, my dear marquis," said he to his noble and highly-valued
friend, Lafayette, "I have become a private citizen on the banks of the
Potomac, and under the shadow of my own vine and my own fig tree, free
from the bustle of a camp and the busy scenes of public life, I am
solacing myself with those tranquil enjoyments of which the soldier,
who is ever in pursuit of fame--the statesman, whose watchful days and
sleepless nights are spent in devising schemes to promote the welfare
of his own, perhaps the ruin of other countries, as if this globe was
insufficient for us all--and the courtier, who is always watching the
countenance of his prince in the hope of catching a gracious smile--can
have very little conception. I have not only retired from all public
employments, but am retiring within myself, and shall be able to view
the solitary walk and tread the paths of private life with heartfelt
satisfaction. Envious of none I am determined to be pleased with all,
and this, my dear friend, being the order of my march, I will move
gently down the stream of life until I sleep with my fathers."

But a mind accustomed to labor for a nation's welfare does not
immediately divest itself of ancient habits. That custom of thinking on
public affairs, and that solicitude respecting them, which belong to
the patriot in office, follow him into his retreat. In a letter to
General Knox, written soon after his resignation, Washington thus
expressed the feelings attendant upon this sudden transition from
public to private pursuits. "I am just beginning to experience the ease
and freedom from public cares, which however desirable, takes some time
to realize, for, strange as it may seem, it is nevertheless true that
it was not until lately I could get the better of my usual custom of
ruminating, as soon as I awoke in the morning, on the business of the
ensuing day, and of my surprise at finding, after revolving many things
in my mind, that I was no longer a public man or had anything to do
with public transactions. I feel now, however, as I conceive a wearied
traveler must do who, after treading many a painful step with a heavy
burden on his shoulders, is eased of the latter, having reached the
haven to which all the former were directed, and from his house-top is
looking back and tracing with an eager eye the meanders by which he
escaped the quicksands and mires which lay in his way, and into which
none but the all-powerful Guide and Dispenser of human events could
have prevented his falling."

For several months after arriving at Mount Vernon, almost every day
brought him the addresses of an affectionate and grateful people. The
glow of expression in which the high sense universally entertained of
his services was conveyed, manifested the warmth of feeling which
animated the American bosom. This unexampled tribute of voluntary
applause, paid by a whole people to an individual no longer in power,
made no impression on the unassuming modesty of his character and
deportment. The same firmness of mind, the same steady and
well-tempered judgment, which had guided him through the most perilous
seasons of the war, still regulated his conduct, and the enthusiastic
applauses of an admiring nation served only to cherish sentiments of
gratitude and to give greater activity to the desire still further to
contribute to the general prosperity.

Soon after peace was proclaimed Congress unanimously passed a
resolution for the erection of an equestrian statue of Washington, at
the place which should be established for the residence of the
government.

The Legislature of Virginia, too, at its first session after his
resignation, passed the following resolution:

"Resolved, That the Executive be requested to take measures for
procuring a statue of General Washington, to be of the finest marble
and best workmanship, with the following inscription on its pedestal:

"The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia have caused this
statue to be erected as a monument of affection and gratitude to George
Washington, who, uniting to the endowments of the hero, the virtues of
the patriot, and exerting both in establishing the liberties of his
country, has rendered his name dear to his fellow-citizens, and given
the world an immortal example of true glory." [5]

In addition to the attention which he bestowed on his own estate
Washington endeavored to ameliorate the condition of agriculture
generally. Nothing could be more wretched than the general state of
this useful art in America. To its amelioration by examples which might
be followed, and by the introduction of systems adapted to the soil,
the climate, and to the wants of the people, the energies of his active
and intelligent mind were now in a great degree directed. No
improvement of the implements to be used on a farm, no valuable
experiments in husbandry, escaped his attention. His inquiries, which
were equally minute and comprehensive, extended beyond the limits of
his own country, and he entered into a correspondence on this
interesting subject with Arthur Young, the celebrated English writer,
and with other foreigners who had been most distinguished for their
additions to the stock of agricultural science.

Mingled with this favorite pursuit were the multiplied avocations
resulting from the high office he had lately filled. He was engaged in
an extensive correspondence with the friends most dear to his
heart--the foreign and American officers who had served under him
during the late war--and with almost every conspicuous political
personage of his own, and with many of other countries. Literary men
also were desirous of obtaining his approbation of their works, and his
attention was solicited to every production of American genius. His
countrymen who were about to travel were anxious to receive from the
first citizen of the rising Republic, some testimonial bearing his
signature, and all those strangers of distinction, who visited this
newly-created empire, were ambitious of being presented to its founder.
In addition to visitors of distinction, and those who had claims of
ancient friendship, he was subjected to the annoyance of visitors, who,
without any just pretension to such an honor, made visits to Mount
Vernon merely to gratify their curiosity, and to the scarcely less
wearisome annoyance of tedious and unnecessary letters. Of these
unwelcome intrusions upon his time Washington thus complained to an
intimate military friend. "It is not, my dear sir, the letters of my
friends which give me trouble or add aught to my perplexity. I receive
them with pleasure, and pay as much attention to them as my avocations
will permit. It is references to old matters with which I have nothing
to do--applications which oftentimes cannot be complied
with--inquiries, to satisfy which would employ the pen of an
historian--letters of compliment, as unmeaning perhaps as they are
troublesome, but which must be attended to--and the common-place
business--which employ my pen and my time often disagreeably. Indeed
these, with company, deprive me of exercise, and, unless I can obtain
relief, must be productive of disagreeable consequences. Already I
begin to feel their effects. Heavy and painful oppressions of the head
and other disagreeable sensations often trouble me. I am determined
therefore to employ some person who shall ease me of the drudgery of
this business. At any rate, if the whole of it is thereby suspended, I
am determined to use exercise. My private affairs also require
infinitely more attention than I have given or can give them under
present circumstances. They can no longer be neglected without
involving my ruin."

It was some time after the date of this letter before he introduced
into his family a young gentleman, qualified by education and manners
to fill the station of private secretary and friend. This was Mr.
Tobias Lear of New Hampshire, who had graduated at Harvard college.

The numerous visits which Washington received made Mount Vernon
anything but a place of seclusion and repose, and "during these
stirring times Mrs. Washington performed the duties of a Virginia
housewife and presided at her well-spread board with that ease and
elegance of manners which always distinguished her." [2]

This multiplicity of private avocations could not entirely withdraw the
mind of Washington from objects tending to promote and secure the
public happiness. His resolution never again to appear in the busy
scenes of political life, though believed by himself and by his bosom
friends to be unalterable, could not render him indifferent to those
measures on which the prosperity of his country essentially depended.

It is a very interesting fact that Washington was among the first, if
not the very first of our public men, who were impressed with the
importance of connecting the western with the eastern territory, by
facilitating the means of intercourse between them. To this subject his
attention had been directed in the early part of his life. While the
American States were yet British colonies he had obtained the passage
of a bill for opening the Potomac so as to render it navigable from
tide-water to Wills creek, a distance of about 150 miles. The river
James had also been comprehended in this plan, and he had triumphed so
far over the opposition produced by local interests and prejudices,
that the business was in a train which promised success, when the
Revolutionary War diverted the attention of its patrons, and of all
America, from internal improvements to the still greater objects of
liberty and independence. As that war approached its termination,
subjects which for a time had yielded their pretensions to
consideration, reclaimed that place to which their real magnitude
entitled them, and internal navigation again attracted the attention of
the wise and thinking part of society. Accustomed to contemplate
America as his country and to consider with solicitude the interests of
the whole, Washington now took a more enlarged view of the advantages
to be derived from opening both the eastern and the western waters; and
for this, as well as for other purposes, after peace had been
proclaimed, he traversed the western parts of New England and New York.
"I have lately," said he, in a letter to the Marquis of Chastellux,
"made a tour through the lakes George and Champlain as far as Crown
Point; then returning to Schenectady I proceeded up the Mohawk river to
Fort Schuyler, crossed over to Wood creek, which empties into the
Oneida lake and affords the water communication with Ontario. I then
traversed the country to the head of the eastern branch of the
Susquehanna and viewed the lake Otsego and the portage between that
lake and the Mohawk river at Canajoharie. Prompted by these actual
observations, I could not help taking a more contemplative and
extensive view of the vast inland navigation of these United States,
and could not but be struck with the immense diffusion and importance
of it, and with the goodness of that Providence which has dealt His
favors to us with so profuse a hand. Would to God we may have wisdom
enough to improve them. I shall not rest contented until I have
explored the western country and traversed those lines (or great part
of them) which have given bounds to a new empire." The journey here
referred to was performed in company with Governor Clinton while the
army was encamped at Newburg.

Scarcely had he answered those spontaneous offerings of the heart which
flowed in upon him from every part of a grateful nation, when his views
were once more seriously turned to this truly interesting subject. Its
magnitude was also impressed on others, and the value of obtaining the
aid which his influence and active interference would afford to any
exertions for giving this direction to the public mind, and for
securing the happy execution of the plan which might be devised, was
perceived by all those who attached to the great work its real
importance. Jefferson, who had taken an expanded view of it concluded a
letter to Washington containing a detailed statement of his ideas on
the subject in these terms:

"But a most powerful objection always arises to propositions of this
kind. It is, that public undertakings are carelessly managed and much
money spent to little purpose. To obviate this objection is the purpose
of my giving you the trouble of this discussion. You have retired from
public life. You have weighed this determination, and it would be
impertinence in me to touch it. But would the superintendence of this
work break in too much on the sweets of retirement and repose? If they
would I stop here. Your future time and wishes are sacred in my eye. If
it would be only a dignified amusement to you, what a monument of your
retirement would it be! It is one which would follow that of your
public life and bespeak it the work of the same great hand. I am
confident that would you, either alone or jointly with any persons you
think proper, be willing to direct this business, it would remove the
only objection, the weight of which I apprehend."

In September, 1784, Washington fulfilled the intention expressed in his
letter to the Marquis of Chastellux, by making a tour to the western
country. He went on horseback, using pack-horses for his tent and
baggage. He crossed the Alleghenies by Braddock's road, examined his
lands on the Monongahela river, and returned through the wilderness by
a circuitous route, examining the country in order to determine the
practicability of connecting the Potomac and James rivers with the
western waters by means of canals. The whole journey extended some 680
miles. [3]

After returning from this tour Washington's first moments of leisure
were devoted to the task of engaging his countrymen in a work which
appeared to him to merit still more attention from its political than
from its commercial influence on the Union. In a long and interesting
letter to Mr. Harrison then Governor of Virginia, he detailed the
advantages which might be derived from opening the great rivers, the
Potomac and the James, as high as should be practicable. After stating,
with his accustomed exactness, the distances and the difficulties to be
surmounted in bringing the trade of the west to different points on the
Atlantic, he expressed unequivocally the opinion that the rivers of
Virginia afforded a more convenient and a more direct course than could
be found elsewhere for that rich and increasing commerce. This was
strongly urged as a motive for immediately commencing the work. But the
rivers of the Atlantic constituted only a part of the great plan he
contemplated. He suggested the appointment of commissioners who should,
after an accurate examination of the James and the Potomac, search out
the nearest and best portages between those waters and the streams
which run into the Ohio. Those streams were to be accurately surveyed,
the impediments to their navigation ascertained, and their relative
advantages examined. The navigable waters west of the Ohio toward the
great lakes were also to be traced to their sources and those which
emptied into the lakes to be followed to their mouths. "These things
being done, and an accurate map of the whole presented to the public,
he was persuaded that reason would dictate what was right and proper."
For the execution of this latter part of his plan he had also much
reliance on Congress, and, in addition to the general advantages to be
drawn from the measure, he labored in his letters to the members of
that body to establish the opinion that the surveys he recommended
would add to the revenue by enhancing the value of the lands offered
for sale. "Nature," he said, "had made such an ample display of her
bounties in those regions that the more the country was explored the
more it would rise in estimation."

The assent and cooperation of Maryland being indispensable to the
improvement of the Potomac, he was equally earnest in his endeavors to
impress a conviction of its superior advantages on those individuals
who possessed most influence in that State. In doing so he detailed the
measures which would unquestionably be adopted by New York and
Pennsylvania for acquiring the monopoly of the western commerce, and
the difficulty which would be found in diverting it from the channel it
had once taken. "I am not," he added, "for discouraging the exertions
of any State to draw the commerce of the western country to its
seaports. The more communications we open to it the closer we bind that
rising world (for indeed it may be so called) to our interests, and the
greater strength shall we acquire by it. Those to whom nature affords
the best communication will, if they are wise, enjoy the greatest share
of the trade. All I would be understood to mean, therefore, is, that
the gifts of Providence may not be neglected."

But the light in which this subject would be viewed with most interest
and which gave to it most importance, was its political influence on
the Union. "I need not remark to you, sir," said he, in his letter to
Governor Harrison of Virginia, "that the flanks and rear of the United
States are possessed by other powers--and formidable ones, too: nor
need I press the necessity of applying the cement of interest to bind
all parts of the Union together by indissoluble bonds--especially of
binding that part of it which lies immediately west of us to the middle
States. For what ties, let me ask, should we have upon those people?
How entirely unconnected with them shall we be, and what troubles may
we not apprehend if the Spaniards on their right and Great Britain on
their left, instead of throwing impediments in their way as they now
do, should hold out lures for their trade and alliance? When they get
strength, which will be sooner than most people conceive, what will be
the consequence of their having formed close commercial connections
with both or either of those powers, it needs not, in my opinion, the
gift of prophecy to foretell."

This idea was enlarged and pressed with much earnestness in his letters
to several members of Congress.

The letter to Governor Harrison was communicated to the Assembly of
Virginia, and the internal improvements it recommended were zealously
supported by the wisest members of that body. While the subject
remained undecided, Washington, accompanied by Lafayette, who had
crossed the Atlantic and had arrived at Mount Vernon on the 17th of
August, paid a visit to the capital of the State. Never was reception
more cordial or more demonstrative of respect and affection than was
given to these beloved personages. But amidst the display of addresses
and of entertainments which were produced by the occasion, the great
business of internal improvements was not forgotten, and the ardor of
the moment was seized to conquer those objections to the plan which yet
lingered in the bosoms of members who could perceive in it no future
advantage to compensate for the present expense.

An exact conformity between the acts of Virginia and of Maryland being
indispensable to the improvement of the Potomac, a resolution was
passed soon after the return of Washington to Mount Vernon, requesting
him to attend the Legislature of Maryland, in order to agree on a bill
which might receive the sanction of both States. This agreement being
happily completed, the bills were passed, and thus began that grand
system of internal improvement by which the eastern portion of the
Union is bound to the west. Canals and portages were the forerunners of
the railroads by which every part of the country is now traversed, and
the whole Republic is firmly united in bonds of mutual intercourse,
which, it is fondly hoped will prove perpetual.

The Legislature of Virginia seized the occasion afforded by the passage
of these acts to signalize the affection and gratitude of the State
towards her favorite son. A bill was drafted by Mr. Madison, the
preamble of which was in the following words:

"Whereas, it is the desire of the representatives of this commonwealth
to embrace every suitable occasion of testifying their sense of the
unexampled merits of George Washington, Esquire, toward his country,
and it is their wish in particular that those great works for its
improvement, which, both as springing from the liberty which he has
been so instrumental in establishing and as encouraged by his patronage
will be durable monuments of his glory, may be made monuments also of
the gratitude of his country. Be it enacted, &c."

By this bill the treasurer was instructed to subscribe, in behalf of
the State, for a specified number of shares in each company. Just at
the close of the session, when no refusal of their offer could be
communicated to them, a bill was suddenly brought in which received the
unanimous assent of both houses, authorizing the treasurer to subscribe
for the benefit of Washington the same number of shares in each company
as were to be taken for the State. The actual value of the shares was
$40,000.

Washington was greatly embarrassed by this mark of gratitude. It
afforded him pleasure to see that his character and services were
appreciated by his fellow-citizens. But he would not depart from his
determination to receive no pecuniary reward for his public services.

To Madison, who conveyed to him the first intelligence of this bill,
his difficulties were thus expressed:

"It is not easy for me to decide by which my mind was most affected
upon the receipt of your letter of the sixth instant--surprise or
gratitude. Both were greater than I had words to express. The attention
and good wishes which the Assembly has evinced by their act for vesting
in me 150 shares in the navigation of the rivers Potomac and James, is
more than mere compliment--there is an unequivocal and substantial
meaning annexed. But, believe me, sir, no circumstance has happened
since I left the walks of public life which has so much embarrassed me.
On the one hand, I consider this act, as I have already observed, as a
noble and unequivocal proof of the good opinion, the affection, and
disposition of my country to serve me, and I should be hurt, if, by
declining the acceptance of it my refusal should be construed into
disrespect or the smallest slight upon the generous intention of the
legislature, or that an ostentatious display of disinterestedness of
public virtue was the source of refusal.

"On the other hand, it is really my wish to have my mind and my
actions, which are the result of reflection as free and independent as
the air, that I may be more at liberty (in things which my
opportunities and experience have brought me to the knowledge of) to
express my sentiments, and, if necessary, to suggest what may occur to
me under the fullest conviction that, although my judgment may be
arraigned, there will be no suspicion that sinister motives had the
smallest influence in the suggestion. Not content then with the bare
consciousness of my having in all this navigation business, acted upon
the clearest conviction of the political importance of the measure, I
would wish that every individual who may hear that it was a favorite
plan of mine, may know also, that I had no other motive for promoting
it than the advantage of which I conceived it would be productive to
the Union at large and to this State in particular, by cementing the
eastern and western territory together, at the same time that it will
give vigor and increase to our commerce and be a convenience to our
citizens."

At length he determined, in the same letter which should convey his
resolution not to retain the shares for his private emolument, to
signify his willingness to hold them in trust for such public
institution as the Legislature should approve. The following letter
conveyed this resolution to the General Assembly through the governor
of the State:


OCTOBER, 1785.

"SIR:--Your Excellency having been pleased to transmit me a copy of the
act appropriating to my benefit certain shares in the companies for
opening the navigation of James and Potomac rivers, I take the liberty
of returning to the General Assembly, through your hands, the profound
and grateful acknowledgments inspired by so signal a mark of their
beneficent intentions towards me. I beg you, sir, to assure them that I
am filled on this occasion with every sentiment which can flow from a
heart warm with love for my country, sensible to every token of its
approbation and affection, and solicitous to testify in every instance
a respectful submission to its wishes.

"With these sentiments in my bosom, I need not dwell on the anxiety I
feel in being obliged, in this instance, to decline a favor which is
rendered no less flattering by the manner in which it is conveyed, than
it is affectionate in itself. In explaining this I pass over a
comparison of my endeavors in the public service, with the many
honorable testimonies of approbation which have already so far
overrated, and overpaid them--reciting one consideration only, which
supersedes the necessity of recurring to every other.

"When I was first called to the station with which I was honored during
the late conflict for our liberties, to the diffidence which I had so
many reasons to feel in accepting it, I thought it my duty to join a
firm resolution to shut my hand against every pecuniary recompense. To
this resolution I have invariably adhered, and from it (if I had the
inclination) I do not consider myself at liberty now to depart.

"Whilst I repeat therefore my fervent acknowledgments to the
Legislature for their very kind sentiments and intentions in my favor,
and at the same time beg them to be persuaded that a remembrance of
this singular proof of their goodness towards me will never cease to
cherish returns of the warmest affection and gratitude, I must pray
that their act, so far as it has for its object my personal emolument,
may not have its effect; but if it should please the General Assembly
to permit me to turn the destination of the fund vested in me, from my
private emolument to objects of a public nature, it will be my study,
in selecting these, to prove the sincerity of my gratitude for the
honor conferred upon me, by preferring such as may appear most
subservient to the enlightened and patriotic views of the Legislature."

The wish suggested in this letter immediately received the sanction of
the Legislature, and at a subsequent time the trust was executed by
conveying the shares respectively to the use of a seminary of
learning--which is now called Washington college, and to a university
to be established in the District of Columbia, under the auspices of
the government.

Washington felt too strong an interest in the success of these works to
refuse the presidency of the companies instituted for their completion.
In conducting the affairs of the Potomac company, he took an active
part; to that formed for opening the navigation of the James, he could
only give his counsel.

While Washington was at Richmond attending to the interests of internal
navigation he had been joined by Lafayette, who, since his recent visit
to Mount Vernon, had accompanied the commissioners to Fort Schuyler to
make a treaty with the Indians, and had assisted on that occasion. He
had subsequently made a tour in the eastern States, where he was
received with much distinction and he was now on his return to pay a
farewell visit to Washington at Mount Vernon.

He remained only a week at Mount Vernon. Washington accompanied him to
Annapolis, where Lafayette was honored with a public reception and
address by the Legislature of Maryland, and there, on the 30th of
November, 1784, these distinguished men took leave of each other. From
Annapolis Lafayette proceeded to Trenton, where Congress was then in
session, and on Christmas day he embarked at New York for France in the
frigate Nymphe. The following is an extract from a letter written by
Washington to Lafayette on his return to Mount Vernon:

"The peregrination of the day in which I parted from you ended at
Maryborough. The next day, bad as it was, I got home before dinner.

"In the moment of separation, upon the road as I traveled, and every
hour since, I have felt all that love, respect, and attachment for you,
with which length of years, close connection, and your merits have
inspired me. I often asked myself, as our carriages separated, whether
that was the last sight I ever should have of you? And though I wished
to say No, my fears answered Yes. I called to mind the days of my
youth, and found they had long since fled to return no more; that I was
now descending the hill I had been fifty-two years climbing, and that,
though I was blest with a good constitution, I was of a short-lived
family, and might soon expect to be entombed in the mansion of my
fathers. These thoughts darkened the shades, and gave a gloom to the
picture, and consequently to my prospect of seeing you again. But I
will not repine; I have had my day.

"Nothing of importance has occurred since I parted with you. I found my
family well, and am now immersed in company; notwithstanding which, I
have in haste produced a few more letters to give you the trouble of,
rather inclining to commit them to your care, than to pass them through
many and unknown hands."

Among the letters referred to in the above extract was one to the
Marchioness de Lafayette and another to her little daughter. In the
former he writes: "The Marquis returns to you with all the warmth and
ardor of a newly-inspired lover. We restore him to you in good health,
crowned with wreaths of love and respect from every part of the Union."

1. Footnote: This statue was executed by Houdon, and stands in the
capitol at Richmond. It is in the costume of commander-in-chief of the
army, and is considered an excellent likeness. Another statue of
Washington, by Canova, was in the Roman costume, and in a sitting
posture. It was made for the State of North Carolina, and was
unfortunately destroyed when the capitol was burnt. Another statue
stands in the statehouse at Boston. It was the result of a private
subscription. A fourth, by Greenough, adorns the grounds of the capitol
at Washington.

2. Footnote: Custis, "Memoir of Martha Washington."

3. Footnote: Sparks.




CHAPTER II.


WASHINGTON PRESIDES AT THE FORMATION OP THE CONSTITUTION. 1785-1788.


On first retiring to Mount Vernon (1785), Washington had devoted his
attention to the restoration of his estate to that high condition of
order and productiveness which had been maintained under his own
personal superintendence previous to the war. During his absence of
nine years he had constantly corresponded with his manager and given
particular directions respecting its cultivation. But it had suffered
much in his absence, and he was determined to renovate it by assiduous
care. He gave up the cultivation of tobacco because it had a tendency
to exhaust the soil, and planted wheat in its stead, giving attention
at the same time to the production of grass, maize, potatoes, and oats,
and pursuing the system of rotation in crops now considered so
indispensable by intelligent farmers.

When this system was well established he commenced planting and
adorning with trees the grounds surrounding the mansion-house. His
diary shows that he paid great attention to this object, directing the
setting out of a great number and variety of ornamental trees, some of
them being obtained in the neighboring woods and others brought from a
great distance. He also replenished his gardens, orchards, and green-
houses with choice fruits and flowers which were confided to the care
of skilful gardeners.

Meantime the number of guests entertained at Mount Vernon was ever on
the increase. Many were known to have crossed the Atlantic for the sole
purpose of visiting the founder of the Republic. Among these was Mrs.
Catharine Macauley Graham. By the principles contained in her "History
of the Stuarts," this lady had acquired much reputation in republican
America and by all was received with marked attention. She was
cordially received at Mount Vernon, and, if her letters may be
credited, the exalted opinion she had formed of its proprietor was "not
diminished by a personal acquaintance with him."

The French military and naval officers, Lafayette, Rochambeau,
D'Estaing, and others, gave letters of introduction to be presented to
Washington by their friends whenever any of them came to America, and
those letters were always duly honored by hospitable attentions to
those who bore them. His own compatriots were still more numerous and
more assiduous in attention to the retired commander. Officers who had
served with him in the old French war and in the Revolution, members of
Congress, politicians, and magistrates from distant States, were among
the guests at Mount Vernon; so that Washington's time would thus have
been completely taken up but for the efficient aid which he received in
discharging the duties of hospitality from the ease, urbanity, and
excellent management of his accomplished lady.

"His habits," says Mr. Sparks, "were uniform and nearly the same as
they had been previously to the war. He arose before the sun and
employed himself in his study writing letters or reading till the hour
of breakfast. When breakfast was over his horse was ready at the door,
and he rode to his farms and gave directions for the day to the
managers and laborers. Horses were likewise prepared for his guests
whenever they chose to accompany him, or to amuse themselves by
excursions into the country. Returning from his fields and dispatching
such business as happened to be on hand, he went again to his study,
and continued there till 3 o'clock, when he was summoned to dinner. The
remainder of the day and the evening were devoted to company or to
recreation in the family circle. At 10 he retired to rest. From these
habits he seldom deviated unless compelled to do so by particular
circumstances." [1]

In a delightful memoir [2] of his own life and times by Mr. Elkanah
Watson, we find the following interesting notice of Washington at home,
and we also learn what subject chiefly occupied his thoughts at the
time of which we are writing:

"I had feasted my imagination for several days," says Mr. Watson, "on
the near prospect of a visit to Mount Vernon--the seat of Washington.
No pilgrim ever approached Mecca with deeper enthusiasm. I arrived
there on the afternoon of January 23d, 1785. I was the bearer of a
letter from General Greene, with another from Colonel Fitzgerald, one
of the former aides of Washington, and also the books from Granville
Sharpe. Although assured that these credentials would secure me a
respectful reception, I felt an unaccountable diffidence as I came into
the presence of the great man. I found him at table with Mrs.
Washington and his private family, and was received with the native
dignity and urbanity so peculiarly combined in the character of a
soldier and eminent private gentleman. He soon put me at ease, by
unbending in a free and affable conversation.

"The cautious reserve which wisdom and policy dictated whilst engaged
in rearing the glorious fabric of our independence was evidently the
result of consummate prudence and not characteristic of his nature.
Although I had frequently seen him in the progress of the Revolution
and had corresponded with him from France in 1781 and 1782, this was
the first occasion on which I had contemplated him in his private
relations. I observed a peculiarity in his smile which seemed to
illuminate his eye; his whole countenance beamed with intelligence,
while it commanded confidence and respect. The gentleman who had
accompanied me from Alexandria left in the evening, and I remained
alone in the enjoyment of the society of Washington for two of the
richest days of my life. I saw him reaping the reward of his
illustrious deeds in the quiet shade of his beloved retirement. He was
at the matured age of fifty-three. Alexander died before he reached
that period of life and he had immortalized his name. How much stronger
and nobler the claims of Washington to immortality! In the impulses of
mad, selfish ambition, Alexander acquired fame by wading to the
conquest of the world through seas of blood. Washington, on the
contrary, was parsimonious of the blood of his countrymen, stood forth
the pure and virtuous champion of their rights, and formed for them,
not himself, a mighty empire.

"To have communed with such a man in the bosom of his family I shall
always regard as one of the highest privileges and most cherished
incidents of my life. I found him kind and benignant in the domestic
circle, revered and beloved by all around him, agreeably social,
without ostentation; delighting in anecdote and adventures, without
assumption; his domestic arrangements harmonious and systematic. His
servants seemed to watch his eye, and to anticipate his every wish;
hence a look was equivalent to a command. His servant Billy, the
faithful companion of his military career, was always at his side.
Smiling content animated and beamed on every countenance in his
presence.

"The first evening I spent under the wing of his hospitality we sat a
full hour at table, by ourselves, without the least interruption, after
the family had retired. I was extremely oppressed with a severe cold
and excessive coughing, contracted from the exposure of a harsh winter
journey. He pressed me to use some remedies, but I declined doing so.
As usual after retiring my cough increased. When some time had elapsed
the door of my room was gently opened, and on drawing my bed-curtains,
to my utter astonishment, I beheld Washington himself standing at my
bedside with a bowl of hot tea in his hand. I was mortified and
distressed beyond expression. This little incident, occurring in common
life with an ordinary man would not have been noticed, but as a trait
of the benevolence and the private virtue of Washington it deserves to
be recorded.

"He modestly waived all allusions to the events in which he had acted
so glorious and conspicuous a part. Much of his conversation had
reference to the interior country and to the opening of the navigation
of the Potomac, by canals and locks at the Seneca, the Great, and the
Little Falls. His mind appeared to be deeply absorbed in that object,
then in earnest contemplation. He allowed me to take minutes from his
former journal on this subject, of which the following is a partial
summary:

"'The stock of the company is divided into 500 shares at 50 sterling
each. The canal company has been incorporated by both Maryland and
Virginia.' Washington had accepted the presidency of it. 'The
preliminary preparations are in full train, to commence operations in
the ensuing spring, not only to remove the obstacles in the Potomac to
a boat navigation from Georgetown to Fort Cumberland, a distance of 190
miles, but to the ultimate construction of a canal to Lake Erie, which
is intended not only to give a direction to the fur trade from Detroit
to Alexandria, but to attract the eventual trade of the country north
of the Ohio which now slumbers in a state of nature.' This scheme was
worthy of the comprehensive mind of Washington.

"To demonstrate the practicability and the policy of diverting the
trade of the immense interior world yet unexplored to the Atlantic
cities, especially in view of the idea that the Mississippi would be
opened by Spain, was his constant and favorite theme. To elucidate the
probability, also, that the Detroit fur trade would take this
direction, he produced the following estimates, which I copied in his
presence and with his aid from the original manuscript:

"From Detroit, at the head of Lake Erie, via Fort Pitt (now Pittsburgh)
and Fort Cumberland, to the head of the Potomac, is 607 Miles.

"To Richmond 840

"To Philadelphia 741

"To Albany 943

"To Montreal 955

"Thus it appeared that Alexandria is 348 miles nearer Detroit than
Montreal, with only two carrying places of about forty miles."

"Since my travels in 1779 I had been deeply and constantly impressed
with the importance of constructing canals to connect the various
waters of America. This conviction was confirmed under the examination
of numerous canals of Europe, and traveling extensively on several of
them. Hearing little else for two days from the persuasive tongue of
this great man I was, I confess, completely under the influence of the
canal mania, and it en kindled all my enthusiasm."

Among the objects which claimed the attention of Washington in his
retirement was a change in the constitution of the Cincinnati. This
society had been formed in May, 1783, when the army was encamped at
Newburg. The prospect of speedily separating from each other had
suggested the plan of forming an association among the officers to
serve as a tie of brotherhood for the future.

This idea was suggested by General Knox and was matured in a meeting
composed of the generals, and of deputies from the regiments, at which
Major-General Steuben presided. An agreement was then entered into by
which the officers were to constitute themselves into one society of
friends, to endure as long as they should endure, or any of their
eldest male posterity, and, in failure thereof, any collateral branches
who might be judged worthy of becoming its supporters and members, were
to be admitted into it. To mark their veneration for that celebrated
Roman between whose situation and their own they found some similitude,
they were to be denominated "The Society of the Cincinnati."
Individuals of the respective States, distinguished for their
patriotism and abilities, might be admitted as honorary members for
life, provided their numbers should at no time exceed a ratio of one to
four.

The society was to be designated by a medal of gold representing the
American eagle bearing on its breast the devices of the order, which
was to be suspended by a ribbon of deep blue edged with white,
descriptive of the union of America and France. To the ministers who
had represented the King of France at Philadelphia, to the admirals who
had commanded in the American seas, to the Count de Rochambeau and the
generals and colonels of the French troops who had served in the United
States, the insignia of the order were to be presented and they were to
be invited to consider themselves as members of the society, at the
head of which the Commander-in-Chief was respectfully solicited to
place his name. An incessant attention, on the part of the members, to
the preservation of the exalted rights and liberties of human nature
for which they had fought and bled, and an unalterable determination to
promote and cherish between the respective States union and national
honor, were declared to be the immutable principles of the society. Its
objects were to perpetuate the remembrance of the American revolution,
as well as cordial affection and the spirit of brotherly kindness among
the officers, and to extend acts of beneficence to those officers and
their families whose situation might require assistance. To give effect
to the charitable object of the institution a common fund was to be
created by the deposit of one month's pay on the part of every officer
becoming a member, the product of which fund, after defraying certain
necessary charges, was to be sacredly appropriated to this humane
purpose.

The military gentlemen of each State were to constitute a distinct
society, deputies from which were to assemble triennially in order to
form a general meeting for the regulation of general concerns.

Without encountering any open opposition this institution was carried
into complete effect, and its honors were sought, especially by the
foreign officers, with great avidity. But soon after it was organized
those jealousies, which in its first moments had been concealed, burst
forth into open view. In October, 1783, a pamphlet was published by Mr.
Burk of South Carolina, for the purpose of rousing the apprehensions of
the public, and of directing its resentments against the society. In
this work its was denounced as an attempt to form an order of nobility.
The hereditary feature of the constitution and the power of conferring
its honors on distinguished personages, not descended from the officers
of the army, were considered particularly inconsistent with the genius
of our republican institutions. In Massachusetts the subject was even
taken up by the Legislature, and it was well understood that, in
Congress, the society was viewed with secret disapprobation.

It was impossible for Washington to view with indifference this state
of the public feeling. Bound to the officers of his army by the
strictest ties of esteem and affection, conscious of their merits and
assured of their attachment to his person, he was alive to everything
which might affect their reputation or their interests. However
innocent the institution might be in itself or however laudable its
real objects, if the impression it made on the public mind was such as
to draw a line of distinction between the military men of America and
their fellow-citizens, he was earnest in his wishes to adopt such
measures as would efface that impression. However ill founded the
public prejudices might be he thought this a case in which they ought
to be respected, and, if it should be found impracticable to convince
the people that their fears were misplaced, he was disposed "to yield
to them in a degree, and not to suffer that which was intended for the
best of purposes to produce a bad one."

A general meeting was to be held in Philadelphia in May, 1784, and, in
the meantime, he had been appointed the temporary president. Washington
was too much in the habit of considering subjects of difficulty in
various points of view, and of deciding on them with coolness and
deliberation, to permit his affections to influence his judgment. The
most exact inquiries, assiduously made into the true state of the
public mind, resulted in a conviction that opinions unfriendly to the
institution, in its actual form, were extensively entertained, and that
those opinions were founded, not in hostility to the late army, but in
real apprehensions for equal liberty.

A wise and necessary policy required, he thought, the removal of these
apprehensions, and, at the general meeting in May, the hereditary
principle, and the power of adopting honorary members, were
relinquished. The result demonstrated the propriety of this alteration.
Although a few, who always perceive most danger where none exists, and
the visionaries then abounding in Europe, continued their prophetic
denunciations against the order, America dismissed her fears, and,
notwithstanding the refusal of several of the State societies to adopt
the measures recommended by the general meeting, the members of the
Cincinnati were received as brethren into the bosom of their country.
[3]

While Washington was engaged in the cultivation of his extensive estate
his thoughts were by no means withdrawn from the political concerns of
the country, which at this time were assuming rather an ominous aspect.
His correspondence evinces that his advice was much sought for by the
leading men in the country, and that his opinions on the aspect of the
public affairs were freely given. The want of power in the central
government, arising from the defects of the old confederation, was
becoming more and more apparent, and the evils arising from this want
of power were pressing severely on every side. While the war lasted the
external pressure held the government together, but on the return of
peace its dissolution had become imminent. Large debts had been
contracted to pay the expenses of the war, and, although an attempt had
been made to establish a general system of revenue from duties on
imports, individual States had obstructed the prosecution of this plan,
and the government had found itself unable to raise the funds necessary
to pay the interest on the public debt. It had, in fact, no power to
regulate commerce or collect a revenue. This made it incapable of
executing treaties, fulfilling its foreign engagements, or causing
itself to be respected by foreign nations. While at home its weakness
was disgusting the public creditors and raising a clamor of discontent
and disaffection on every side. An alarming crisis was rapidly
approaching.

By the enlightened friends of republican government, this gloomy state
of things was viewed with deep chagrin. Many became apprehensive that
those plans from which so much happiness to the human race had been
anticipated would produce only real misery, and would maintain but a
short and a turbulent existence. Meanwhile, the wise and thinking part
of the community, who could trace evils to their source, labored
unceasingly to inculcate opinions favorable to the incorporation of
some principles into the political system which might correct the
obvious vices, without endangering the free spirit of the existing
institutions.

While the advocates for union were exerting themselves to impress its
necessity on the public mind, measures were taken in Virginia, which,
though originating in different views, terminated in a proposition for
a general convention to revise the state of the Union.

To form a compact relative to the navigation of the rivers Potomac and
Pocomoke, and of part of Chesapeake Bay, commissioners were appointed
by the Legislatures of Virginia and Maryland, who assembled in
Alexandria in March, 1785. While at Mount Vernon on a visit [4] they
agreed to propose to their respective governments the appointment of
other commissioners, with power to make conjoint arrangements, to which
the assent of Congress was to be solicited, for maintaining a naval
force in the Chesapeake, and to establish a tariff of duties on imports
to which the laws of both States should conform. When these
propositions received the assent of the Legislature of Virginia an
additional resolution was passed, directing that which respected the
duties on imports to be communicated to all the States in the Union,
who were invited to send deputies to the meeting.

On the 21st of January, 1786, a few days after the passage of these
resolutions, another was adopted appointing Edmund Randolph, James
Madison, Walter Jones, St. George Tucker, and Meriwether Smith,
commissioners, "who were to meet such as might be appointed by the
other States in the Union, at a time and place to be agreed on, to take
into consideration the trade of the United States; to examine the
relative situation and trade of the said States; to consider how far a
uniform system in their commercial relations may be necessary to their
common interest and their permanent harmony, and to report to the
several States such an act relative to this great object, as, when
unanimously ratified by them, will enable the United States in Congress
assembled effectually to provide for the same."

In the circular letter transmitting these resolutions to the respective
States, Annapolis, in Maryland, was proposed as the place, and the
ensuing September (1786) as the time of meeting.

Before the arrival of the period at which these commissioners were to
assemble the idea was carried by those who saw and deplored the
complicated calamities which flowed from the inefficacy of the general
government, much further than was avowed by the resolution of Virginia.
"Although," said Mr. Jay, one of the most conspicuous patriots of the
Revolution, in a letter to Washington, dated the 16th of March, 1786,
"you have wisely retired from public employments, and calmly view, from
the temple of fame, the various exertions of that sovereignty and
independence which Providence has enabled you to be so greatly and
gloriously instrumental in securing to your country, yet I am persuaded
you cannot view them with the eye of an unconcerned spectator.

"Experience has pointed out errors in our national government which
call for correction, and which threaten to blast the fruit we expected
from our tree of liberty. The convention proposed by Virginia may do
some good, and would perhaps do more, if it comprehended more objects.
An opinion begins to prevail that a general convention for revising the
articles of confederation would be expedient. Whether the people are
yet ripe for such a measure, or whether the system proposed to be
attained by it is only to be expected from calamity and commotion, is
difficult to ascertain.

"I think we are in a delicate situation, and a variety of
considerations and circumstances give me uneasiness. It is in
contemplation to take measures for forming a general convention. The
plan is not matured. If it should be well connected and take effect, I
am fervent in my wishes that it may comport with the line of life you
have marked out for yourself to favor your country with your counsels
on such an important and single occasion. I suggest this merely as a
hint for consideration."

To the patriots who accomplished the great revolution which gave to the
American people a national government capable of maintaining the union
of the States and of preserving republican liberty, we must ever feel
grateful and admire and honor them for their services during that
arduous and doubtful struggle which terminated in the triumph of human
reason and the establishment of a free government. To us who were not
actors in those busy scenes, but who enjoy the fruits of the labor
without having participated in the toils or the fears of the patriots
who achieved such glorious results, the sentiments entertained by the
most enlightened and virtuous of America at that eventful period cannot
be uninteresting.

"Our affairs," said Mr. Jay, in a letter of the 27th of June (1786),
"seem to lead to some crisis, some revolution--something that I cannot
foresee or conjecture. I am uneasy and apprehensive, more so than
during the war. Then, we had a fixed object and, though the means and
time of obtaining it were often problematical, yet I did firmly believe
that we should ultimately succeed, because I did firmly believe that
justice was with us. The case is now altered, we are going and doing
wrong and therefore I look forward to evils and calamities, but without
being able to guess at the instrument, nature, or measure of them.

"That we shall again recover and things again go well, I have no doubt.
Such a variety of circumstances would not, almost miraculously, have
combined to liberate and make us a nation for transient and unimportant
purposes. I therefore believe we are yet to become a great and
respectable people, but when or how, only the spirit of prophecy can
discern.

"There doubtless is much reason to think and to say that we are
woefully, and, in many instances, wickedly misled. Private rage for
property suppresses public considerations, and personal rather than
national interests have become the great objects of attention. New
governments have not the aid of habit and hereditary respect, and,
being generally the result of preceding tumult and confusion, do not
immediately acquire stability or strength. Besides, in times of
commotion, some men will gain confidence and importance who merit
neither, and who, like political mountebanks, are less solicitous about
the health of the credulous crowd than about making the most of their
nostrums and prescriptions.

"What I most fear is that the better kind of people (by which I mean
the people who are orderly and industrious, who are content with their
situations, and not uneasy in their circumstances) will be led by the
insecurity of property, the loss of confidence in their rulers, and the
want of public faith and rectitude, to consider the charms of liberty
as imaginary and delusive. A state of uncertainty and fluctuation must
disgust and alarm such men and prepare their minds for almost any
change that may promise them quiet and security."

To this interesting letter Washington made the following reply:

"Your sentiments, that our affairs are drawing rapidly to a crisis,
accord with my own. What the event will be, is also beyond the reach of
my foresight. We have errors to correct; we have probably had too good
an opinion of human nature in forming our confederation. Experience has
taught us that men will not adopt and carry into execution measures the
best calculated for their own good without the intervention of coercive
power. I do not conceive we can exist long as a nation, without lodging
somewhere a power which will pervade the whole Union in as energetic a
manner as the authority of the State governments extends over the
several States. To be fearful of investing Congress, constituted as
that body is with ample authorities for national purposes, appears to
me the very climax of popular absurdity and madness. Could Congress
exert them for the detriment of the people, without injuring themselves
in an equal or greater proportion? Are not their interests inseparably
connected with those of their constituents? By the rotation of
appointment, must they not mingle frequently with the mass of citizens?
Is it not rather to be apprehended, if they were possessed of the
powers before described, that the individual members would be induced
to use them, on many occasions, very timidly and inefficaciously, for
fear of losing their popularity and future election? We must take human
nature as we find it; perfection falls not to the share of mortals.
Many are of opinion that Congress have too frequently made use of the
suppliant humble tone of requisition, in applications to the States,
when they had a right to assert their imperial dignity, and command
obedience. Be that as it may, requisitions are a perfect nullity, where
thirteen sovereign, independent, disunited States are in the habit of
discussing, and refusing or complying with them at their option.
Requisitions are actually little better than a jest and a by-word
throughout the land. If you tell the Legislatures they have violated
the treaty of peace, and invaded the prerogatives of the confederacy,
they will laugh in your face. What then is to be done? Things cannot go
on in the same train forever. It is much to be feared, as you observe,
that the better kind of people, being disgusted with these
circumstances, will have their minds prepared for any revolution
whatever. We are apt to run from one extreme into another. To
anticipate and prevent disastrous contingencies would be the part of
wisdom and patriotism.

"What astonishing changes a few years are capable of producing! I am
told that even respectable characters speak of a monarchical form of
government without horror. From thinking proceeds speaking; thence to
acting is often but a single step. But how irrevocable and tremendous!
what a triumph for our enemies to verify their predictions! what a
triumph for the advocates of despotism, to find that we are incapable
of governing ourselves, and that systems founded on the basis of equal
liberty are merely ideal and fallacious! Would to God that wise
measures may be taken in time to avert the consequences we have but too
much reason to apprehend.

"Retired as I am from the world, I frankly acknowledge I cannot feel
myself an unconcerned spectator. Yet, having happily assisted in
bringing the ship into port, and having been fairly discharged, it is
not my business to embark again on a sea of troubles.

"Nor could it be expected that my sentiments and opinions would have
much weight on the minds of my countrymen. They have been neglected,
though given as a last legacy in the most solemn manner. I had then
perhaps some claims to public attention. I consider myself as having
none at present."

The convention at Annapolis was attended by commissioners from only six
States--New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and
Virginia. These, after appointing Mr. Dickinson their chairman,
proceeded to discuss the objects for which they had convened.
Perceiving that more ample powers would be required to effect the
beneficial purposes which they contemplated, and hoping to procure a
representation from a greater number of States, the convention
determined to rise without coming to any specific resolutions on the
particular subject which had been referred to them.

Previous to their adjournment, however, they agreed on a report to be
made to their respective States, in which they represented the
necessity of extending the revision of the Federal system to all its
defects, and recommended that deputies for that purpose be appointed by
the several Legislatures, to meet in convention in the city of
Philadelphia on the second day of the ensuing May (1787).

The reasons for preferring a convention to a discussion of this subject
in Congress, were stated to be, "that in the latter body it might be
too much interrupted by the ordinary business before them and would,
besides, be deprived of the valuable counsels of sundry individuals who
were disqualified by the constitution or laws of particular States or
by peculiar circumstances from a seat in that assembly."

A copy of this report was transmitted to Congress in a letter from the
chairman, stating the inefficacy of the Federal government and the
necessity of devising such further provisions as would render it
adequate to the exigencies of the Union. On receiving this report, the
Legislature of Virginia (1786) passed an act for the appointment of
deputies to meet such as might be appointed by other States, to
assemble in convention at Philadelphia at the time and for the purposes
specified in the recommendation from the convention which had met at
Annapolis.

When the plan of a convention was thus ripened and its meeting
appointed to be at Philadelphia in May, 1787, Mr. Madison communicated
to Washington the intention of that State to elect him one of her
representatives on this important occasion. He explicitly declined
being a candidate, yet the Legislature placed him at the head of her
delegation, in the hope that mature reflection would induce him to
attend upon the service. The governor of the State, Mr. Randolph,
informed him of his appointment by the following letter:

"By the enclosed act you will readily discover that the assembly are
alarmed at the storms which threaten the United States. What our
enemies have foretold seems to be hastening to its accomplishment, and
cannot be frustrated but by an instantaneous, zealous, and steady union
among the friends of the Federal government. To you I need not press
our present dangers. The inefficacy of Congress you have often felt in
your official character, the increasing languor of our associated
republics you hourly see; and a dissolution would be, I know, to you a
source of the deepest mortification. I freely then entreat you to
accept the unanimous appointment of the General Assembly to the
convention at Philadelphia. For the gloomy prospect still admits one
ray of hope--that those who began, carried on, and consummated the
Revolution, can yet restore America from the impending ruin."

"Sensible as I am," said Washington in his answer, "of the honor
conferred on me by the General Assembly of this commonwealth, in
appointing me one of the deputies to a convention proposed to be held
in the city of Philadelphia in May next, for the purpose of revising
the Federal constitution, and desirous as I am on all occasions of
testifying a ready obedience to the calls of my country, yet, sir,
there exist at this moment circumstances which I am persuaded will
render this fresh instance of confidence incompatible with other
measures which I had previously adopted and from which, seeing little
prospect of disengaging myself, it would be disingenuous not to express
a wish that some other character, on whom greater reliance can be had,
may be substituted in my place, the probability of my nonattendance
being too great to continue my appointment.

"As no mind can be more deeply impressed than mine is with the critical
situation of our affairs, resulting in a great measure from the want of
efficient powers in the Federal head and due respect to its ordinances,
so consequently those who do engage in the important business of
removing these defects will carry with them every good wish of mine,
which the best dispositions toward their obtainment can bestow."

The governor declined the acceptance of his resignation of the
appointment and begged him to suspend his determination until the
approach of the period of the meeting of the convention, that his final
judgment might be the result of a full acquaintance with all
circumstances.

Thus situated, Washington reviewed the subject that he might, upon
thorough deliberation, make the decision which duty and patriotism
enjoined. He had, by a circular letter to the State societies, declined
being re-elected the president of the Cincinnati, and had announced
that he should not attend their general meeting at Philadelphia in the
next May, and he apprehended that if he attended the convention at the
time and place of their meeting he should give offense to all the
officers of the late army who composed this body. He was under
apprehension that the States would not be generally represented on this
occasion, and that a failure in the plan would diminish the personal
influence of those who engaged in it. Some of his confidential friends
were of opinion that the occasion did not require his interposition and
that he ought to reserve himself for a state of things which would
unequivocally demand his agency and influence. Even on the supposition
that the plan should succeed they thought that he ought not to engage
in it, because his having been in convention would oblige him to make
exertions to carry the measures that body might recommend into effect,
and would necessarily "sweep him into the tide of public affairs." His
own experience since the close of the Revolutionary War created in his
mind serious doubts whether the respective States would quietly adopt
any system calculated to give stability and vigor to the national
government. "As we could not," to use his own language, "remain quiet
more than three or four years in times of peace under the constitutions
of our own choosing, which were believed in many States to have been
formed with deliberation and wisdom, I see little prospect either of
our agreeing on any other, or that we should remain long satisfied
under it, if we could. Yet I would wish anything and everything essayed
to prevent the effusion of blood and to divert the humiliating and
contemptible figure we are about to make in the annals of mankind."

These considerations operated powerfully to confirm him in the
determination first formed, not to attend the convention. On the other
hand he realized the greatness of the emergency. The confederation was
universally considered as a nullity. The advice of a convention,
composed of respectable characters from every part of the Union, would
probably have great influence with the community, whether it should be
to amend the articles of the old government or to form a new
constitution.

Amidst the various sentiments which at this time prevailed respecting
the state of public affairs, many entertained the supposition that the
"times must be worse before they could be better," and that the
American people could be induced to establish an efficient and liberal
national government only by the scourge of anarchy. Some seemed to
think that the experiment of a republican government in America had
already failed and that one more energetic would soon by violence be
introduced. Washington entertained some apprehension that his declining
to attend the convention would be considered as a dereliction of
republican principles.

While he was balancing these opposite circumstances in his mind the
insurrection of Massachusetts occurred, [5] which turned the scale of
opinion in favor of his joining the convention. He viewed this event as
awfully alarming. "For God's sake, tell me," said he, in a letter to
Colonel Humphreys, "what is the cause of all these commotions? Do they
proceed from licentiousness, British influence disseminated by the
Tories, or real grievances which admit of redress? If the latter, why
was redress delayed until the public mind had become so much agitated?
If the former, why are not the powers of the government tried at once?
It is as well to be without as not to exercise them."

To General Knox and other friends similar apprehensions were expressed.
"I feel infinitely more than I can express to you for the disorders
which have arisen in these States. Good God! who besides a Tory could
have foreseen, or a Briton have predicted them? I do assure you that
even at this moment, when I reflect upon the present aspect of our
affairs, it seems to me like the visions of a dream. My mind can
scarcely realize it as a thing in actual existence, so strange, so
wonderful, does it appear to me. In this, as in most other matters, we
are too slow. When this spirit first dawned it might probably have been
easily checked, but it is scarcely within the reach of human ken, at
this moment, to say when, where, or how it will terminate. There are
combustibles in every State to which a spark might set fire. In
bewailing, which I have often done with the keenest sorrow, the death
of our much-lamented friend, General Greene, I have accompanied my
regrets of late with a query, whether he would not have preferred such
an exit to the scenes which it is more than probable many of his
compatriots may live to bemoan.

"You talk, my good sir, of employing influence to appease the present
tumults in Massachusetts. I know not where that influence is to be
found, nor if attainable, that it would be a proper remedy for these
disorders. Influence is not government. Let us have a government by
which our lives, liberties, and properties will be secured, or let us
know the worst at once. Under these impressions my humble opinion is
that there is a call for decision. Know then precisely what the
insurgents aim at. If they have real grievances redress them if
possible, or acknowledge the justice of them and your inability to do
it in the present moment. If they have not, employ the force of the
government against them at once. If this is inadequate all will be
convinced that the superstructure is bad or wants support. To be more
exposed in the eyes of the world, and more contemptible than we already
are, is hardly possible. To delay one or the other of these expedients
is to exasperate on the one hand or to give confidence on the other,
and will add to their numbers, for, like snowballs, such bodies
increase by every movement, unless there is something in the way to
obstruct and crumble them before their weight is too great and
irresistible.

"These are my sentiments. Precedents are dangerous things. Let the
reins of government then be braced and held with a steady hand, and
every violation of the constitution be reprehended. If defective, let
it be amended, but not suffered to be trampled upon while it has an
existence."

Colonel Humphreys having intimated by letter his apprehension that
civil discord was near, in which event he would be obliged to act a
public part, or to leave the continent--"It is," said Washington in
reply, "with the deepest and most heartfelt concern I perceive, by some
late paragraphs extracted from the Boston papers, that the insurgents
of Massachusetts, far from being satisfied with the redress offered by
their General Court, are still acting in open violation of law and
government, and have obliged the chief magistrate, in a decided tone,
to call upon the militia of the State to support the constitution.

"What, gracious God, is man, that there should be such inconsistency
and perfidiousness in his conduct! It is but the other day that we were
shedding our blood to obtain the constitutions under which we
live--constitutions of our own choice and making--and now we are
unsheathing the sword to overturn them. The thing is so unaccountable
that I hardly know how to realize it, or to persuade myself that I am
not under the illusion of a dream. My mind, previous to the receipt of
your letter of the first ultimo, had often been agitated by a thought
similar to the one you expressed respecting a friend of yours, but
heaven forbid that a crisis should come when he shall be driven to the
necessity of making a choice of either of the alternatives there
mentioned."

Having learned that the States had generally elected their
representatives to the convention, and Congress having given its
sanction to it, he on the 28th of March communicated to the governor of
Virginia his consent to act as one of the delegates of his State on
this important occasion.

When this determination was formed Washington at once commenced his
preparations to leave Mount Vernon at an early day, so that he might be
able to be present at the meeting of the Cincinnati; but on the 26th of
April (1787) he received intelligence by an express that his mother and
sister were dangerously ill at Fredericksburg. He immediately set off
for that place, and the detention thus occasioned prevented his meeting
the Cincinnati. After remaining three days at Fredericksburg, his
mother and sister being partially recovered, he returned to Mount
Vernon, and was enabled to complete his preparations for leaving home
in season to arrive in Philadelphia on the 13th of May, the day before
the opening of the convention. [6]

Public honors had awaited him everywhere on his route. At Chester he
was met by General Mifflin, then speaker of the Assembly of
Pennsylvania, and several officers of the army and other public
characters who accompanied him to Gray's Ferry, where his former
escort, the "First Troop" of Philadelphia, were waiting to conduct him
to the city. On his arrival he paid his first visit to Dr. Franklin,
president of the State of Pennsylvania, who had also been elected a
member of the convention.

On the next day (May 14, 1787), the convention assembled which was to
accomplish one of the most splendid works that ever was achieved by
human wisdom. Several days, however, elapsed before a quorum of members
could be formed. When the moment for commencing the organization of the
convention arrived, Robert Morris, on behalf of the Pennsylvania
delegation, nominated Washington as its president. John Rutledge of
South Carolina, future chief justice of the United States, seconded the
nomination, remarking at the same time that the presence of General
Washington forbade any observations on the occasion which might not be
proper. He was elected by a unanimous vote. By this act the convention
did but fulfill the wishes of the whole nation. A crisis had arrived in
which all eyes were turned to the Great Founder for deliverance. To use
his own language in a letter written to Mr. Jefferson a few days later
(May 30, 1787), "That something is necessary none will deny, for the
general government, if it can be called a government, is shaken to its
foundation and liable to be overturned by every blast. In a word, it is
at an end, and unless a remedy is soon applied anarchy and confusion
will inevitably ensue."

Among the members of the convention were many men of exalted character
and signal abilities. New York sent Alexander Hamilton, himself a host.
No member was better fitted for the work or exerted a more important
influence in perfecting it. Madison was one of the delegates from
Virginia, whose pen was subsequently exerted, in connection with those
of Hamilton and Jay in defending and expounding the constitution to the
people in the memorable papers of the "Federalist." Massachusetts sent
Nathaniel Gorham and Rufus King; New Hampshire, John Langdon and
Nicholas Gilman; Pennsylvania counted in her numerous delegates
Franklin, Mifflin, James Wilson, Robert Morris, and Gouverneur Morris,
with others whose historical names are less distinguished for ability
and eloquence, though not less for integrity and patriotism. South
Carolina sent John Rutledge, her former governor, one of the ablest and
purest men then living, and destined to preside over the supreme
judiciary of the Union. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, one of the bravest
of the revolutionary generals, and the future ambassador to France, was
also among the delegates of South Carolina. Among the other names on
the roll of the convention, we recognize those of another Pinckney,
famed for eloquence; Roger Sherman, a veteran statesman and signer of
the Declaration of Independence; William Livingston, afterwards
Governor of New Jersey, friend and correspondent of Washington, and
Doctor Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, an early patriot, who had
assisted Franklin in detecting the intrigues of Hutchinson and Oliver.

It would fill far too much space to enumerate all the members of the
convention, or even to glance at their respective titles, already
earned by public service, to the confidence of their countrymen.

"It was a most fortunate thing for America," says a recent writer, [7]
"that the Revolutionary age, with its hardships, its trials, and its
mistakes, had formed a body of Statesmen capable of framing for it a
durable constitution. The leading persons in the convention which
formed the constitution had been actors either in civil or military
life in the scenes of the Revolution. In those scenes their characters
as American statesmen had been formed. When the condition of the
country had fully revealed the incapacity of the government to provide
for its wants, these men were naturally looked to to construct a system
which would save it from anarchy. And their great capacities, their
high disinterested purposes, their freedom from all fanaticism and
illiberality, and their earnest, unconquerable faith in the destiny of
the country, enabled them to found that government which now upholds
and protects the whole fabric of liberty in the States of this Union."

The convention remained in session four months, and their industry and
devotion to their important work is amply testified by the fact that
they sat from five to seven hours a day. It was a most imposing
assemblage. "The severe, unchanging presence of Washington," says the
writer last quoted, "presided over all. The chivalrous sincerity and
disinterestedness of Hamilton pervaded the assembly with all the power
of his fascinating manners. The flashing eloquence of Gouverneur Morris
recalled the dangers of anarchy, which must be accepted as the
alternative of an abortive experiment. The calm, clear, statesmanlike
views of Madison, the searching and profound expositions of King, the
prudent influence of Franklin, at length ruled the hour."

On the 17th of September, 1787, the constitution was signed by all the
members present, except Edmund Randolph, the governor of Virginia;
George Mason and Elbridge Gerry; and it was then forwarded with a
letter to Congress. By that assembly it was sent to the State
Legislatures to be submitted in each State to a convention of
delegates, to be chosen by the people, for approval or rejection. As
the State Legislatures assembled at different times, nearly a year
would elapse before the result could be known.

Immediately after the convention had ended its labors, Washington
returned to Mount Vernon to resume his agricultural pursuits and to
watch with intense interest the slow process of ratifying the
constitution by the several States. His correspondence with Hamilton,
Madison, Jay, Wilson, Governor Langdon of New Hampshire, Generals Knox
and Lincoln, and Governor Randolph, at this time, shows that the
subject occupied a great share of his attention, and that he was
extremely anxious that the constitution should be adopted by all the
States.

In a letter to Lafayette (7th of February, 1788), he says: "As to my
sentiments with respect to the merits of the new constitution, I will
disclose them without reserve, although, by passing through the post-
offices they should become known to all the world; for, in truth, I
have nothing to conceal on that subject. It appears to me, then, little
short of a miracle that the delegates from so many States, different
from each other, as you know, in their manners, circumstances, and
prejudices, should unite in forming a system of national government so
little liable to well-founded objections. Nor am I yet such an
enthusiastic, partial, or undiscriminating admirer of it as not to
perceive it is tinctured with some real though not radical defects. The
limits of a letter would not suffer me to go fully into an examination
of them; nor would the discussion be entertaining or profitable. I
therefore forbear to touch upon it. With regard to the two great
points, the pivots upon which the whole machine must move, my creed is
simply--

"First, That the general government is not invested with more powers
than are indispensably necessary to perform the functions of a good
government, and, consequently, that no objection ought to be made
against the quantity of power delegated to it.

"Secondly, That these powers, as the appointment of all rulers will
forever arise from, and at short stated intervals recur to the free
suffrage of the people, are so distributed among the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches in to which the general government is
arranged that it can never be in danger of degenerating into a
monarchy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, or any other despotic or
oppressive form so long as there shall remain any virtue in the body of
the people.

"I would not be understood, my dear Marquis, to speak of consequences
which may be produced in the revolution of ages, by corruption of
morals, profligacy of manners, and listlessness in the preservation of
the natural and unalienable rights of mankind, nor of the successful
usurpations that may be established at such an unpropitious juncture
upon the ruins of liberty, however providentially guarded and secured,
as these are contingencies against which no human prudence can
effectually provide. It will at least be a recommendation to the
proposed constitution that it is provided with more checks and barriers
against the introduction of tyranny and those of a nature less liable
to be surmounted than any government hitherto instituted among mortals.
We are not to expect perfection in this world: but mankind, in modern
times, have apparently made some progress in the science of government.
Should that which is now offered to the people of America be found an
experiment less perfect than it can be made, a constitutional door is
left open for its amelioration."

A letter of Mr. Jefferson, written to one of his friends while the
constitution was under consideration, gives some interesting
particulars respecting its reception and the opinions of some of the
States and leaders in regard to it:

"The constitution," he says, "has been received with very general
enthusiasm; the bulk of the people are eager to adopt it. In the
eastern States the printers will print nothing against it unless the
writer subscribes his name. Massachusetts and Connecticut have called
conventions in January to consider it. In New York there is a division;
the governor, Clinton, is known to be hostile. Jersey, it is thought,
will accept; Pennsylvania is divided, and all the bitterness of her
factions has been kindled anew. But the party in favor of it is the
strongest, both in and out of the Legislature. This is the party
anciently of Morris, Wilson, etc. Delaware will do what Pennsylvania
shall do. Maryland is thought favorable to it, yet it is supposed that
Chase and Paca will oppose it. As to Virginia, two of her delegates, in
the first place, refused to sign it; these were Randolph, the governor,
and George Mason. Besides these, Henry, Harrison, Nelson, and the Lees
are against it. General Washington will be for it, but it is not in his
character to exert himself much in the case. Madison will be its main
pillar," etc.

With respect to Washington, Jefferson was mistaken. His letters show
that he did exert himself very zealously to remove the objections of
recusant States and statesmen, especially the Virginia leaders who were
all numbered among his personal friends.

The following letter to Jonathan Trumbull, of Connecticut, written at
Mount Vernon on the 20th of July, 1788, when the final event was pretty
certain, evinces the lively interest he took in the progress of affairs
and the deep religious feeling of thankfulness with which, as usual, he
recognized the hand of Providence in the result:

"You will have perceived from the public papers," he writes, "that I
was not erroneous in my calculation, that the constitution would be
accepted by the convention of this State. The majority, it is true, was
small and the minority respectable in many points of view. But the
great part of the minority here, as in most other States, have
conducted themselves with great prudence and political moderation,
insomuch that we may anticipate a pretty general and harmonious
acquiescence. We shall impatiently wait the result from New York and
North Carolina. The other State, which has not yet acted, is nearly out
of the question.

"I am happy to hear from General Lincoln and others that affairs are
taking a good turn in Massachusetts, but the triumph of salutary and
liberal measures over those of an opposite tendency seems to be as
complete in Connecticut as in any other State, and affords a particular
subject of congratulation. Your friend, Colonel Humphreys, informs me
from the wonderful revolution of sentiment in favor of Federal measures
and the marvelous change for the better in the elections of your State,
that he shall begin to suspect that miracles have not ceased. Indeed,
for myself, since so much liberality has been displayed in the
construction and adoption of the proposed general government, I am
almost disposed to be of the same opinion. Or at least we may, with a
kind of pious and grateful exultation, trace the finger of Providence
through those dark and mysterious events which first induced the States
to appoint a general convention and then led them one after another, by
such steps as were best calculated to effect the object into an
adoption of the system recommended by that general convention, thereby,
in all human probability, laying a lasting foundation for tranquility
and happiness, when we had but too much reason to fear that confusion
and misery were coming rapidly upon us."

North Carolina and Rhode Island did not at first accept the
constitution and New York was apparently dragged into it by a
repugnance to being excluded from the confederacy. At length the
conventions of eleven States assented to and ratified the constitution.
When officially informed of this fact, Congress passed an act
appointing a day for the people throughout the Union to choose electors
of a president of the United States in compliance with the provision in
the constitution and another day for the electors to meet and vote for
the person of their choice. The choice of electors was to take place in
February, 1789, and the electors were to meet and choose a president on
the first Wednesday in March following.

A few days before the close of the convention, Washington prepared and
submitted a draft of a letter to Congress, which was adopted. The
constitution having been duly signed, it was transmitted to Congress,
with the letter from the president of the convention.


"IN CONVENTION, September 17, 1787.

"SIR:--We have now the honor to submit to the consideration of the
United States, in Congress assembled, that constitution which has
appeared to us the most advisable.

"The friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the power
of making war, peace, and treaties; that of levying money, and
regulating commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial
authorities, should be fully and effectually vested in the general
government of the Union: but the impropriety of delegating such
extensive trust to one body of men is evident. Hence results the
necessity for a different organization.

"It is obviously impracticable in the federal government of these
States to secure all the rights of independent sovereignty to each, and
yet provide for the interest and safety of all. Individuals entering
into society, must give up a share of liberty, to preserve the rest.
The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend, as well on situation and
circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times
difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which
must be surrendered, and those which may be reserved; and on the
present occasion, this difficulty was increased by a difference among
the several States, as to their situation, extent, habits, and
particular interests.

"In all our deliberations on this subject, we kept steadily in our view
that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American,
the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our prosperity,
felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This important
consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each
State in the Convention to be less rigid on points of inferior
magnitude than might have been otherwise expected; and thus the
constitution, which we now present, is the result of a spirit of amity,
and of that mutual deference and concession, which the peculiarity of
our political situation rendered indispensable.

"That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every State, is
not perhaps to be expected; but each State will doubtless consider,
that had her interests alone been consulted, the consequences might
have been particularly disagreeable or injurious to others; that it is
liable to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected, we
hope and believe; that it may promote the lasting welfare of that
country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom and happiness, is our
most ardent wish.

"With great respect, we Have the honor to be, sir, your Excellency's
most obedient and humble servants.

"GEORGE WASHINGTON,

"_President_.

"By unanimous Order of the Convention.

"His EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS."

We give this important document in full, as contained in the Supplement
to the Journal of the Federal Convention.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the
common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.

ARTICLE I.

Sect. 1. All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives.

Sect. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members
chosen every second year by the people of the several States; and the
electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.

No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the
age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State
in which he shall be chosen.

Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this union, according to their
respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of
years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other
persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after
the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within
every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law
direct. The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every
thirty thousand, but each State shall have, at least, one
representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of
New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight,
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York
six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six,
Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia
three.

When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the
executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such
vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other
officers; and shall have the sole power of impeachment.

SECT. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
senators from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six
years; and each senator shall have one vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first
election, they shall be divided, as equally as may be, into three
classes. The seats of the senators of the first class shall be vacated
at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the
expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class at the expiration
of the sixth year, so that one-third may be chosen every second year;
and if vacancies happen by resignation or otherwise, during the recess
of the Legislature of any State, the executive thereof may make
temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which
shall then fill such vacancies.

No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the age of
thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which
he shall be chosen.

The vice-president of the United States shall be president of the
Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided.

The Senate shall choose their other officers, also a president pro
tempore, in the absence of the vice-president, or when he shall
exercise the office of president of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When
sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When
the president of the United States is tried, the chief-justice shall
preside; and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
two-thirds of the members present.

Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office
of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States; but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment,
trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law.

SECT. 4. The times, places, and manner of holding elections for
senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or
alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such
meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by
law appoint a different day.

SECT. 5. Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its own members; and a majority of each shall
constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn
from day to day, and imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States:

To borrow money on the credit of the United States:

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes:

To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States:

To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix
the standard of weights and measures:

To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and
current coin of the United States:

To establish post-offices and post-roads:

To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries:

To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court:

To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas,
and offences against the law of nations:

To declare war, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules
concerning captures on land and water:

To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use
shall be for a longer term than two years:

To provide and maintain a navy:

To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces:

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions:

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and
for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of
the United States-reserving to the States respectively the appointment
of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to
the discipline prescribed by Congress:

To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such
district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of
particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of
government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over
all places purchased, by the consent of the legislature of the State in
which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines,
arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings:--and,

To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
constitution in the government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof.

SECT. 9. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the
States, now existing, shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty
may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
person.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may
require it.

No bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, shall be passed.

No capitation, or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion
to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State. No
preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to
the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound
to, or from one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in
another.

No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of
appropriations made by law: and a regular statement and account of the
receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from
time to time.

No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States: and no
person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without
the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office,
or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.

SECT. 10. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit
bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in
payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility.

No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or
duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties
and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the
use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be
subject to the revision and control of the Congress. No State shall,
without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops
or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact
with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless
actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of
delay.

ARTICLE II.

SECT. I. The executive power shall be vested in a president of the
United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of
four years, and, together with the vice-president, chosen for the same
term, be elected as follows:

Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may
direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of senators and
representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but
no senator or representative, or person holding any office of trust or
profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector.

The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot
for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the
same State with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the
persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list they
shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the
government of the United States, directed to the president of the
Senate. The president of the Senate shall, in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the
votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of
votes shall be the president, if such number be a majority of the whole
number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have
such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of
Representatives shall immediately choose, by ballot, one of them for
president; and if no person have a majority, then from the five highest
on the list, the said house shall, in like manner, choose the
president. But in choosing the president, the votes shall be taken by
States, the representation from each State having one vote. A quorum
for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds
of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a
choice. In every case, after the choice of the president, the person
having the greatest number of votes of the electors shall be the vice-
president. But if there should remain two or more who have equal votes,
the Senate shall choose from them, by ballot, the vice-president.

The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the
day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be the same
throughout the United States.

No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United
States at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be
eligible to the office of president; neither shall any person be
eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of
thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United
States.

In case the removal of the president from office, or of his death,
resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
said office, the same shall devolve on the vice-president; and the
Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death,
resignation, or inability, both of the president and vice-president,
declaring what officer shall then act as president, and such officer
shall act accordingly until the disability be removed, or a president
shall be elected.

The president shall, at stated times, receive for his services a
compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during
the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not
receive within that period any other emolument from the United States,
or any of them.

Before he enters on the execution of his office, he shall take the
following oath or affirmation:

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the
office of president of the United States, and will, to the best of my
ability, preserve, protect, and defend the constitution of the United
States."

SECT. 2. The president shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy
of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when
called into the actual service of the United States; he may require the
opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive
departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their
respective offices; and he shall have power to grant reprieves and
pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of
impeachment.

He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur;
and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls,
judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United
States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by law. But the Congress may by law vest the
appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the
president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

The president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen
during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions, which shall
expire at the end of their next session.

SECT. 3. He shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information
of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such
measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on
extraordinary occasions, convene both houses, or either of them, and in
case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of
adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper;
he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed; and shall commission all the
officers of the United States.

SECT. 4. The president, vice-president, and all civil officers of the
United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

ARTICLE III.

SECT. 1. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from
time to time, ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and
inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior; and
shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

SECT. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and
equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States,
and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority; to all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to
which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two
or more States, between a State and citizens of another State, between
citizens of different States, between citizens of the same State,
claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State,
or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects.

In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the supreme court
shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before
mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as
to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the
Congress shall make.

The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by
jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes
shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the
trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have
directed.

SECT. 3. Treason against the United States shall consist only in
levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them
aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in
open court. The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of
treason; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or
forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.

ARTICLE IV.

SECT. 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which
such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect
thereof.

SECT. 2. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States.

A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who
shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on
demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be
delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the
crime.

No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or
regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall
be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor
may be due.

SECT. 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union;
but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of
any other State, nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more
States, or parts of States, without the consent of the legislatures of
the States concerned, as well as of the Congress.

The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules
and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to
the United States; and nothing in this constitution shall be so
construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any
particular State.

SECT. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against
invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive
(when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.

ARTICLE V.

The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose amendments to this constitution; or, on the
application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States,
shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either
case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this
constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
several States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one
or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress:
Provided, that no amendment which may be made prior to the year 1808,
shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth
section of the first article; and that no State, without its consent,
shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.

ARTICLE VI.

All debts contracted and engagements entered into, before the adoption
of this constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under
this constitution as under the confederation.

This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.

The senators and representatives before mentioned, and the members of
the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial
officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be
bound by oath or affirmation to support this constitution; but no
religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office
or public trust under the United States.

ARTICLE VII.

The ratification of the conventions of nine States shall be sufficient
for the establishment of this constitution between the States so
ratifying the same.

Done in convention, by the unanimous consent of the States present, the
17th day of September, in the year of our Lord 1787, and of the
independence of the United States of America, the twelfth. In witness
whereof, we have hereunto subscribed our names.

GEORGE WASHINGTON,

_President, and Deputy from Virginia._

_New Hampshire_.

JOHN LANGDON,

NICHOLAS GILMAN.

_Massachusetts_.

NATHANIEL GORHAM,

RUFUS KING.

_Connecticut._

WILLIAM SAMUEL JOHNSON,

ROGER SHERMAN.

_New York_.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

_New Jersey_.

WILLIAM LIVINGSTON,

DAVID BREARLY,

WILLIAM PATTERSON,

JONATHAN DAYTON.

_Pennsylvania_.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN,

THOMAS MIFFLIN,

ROBERT MORRIS, G

GEORGE CLYMER,

THOMAS FITZSIMONS,

JARED INGERSOLL,

JAMES WILSON,

GOUVERNEUR MORRIS.

_Delaware_.

GEORGE READ,

GUNNING BEDFORD, JR.,

JOHN DICKINSON,

RICHARD BASSETT,

JACOB BROOM.

_Maryland_.

JAMES M'HENRY,

DANIEL OF ST. THOMAS JENIFER,

DANIEL CARROLL.

_Virginia_.

JOHN BLAIR,

JAMES MADISON, JR.

_North Carolina_.

WILLIAM BLOUNT,

RICHARD DOBBS SPAIGHT,

HUGH WILLIAMSON.

_South Carolina_.

JOHN RUTLEDGE,

CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY,

CHARLES PINCKNEY,

PIERCE BUTLER.

_Georgia_.

WILLIAM FEW,

ABRAHAM BALDWIN.

Attest: WILLIAM JACKSON, Secretary.


1. Footnote: "Life of Washington," p. 389.

2. Footnote: "Men and Times of the Revolution, or Memoirs of Elkanah
Watson."

3. Footnote: Marshall, "Life of Washington."

4. Footnote: It is a very interesting fact that the proposition in
which the Convention that formed the Constitution originated should
have been made at Mount Vernon, in Washington's presence, if not by
himself. As Faneuil Hall is called the Cradle of Liberty, Mount Vernon
may be regarded as the Cradle of the Constitution.

5. Footnote: The occasion and effect of this insurrection, commonly
called Shay's Rebellion, are thus described by a recent writer. The
jealousy felt toward the statesmen of the Republic, or toward the upper
by the middle class--if the terms may be allowed--was likely to operate
fatally in marring the project of a Constitution, and rendering any
innovation for the purpose impracticable; since the dissentient States
were resolved not to choose delegates, or accede to the desire of
Virginia.

These democratic opinions of the middle classes, however, and the
resolutions founded upon them, were eventually shaken and overturned by
the extreme to which they were carried by the lower orders. These were
no sooner inspired by the same political feelings, than, after their
fashion, they rose in insurrection; bade defiance not only to Congress,
but to the State authorities themselves; and, collecting in armed
bands, threatened to effect a serious revolution by taking law and
property into their own hands. The New England States, principally
Massachusetts, were the scenes of these disorders, which took place
toward the close of 1786.

A body of 2,000 men, assembled in the northwestern region of the State,
chose one of their number, Daniel Shay, for leader. They asked for
suspension of taxes, and the remission of paper money; but it was known
that their favorite scheme was that of an agrarian law--a general
division of property. Respectable classes were, of course, thrown into
alarm; Congress recovered a portion of that vigor which had marked it
during the war; troops were dispatched, under General Lincoln and other
officers, against the insurgents; and the citizens of the New England
towns forgot their late jealousy of the military so far as to join them
in the task of putting down their domestic foes. Funds were raised by
private subscription to supply the emptiness of the public treasury;
and an efficient force was enabled to march, in the midst of winter,
against the insurgents, who were soon dispersed and reduced.

The rebellion thus suppressed was productive of the most salutary
result. The middle classes, terrified at the exaggeration of their own
doctrines, and at the risk of exciting the mob as supporters, rallied
universally to the support of Congress.

Jealousy of those above was counterbalanced by fear of those below; and
the majority of the State Legislatures was brought to coincide with the
views of the Federal statesmen. Convinced by late experience of the
necessity of an established and general government, even for purposes
of domestic security, the hitherto refractory States named, without
hesitation, their delegates to the appointed convention for forming a
constitution. Rhode Island alone refused.

6. Footnote: Sparks, "Writings of Washington."

7. Footnote: George Ticknor Curtis, "History of the Constitution of the
United States."

       *       *       *       *       *

PART VI.




WASHINGTON AS PRESIDENT AND IN RETIREMENT.




CHAPTER I.


THE ELECTION. 1789.


As soon as it was ascertained that the new form of government had
received the sanction of the people and would go into immediate
operation, all eyes were at once turned to Washington as the first
President of the United States. During the war he had, in fact,
directed the course of public affairs. His suggestions had been almost
invariably followed by Congress. His recommendations had influenced the
action of the different States. His practical administrative abilities
were known to all. He alone possessed the confidence of the people to
that degree which was necessary to carry the constitution into vigorous
effect at the outset and to defend it against its secret as well as its
open enemies. But it was by no means certain that he would accept the
office. By all who knew him, fears were entertained that his preference
for private life would prevail over the wishes of the public, and soon
after the adoption of the constitution was ascertained, his
correspondents began to press him on a point which was believed
essential to the completion of the great work on which the grandeur and
happiness of America was supposed to depend. "We cannot," said Mr.
Johnson, a man of great political eminence in Maryland, "do without
you; and I, and thousands more, can explain to anybody but yourself why
we cannot do without you." "I have ever thought," said Gouverneur
Morris, "and have ever said, that you must be President; no other man
can fill that office. No other man can draw forth the abilities of our
country into the various departments of civil life. You alone can awe
the insolence of opposing factions and the greater insolence of
assuming adherents. I say nothing of foreign powers nor of their
ministers. With these last you will have some plague. As to your
feelings on this occasion they are, I know, both deep and affecting:
you embark property most precious on a most tempestuous ocean; for, as
you possess the highest reputation, so you expose it to the perilous
chance of popular opinion. On the other hand, you will, I firmly
expect, enjoy the inexpressible felicity of contributing to the
happiness of all your countrymen. You will become the father of more
than three millions of children; and while your bosom glows with
parental tenderness, in theirs or at least in a majority of them, you
will excite the duteous sentiments of filial affection. This, I repeat
it, is what I firmly expect; and my views are not directed by that
enthusiasm which your public character has impressed on the public
mind. Enthusiasm is generally short-sighted and too often blind. I
form my conclusions from those talents and virtues which the world
believes and which your friends know you possess."

In a letter detailing the arrangements which were making for the
introduction of the new government, Col. Henry Lee proceeded thus to
speak of the presidency of the United States. "The solemnity of the
moment and its application to yourself have fixed my mind in
contemplations of a public and a personal nature, and I feel an
involuntary impulse which I cannot resist, to communicate without
reserve to you some of the reflections which the hour has produced.
Solicitous for our common happiness as a people, and convicted as I
continue to be that our peace and prosperity depend on the proper
improvement of the present period, my anxiety is extreme that the new
government may have an auspicious beginning. To effect this and to
perpetuate a nation formed under your auspices it is certain that again
you will be called forth.

"The same principles of devotion to the good of mankind which have
invariably governed your conduct will no doubt continue to rule your
mind, however opposite their consequences may be to your repose and
happiness. It may be wrong, but I cannot suppress, in my wishes for
national felicity, a due regard for your personal fame and content.

"If the same success should attend your efforts on this important
occasion which has distinguished you hitherto, then, to be sure, you
will have spent a life which Providence rarely if ever before gave to
the lot of one man. It is my anxious hope, it is my belief, that this
will be the case; but all things are uncertain, and perhaps nothing
more so than political events." He then proceeded to state his
apprehensions that the government might sink under the activity
hostility of its foes, and in particular the fears which he entertained
from the circular letter of New York, around which the minorities in
the several States might be expected to rally. Before concluding his
letter, Colonel Lee said, "Without you the government can have but
little chance of success; and the people of that happiness which its
prosperity must yield."

In reply to this letter Washington said: "Your observations on the
solemnity of the crisis and its application to myself bring before me
subjects of the most momentous and interesting nature. In our endeavors
to establish a new general government the contest, nationally
considered, seems not to have been so much for glory as existence. It
was for a long time doubtful whether we were to survive as an
independent Republic or decline from our federal dignity into
insignificant and wretched fragments of empire. The adoption of the
constitution so extensively and with so liberal an acquiescence on the
part of the minorities in general, promised the former; but lately the
circular letter of New York has manifested, in my apprehension, an
unfavorable if not an insidious tendency to a contrary policy. I still
hope for the best, but before you mentioned it I could not help fearing
it would serve as a standard to which the disaffected might resort. It
is now evidently the part of all honest men who are friends to the new
constitution, to endeavor to give it a chance to disclose its merits
and defects, by carrying it fairly into effect in the first instance.

"The principal topic of your letter is to me a point of great delicacy
indeed--insomuch that I can scarcely without some impropriety touch
upon it. In the first place, the event to which you allude may never
happen; among other reasons, because, if the partiality of my fellow-
citizens conceive it to be a means by which the sinews of the new
government would be strengthened, it will of consequence be obnoxious
to those who are in opposition to it, many of whom unquestionably will
be placed among the electors.

"This consideration alone would supersede the expediency of announcing
any definite and irrevocable resolution. You are among the small number
of those who know my invincible attachment to domestic life, and that
my sincerest wish is to continue in the enjoyment of it solely, until
my final hour. But the world would be neither so well instructed, nor
so candidly disposed, as to believe me to be uninfluenced by sinister
motives, in case any circumstance should render a deviation from the
line of conduct I had prescribed for myself indispensable. Should the
contingency you suggest take place, and (for argument sake alone, let
me say) should my unfeigned reluctance to accept the office be overcome
by a deference for the reasons and opinions of my friends, might I not,
after the declarations I have made (and heaven knows they were made in
the sincerity of my heart), in the judgment of the impartial world, and
of posterity, be chargeable with levity and inconsistency, if not with
rashness and ambition? Nay, further, would there not even be some
apparent foundation for the two former charges? Now, justice to myself,
and tranquility of conscience, require that I should act a part, if not
above imputation, at least capable of vindication. Nor will you
conceive me to be too solicitous for reputation. Though I prize as I
ought the good opinion of my fellow-citizens, yet, if I know myself, I
would not seek or retain popularity at the expense of one social duty
or moral virtue. While doing what my conscience informed me was right,
as it respected _my God_, my country, and myself, I could despise all
the party clamor and unjust censure which must be expected from some,
whose personal enmity might be occasioned by their hostility to the
government. I am conscious that I fear alone to give any real occasion
for obloquy, and that I do not dread to meet with unmerited reproach.
And certain I am, when-so-ever I shall be convinced the good of my
country requires my reputation to be put in risk, regard for my own
fame will not come in competition with an object of so much magnitude.

"If I declined the task it would be upon quite another principle.
Notwithstanding my advanced season of life, my increasing fondness for
agricultural amusements, and my growing love of retirement, augment and
confirm my decided predilection for the character of a private citizen,
yet it will be no one of these motives, nor the hazard to which my
former reputation might be exposed, or the terror of encountering new
fatigues and troubles, that would deter me from an acceptance, but a
belief that some other person, who had less pretense and less
inclination to be excused, could execute all the duties full as
satisfactorily as myself. To say more would be indiscreet, as a
disclosure of a refusal beforehand might incur the application of the
fable in which the fox is represented as undervaluing the grapes he
could not reach. You will perceive, my dear sir, by what is here
observed (and which you will be pleased to consider in the light of a
confidential communication), that my inclinations will dispose and
decide me to remain as I am, unless a clear and insurmountable
conviction should be impressed on my mind, that some very disagreeable
consequences must in all human probability result from the indulgence
of my wishes."

About the same time Colonel Hamilton concluded a letter on
miscellaneous subjects with the following observations. "I take it for
granted, sir, you have concluded to comply with what will, no doubt, be
the general call of your country in relation to the new government. You
will permit me to say that it is indispensable you should lend yourself
to its first operations. It is to little purpose to have introduced a
system, if the weightiest influence is not given to its firm
establishment in the outset."

"On the delicate subject," said Washington in reply, "with which you
conclude your letter, I can say nothing; because the event alluded to
may never happen; and because, in case it should occur, it would be a
point of prudence to defer forming one's ultimate and irrevocable
decision so long as new data might be afforded for one to act with the
greater wisdom and propriety. I would not wish to conceal my prevailing
sentiment from you. For you know me well enough, my good sir, to be
persuaded that I am not guilty of affectation, when I tell you it is my
great and sole desire to live and die in peace and retirement on my own
farm. Were it even indispensable a different line of conduct should be
adopted, while you and some others who are acquainted with my heart
would acquit, the world and posterity might probably accuse me of
inconsistency and ambition. Still, I hope I shall always possess
firmness and virtue enough to maintain (what I consider the most
enviable of all titles) the character of an honest man."

This answer drew from Hamilton the following reply: "I should be deeply
pained, my dear sir, if your scruples in regard to a certain station
should be matured into a resolution to decline it; though I am neither
surprised at their existence, nor can I but agree in opinion that the
caution you observe in deferring the ultimate determination is prudent.
I have, however, reflected maturely on the subject, and have come to
the conclusion (in which I feel no hesitation) that every public and
personal consideration will demand from you an acquiescence in what
will certainly be the unanimous wish of your country.

"The absolute retreat which you meditated at the close of the late war
was natural and proper. Had the government produced by the Revolution
gone on in a tolerable train, it would have been most advisable to have
persisted in that retreat. But I am clearly of opinion that the crisis
which brought you again into public view left you no alternative but to
comply; and I am equally clear in the opinion that you are by that act
pledged to take a part in the execution of the government. I am not
less convinced that the impression of the necessity of your filling the
station in question is so universal that you run no risk of any
uncandid imputation by submitting to it. But even if this were not the
case, a regard to your own reputation, as well as to the public good,
calls upon you in the strongest manner to run that risk.

"It cannot be considered as a compliment to say that, on your
acceptance of the office of President, the success of the new
government in its commencement may materially depend. Your agency and
influence will be not less important in preserving it from the future
attacks of its enemies than they have been in recommending it in the
first instance to the adoption of the people. Independent of all
considerations drawn from this source, the point of light in which you
stand at home and abroad will make an infinite difference in the
respectability with which the government will begin its operations, in
the alternative of your being or not being at the head of it. I forbear
to mention considerations which might have a more personal application.
What I have said will suffice for the inferences I mean to draw.

"First. In a matter so essential to the well-being of society as the
prosperity of a newly-instituted government, a citizen of so much
consequence as yourself to its success has no option but to lend his
services if called for. Permit me to say it would be inglorious, in
such a situation, not to hazard the glory, however great, which he
might have previously acquired.

"Secondly. Your signature to the proposed system pledges your judgment
for its being such a one as, upon the whole, was worthy of the public
approbation. If it should miscarry (as men commonly decide from success
or the want of it), the blame will, in all probability, be laid on the
system itself. And the framers of it will have to encounter the
disrepute of having brought about a revolution in government without
substituting anything that was worthy of the effort; they pulled down
one utopia, it will be said, to build up another. This view of the
subject, if I mistake not, my dear sir, will suggest to your mind
greater hazard to that fame which must be, and ought to be, dear to
you, in refusing your future aid to the system than in affording it. I
will only add that in my estimate of the matter that aid is
indispensable.

"I have taken the liberty to express these sentiments and to lay before
you my view of the subject. I doubt not the considerations mentioned
have fully occurred to you, and I trust they will finally produce in
your mind the same result which exists in mine. I flatter myself the
frankness with which I have delivered myself will not be displeasing to
you. It has been prompted by motives which you would not disapprove."

In answer to this letter, Washington expressed himself without reserve.
"In acknowledging," said he, "the receipt of your candid and kind
letter by the last post, little more is incumbent on me than to thank
you sincerely for the frankness with which you communicated your
sentiments, and to assure you that the same manly tone of intercourse
will always be more than barely welcome--indeed, it will be highly
acceptable to me.

"I am particularly glad, in the present instance, that you have dealt
thus freely and like a friend. Although I could not help observing,
from several publications and letters, that my name had been sometimes
spoken of, and that it was possible the contingency which is the
subject of your letter might happen, yet I thought it best to maintain
a guarded silence, and to lack the counsel of my best friends (which I
certainly hold in the highest estimation), rather than to hazard an
imputation unfriendly to the delicacy of my feelings. For, situated as
I am, I could hardly bring the question into the slightest discussion,
or ask an opinion even in the most confidential manner, without
betraying, in my judgment, some impropriety of conduct, or without
feeling an apprehension that a premature display of anxiety might be
construed into a vainglorious desire of pushing myself into notice as a
candidate. Now, if I am not grossly deceived in myself, I should
unfeignedly rejoice, in case the electors, by giving their votes in
favor of some other person, would save me from the dreadful dilemma of
being forced to accept or refuse. If that may not be, I am, in the next
place, earnestly desirous of searching out the truth, and of knowing
whether there does not exist a probability that the government would be
just as happily and effectually carried into execution without my aid
as with it. I am truly solicitous to obtain all the previous
information which the circumstances will afford, and to determine (when
the determination can with propriety be no longer postponed), according
to the principles of right reason and the dictates of a clear
conscience, without too great a reference to the unforeseen
consequences which may affect my person or reputation. Until that
period, I may fairly hold myself open to conviction, though I allow
your sentiments to have weight in them, and I shall not pass by your
arguments without giving them as dispassionate a consideration as I can
possibly bestow upon them.

"In taking a survey of the subject, in whatever point of light I have
been able to place it, I will not suppress the acknowledgment, my dear
sir, that I have always felt a kind of gloom upon my mind, as often as
I have been taught to expect I might, and perhaps must ere long, be
called to make a decision. You will, I am well assured, believe the
assertion (though I have little expectation it would gain credit from
those who are less acquainted with me), that if I should receive the
appointment, and should be prevailed upon to accept it, the acceptance
would be attended with more diffidence and reluctance than ever I
experienced before in my life. It would be, however, with a fixed and
sole determination of lending whatever assistance might be in my power
to promote the public weal, in hopes that at a convenient and an early
period, my services might be dispensed with, and that I might be
permitted once more to retire--to pass an unclouded evening, after the
stormy day of life, in the bosom of domestic tranquility."

This correspondence was thus closed by Hamilton: "I feel a conviction
that you will finally see your acceptance to be indispensable. It is no
compliment to say that no other man can sufficiently unite the public
opinion, or can give the requisite weight to the office, in the
commencement of the government. These considerations appear to me of
themselves decisive. I am not sure that your refusal would not throw
everything into confusion. I am sure that it would have the worst
effect imaginable.

"Indeed, as I hinted in a former letter, I think circumstances leave no
option."

Although this correspondence does not appear to have absolutely decided
Washington on the part he should embrace, it could not have been
without its influence on his judgment, nor have failed to dispose him
to yield to the wish of his country. "I would willingly," said he, to
his estimable friend, General Lincoln, who had also pressed the subject
on him, "pass over in silence that part of your letter in which you
mention the persons who are candidates for the two first offices in the
executive, if I did not fear the omission might seem to betray a want
of confidence. Motives of delicacy have prevented me hitherto from
conversing or writing on this subject, whenever I could avoid it with
decency. I may, however, with great sincerity, and I believe without
offending against modesty or propriety, say to you that I most heartily
wish the choice to which you allude might not fall upon me; and that if
it should, I must reserve to myself the right of making up my final
decision at the last moment, when it can be brought into one view and
when the expediency or inexpediency of a refusal can be more
judiciously determined than at present. But be assured, my dear sir, if
from any inducement I shall be persuaded ultimately to accept, it will
not be (so far as I know my own heart) from any of a private or
personal nature. Every personal consideration conspires to rivet me (if
I may use the expression) to retirement. At my time of life, and under
my circumstances, nothing in this world can ever draw me from it,
unless it be a conviction that the partiality of my countrymen had made
my services absolutely necessary, joined to a fear that my refusal
might induce a belief that I preferred the conservation of my own
reputation and private ease to the good of my country. After all, if I
should conceive myself in a manner constrained to accept, I call Heaven
to witness that this very act would be the greatest sacrifice of my
personal feelings and wishes that ever I have been called upon to make.
It would be to forego repose and domestic enjoyment for
trouble--perhaps for public obloquy; for I should consider myself as
entering upon an unexplored field, enveloped on every side with clouds
and darkness.

"From this embarrassing situation I had naturally supposed that my
declarations at the close of the war would have saved me, and that my
sincere intentions, then publicly made known, would have effectually
precluded me forever afterward from being looked upon as a candidate
for any office. This hope, as a last anchor of worldly happiness in old
age, I had still carefully preserved, until the public papers and
private letters from my correspondents in almost every quarter taught
me to apprehend that I might soon be obliged to answer the question
whether I would go again into public life or not."

"I can say little or nothing new," said he in a letter to Lafayette,
"in consequence of the repetition of your opinion on the expediency
there will be for my accepting the office to which you refer. Your
sentiments, indeed, coincide much more nearly with those of my other
friends than with my own feelings. In truth, my difficulties increase
and magnify as I draw toward the period when, according to the common
belief, it will be necessary for me to give a definitive answer in one
way or other. Should circumstances render it, in a manner, inevitably
necessary to be in the affirmative, be assured, my dear sir, I shall
assume the task with the most unfeigned reluctance and with a real
diffidence, for which I shall probably receive no credit from the
world. If I know my own heart, nothing short of a conviction of duty
will induce me again to take an active part in public affairs. And in
that case, if I can form a plan for my own conduct, my endeavors shall
be unremittingly exerted (even at the hazard of former fame or present
popularity) to extricate my country from the embarrassments in which it
is entangled through want of credit, and to establish a general system
of policy which, if pursued, will insure permanent felicity to the
commonwealth. I think I see a path, as clear and as direct as a ray of
light, which leads to the attainment of that object. Nothing but
harmony, honesty, industry, and frugality are necessary to make us a
great and happy people. Happily, the present posture of affairs, and
the prevailing disposition of my countrymen, promise to cooperate in
establishing those four great and essential pillars of public
felicity."

After the electors had been chosen, and before the electoral colleges
met, Washington was assailed with the usual importunities of office-
seekers.

As marking the frame of mind with which he came into the government,
the following extract is given from one of the many letters written to
persons whose pretensions he was disposed to favor. "Should it become
absolutely necessary for me to occupy the station in which your letter
presupposes me, I have determined to go into it perfectly free from all
engagements of every nature whatsoever. A conduct in conformity to this
resolution would enable me, in balancing the various pretensions of
different candidates for appointments, to act with a sole reference to
justice and the public good. This is, in substance, the answer that I
have given to all applications (and they are not few) which have
already been made. Among the places sought after in these applications,
I must not conceal that the office to which you particularly allude is
comprehended. This fact I tell you merely as matter of information. My
general manner of thinking, as to the propriety of holding myself
totally disengaged, will apologize for my not enlarging further on the
subject.

"Though I am sensible that the public suffrage which places a man in
office should prevent him from being swayed, in the execution of it, by
his private inclinations, yet he may assuredly, without violating his
duty, be indulged in the continuance of his former attachments."

Although the time appointed for the new government to commence its
operations was the 4th of March, 1789, the members of Congress were so
dilatory in their attendance that a House of Representatives was not
formed till the 1st nor a Senate till the 6th of April.

When at length the votes for President and Vice-President were opened
and counted in the Senate, it was found that Washington was unanimously
elected President, and that the second number of votes was given to
John Adams. George Washington and John Adams were therefore declared to
be duly elected President and Vice-President of the United States, to
serve for four years from the 4th of March, 1789.

In a letter to General Knox, just before this announcement, Washington
thus adverts to the delay in forming a quorum of Congress: "I feel for
those members of the new Congress, who, hitherto, have given an
unavailing attendance at the theater of action. For myself, the delay
may be compared to a reprieve; for, in confidence, I tell you (with the
world it would obtain little credit) that my movements to the chair of
government will be accompanied by feelings not unlike those of a
culprit who is going to the place of his execution; so unwilling am I,
in the evening of life, nearly consumed in public cares, to quit a
peaceful abode for an ocean of difficulties, without that competency of
political skill, abilities, and inclination which are necessary to
manage the helm. I am sensible that I am embarking the voice of the
people, and a good name of my own, on this voyage; but what returns
will be made for them heaven alone can foretell. Integrity and firmness
are all I can promise; these, be the voyage long or short, shall never
forsake me, although I may be deserted by all men; for of the
consolations which are to be derived from these, under any
circumstances, the world cannot deprive me." There is every reason to
believe that the diffidence expressed in the above was sincere. It is
perfectly consistent with the unaffected modesty of Washington's
character.




CHAPTER II.


THE ADMINISTRATION FORMED. 1789.


Washington's election was announced to him by a special messenger from
Congress, on the 14th of April, 1789. His acceptance of it, and his
expressions of gratitude for this fresh proof of the esteem and
confidence of his country, were connected with declarations of
diffidence in himself. "I wish," he said, "that there may not be reason
for regretting the choice--for, indeed, all I can promise is to
accomplish that which can be done by an honest zeal."

As the public business required the immediate attendance of the
President at the seat of government, he hastened his departure, and, on
the second day after receiving notice of his appointment, took leave of
Mount Vernon.

In an entry made by himself in his diary, the feelings inspired by an
occasion so affecting to his mind are thus described: "About 10 o'clock
I bade adieu to Mount Vernon, to private life, and to domestic
felicity, and, with a mind oppressed with more anxious and painful
sensations than I have words to express, set out for New York in
company with Mr. Thomson and Colonel Humphreys, with the best
dispositions to render service to my country in obedience to its call,
but with less hope of answering its expectations."

"The President and his lady," says Mr. Custis, "bid adieu with extreme
regret to the tranquil and happy shades where a few years of repose
had, in a great measure, effaced the effects of the toils and anxieties
of war; where little Eden had bloomed and nourished under their
fostering hands and where a numerous circle of friends and relatives
would sensibly feel the privation of their departure. They departed and
hastened to where duty called the man of his country."

Soon after leaving Mount Vernon he was met by a cavalcade of gentlemen,
who escorted him to Alexandria, where a public dinner had been prepared
to which he was invited. Arrived at that place, he was greeted by a
public address, to which he made an appropriate reply. The address
differs from others, inasmuch as it came from his personal friends and
neighbors, and gives some interesting personal details. The tenor of
the following passage must have sensibly touched the feelings of
Washington:

"Not to extol your glory as a soldier; not to pour forth our gratitude
for past services; not to acknowledge the justice of the unexampled
honor which has been conferred upon you by the spontaneous and
unanimous suffrages of 3,000,000 of freemen, in your election to the
supreme magistracy; nor to admire the patriotism which directs your
conduct, do your neighbors and friends now address you. Themes less
splendid, but more endearing, impress our minds. The first and best of
citizens must leave us; our aged must lose their ornament; our youth
their model; our agriculture its improver; our commerce its friend; our
infant academy its protector; our poor their benefactor; and the
interior navigation of the Potomac (an event replete with the most
extensive utility, already, by your unremitted exertions, brought into
partial use) its institutor and promoter."

Washington left Alexandria on the afternoon of the same day and
attended by his neighbors proceeded to Georgetown, where he was
received by a number of citizens of Maryland. His journey thenceforth
to the seat of government was a continual triumph. Military escorts,
cavalcades of citizens, and crowds of people of all ages and both sexes
awaited his arrival at each town. We may imagine the enthusiastic
shouts and welcomes with which he was received by the people.

On his approach to Philadelphia he was met by Governor Mifflin, Judge
Peters, and a military escort, headed by General St. Clair, and
followed by the usual cavalcade of gentlemen. Washington was mounted on
a splendid white horse. The procession passed into the city through
triumphal arches adorned with wreaths of flowers and laurel, attended
by an immense crowd of people. The day was a public festival, and in
the evening an illumination and a display of fireworks testified the
enthusiasm of the occasion. The next day, at Trenton, he was welcomed
in a manner as new as it was pleasing. In addition to the usual
demonstrations of respect and attachment which were given by the
discharge of cannon, by military corps, and by private persons of
distinction, the gentler sex prepared in their own taste a tribute of
applause indicative of the grateful recollection in which they held
their deliverance twelve years before from a formidable enemy. On the
bridge over the creek which passes through the town was erected a
triumphal arch highly ornamented with laurels and flowers and supported
by thirteen pillars, each entwined with wreaths of evergreen. On the
front arch was inscribed in large gilt letters, "The defender of the
mothers will be the protector of the daughters."

On the center of the arch, above the inscription, was a dome or cupola
of flowers and evergreens, encircling the dates of two memorable events
which were peculiarly interesting to New Jersey. The first was the
battle of Trenton, and the second the bold and judicious stand made by
the American troops at the same creek, by which the progress of the
British army was arrested on the evening preceding the battle of
Princeton.

At this place he was met by a party of matrons leading their daughters,
dressed in white, who carried baskets of flowers in their hands and
sang, with exquisite sweetness, an ode of two stanzas, composed for the
occasion.

At New Brunswick he was joined by the Governor of New Jersey, who
accompanied him to Elizabethtown Point. A committee of Congress
received him on the road and conducted him with military parade to the
Point, where he took leave of the Governor and other gentlemen of New
Jersey and embarked for New York in an elegant barge of thirteen oars,
manned by thirteen branch pilots, prepared for the purpose by the
citizens of New York.

"The display of boats," says Washington, in his private journal, "which
attended and joined on this occasion, some with vocal and others with
instrumental music, on board, the decorations of the ships, the roar of
cannon, and the loud acclamations of the people, which rent the sky as
I passed along the wharves, filled my mind with sensations as painful
(contemplating the reverse of this scene, which may be the case after
all my labors to do good) as they were pleasing."

At the stairs on Murray's wharf, which had been prepared and ornamented
for the purpose, he was received by Governor Clinton, of New York, and
conducted with military honors, through an immense concourse of people,
to the apartments provided for him. These were attended by all who were
in office and by many private citizens of distinction, who pressed
around him to offer their congratulations and to express the joy which
glowed in their bosoms at seeing the man in whom all confided at the
head of the American empire. This day of extravagant joy was succeeded
by a splendid illumination.

Mr. Custis, writing of the journey from Mount Vernon to New York, and
of Washington's mode of living at the seat of government, says:

"The august spectacle at the bridge of Trenton brought tears to the
eyes of the chief, and forms one of the most brilliant recollections of
the age of Washington.

"Arrived at the seat of the Federal government, the President and Mrs.
Washington formed their establishment upon a scale that, while it
partook of all the attributes of our republican institutions, possessed
at the same time that degree of dignity and regard for appearances so
necessary to give our infant Republic respect in the eyes of the world.
The house was handsomely furnished; the equipages neat, with horses of
the first order; the servants wore the family liveries, and, with the
exception of a steward and housekeeper, the whole establishment
differed but little from that of a private gentleman. On Tuesdays, from
3 to 4 o'clock, the President received the foreign ambassadors and
strangers who wished to be introduced to him. On these occasions, and
when opening the sessions of Congress, the President wore a dress
sword. His personal apparel was always remarkable for its being
old-fashioned and exceedingly plain and neat. On Thursdays were the
congressional dinners and on Friday nights Mrs. Washington's
drawing-room. The company usually assembled about 7 and rarely stayed
exceeding 10 o'clock. The ladies were seated, and the President passed
around the circle, paying his compliments to each. At the drawing-rooms
Mrs. Morris always sat at the right of the lady president, and at all
the dinners, public or private, at which Robert Morris was a guest,
that venerable man was placed at the right of Mrs. Washington.

"On the great national festivals of the 4th of July and 22d of
February, the sages of the Revolutionary Congress and the officers of
the Revolutionary army renewed their acquaintance with Mrs. Washington;
many and kindly greetings took place with many a recollection of the
days of trial. The Cincinnati, after paying their respects to their
chief, were seen to file off toward the parlor, where Lady Washington
was in waiting to receive them, and where Wayne, and Mifflin, and
Dickinson, and Stewart, and Moylan, and Hartley, and a host of veterans
were cordially welcomed as old friends, and where many an interesting
reminiscence was called up, of the headquarters and the 'times of the
Revolution.'

"On Sundays, unless the weather was uncommonly severe, the President
and Mrs. Washington attended divine service at Christ Church, and in
the evening the President read to Mrs. Washington, in her chamber, a
sermon or some portion from the sacred writings. No visitors, with the
exception of Mr. Speaker Trumbull, were admitted to the presidoliad on
Sundays.

"There was one description of visitors, however, to be found about the
first President's mansion on all days. The old soldiers repaired, as
they said, to headquarters just to inquire after the health of his
Excellency and Lady Washington. They knew his Excellency was, of
course, much engaged, but they would like to see the good lady, one had
been a soldier of the life guard, another had been on duty when the
British threatened to surprise the headquarters, a third had witnessed
that terrible fellow, Cornwallis, surrender his sword; each one had
some touching appeal with which to introduce himself to the peaceful
headquarters of the presidoliad. All were 'kindly bid to stay,' were
conducted to the steward's apartments, and refreshments set before
them, and, after receiving some little token from the lady, with her
best wishes for the health and happiness of an old soldier, they went
their ways, while blessings upon their revered commander and the good
Lady Washington were uttered by many a war worn veteran of the
Revolution." [1]

The simple mode of life above described did not save Washington from
public censure by those who are always ready to carp at the doings of
distinguished men, however unexceptionable their conduct may be. Free
levees were said to savor of an affectation of royal state. In a letter
to his friend, Dr. Stewart, Washington thus puts to silence this
calumny, with his usual good sense and unanswerable argument:

"Before the custom was established which now accommodates foreign
characters, strangers, and others, who, from motives of curiosity,
respect to the chief magistrate, or any other cause, are induced to
call upon me, I was unable to attend to any business whatsoever. For
gentlemen, consulting their own convenience rather than mine, were
calling from the time I rose from breakfast--often before--until I sat
down to dinner. This, as I resolved not to neglect my public duties,
reduced me to the choice of one of these alternatives--either to refuse
them altogether or to appropriate a time for the reception of them. The
first would, I well knew, be disgusting to many; the latter I expected
would undergo animadversion from those who would find fault with or
without cause. To please everybody was impossible. I therefore adopted
that line of conduct which combined public advantage with private
convenience, and which, in my judgment, was unexceptionable in itself.

"These visits are optional. They are made without invitation. Between
the hours of 3 and 4 every Tuesday I am prepared to receive them.
Gentlemen, often in great numbers, come and go, chat with each other,
and act as they please. A porter shows them into the room, and they
retire from it when they choose, and without ceremony. At their first
entrance they salute me and I them, and as many as I can talk to I do.
What pomp there is in all this I am unable to discover. Perhaps it
consists in not sitting. To this two reasons are opposed: first, it is
unusual; secondly (which is a more substantial one); because I have no
room large enough to contain a third of the chairs which would be
sufficient to admit it. If it is supposed that ostentation or the
fashions of courts (which by the by, I believe originate oftener in
convenience, not to say necessity, than is generally imagined) gave
rise to this custom, I will boldly affirm that no supposition was ever
more erroneous, for were I to indulge my inclinations every moment that
I could withdraw from the fatigues of my station should be spent in
retirement. That they are not proceeds from the sense I entertain of
the propriety of giving to everyone as free access as consists with
that respect which is due to the chair of government; and that respect,
I conceive, is neither to be acquired or preserved but by maintaining a
just medium between too much state and too great familiarity.

"Similar to the above, but of a more familiar and sociable kind, are
the visits every Friday afternoon to Mrs. Washington, where I always
am. These public meetings, and a dinner once a week to as many as my
table will hold, with the references to and from the different
departments of state and other communications with all parts of the
Union, is as much if not more than I am able to undergo; for I have
already had within less than a year two severe attacks--the last worse
than the first; a third, it is more than probable, will put me to sleep
with my fathers--at what distance this may be I know not."

The inauguration of Washington deserves particular notice, inasmuch as
in its chief outlines it has served for the precedent to all succeeding
inaugurations. Congress had determined that the ceremony of taking the
oath of office should be performed in public and in the open air. It
took place on the 30th of April, 1789. In the morning religious
services were performed in all the churches of the city. At 12 o'clock
a procession was formed at the residence of the President, consisting
of a military escort and the committees of Congress and heads of
departments in carriages, followed by Washington alone in a carriage,
and his aid-de-camp, Colonel Humphreys, and secretary, Mr. Lear, in
another carriage, with the foreign ministers and citizens bringing up
the rear. The procession moved to the hall of Congress, where
Washington alighted with his attendants and entered the senate chamber.
Here he was received by the Senate and House of Representatives. The
Vice-President, John Adams, conducted Washington to his appointed seat,
and shortly after announced to him that all was prepared for his taking
the oath of office. Washington then proceeded to an open balcony in
front of the house, where was a table with an open Bible lying upon it.
On his appearance in the balcony, he was received with a most
enthusiastic burst of popular applause, which he acknowledged by bowing
to the people. Chancellor Livingston administered the oath, while
Adams, Hamilton, Knox, Steuben, and others stood near the President.
While the oath was being administered Washington laid his hand on the
Bible. At its conclusion he said, "I swear, so help me God." His
administration proves that the oath was sincere. He then stooped down
and kissed the Bible. When the ceremony was concluded, he returned to
the senate chamber and delivered his inaugural address to the two
branches of Congress. He then proceeded on foot, with the whole
assemblage, to St. Paul's Church, where prayers were read by the
bishop, and the public ceremonial of the day was completed.

The occasion was celebrated by the people as a grand festival, and in
the evening there was a display of fireworks as well as a general
illumination of the city.

This display of enthusiasm on the part of the people was far from
rendering Washington over-confident of success in his new position. He
was thoroughly aware of the difficulties which would have to be
encountered in putting the new government into action, so as to insure
its stability and success. The opening of his inaugural address to both
branches of Congress gives a clear indication of his views and feelings
on taking office. It is as follows:

"Among the vicissitudes incident to life, no event could have filled me
with greater anxieties than that of which the notification was
transmitted by your order and received on the 14th day of the present
month. On the one hand I was summoned by my country, whose voice I can
never hear but with veneration and love, from a retreat which I had
chosen with the fondest predilection, and, in my flattering hopes, with
an immutable decision, as the asylum of my declining years; a retreat
which was rendered every day more necessary as well as more dear to me
by the addition of habit to inclination, and of frequent interruptions
in my health to the gradual waste committed on it by time. On the other
hand, the magnitude and difficulty of the trust to which the voice of
my country called me, being sufficient to awaken in the wisest and most
experienced of her citizens a distrustful scrutiny into his
qualifications, could not but overwhelm with despondence one, who,
inheriting inferior endowments from nature, and unpracticed in the
duties of civil administration, ought to be peculiarly conscious of his
own deficiencies. In this conflict of emotions, all I dare aver is,
that it has been my faithful study to collect my duty from a just
appreciation of every circumstance by which it might be effected. All I
dare hope is, that if, in accepting this task, I have been too much
swayed by a grateful remembrance of former instances or by an
affectionate sensibility to this transcendent proof of the confidence
of my fellow-citizens, and have thence too little consulted my
incapacity, as well as disinclination for the weighty and untried cares
before me, my error will be palliated by the motives which misled me,
and its consequences be judged by my country with some share of the
partiality in which they originated.

"Such being the impressions under which I have, in obedience to the
public summons, repaired to the present station, it will be peculiarly
improper to omit, in this first official act, my fervent supplications
to that Almighty Being who rules over the universe--who presides in the
councils of nations, and whose Providential aids can supply every human
defect--that his benediction may consecrate to the liberties and
happiness of the people of the United States, a government instituted
by themselves for these essential purposes, and may enable every
instrument employed in its administration to execute with success the
functions allotted to his charge. In tendering this homage to the great
Author of every public and private good, I assure myself that it
expresses your sentiments not less than my own, nor those of my
fellow-citizens at large less than either. No people can be bound to
acknowledge and adore the invisible hand which conducts the affairs of
men more than the people of the United States. Every step by which they
have advanced to the character of an independent nation seems to have
been distinguished by some token of Providential agency, and in the
important Revolution just accomplished in the system of their united
government, the tranquil deliberations and voluntary consent of so many
distinct communities, from which the event has resulted, cannot be
compared with the means by which most governments have been
established, without some return of pious gratitude, along with an
humble anticipation of the future blessings which the past seem to
presage. These reflections, arising out of the present crisis, have
forced themselves too strongly on my mind to be suppressed. You will
join with me, I trust, in thinking that there are none under the
influence of which the proceedings of a new and free government can
more auspiciously commence."

It will be seen by these expressions that the same sense of solemn
responsibility and the same undoubting trust in Providence, so often
evinced by Washington during the conflicts and perils of the war,
marked his entrance upon the arduous duties of chief magistrate of the
nation. As in the previous instance of accepting office, he now
signified to Congress that he would receive no compensation for his
services, except such as should be necessary to defray the expenses
incident to the position in which he was placed.

This determination was announced in the concluding portion of the
inaugural address, which was as follows:

"By the article establishing the executive department, it is made the
duty of the President 'to recommend to your consideration such measures
as he shall judge necessary and expedient.' The circumstances under
which I now meet you will acquit me from entering into that subject,
further than to refer to the great constitutional charter under which
you are assembled, and which, in defining your powers, designates the
objects to which your attention is to be given. It will be more
consistent with those circumstances and far more congenial with the
feelings which actuate me to substitute in place of a recommendation of
particular measures the tribute that is due to the talents, the
rectitude, and the patriotism which adorn the characters selected to
devise and adopt them. In these honorable qualifications I behold the
surest pledges that, as on one side no local prejudices or attachments,
no separate views nor party animosities will misdirect the
comprehensive and equal eye which ought to watch over this great
assemblage of communities and interests; so, on another, that the
foundations of our national policy will be laid in the pure and
immutable principles of private morality, and the pre-eminence of free
government be exemplified by all the attributes which can win the
affections of its citizens and command the respect of the world. I
dwell on this prospect with every satisfaction which an ardent love for
my country can inspire, since there is no truth more thoroughly
established than that there exists in the economy and course of nature,
an indissoluble union between virtue and happiness--between duty and
advantage--between the genuine maxims of an honest and magnanimous
policy and the solid rewards of public prosperity and felicity, since
we ought to be no less persuaded that the propitious smiles of Heaven
can never be expected on a nation that disregards the eternal rules of
order and right which Heaven itself has ordained, and since the
preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the
republican model of government are justly considered as deeply, perhaps
as finally, staked on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the
American people.

"Besides the ordinary objects submitted to your care it will remain
with your judgment to decide how far an exercise of the occasional
power delegated by the fifth article of the constitution is rendered
expedient, at the present juncture, by the nature of objections which
have been urged against the system or by the degree of inquietude which
has given birth to them. Instead of undertaking particular
recommendations on this subject, in which I could be guided by no
lights derived from official opportunities, I shall again give way to
my entire confidence in your discernment and pursuit of the public
good, for I assure myself that, whilst you carefully avoid every
alteration which might endanger the benefits of a united and effective
government, or which ought to await the future lessons of experience, a
reverence for the characteristic rights of freemen and a regard for the
public harmony will sufficiently influence your deliberations on the
question how far the former can be more impregnably fortified or the
latter be safely and advantageously promoted.

"To the preceding observations I have one to add, which will be most
properly addressed to the House of Representatives. It concerns myself,
and will, therefore, be as brief as possible. When I was first honored
with a call into the service of my country, then on the eve of an
arduous struggle for its liberties, the light in which I contemplated
my duty required that I should renounce every pecuniary compensation.
From this resolution I have in no instance departed. And being still
under the impressions which produced it, I must decline, as
inapplicable to myself, any share in the personal emoluments which may
be indispensably included in a permanent provision for the executive
department, and must accordingly pray that the pecuniary estimates for
the station in which I am placed, may, during my continuance in it, be
limited to such actual expenditures as the public good may be thought
to require.

"Having thus imparted to you my sentiments, as they have been awakened
by the occasion which brings us together, I shall take my present
leave, but not without resorting once more to the benign Parent of the
human race, in humble supplication, that since He has been pleased to
favor the American people with opportunities for deliberating in
perfect tranquility and dispositions for deciding with unparalleled
unanimity on a form of government for the security of their union and
the advancement of their happiness, so his divine blessing may be
equally conspicuous in the enlarged views, the temperate consultations,
and the wise measures on which the success of his government must
depend."

This speech was read to Congress by the President himself. The practice
of sending a message instead of reading the speech in person was
introduced by President Jefferson, who did not appear to advantage as
an orator, and it has been continued to the present time. The same
persons who found fault with Washington's levees would probably have
regarded the practice introduced by Washington as anti-republican, as
it is practiced by the sovereigns of Great Britain.

The executive departments which had existed under the confederation
were necessarily continued until Congress should make new arrangements.
Mr. Jay still acted as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, an office
analogous to that which is now denominated Secretary of State, and
General Knox as Secretary of War. The treasury was entrusted to a board
of commissioners. Each of these at the request of the President
furnished a full report of the state of the department respectively
under their control. To the digesting, condensing, and studying of
these, and of the diplomatic correspondence of the government since the
close of the war, Washington now devoted himself with unwearied
attention.

Of the mode in which his daily life was now passed during the hours
when not engaged in official duty, we gain a pleasing glimpse from the
following extract from G. W. P. Custis' "Recollections and Private
Memoirs of the Life and Character of Washington," as follows:

"In the then limited extent and improvement of the city there was some
difficulty in selecting a mansion for the residence of the chief
magistrate and a house suitable to his rank and station. Osgood's
house, a mansion of very moderate extent, was at length fixed upon,
situated in Cherry street.

"There the President became domiciled. His domestic family consisted of
Mrs. Washington, the two adopted children, Mr. Lear, as principal
secretary, Colonel Humphreys, with Messrs. Lewis and Nelson,
secretaries, and Maj. William Jackson, aide-de-camp.

"Persons visiting the house in Cherry street at this time of day will
wonder how a building so small could contain the many and mighty
spirits that thronged its halls in olden days. Congress, cabinets, all
public functionaries in the commencement of the government were
selected from the very elite of the nation. Pure patriotism, commanding
talent, eminent services, were the proud and indispensable requisites
for official station in the first days of the Republic. The first
Congress was a most enlightened and dignified body. In the Senate were
several of the members of the Congress of 1776 and signers of the
Declaration of Independence--Richard Henry Lee, who moved the
Declaration, John Adams, who seconded it, with Sherman, Morris,
Carroll, etc.

"The levees of the first President were attended by these illustrious
patriots and statesmen, and by many other of the patriots, statesmen,
and soldiers, who could say of the Revolution, '_magna pars fui_,'
while numbers of foreigners and strangers of distinction crowded to the
seat of the general government, all anxious to witness the grand
experiment that was to determine how much rational liberty mankind is
capable of enjoying, without said liberty degenerating into
licentiousness.

"Mrs. Washington's drawing-rooms, on Friday nights, were attended by
the grace and beauty of New York. On one of these occasions an incident
occurred which might have been attended by serious consequences. Owing
to the lowness of the ceiling in the drawing-room, the ostrich feather
in the head-dress of Miss McIver, a belle of New York, took fire from
the chandelier, to the no small alarm of the company. Major Jackson,
aide-de-camp to the President, with great presence of mind and equal
gallantry, flew to the rescue of the lady, and, by clapping the burning
plumes between his hands, extinguished the flames, and the drawing-room
went on as usual.

"Washington preserved the habit, as well in public as in private life,
of rising at 4 o'clock and retiring to bed at 9. On Saturdays he rested
somewhat from his labors by either riding into the country, attended by
a groom, or with his family in his coach drawn by six horses.

"Fond of horses, the stables of the President were always in the finest
order and his equipage excellent, both in taste and quality. Indeed, so
long ago as the days of the vice-regal court of Lord Botetourt, at
Williamsburg, in Virginia, we find that there existed a rivalry between
the equipages of Colonel Byrd, a magnate of the old _rgime_, and
Colonel Washington--the grays against the bays. Bishop, the celebrated
body-servant of Braddock, was the master of Washington's stables. And
there were what was termed muslin horses in those days. At cockcrow the
stable boys were at work; at sunrise Bishop stalked into the stables, a
muslin handkerchief in his hand, which he applied to the coats of the
animals, and, if the slightest stain was perceptible upon the muslin,
up went the luckless wights of the stableboys and punishment was
administered instanter; for to the veteran Bishop, bred amid the iron
discipline of European armies, mercy for anything like a breach of duty
was altogether out of the question.

"The President's stables in Philadelphia were under the direction of
German John, and the grooming of the white chargers will rather
surprise the moderns. The night before the horses were expected to be
rode they were covered entirely over with a paste, of which whiting was
the principal component part; then the animals were swathed in body
clothes and left to sleep upon clean straw. In the morning the
composition had become hard, was well rubbed in, and curried and
brushed, which process gave to the coats a beautiful, glossy, and
satin-like appearance. The hoofs were then blacked and polished, the
mouths washed, teeth picked and cleaned, and, the leopard-skin housings
being properly adjusted, the white chargers were led out for service.
Such was the grooming of ancient times.

"There was but one theater in New York in 1789 (in John street), and so
small were its dimensions that the whole fabric might easily be placed
on the stage of one of our modern theaters. Yet, humble as was the
edifice, it possessed an excellent company of actors and actresses,
including old Morris, who was the associate of Garrick, in the very
outset of that great actor's career, at Goodrhan's Fields. The stage
boxes were appropriated to the President and Vice-President, and were
each of them decorated with emblems, trophies, etc. At the foot of the
playbills were always the words, '_Vivat Respublica_.' Washington often
visited this theater, being particularly gratified by Wignell's
performance of Darby, in the 'Poor Soldier.'

"It was in the theater in John street that the now national air of
'Hail Columbia,' then called the 'President's March,' was first played.
It was composed by a German musician by the name of Fyles, the leader
of the orchestra, in compliment to the President. The national air will
last as long as the nation lasts, while the meritorious composer has
been long since forgotten.

"It was while residing in Cherry street that the President was attacked
by a severe illness that required a surgical operation. He was attended
by the elder and younger Drs. Bard. The elder, being somewhat doubtful
of his nerves, gave the knife to his son, bidding him 'cut
away--deeper, deeper still; don't be afraid; you see how well he bears
it.' Great anxiety was felt in New York at this time, as the
President's case was considered extremely dangerous. Happily, the
operation proved successful, and the patient's recovery removed all
cause of alarm. During the illness a chain was stretched across the
street and the sidewalks laid with straw. Soon after his recovery the
President set out on his intended tour through the New England States.

"The President's mansion was so limited in accommodation that three of
the secretaries were compelled to occupy one room--Humphreys, Lewis,
and Nelson. Humphreys, aide-de-camp to the Commander-in-Chief at
Yorktown, was a most estimable man, and at the same time a poet. About
this period he was composing his 'Widow of Malabac.' Lewis and Nelson,
both young men, were content, after the labors of the day, to enjoy a
good night's repose. But this was often denied them, for Humphreys,
when in the vein, would rise from his bed at any hour, and, with
stentorian voice, recite his verses. The young men, roused from their
slumbers, and rubbing their eyes, beheld a great burly figure, '_en
chemise_,' striding across the floor, reciting, with great emphasis,
particular passages from his poems, and calling on his room-mates for
their approbation. Having, in this way, for a considerable time,
'murdered the sleep' of his associates, Humphreys, at length, wearied
by his exertions, would sink upon his pillow in a kind of dreamy
languor. So sadly were the young secretaries annoyed by the frequent
outbursts of the poet's imagination that it was remarked of them by
their friends, that, from 1789 to the end of their lives, neither
Robert Lewis nor Thomas Nelson was ever known to evince the slightest
taste for poetry."

Washington had hardly recovered from the severe attack of illness above
referred to, when he heard of the death of his mother, who died on the
25th of August, 1789. He had paid her a visit just before leaving Mount
Vernon for the seat of government. She was then residing at
Fredericksburg, and was gradually sinking under a disease which was
evidently mortal; and Washington, fully aware that he was seeing her
for the last time, was much affected at the interview. She also felt
that they were parting to meet no more in this world. "But she bade him
go, with Heaven's blessing and her own, to fulfill the high destinies
to which he had been called."

The mother of Washington was, in many respects, a remarkable woman. Her
influence over her son in early life we have already had occasion to
notice. In her last days she presents a true picture of matronly
dignity. Mr. Custis states that she was continually visited and
solaced, in the retirement of her declining years, by her children and
numerous grandchildren. Her daughter, Mrs. Lewis, repeatedly and
earnestly solicited her to remove to her house and there pass the
remainder of her days. Her son pressingly entreated her that she would
make Mount Vernon the home of her age. But the matron's answer was: "I
thank you for your affectionate and dutiful offers, but my wants are
few in this world and I feel perfectly competent to take care of
myself." To the proposition of her son-in-law, Colonel Lewis, to
relieve her by taking the direction of her concerns, she replied. "Do
you, Fielding, keep my books in order, for your eyesight is better than
mine; but leave the executive management to me." Such were the energy
and independence she preserved to an age beyond that usually allotted
to mortals, and till within three years of her death, when the disease
under which she suffered (cancer of the breast) prevented exertion.

Her meeting with Washington, after the victory which decided the
fortune of America, illustrates her character too strikingly to be
omitted: "After an absence of nearly seven years it was, at length, on
the return of the combined armies from Yorktown, permitted to the
mother to see and embrace her illustrious son. So soon as he had
dismounted, in the midst of a numerous and brilliant suite, he sent to
apprise her of his arrival and to know when it would be her pleasure to
receive him. And now, mark the force of early education and habits, and
the superiority of the Spartan over the Persian schools, in this
interview of the great Washington with his admirable parent and
instructor. No pageantry of war proclaimed his coming--no trumpets
sounded--no banners waved. Alone, and on foot, the Marshal of France,
the General-in-Chief of the combined armies of France and America, the
deliverer of his country, the hero of the age, repaired to pay his
humble duty to her whom he venerated as the author of his being, the
founder of his fortune and his fame. Full well he knew that the matron
was made of sterner stuff than to be moved by all the pride that glory
ever gave or by all the "pomp and circumstance" of power. The lady was
alone--her aged hands employed in the works of domestic industry--when
the good news was announced, and it was further told that the victor
chief was in waiting at the threshold. She welcomed him with a warm
embrace, and by the well-remembered and endearing names of his
childhood. Inquiring as to his health, she remarked the lines which
mighty cares and many trials had made on his manly countenance, spoke
much of old times and old friends, but of his glory, not one word!

"Meantime, in the village of Fredericksburg, all was joy and revelry.
The town was crowded with the officers of the French and American
armies, and with gentlemen from all the country around, who hastened to
welcome the conquerors of Cornwallis. The citizens made arrangements
for a splendid ball to which the mother of Washington was specially
invited. She observed that although her dancing days were pretty well
over she should feel happy in contributing to the general festivity,
and consented to attend.

"The foreign officers were anxious to see the mother of their chief.
They had heard indistinct rumors respecting her remarkable life and
character, but, forming their judgment from European examples, they
were prepared to expect in the mother that glare and show which would
have been attached to the parents of the great in the old world. How
were they surprised when the matron, leaning on the arm of her son,
entered the room! She was arrayed in the very plain, yet becoming garb
worn by the Virginia lady of the olden time. Her address, always
dignified and imposing, was courteous though reserved. She received the
complimentary attentions which were profusely paid her without evincing
the slightest elevation, and, at an early hour, wished the company much
enjoyment of their pleasures, and observing that it was time for old
people to be at home, retired, leaning as before on the arm of her
son."

To this picture may be added another:

"The Marquis de Lafayette repaired to Fredericksburg, previous to his
departure for Europe in the fall of 1784, to pay his parting respects
to the mother, and to ask her blessing. Conducted by one of her
grandsons he approached the house, when the young gentleman observed:
'There, sir, is my grandmother.' Lafayette beheld--working in the
garden, clad in domestic-made clothes, and her gray head covered with a
plain straw hat--the mother of 'his hero, his friend, and a country's
preserver.' The lady saluted him, kindly observing: 'Ah, marquis! you
see an old woman, but come, I can make you welcome to my poor dwelling
without the parade of changing my dress.'"

To the encomiums lavished by the marquis on his chief, the mother
replied: "I am not surprised at what George has done for he was always
a very good boy." So simple, in her true greatness of soul, was this
remarkable woman.

Her piety was ardent, and she associated devotion with the grand and
beautiful in nature. She was in the habit of repairing every day for
prayer to a secluded spot, formed by rocks and trees, near her
dwelling.

The person of Mrs. Washington is described as being of the medium
height and well proportioned--her features pleasing, though strongly
marked. There were few painters in the Colonies in those days, and no
portrait of her is in existence. Her biographer saw her but with infant
eyes, but well remembered the sister of the chief. Of her we are told
nothing, except that "she was a most majestic woman and so strikingly
like the brother that it was a matter of frolic to throw a cloak around
her and place a military hat upon her head, and such was the perfect
resemblance that had she appeared on her brother's steed, battalions
would have presented arms, and senates risen to do homage to the
chief."

Mrs. Washington died at the age of eighty-five, rejoicing in the
consciousness of a life well spent, and the hope of a blessed
immortality. Her ashes repose at Fredericksburg, where a splendid
monument has been erected to her memory. [2]

Deeply as Washington felt the loss of his estimable parent his
attention was speedily withdrawn from his private and personal
interests by the important political affairs which were pressing upon
him. Congress were now fairly engaged in giving form and efficiency to
the newly-created government. [3]

The continued existence of the constitution itself was menaced by some
of the States which had acceded to it, as well as by those who had
refused to adopt it. In some of the States a disposition to acquiesce
in the decision which had been made, and to await the issue of a fair
experiment of the constitution was avowed by the minority. In others
the chagrin of defeat seemed to increase the original hostility to the
instrument, and serious fears were entertained by its friends that a
second general convention might pluck from it the most essential of its
powers before their value and the safety with which they might be
confided where they were placed could be ascertained by experience.

From the same cause exerting itself in a different direction the
friends of the new system had been still more alarmed. In all those
States where the opposition was sufficiently formidable to inspire a
hope of success, the effort was made to fill the Legislature with the
declared enemies of the government and thus to commit it, in its
infancy, to the custody of its foes. Their fears were quieted for the
present. In both branches of the Legislature the Federalists, an
appellation at that time distinguishing those who had supported the
constitution, formed the majority, and it soon appeared that a new
convention was too bold an experiment to be applied for by the
requisite number of States. But two States, Rhode Island and North
Carolina, still remained out of the pale of the Union, and a great deal
of ill humor existed among those who were included within it, which
increased the necessity of circumspection in those who administered the
government.

To the western parts of the continent the attention of the Executive
was attracted by discontents which were displayed with some violence,
and which originated in circumstances and in interests peculiar to that
country.

Spain, in possession of the mouth of the Mississippi, had refused to
permit the citizens of the United States to follow its waters into the
ocean, and had occasionally tolerated or interdicted their commerce to
New Orleans, as had been suggested by the supposed interest or caprice
of the Spanish government or of its representatives in America. The
eyes of the inhabitants adjacent to the waters which emptied into that
river were turned down it as the only channel through which the surplus
produce of their luxuriant soil could be conveyed to the markets of the
world. Believing that the future wealth and prosperity of their country
depended on the use of that river they gave some evidence of a
disposition to drop from the Confederacy, if this valuable acquisition
could not otherwise be made. This temper could not fail to be viewed
with interest by the neighboring powers, who had been encouraged by it
and by the imbecility of the government, to enter into intrigues of an
alarming nature.

Previous to his departure from Mount Vernon, Washington had received
intelligence, too authentic to be disregarded, of private machinations,
by real or pretended agents both of Spain and Great Britain, which were
extremely hostile to the peace and to the integrity of the Union.

Spain had intimated that the navigation of the Mississippi could never
be conceded while the inhabitants of the western country remained
connected with the Atlantic States, but might be freely granted to them
if they should form an independent empire.

On the other hand a gentleman from Canada, whose ostensible business
was to repossess himself of some lands on the Ohio which had been
formerly granted to him, frequently discussed the vital importance of
the navigation of the Mississippi, and privately assured several
individuals of great influence that if they were disposed to assert
their rights he was authorized by Lord Dorchester, the Governor of
Canada, to say that they might rely confidently on his assistance. With
the aid it was in his power to give they might seize New Orleans,
fortify the Balize at the mouth of the Mississippi, and maintain
themselves in that place against the utmost efforts of Spain. [4]

The probability of failing in any attempt to hold the mouth of the
Mississippi by force, and the resentments against Great Britain which
prevailed generally throughout the western country, diminished the
danger to be apprehended from any machinations of that power, but
against those of Spain the same security did not exist.

In contemplating the situation of the United States in their relations
not purely domestic the object demanding most immediate consideration
was the hostility of several tribes of Indians. The military strength
of the nations who inhabited the country between the lakes, the
Mississippi, and the Ohio was computed at 5,000 men, of whom about
1,500 were at open war with the United States. Treaties had been
concluded with the residue, but the warlike disposition of the Indians,
and the provocations they had received, furnished reasons for
apprehending that these treaties would soon be broken.

In the South the Creeks, who could bring into the field 6,000 fighting
men, were at war with Georgia. In the mind of their leader,
M'Gillivray, the son of a white man, some irritation had been produced
by the confiscation of the lands of his father who had resided in that
State, and several other refugees, whose property had also been
confiscated, contributed still further to exasperate the nation. But
the immediate point in contest between them was a tract of land on the
Oconee, which the State of Georgia claimed under a purchase, the
validity of which was denied by the Indians.

The regular force of the United States was less than 600 men.

Not only the policy of accommodating differences by negotiation which
the government was in no condition to terminate by the sword, but a
real respect for the rights of the natives and a regard for the claims
of justice and humanity, disposed Washington to endeavor, in the first
instance, to remove every cause of quarrel by a treaty, and his message
to Congress on this subject evidenced his preference of pacific
measures.

Possessing many valuable articles of commerce for which the best market
was often found on the coast of the Mediterranean, struggling to export
them in their own bottoms, and unable to afford a single gun for their
protection, the Americans could not view with unconcern the
dispositions which were manifested toward them by the Barbary powers. A
treaty had been formed with the Emperor of Morocco, but from Algiers,
Tunis, and Tripoli peace had not been purchased, and those regencies
considered all as enemies to whom they had not sold their friendship.
The unprotected vessels of America presented a tempting object to their
rapacity, and their hostility was the more terrible, because by their
public law prisoners became slaves.

The United States were at peace with all the powers of Europe, but
controversies of a delicate nature existed with some of them, the
adjustment of which required a degree of moderation and firmness which
there was reason to fear might not, in every instance, be exhibited.

The apprehensions with which Spain had contemplated the future strength
of the United States, and the consequent disposition to restrict them
to narrow limits, have been already noticed. After the conclusion of
the war the attempt to form a treaty with that power had been repeated,
but no advance toward an agreement on the points Of difference between
the two governments had been made.

Circumstances attending the points of difference with Great Britain
were still more serious, because, in their progress, a temper
unfavorable to accommodation had been uniformly displayed.

The resentments produced by the various calamities war had occasioned
were not terminated with their cause. The idea that Great Britain was
the natural enemy of America had become habitual. Believing it
impossible for that nation to have relinquished its views of conquest,
many found it difficult to bury their animosities and to act upon the
sentiment contained in the Declaration of Independence, "to hold them
as the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends." In addition
to the complaints respecting the violation of the treaty of peace
events were continually supplying this temper with fresh aliment. The
disinclination which the cabinet of London had discovered to a
commercial treaty with the United States was not attributed exclusively
to the cause which had been assigned for it. It was in part ascribed to
that jealousy with which Britain was supposed to view the growing trade
of America.

The general restrictions on commerce by which every maritime power
sought to promote its own navigation, and that part of the European
system in particular by which each aimed at a monopoly of the trade of
its Colonies, were felt with peculiar keenness when enforced by
England. In this suspicious temper almost every unfavorable event which
occurred was traced up to British hostility.

That an attempt to form a commercial treaty with Portugal had failed,
was attributed to the influence of the cabinet of London, and to the
machinations of the same power were also ascribed the danger from the
corsairs of Barbary and the bloody incursions of the Indians. The
resentment excited by these causes was felt by a large proportion of
the American people, and the expression of it was common and public.
That correspondent dispositions existed in England is by no means
improbable, and the necessary effect of this temper was to increase the
difficulty of adjusting the differences between the two nations.

With France the most perfect harmony subsisted. Those attachments which
originated in the signal services received from the King of France
during the war of the Revolution had sustained no diminution. Yet, from
causes which it was found difficult to counteract, the commercial
intercourse between the two nations was not so extensive as had been
expected. It was the interest and, of consequence, the policy of
France, to avail herself of the misunderstandings between the United
States and Great Britain, in order to obtain such regulations as might
gradually divert the increasing trade of the American continent from
those channels in which it had been accustomed to flow, and a
disposition was felt throughout the United States to cooperate with her
in enabling her merchants, by legislative encouragements, to rival
those of Britain in the American market.

A great revolution had commenced in that country, the first stage of
which was completed by limiting the powers of the monarch, and by the
establishment of a popular assembly. In no part of the globe was this
revolution hailed with more joy than in America. The influence it would
have on the affairs of the world was not then distinctly foreseen, and
the philanthropist, without becoming a political partisan, rejoiced in
the event. On this subject, therefore, but one sentiment existed.

The relations of the United States with the other powers of Europe did
not require particular attention. Their dispositions were rather
friendly than otherwise, and an inclination was generally manifested to
participate in the advantages which the erection of an independent
empire on the western shores of the Atlantic held forth to the
commercial world.

By the ministers of foreign powers in America it would readily be
supposed that the first steps taken by the new government would not
only be indicative of its present system, but would probably affect its
foreign relations permanently, and that the influence of the President
would be felt in the Legislature. Scarcely was the exercise of his
executive functions commenced when Washington received an application
from the Count de Moustiers, the minister of France, requesting a
private conference. On being told that the Department of Foreign
Affairs was the channel through which all official business should
pass, the count replied that the interview he requested was not for the
purpose of actual business, but rather as preparatory to its future
transaction.

The next day, at 1 in the afternoon, was named for the interview. The
count commenced the conversation with declarations of his personal
regard for America, the manifestations of which, he said, had been
early and uniform. His nation, too, was well disposed to be upon terms
of amity with the United States, but at his public reception there were
occurrences which he thought indicative of coolness in the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, who had, he feared, while in Europe, imbibed
prejudices, not only against Spain, but against France also. If this
conjecture should be right the present head of that department could
not be an agreeable organ of intercourse with the President. He then
took a view of the modern usages of European courts, which, he said,
favored the practice he recommended, of permitting foreign ministers to
make their communications directly to the chief of the executive. "He
then presented a letter," says Washington in his private journal,
"which he termed confidential, and to be considered as addressed to me
in my private character, which was too strongly marked with an
intention, as well as a wish, to have no person between the minister
and President in the transaction of business between the two nations."

In reply to these observations Washington assured him that, judging
from his own feelings and from the public sentiment, there existed in
America a reciprocal disposition to be on the best terms with France.
That whatever former difficulties might have occurred he was persuaded
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs had offered no intentional disrespect
either to the minister or to his nation. Without undertaking to know
the private opinions of Mr. Jay he would declare that he had never
heard that officer express, directly or indirectly, any sentiment
unfavorable to either.

Reason and usage, he added, must direct the mode of treating national
and official business. If rules had been established they must be
conformed to. If they were yet to be framed it was hoped that they
would be convenient and proper. So far as case could be made to comport
with regularity and with necessary forms, it ought to be consulted, but
custom, and the dignity of office, were not to be disregarded. The
conversation continued upward of an hour, but no change was made in the
resolution of the President.

During its first session the national Legislature was principally
occupied in providing revenues for the long-exhausted treasury, in
establishing a judiciary, in organizing the executive departments in
detail, and in framing amendments to the constitution, agreeably to the
suggestion of the President. The members immediately entered upon the
exercise of those powers so long refused under the articles of
confederation. They imposed a tonnage duty, as well as duties on
various imported articles, steadily keeping in sight, however, the
navigating interest of the country, which had hitherto been almost
wholly at the mercy of other nations. Higher tonnage duties were
imposed on foreign than on American bottoms, and goods imported in
vessels belonging to citizens of the United States paid 10 per cent
less duty than the same goods brought in those owned by foreigners.
These discriminating duties were intended to counteract the commercial
regulations of foreign nations and to encourage American shipping. To
aid in the management of the affairs of government three executive
departments were established, styled Departments of War, Foreign
Affairs, and of the Treasury, with a secretary at the head of each.

The heads of these departments, in addition to the duties specially
assigned them, were intended to constitute a council, to be consulted
by the President whenever he thought proper, and the Executive was
authorized by the constitution to require the opinion, in writing, of
the principal officers in the executive departments, on subjects
relating to the duties of their offices. In framing the acts
constituting these offices and defining their duties, it became an
important subject of inquiry in what manner or by whom these important
officers could be removed from office. This was a question as new as it
was momentous and was applicable to all officers of executive
appointment. In the long and learned debates on the subject in
Congress, there arose a very animated opposition to such a construction
of the constitution as to give this power to any one individual.
Whatever confidence might be placed in the chief magistrate then at the
head of the government, equal confidence could not be expected in his
successors, and it was contended that a concurrence of the Senate was
as necessary and proper in the removal of a person from office as in
his appointment. Some of the members of the House of Representatives
were of opinion that they could not be removed without impeachment. The
principal question, however, on which Congress was divided, was,
whether they were removable by the President alone, or by the President
in concurrence with the Senate. A majority, however, in both houses,
decided that this power was in the President alone. In the House, the
majority in favor of this construction was twelve. This decision of a
great constitutional question has been acquiesced in, and in its
consequences has been of greater importance than almost any other since
the establishment of the new government. From the manner in which this
power has been exercised, it has given a tone and character to the
executive branch of the government not contemplated, it is believed, by
the framers of the constitution or by those who constituted the first
Congress under it. It has greatly increased the influence and patronage
of the President and in no small degree made him the center around
which the other branches of the government revolve. [4]

In a free country, where the private citizen has both the right and the
inclination to take an interest in the public concerns, it is natural
that political parties and civil contentions should arise. These will
be more or less violent, angry, and hostile, according as a sense of
common security from external dangers leaves no cause for united
action, and little anxiety for the common peace. A natural consequence
of this strife of parties is the exercise of the passions--pride,
interest, vanity, resentment, gratitude--each contributing its share in
irritating and prolonging the controversy. In the beginning of the
Revolution, the people of the United States divided themselves into the
two great classes of Whigs and Tories; then they again separated upon
the question of absolute independence. Other questions arose during the
war, relative to its conduct, and the qualifications of the leaders of
the army. Independence achieved, the minds of the people were agitated
about the nature of the government, which all saw to be necessary for
their own happiness, and for the better enabling them to prosecute with
foreign countries peaceful negotiations or the operations of war. Many
saw, in too close a union, dangers as great and consequences as
distasteful as in their entire separation. It was believed by many that
the extent of the country, the great diversity of character, habits,
and pursuits among the several States, presented insuperable obstacles
to a closer union than that afforded by the articles of confederation.
Some were almost exclusively commercial, others agricultural; some were
disposed to engage in manufacturing pursuits; some had domestic slavery
firmly connected with their domestic relations and were disposed to
look favorably on the extension of the institution; others regarded
involuntary servitude as a curse, and desired its abolition.

It was not to be wondered at, that with such points of diversity, many
should suppose that a single government could not administer the
affairs of all, except by a greater delegation of power than would be
submitted to by the American people. While some looked wholly to these
apprehended consequences of a close union and a single government,
others chiefly regarded the dangers arising from disunion, domestic
dissensions, and even war. One party dreaded consolidation; the other,
anarchy and separation. Each saw, in the object of its dread, the
destruction of good government, though one party looked too exclusively
to its characteristic of order, the other to that of civil liberty.
These were the thoughts of the people, widely different, but all
equally honest. But the politicians addressed themselves to these
prejudices, often with unworthy motives. Local prejudices,
self-interest, fears, in some cases from an anticipated loss of
consequence, in the event of a transfer of sovereignty from the
individual States to the general government, all combined to make many
violent in their expressions of opposition to the plan. Apprehensions
of violence and disorder, and fears from individual popularity in a
circumscribed sphere, led others to desire consolidation. With these,
ranked others who were fond of the pomp and show of authority which
would attend a powerful government; and still others, who, having
claims upon the country, supposed that they would have much stronger
hopes of being paid themselves and of seeing the debts due abroad
liquidated if a system of government were established which could be
certain to raise a revenue for these objects. On the formation of the
constitution, the community settled down into two great parties,
Federalists and Anti-Federalists, or Democrats; the first believing
that the most imminent danger to our peace and prosperity was in
disunion, and that popular jealousy, always active, would withhold the
power which was essential to good order and national safety; the other
party believing that the danger most to be apprehended was in too close
a union, and that their most powerful opponents wished a consolidated
and even a monarchial government.

There were many who had been accustomed to reflect upon government and
political relations previously to the war of independence, when the
constitution of Great Britain being by far the best that had ever
existed, they may naturally be supposed to have conceived for it a
degree of homage and respect which it could not now inspire. The
speculations on political rights, to which the contest with Great
Britain and the debates on the question of independence gave rise,
greatly favored the doctrines of political equality and the hatred of
power in any form that could control the public will. There are, in the
heart of every man, principles which readily prepare him for republican
doctrines, and after a few years some of the speculative politicians
began to think that the free, simple, and equal government which was
suited to the tastes and habits of our people, was also the best in
theory. The great body of the people were partial to the form of
government to which they had been accustomed and wished for none other,
though the leading statesmen differed upon this point. Some preferred
the republican form in theory and believed that no other would be
tolerated in practice, and others regretted that they were obliged to
yield so far to popular prejudice as to forego the form they deemed
best, but determined to avail themselves of every opportunity of
improving the existing government into that form. Nor were they without
hopes that by siding with the general government in every question of
power between that and the separate States, and with the Executive in
all questions between that and the Legislature, and by continually
increasing the patronage of the executive by means of an army, a navy,
and the multiplication of civil officers, they would ultimately obtain
their object. [5]

It was in the midst of this society, so agitated and disturbed, that
Washington, without ambition, without any false show, from a sense of
duty rather than inclination and rather trusting in truth than
confident of success, undertook actually to found the government
decreed by the new-born constitution. He rose to his high office
invested with an immense influence, which was acknowledged and received
even by his enemies.

Washington's natural inclination, says Guizot, [7] was rather to a
democratic social state than to any other. Of a mind just rather than
expansive, of a temper wise and calm, full of dignity, but free from
all selfish and arrogant pretensions--coveting rather respect than
power--the impartiality of democratic principles and the simplicity of
democratic manners, far from offending or annoying him, suited his
tastes and satisfied his judgment. He did not trouble himself with
inquiring whether more elaborate combinations, a division into ranks,
privileges, and artificial barriers, were necessary to the preservation
of society. He lived tranquilly in the midst of an equal and sovereign
people, finding its authority to be lawful and submitting to it without
effort.

But when the question was one of political and not social order, when
the discussion turned upon the organization of the government, he was
strongly federal, opposed to local and popular pretensions and the
declared advocate of the unity and force of the central power.

He placed himself under this standard and did so to insure its triumph.
But still his elevation was not the victory of a party and awakened in
no one either exultation or regret. In the eyes, not only of the
public, but of his enemies, he was not included in any party and was
above them all: "the only man in the United States," said Jefferson,
"who possessed the confidence of all;--there was no other one who was
considered as anything more than a party leader."

It was his constant effort to maintain this honorable privilege. "It is
really my wish to have my mind and my actions, which are the result of
reflection, as free and independent as the air. If it should be my
inevitable fate to administer the government, I will go to chair under
no pre-engagement of any kind or nature whatsoever. Should anything
tending to give me anxiety present itself in this or any other
publication, I shall never undertake the painful task of recrimination,
nor do I know that I should ever enter upon my justification. All else
is but food for declamation. Men's minds are as various as their faces,
and, where the motives of their actions are pure, the operations of the
former are no more to be imputed to them as a crime than the appearance
of the latter. Differences in political opinions are as unavoidable,
as, to a certain point, they may, perhaps, be necessary." [8]

A stranger also to all personal disputes, to the passions and
prejudices of his friends, as well as his enemies, the purpose of his
whole policy was to maintain this position and to this policy he gave
the true name, "the just medium!"

It is much, continues the great statesman of France, to have the wish
to preserve a just medium; but the wish, though accompanied with
firmness and ability, is not always enough to secure it. Washington
succeeded in this as much by the natural turn of his mind and character
as by making it his peculiar aim; he was, indeed, really of no party,
and his country in esteeming him so, did no more than pay homage to
truth.

A man of experience and a man of action, he had an admirable wisdom,
and made no pretension to systematic theories. He took no side
beforehand; he made no show of the principles that were to govern him.
Thus, there was nothing like a logical harshness in his conduct, no
committal of self-love, no struggle of rival talent. When he obtained
the victory, his success was not to his adversaries either a stake lost
or a sweeping sentence of condemnation. It was not on the ground of the
superiority of his own mind that he triumphed, but on the ground of the
nature of things and of the inevitable necessity that accompanied them.
Still, his success was not an event without a moral character, the
simple result of skill, strength, or fortune. Uninfluenced by any
theory he had faith in truth and adopted it as the guide of his
conduct. He did not pursue the victory of one opinion against the
partisans of another; neither did he act from interest in the event
alone, or merely for success. He did nothing which he did not think to
be reasonable and just; so that his conduct, which had no systematic
character that might be humbling to his adversary, had still a moral
character which commanded respect.

Men had, moreover, the most thorough conviction of his
disinterestedness, that great light to which men so willingly trust
their fate; that vast power which draws after it their hearts, while at
the same time it gives them confidence that their interests will not be
surrendered, either as a sacrifice or as instruments to selfishness and
ambition. A striking proof of his impartiality was afforded in the
choice of the persons who were to form his cabinet under the law for
the formation of the executive departments.

The government being completely organized and a system of revenue
established, the important duty of filling the offices which had been
created remained to be performed. In the execution of this delicate
trust the purest virtue and the most impartial judgment were exercised
by Washington in selecting the best talents and the greatest weight of
character which the United States could furnish. The unmingled
patriotism of the motives by which he was actuated, receives its
clearest demonstration from a view of all his private letters on this
subject, and the success of his endeavors is attested by the abilities
and reputation which he drew into the public service.

At the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs, since denominated the
Department of State, he placed Jefferson, who had been bred to the bar,
and at an early period of life had acquired considerable reputation for
extensive attainments in the science of politics. He had been a
distinguished member of the Second Congress and had been offered a
diplomatic appointment, which he had declined. Withdrawing from the
administration of Continental affairs, he had been elected Governor of
Virginia, which office he filled for two years. He afterwards again
represented his native State in the councils of the Union, and in the
year 1784 was appointed to succeed Dr. Franklin at the court of
Versailles. In that station he had acquitted himself much to
the public satisfaction. His "Notes on Virginia," which were read with
applause, were believed to evince the soundness of his political
opinions, and the Declaration of Independence was universally ascribed
to his pen. He had long been placed by America amongst the most eminent
of her citizens, and had long been classed by the President with those
who were most capable of serving the nation. Having lately obtained
permission to return for a short time to the United States, he was,
while on his passage, nominated to this important office, and, on his
arrival in Virginia, found a letter from the President, giving him the
option of becoming the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or of retaining his
station at the court of Versailles. He appears rather to have inclined
to continue in his foreign appointment, and, in changing his situation,
to have consulted the wishes of the first magistrate more than the
preference of his own mind. [8]

The task of restoring public credit, of drawing order and arrangement
from the chaotic confusion in which the finances of America were
involved, and of devising means which should render the revenue
productive and commensurate with the demand, in a manner least
burdensome to the people, was justly classed among the most arduous of
the duties which devolved on the new government. In discharging it,
much aid was expected from the head of the treasury. This important,
and at that time, intricate department, was assigned to Colonel
Hamilton.

This gentleman was a native of the Island of St. Croix, and at a very
early period of life had been placed by his friends in New York.
Possessing an ardent temper, he caught fire from the concussions of the
moment, and, with all the enthusiasm of youth, engaged first his pen,
and afterwards his sword in the stern contest between the American
Colonies and their parent State. Among the first troops raised by New
York was a corps of artillery, in which he was appointed a captain.
Soon after the war was transferred to the Hudson, his superior
endowments recommended him to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief,
into whose family, before completing his twenty-first year, he was
invited to enter. Equally brave and intelligent, he continued in this
situation to display a degree of firmness and capacity which commanded
the confidence and esteem of his general and of the principal officers
in the army.

After the capitulation at Yorktown, the war languished throughout the
American continent and the probability that its termination was
approaching daily increased.

The critical circumstances of the existing government rendered the
events of the civil more interesting than those of the military
department, and Colonel Hamilton accepted a seat in the Congress of the
United States. In all the important acts of the day he performed a
conspicuous part, and was greatly distinguished among those
distinguished men whom the crisis had attracted to the councils of
their country. He had afterwards been active in promoting those
measures which led to the convention at Philadelphia, of which he was a
member, and had greatly contributed to the adoption of the constitution
by the State of New York. In the preeminent part he had performed, both
in the military and civil transactions of his country, he had acquired
a great degree of well-merited fame, and the frankness of his manners,
the openness of his temper, the warmth of his feelings, and the
sincerity of his heart, had secured him many valuable friends.

To talents equally splendid and useful he united a patient industry,
not always the companion of genius, which fitted him, in a peculiar
manner, for subduing the difficulties to be encountered by the man who
should be placed at the head of the American finances. [9]

The Department of War was already filled by General Knox, and he was
again nominated to it.

Throughout the contest of the Revolution this officer had continued at
the head of the American artillery, and from being the colonel of a
regiment, had been promoted to the rank of a major-general. In this
important station he had preserved a high military character, and on
the resignation of General Lincoln had been appointed Secretary of War.
To his past services and to unquestionable? integrity, he was admitted
to unite a sound understanding, and the public judgment, as well as
that of the chief magistrate, pronounced him in all respects competent
to the station he filled.

The office of attorney-general was filled by Edmund Randolph. To a
distinguished reputation in the line of his profession, this gentleman
added a considerable degree of political eminence. After having been,
for several years the attorney-general of Virginia, he had been elected
its Governor. While in this office he was chosen a member of the
convention which framed the constitution, and was also elected to that
which was called by the State for its adoption or rejection. After
having served at the head of the executive the term permitted by the
constitution of the State, he entered into its Legislature, where he
preserved a great share of influence.

Such was the first cabinet council of the President. In its
composition, public opinion as well as intrinsic worth had been
consulted, and a high degree of character had been combined with real
talent.

In the selection of persons for high judicial offices, the President
was guided by the same principles. At the head of this department he
placed John Jay.

From the commencement of the Revolution this gentleman had filled a
large space in the public mind. Remaining, without intermission, in the
service of his country, he had passed through a succession of high
offices, and in all of them had merited the approbation of his
fellow-citizens. To his pen, while in Congress, America was indebted
for some of those masterly addresses which reflected most honor upon
the government, and to his firmness and penetration was to be ascribed,
in no inconsiderable degree, the happy issue of those intricate
negotiations which were conducted, toward the close of the war, at
Madrid and at Paris. On returning to the United States he had been
appointed Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in which station he had
conducted himself with his accustomed ability. A sound judgment
improved by extensive reading and great knowledge of public affairs,
unyielding firmness, and inflexible integrity, were qualities of which
Mr. Jay had given frequent and signal proofs. Although for some years
withdrawn from that profession to which he was bred, the acquisitions
of his early life had not been lost, and the subjects on which his mind
had been exercised were not entirely foreign from those which would, in
the first instance, employ the courts in which he was to preside.

John Rutledge of South Carolina, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, William
Gushing of Massachusetts, Robert Harrison of Maryland, and John Blair
of Virginia, were nominated as associate justices. Some of these
gentlemen had filled the highest law offices in their respective
States, and all of them had received distinguished marks of the public
confidence.

In the systems which had been adopted by the several States, offices
corresponding to those created by the revenue laws of Congress had been
already established.

Uninfluenced by considerations of personal regard, Washington could not
be induced to change men whom he found in place, if worthy of being
employed, and where the man who had filled such office in the former
state of things was unexceptionable in his conduct and character he was
uniformly reappointed. In deciding between competitors for vacant
offices the law he prescribed for his government was to regard the
fitness of candidates for the duties they would be required to
discharge, and, where an equality in this respect existed, former
merits and sufferings in the public service gave claims to preference
which could not be overlooked.

In the legislative, as well as in the executive and judicial
departments, great respectability of character was also associated with
an eminent degree of talents. The constitutional prohibition to appoint
any member of the Legislature to an office created during the time for
which he had been elected did not exclude men of the most distinguished
abilities from the First Congress. Impelled by an anxious solicitude
respecting the first measures of the government its zealous friends had
pressed into its service, and, in both branches of the Legislature, men
were found who possessed the fairest claims to the public confidence.

From the duties attached to his office the Vice-President of the United
States and President of the Senate, though not a member of the
Legislature, was classed, in the public mind, with that department not
less than with the executive. Elected by the whole people of America in
common with the President he could not fail to be taken from the most
distinguished citizens and to add to the dignity of the body over which
he presided.

John Adams was one of the earliest and most ardent patriots of the
Revolution. Bred to the bar, he had necessarily studied the
constitution of his country and was among the most determined assertors
of its rights. Active in guiding that high spirit which animated all
New England, he became a member of the Congress of 1774 and was among
the first who dared to avow sentiments in favor of independence. In
that body he soon attained considerable eminence, and, at an early
stage of the war, was chosen one of the commissioners to whom the
interests of the United States in Europe were confided. In his
diplomatic character he had contributed greatly to those measures which
drew Holland into the war; had negotiated the treaty between the United
States and the Dutch Republic, and had, at critical points of time,
obtained loans of money which were of great advantage to his country.
In the negotiations which terminated the war he had also rendered
important services, and, after the ratification of the definitive
articles of peace, had been deputed to Great Britain for the purpose of
effecting a commercial treaty with that nation. The political situation
of America having rendered this object unattainable he solicited leave
to return, and arrived in the United States soon after the adoption of
the constitution.

As a statesman John Adams had at all times ranked high in the
estimation of his countrymen. He had improved a sound understanding by
extensive political and historical reading, and perhaps no American had
reflected more profoundly on the subject of government. The exalted
opinion he entertained of his own country was flattering to his
fellow-citizens, and the purity of his mind, the unblemished integrity
of a life spent in the public service, had gained him their confidence.

A government, supported in all its departments by so much character and
talent, at the head of which was placed a man whose capacity was
undoubted, whose life had been one great and continued lesson of
disinterested patriotism, and for whom almost every bosom glowed with
an attachment bordering on enthusiasm, could not fail to make a rapid
progress in conciliating the affection of the people. That all
hostility to the constitution should subside, that public measures
should receive universal approbation, that no particular disgusts and
individual irritations should be excited, were expectations which could
not reasonably be indulged. Exaggerated accounts were indeed
occasionally circulated of the pomp and splendor which were affected by
certain high officers of the monarchical tendencies of particular
institutions and of the dispositions which prevailed to increase the
powers of the executive. That the doors of the Senate were closed and
that a disposition had been manifested by that body to distinguish the
President of the United States by a title, gave considerable umbrage,
and were represented as evincing inclinations in that branch of the
Legislature unfriendly to republicanism. The exorbitance of salaries
was also a subject of some declamation, and the equality of commercial
privileges with which foreign bottoms entered American ports, was not
free from objection. But the apprehensions of danger to liberty from
the new system, which had been impressed on the minds of well-meaning
men, were visibly wearing off; the popularity of the administration was
communicating itself to the government, and the materials with which
the discontented were furnished could not yet be efficaciously
employed.

Toward the close of the session a report on a petition which had been
presented at an early period by the creditors of the public residing in
the State of Pennsylvania was taken up in the House of Representatives.
Though many considerations rendered a postponement of this interesting
subject necessary two resolutions were passed: the one, "declaring that
the House considered an adequate provision for the support of the
public credit, as a matter of high importance to the national honor and
prosperity," and the other, directing "the Secretary of the Treasury to
prepare a plan for that purpose, and to report the same to the House at
its next meeting."

On the 29th of September (1789) Congress adjourned to the first Monday
in the succeeding January (1790).

Throughout the whole of this laborious and important session perfect
harmony subsisted between the executive and the Legislature, and no
circumstance occurred which threatened to impair it. The modes of
communication between the departments of government were adjusted in a
satisfactory manner, and arrangements were made on some of those
delicate points in which the Senate participate of executive power.

Washington's own views of the proceedings of Congress are expressed in
the following extract from a letter to a friend:

"That Congress does not proceed with all that dispatch which people at
a distance expect, and which, were they to hurry business, they
possibly might, is not to be denied. That measures have been agitated
which are not pleasing to Virginia--and others, pleasing perhaps to
her, but not to some other States--is equally unquestionable. Can it
well be otherwise in a country so extensive, so diversified in its
interests? And will not these different interests naturally produce--in
an assembly of representatives who are to legislate for, and to
assimilate and reconcile them to, the general welfare--long, warm, and
animated debates? Most assuredly they will, and if there was the same
propensity in mankind for investigating the motives as there is for
censuring the conduct of public characters, it would be found that the
censure so freely bestowed is oftentimes unmerited and uncharitable.
For instance, the condemnation of Congress for sitting only four hours
in the day. The fact is, by the established rules of the House of
Representatives, no committee can sit whilst the House is sitting, and
that is, and has been for a considerable time, from 10 o'clock in the
forenoon until 3, often later, in the afternoon, before and after which
the business is going on in committees. If this application is not as
much as most constitutions are equal to, I am mistaken.

"Many other things, which undergo malignant constructions, would be
found, upon a candid examination, to wear a better face than is given
to them. The misfortune is that the enemies to the government, always
more active than its friends and always upon the watch to give it a
stroke, neglect no opportunity to aim one. If they tell truth it is not
the whole truth, by which means one side only of the picture is
exhibited, whereas, if both sides were seen it might, and probably
would, assume a different form in the opinion of just and candid men,
who are disposed to measure matters by a continental scale.

"I do not mean, however, from what I have here said, to justify the
conduct of Congress in all its movements, for some of these movements,
in my opinion, have been injudicious, and others unreasonable; whilst
the questions of assumption, residence, and other matters, have been
agitated with a warmth and intemperance, with prolixity and threats,
which, it is to be feared, have lessened the dignity of that body and
decreased that respect which was once entertained for it. And this
misfortune is increased by many members, even among those who wish well
to the government, ascribing, in letters to their respective States,
when they are defeated in a favorite measure, the worst motives for the
conduct of their opponents, who, viewing matters through another
medium, may and do retort in their turn, by which means jealousies and
distrusts are spread most impolitically far and wide, and will, it is
to be feared, have a most unhappy tendency to injure our public
affairs, which, if wisely managed, might make us, as we are now by
Europeans thought to be, the happiest people upon earth."

Anxious to visit New England to observe in person the condition of the
country and the dispositions of the people toward the government and
its measures, the President was disposed to avail himself of the short
respite from official cares afforded by the recess of Congress, to make
a tour through the eastern States.

His resolution being taken and the executive business which required
his immediate personal attendance being dispatched, he commenced his
tour on the 15th of October (1789), and, passing through Connecticut
and Massachusetts, as far as Portsmouth in New Hampshire, returned by a
different route to New York, where he arrived on the 13th of November.

With this visit the President had much reason to be satisfied. To
contemplate the theater on which many interesting military scenes had
been exhibited, and to review the ground on which his first campaign as
Commander-in-Chief of the American army had been made, were sources of
rational delight. To observe the progress of society, the improvements
in agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, and the temper,
circumstances, and dispositions of the people, could not fail to be
grateful to an intelligent mind, and an employment in all respects
worthy of the chief magistrate of the nation. The reappearance of their
general in the high station he now filled brought back to recollection
the perilous transactions of the war, and the reception universally
given to him attested the unabated love which was felt for his person
and character, and indicated unequivocally the growing popularity, at
least in that part of the Union, of the government he administered.

The sincerity and warmth with which he reciprocated the affection
expressed for his person in the addresses presented to him was well
calculated to preserve the sentiments which were generally diffused. "I
rejoice with you, my fellow-citizens," said he in answer to an address
from the inhabitants of Boston, "in every circumstance that declares
your prosperity, and I do so most cordially, because you have well
deserved to be happy.

"Your love of liberty, your respect for the law, your habits of
industry, and your practice of the moral and religious obligations, are
the strongest claims to national and individual happiness; and they
will, I trust, be firmly and lastingly established."

But the interchange of sentiments with the companions of his military
toils and glory will excite most interest, because on both sides the
expressions were dictated by the purest and most delicious feelings of
the human heart.

From the Cincinnati of Massachusetts he received the following address:
"Amidst the various gratulations which your arrival in this metropolis
has occasioned, permit us, the members of the Society of the Cincinnati
in this commonwealth, most respectfully to assure you of the ardor of
esteem and affection you have so indelibly fixed in our hearts, as our
glorious leader in war and illustrious example in peace.

"After the solemn and endearing farewell on the banks of the Hudson,
which our anxiety presaged as final, most peculiarly pleasing is the
present unexpected meeting. On this occasion we cannot avoid the
recollection of the various scenes of toil and danger through which you
conducted us, and while we contemplate various trying periods of the
war, and the triumphs of peace, we rejoice to behold you, induced by
the unanimous voice of your country, en-terming upon other trials and
other services alike important, and, in some points of view, equally
hazardous. For the completion of the great purposes which a grateful
country has assigned you, long, very long, may your invaluable life
be preserved. And as the admiring world, while considering you as a
soldier, have long wanted a comparison, may your virtue and talents
as a statesman leave them without a parallel.

"It is not in words to express an attachment founded like ours. We can
only say that, when soldiers, our greatest pride was a promptitude of
obedience to your orders; as citizens, our supreme ambition is to
maintain the character of firm supporters of that noble fabric of
Federal government over which you preside.

"As members of the Society of the Cincinnati it will be our endeavor to
cherish those sacred principles of charity and fraternal attachment
which our institution inculcates. And while our conduct is thus
regulated, we can never want the patronage of the first of patriots and
the best of men."

To this address the following answer was returned:

"In reciprocating with gratitude and sincerity the multiplied and
affecting gratulations of my fellow-citizens of this commonwealth, they
will all of them with justice allow me to say, that none can be dearer
to me than the affectionate assurances which you have expressed. Dear,
indeed, is the occasion which restores an intercourse with my faithful
associates in prosperous and adverse fortune; and enhanced are the
triumphs of peace, participated with those whose virtue and valor so
largely contributed to procure them. To that virtue and valor your
country has confessed her obligations. Be mine the grateful task to add
the testimony of a connection which it was my pride to own in the
field, and is now my happiness to acknowledge in the enjoyments of
peace and freedom.

"Regulating your conduct by those principles which have heretofore
governed your actions as men, soldiers, and citizens, you will repeat
the obligations conferred on your country, and you will transmit to
posterity an example that must command their admiration and grateful
praise. Long may you continue to enjoy the endearments of fraternal
attachments and the heartfelt happiness of reflecting that you have
faithfully done your duty.

"While I am permitted to possess the consciousness of this worth, which
has long bound me to you by every tie of affection and esteem, I will
continue to be your sincere and faithful friend."

After Washington's return to New York from his tour to the north and
east, Mrs. Washington expressed, in the following letter, the
gratification and benefit he had derived from his journey. It also
presents a delightful view of her feelings and character:


"NEW YORK, _December_ 26th, 1789.

"MY DEAR MADAM:--Your very friendly letter, of the 27th of last month,
has afforded me much more satisfaction than all the formal compliments
and empty ceremonies of mere etiquette could possibly have done. I am
not apt to forget the feelings that have been inspired by my former
society with good acquaintances, nor to be insensible to their
expressions of gratitude to the President of the United States; for you
know me well enough to do me the justice to believe that I am only fond
of what comes from the heart. Under a conviction that the
demonstrations of respect and affection which have been made to the
President originate from that source, I cannot deny that I have taken
some interest and pleasure in them. The difficulties which presented
themselves to view upon his first entering upon the Presidency, seem
thus to be, in some measure, surmounted. It is owing to this kindness
of our numerous friends, in all quarters, that my new and unwished-for
situation is not indeed a burden to me. When I was much younger, I
should probably have enjoyed the innocent gayeties of life as much as
most of my age. But I had long since placed all the prospects of my
future worldly happiness in the still enjoyments of the fireside at
Mount Vernon.

"I little thought, when the war was finished, that any circumstances
could possibly have happened which would call the General into public
life again. I had anticipated that, from that moment, we should have
been left to grow old, in solitude and tranquility, together. That was,
my dear madam, the first and dearest wish of my heart; but in that I
have been disappointed. I will not, however, contemplate with too much
regret disappointments that were inevitable. Though the General's
feelings and my own were perfectly in unison with respect to our
predilection for private life, yet I cannot blame him for having acted
according to his ideas of duty in obeying the voice of his country. The
consciousness of having attempted to do all the good in his power, and
the pleasure of finding his fellow-citizens so well satisfied with the
disinterestedness of his conduct, will doubtless be some compensation
for the great sacrifices which I know he has made. Indeed, in his
journey from Mount Vernon to this place, in his late tour through the
eastern States, by every public and by every private information which
has come to him, I am persuaded that he has experienced nothing to make
him repent his having acted from what he conceived to be, alone, a
sense of indispensable duty. On the contrary, all his sensibility has
been awakened in receiving such repeated and unequivocal proofs of
sincere regards from all his countrymen.

"With respect to myself, I sometimes think the arrangement is not quite
as it ought to have been; that I, who had much rather be at home,
should occupy a place with which a great many younger and gayer women
would be prodigiously pleased. As my grandchildren and domestic
connections make up a great portion of the felicity which I looked for
in this world, I shall hardly be able to find any substitute that would
indemnify me for the loss of a part of such endearing society. I do not
say this because I feel dissatisfied with my present station. No, God
forbid! For everybody and everything conspire to make me as contented
as possible in it; yet I have seen too much of the vanity of human
affairs to expect felicity from the splendid scenes of public life. I
am still determined to be cheerful and to be happy in whatever
situation I may be; for I have also learnt from experience that the
greater part of our happiness or misery depends upon our dispositions,
and not upon our circumstances. We carry the seeds of the one or the
other about with us, in our minds, where-so-ever we go. I have two of
my grandchildren with me, who enjoy advantages in point of education,
and who, I trust, by the goodness of Providence, will continue to be a
great blessing to me. My other two grandchildren are with their mother,
in Virginia.

"The President's health is quite re-established by his late journey.
Mine is much better than it used to be. I am sorry to hear that General
Warren has been ill; hope, before this time, that he may be entirely
recovered. We should rejoice to see you both. To both, I wish the best
of Heaven's blessings; and am, my dear madam, with esteem and regard,
your friend and humble servant,

"M. WASHINGTON."


Soon after his return to New York, after his visit to the eastern
States, the President was informed of the ill success which had
attended his first attempt to negotiate a peace with the Creek Indians.
General Lincoln, Mr. Griffin, and Colonel Humphreys had been deputed on
this mission, and had met M'Gillivray with several other chiefs, and
about 2,000 men, at Rock Landing, on the Oconee, on the frontiers of
Georgia. The treaty commenced with favorable appearances, but was soon
abruptly broken off by M'Gillivray. Some difficulties arose on the
subject of a boundary, but the principal obstacles to a peace were
supposed to grow out of his personal interests, and his connections
with Spain.

This intelligence was more than counterbalanced by the accession of
North Carolina to the Union. In the month of November a second
convention had assembled under the authority of the Legislature of that
State, and the constitution was adopted by a great majority.

We embrace the occasion afforded by the interval between the two
sessions of Congress to insert some further notices of Washington's
mode of life in New York, as well as of his personal appearance.

The manner of living observed by President Washington has been
described in the following speech, delivered by Mr. Stuyvesant, the
president of the New York Historical society, at the dinner on the
occasion of the jubilee celebration, in the city of New York, April 30,
1839.

"It cannot be expected, at this time and place, that any allusion
should be made to the public character of Washington; we are all in
possession of his history, from the dawn of life to the day that Mount
Vernon was wrapped in sable; and, after the exercises of this morning,
if any attempt to portray his political or military life were made, it
would only be the glimmering light of a feeble star succeeding the rays
of a meridian sun.

"But the occasion affords an opportunity of congratulating the small
number of gentlemen present, who enjoyed the privilege of participating
in the ceremonies of the 30th of April, 1789; they will recall to their
memories the spontaneous effusions of joy that pervaded the breasts of
the people who on that occasion witnessed the organization of a
constitutional government, formed by intelligent freemen, and
consummated by placing at its head the man in whom their affections
were concentrated as the father of their country.

"Washington's residence in this city, after his inauguration, was
limited to about two years. His deportment in life was not plain, nor
was it at all pompous, for no man was more devoid of ostentation than
himself, his style, however, gave universal satisfaction to all classes
in the community, and, his historian has informed us, was not adopted
for personal gratification, but from a devotion to his country's
welfare. Possessing a desirable stature, an erect frame, and,
superadded, a lofty and sublime countenance, he never appeared in
public without arresting the reverence and admiration of the beholder;
and the stranger who had never before seen him, was at the first
impression convinced it was the President who delighted him.

"He seldom walked in the street; his public recreation was in riding.
When accompanied by Mrs. Washington, he rode in a carriage drawn by six
horses, with two outriders who wore rich livery, cocked hats, with
cockades and powder. When he rode on horseback he was joined by one or
more of the gentlemen of his family and attended by his outriders. He
always attended Divine service on Sundays. His carriage on those
occasions contained Mrs. Washington and himself, with one or both of
their grandchildren and was drawn by two horses, with two footmen
behind; it was succeeded by a post-chaise, accommodating two gentlemen
of his household. On his arrival in the city the only residence that
could be procured was a house in Cherry street, long known as the
mansion of the Franklin family, but in a short time afterwards he
removed to and occupied the house in Broadway, now Bunker's hotel.

"Washington held a levee once a week, and, from what is now
recollected, they were generally well attended, but confined to men in
public life and gentlemen of leisure, for at that day it would have
been thought a breach of decorum to visit the President of the United
States in dishabille.

"The arrival of Washington, in 1789, to assume the reins of government,
was not his first entry into this city, accompanied with honor to
himself and glory to this country. This was on the 24th of November,
1783, and here again, I must observe, the number present who witnessed
the ceremonies of that day, must, indeed, be very limited; on that day
he made his triumphal entry, not to sway the sceptre, but to lay down
his sword, not for personal aggrandizement, but to secure the happiness
of his countrymen. He early in the morning left Harlem and entered the
city through what is now called the Bowery; he was escorted by cavalry
and infantry and a large concourse of citizens, on horseback and on
foot, in plain dress. The latter must have been an interesting sight to
those of mature age who were capable of comprehending their merit. In
their ranks were seen men with patched elbows, odd buttons on their
coats and unmatched buckles in their shoes; they were not, indeed,
Falstaff's company of scarecrows, but the most respectable citizens who
had been in exile, and endured privations we know not of, for seven
long and tedious years."

On that occasion, and on his arrival in 1789, Washington was received,
as is well known, by the elder Clinton, who was at both periods
Governor of the State.

In the following extract, from a reliable source, we have a fine
description of the effect produced by Washington's personal appearance
and manners on the mind of a highly intelligent observer:

"The beautiful effusion which the reader will find below is the
production of the chaste and classic mind of the late venerable and
distinguished senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Robbins, and was
occasioned by the following circumstances. During the session of
1837-8, Mr. Webster entertained a large party of friends at
dinner, among them the venerable senator we have named. The evening
passed off with much hilarity, enlivened with wit and sentiment, but,
during the greater part of the time, Mr. Robbins maintained that grave
but placid silence which was his habit. While thus apparently
abstracted, someone suddenly called on him for a toast, which call was
seconded by the company. He rose, and in his surprise asked if they
were serious in making such a demand of so old a man, and being assured
that they were, he said, if they would suspend their hilarity for a few
moments, he would give them a toast and preface it with a few
observations. Having thus secured a breathless stillness, he went on to
remark, that they were then on the verge of the 22d of February, the
anniversary of the birth of the great patriot and statesman of our
country, whom all delighted to remember and to honor, and he hoped he
might be allowed the privilege of an aged man to recur, for a few
moments, to past events connected with his character and history. He
then proceeded and delivered in the most happy and impressive manner
the beautiful speech which now graces our columns. The whole company
were electrified by his patriotic enthusiasm, and one of the guests,
before they separated, begged that he would take the trouble to put on
paper what he had so happily expressed and furnish a copy for
publication. Mr. Robbins obligingly complied with this request on the
following day, but by some accident the manuscript got mislaid and
eluded all search for it until a few days ago, when it was unexpectedly
recovered, and is now presented to our readers.

"'On the near approach of that calendar-day which gave birth to
Washington, I feel rekindling within me some of those emotions always
connected with the recollection of that hallowed name. Permit me to
indulge them, on this occasion, for a moment, in a few remarks, as
preliminary to a sentiment which I shall beg leave to propose.

"'I consider it as one of the consolations of my age, that I am old
enough and fortunate enough to have seen that wonderful man. This
happiness is still common to so many yet among the living, that less is
thought of it now than will be in after-times; but it is no less a
happiness to me on that account.

"'While a boy at school, I saw him for the first time; it was when he
was passing through New England, to take command in chief of the
American armies at Cambridge. Never shall I forget the impression his
imposing presence then made upon my young imagination, so superior did
he seem to me to all that I had seen or imagined of the human form for
striking effect. I remember with what delight, in my after studies, I
came to the line in Virgil that expressed all the enthusiasm of my own
feelings, as inspired by that presence, and which I could not often
enough repeat:

"'I saw him again at his interview with Rochambeau, when they met to
settle the plan of combined operations between the French fleet and the
American armies against the British on the Chesapeake, and then I saw
the immense crowd drawn together from all the neighboring towns, to
get, if possible, one look at the man who had throned himself in every
heart. Not one of that immense crowd doubted the final triumph of his
country in her arduous conflict, for everyone saw, or thought he saw,
in Washington, her guardian angel, commissioned by Heaven to insure her
that triumph. 'Nil desperandum' was the motto with everyone.

"'In after-life, when the judgment corrects the extravagance of early
impressions, I saw him on several occasions, but saw nothing to
admonish me of any extravagance in my early impressions. "Credo
equidem, nee vana fides, genus esse Deorum." [10]

"'"Nil desperandum, Teucro duce, et auspice Teucro." [11] The impression
was still the same; I had the same overpowering sense of standing in
the presence of some superior being.

"'It is indeed remarkable, and I believe unique, in the history of men,
that Washington made the same impression upon all minds, at all places,
and at once. When his fame first broke upon the world, it spread at
once over the whole world. By the consent of mankind, by the universal
sentiment, he was placed at the head of the human species; above all
envy, because above all emulation; for no one then pretended, or has
pretended to be--at least who has been allowed to be--the co-rival of
Washington in fame.

"'When the great Frederick of Prussia sent his portrait to Washington,
with this inscription upon it--"From the oldest general in Europe to
the greatest general in the world," he did but echo the sentiment of
all the chivalry of Europe. Nor was the sentiment confined to Europe,
nor to the bounds of civilization; for the Arab of the desert talked of
Washington in his tent; his name wandered with the wandering Scythian,
and was cherished by him as a household word in all his migrations. No
clime was so barbarous as to be a stranger to the name, but everywhere,
and by all men, that name was placed at the same point of elevation,
and above compare. As it was in the beginning, so it is now; of the
future we cannot speak with certainty. Some future age, in the endless
revolutions of time, may produce another Washington, but the greater
probability is, that he is destined to remain forever, as he now is,
the Phoenix of human kind.

"'What a possession to his country is such a fame! Such a "Clarum et
venerabile nomen gentibus?" [12]

"'To all his countrymen it gives, and forever will give, a passport to
respect wherever they go, to whatever part of the globe, for his
country is in every other identified with that fame.

"'What, then, is incumbent upon us, his countrymen? Why, to be such a
people as shall be worthy of such a fame--a people of whom it shall be
said, "No wonder such a people have produced such a man as Washington."
I give you, therefore, this sentiment:

"'The memory of Washington: May his countrymen prove themselves a
people worthy of his fame.'"


1. Footnote: Memoir of Martha Washington in Longacre's Gallery.

2. Footnote: Mrs. Ellet, "Women of the Revolution"

3. Footnote: One of the first topics of debate in Congress was the
title by which the President should be addressed. Such title as "His
Highness," "His Mightiness," etc., having been discussed, it was
finally and very properly determined that the title of "President of
the United States" should be used; and it was accordingly used in the
answers to the inaugural address. No title could be more dignified.

4. Footnote: Marshall

5. Footnote: Pitkin.

6. Footnote: Tucker's "Life of Jefferson."

7. Footnote: "Essay on the Character and Influence of Washington."

8. Footnote: "Washington's Writings," vols. IX, X.

9. Footnote: Marshall.

10. Footnote: I verily believe, nor is my confidence unfounded, that he
is of Divine descent.

11. Footnote: Let us never despair, with Teucer to lead us, and under
Teucer's auspices.

12. Footnote: A name, illustrious and venerable among the nations!




CHAPTER III.


THE PUBLIC CREDIT ESTABLISHED. 1789-1790.


During the recess of Congress Washington generally visited Mount
Vernon, but, after the rising of the first Congress under the
constitution, his visit to New England consumed so much time that he
remained in New York till Congress reassembled. His eastern tour
commenced on the 15th of October, as we have already seen, and ended on
the 13th of November. As Congress was to meet on the 1st of January,
1790, he had no time to visit Mount Vernon. During the short time which
elapsed before that day he was very earnestly engaged in the duties of
his office and in correspondence with public men on political affairs.
One of his letters, addressed to the Emperor of Morocco, is curious, as
showing the tact with which he accommodated his style to the
comprehension of the oriental sovereign. It was written in consequence
of an intimation from Mr. Chiappe, the American agent at Mogadore, that
the emperor was not well pleased at receiving no acknowledgment from
the government in respect to the treaty with Morocco of the 28th of
June, 1786, his subsequent faithful observance of the same, as well as
his good offices in favor of the Americans with the bashaws of Tunis
and Tripoli. The letter is as follows:

"GREAT AND MAGNANIMOUS FRIEND:

"Since the date of the last letter which the late Congress by their
President addressed to your Imperial Majesty, the United States of
America have thought proper to change their government and to institute
a new one, agreeably to the constitution, of which I have the honor of
herewith enclosing a copy. The time necessarily employed in the arduous
task and the derangements occasioned by so great, though peaceable, a
revolution, will apologize and account for your Majesty's not having
received those regular advices and marks of attention from the United
States, which the friendship and magnanimity of your conduct toward
them afforded reason to expect.

"The United States having unanimously appointed me to the supreme
executive authority in this nation, your Majesty's letter of the 17th
of August, 1788, which, by reason of the dissolution of the late
government, remained unanswered, has been delivered to me. I have also
received the letters which your Imperial Majesty has been so kind as to
write, in favor of the United States, to the bashaws of Tunis and
Tripoli, and I present to you the sincere acknowledgments and thanks of
the United States for this important mark of your friendship for them.

"We greatly regret that the hostile disposition of those regencies
toward this nation, who have never injured them, is not to be removed
on terms in our power to comply with. Within our territories there are
no mines either of gold or silver, and this young nation, just
recovering from the waste and desolation of a long war, has not as yet
had time to acquire riches by agriculture and commerce. But our soil is
bountiful and our people industrious, and we have reason to flatter
ourselves that we shall gradually become useful to our friends.

"The encouragement which your Majesty has been pleased generously to
give to our commerce with your dominions, the punctuality with which
you have caused the treaty with us to be observed, and the just and
generous measures taken in the case of Captain Proctor, make a deep
impression on the United States, and confirm their respect for, and
attachment to, your Imperial Majesty.

"It gives me pleasure to have this opportunity of assuring your Majesty
that, while I remain at the head of this nation, I shall not cease to
promote every measure that may conduce to the friendship and harmony
which so happily subsist between your empire and them, and shall esteem
myself happy on every occasion of convincing your Majesty of the high
sense which, in common with the whole nation, I entertain of the
magnanimity, wisdom, and benevolence of your Majesty. In the course of
the approaching winter the national Legislature, which is called by the
former name of Congress, will assemble, and I shall take care that
nothing be omitted that may be necessary to cause the correspondence
between our countries to be maintained and conducted in a manner
agreeable to your Majesty and satisfactory to all parties concerned in
it.

"May the Almighty bless your Imperial Majesty--our great and
magnanimous friend--with his constant guidance and protection.

"Written at the city of New York, the 1st day of December, 1789."

       *       *       *       *       *

In December, 1789, Washington was requested by Mr. Joseph Willard, the
president of Harvard University, to sit to Mr. Savage for his portrait,
to be placed in the philosophy chamber of the university. Washington
promptly replied to the letter of the president, and the portrait was
painted by Mr. Savage, and deposited in the university.

On the 8th of January, 1790, the President met both houses of Congress
in the Senate chamber. In his speech, which was delivered from the
chair of the Vice-President, after congratulating Congress on the
accession of the important State of North Carolina to the Union and on
the prosperous aspect of American affairs, he proceeded to recommend
certain great objects of legislation to their more especial
consideration.

"Among the many interesting objects," continued the speech, "which will
engage your attention, that of providing for the common defense will
merit your particular regard. To be prepared for war is one of the most
effectual means of preserving peace.

"A free people ought not only to be armed but disciplined, to which end
a uniform and well-digested plan is requisite, and their safety and
interest require that they should promote such manufactories as tend to
render them independent on others for essential, particularly for
military, supplies."

As connected with this subject a proper establishment for the troops
which they might deem indispensable, was suggested for their mature
deliberation, and the indications of a hostile temper given by several
tribes of Indians, were considered as admonishing them of the necessity
of being prepared to afford protection to the frontiers and to punish
aggression.

The interests of the United States were declared to require that the
means of keeping up their intercourse with foreign nations should be
provided, and the expediency of establishing a uniform rule of
naturalization was suggested.

After expressing his confidence in their attention to many improvements
essential to the prosperity of the interior, the President added: "Nor
am I less persuaded that you will agree with me in opinion that there
is nothing which can better deserve your patronage than the promotion
of science and literature. Knowledge is in every country the surest
basis of public happiness. In one, in which the measures of government
receive their impression so immediately from the sense of the community
as in ours, it is proportionally essential. To the security of a free
constitution it contributes in various ways, by convincing those who
are entrusted with the public administration that every valuable end of
government is best answered by the enlightened confidence of the
people, and by teaching the people themselves to know and to value
their own rights; to discern and provide against invasions of them; to
distinguish between oppression and the necessary exercise of lawful
authority--between burdens proceeding from a disregard to their
convenience, and those resulting from the inevitable exigencies of
society; to discriminate the spirit of liberty from that of
licentiousness, cherishing the first, avoiding the last, and uniting a
speedy but temperate vigilance against encroachments, with an
inviolable respect to the laws.

"Whether this desirable object will be best promoted by affording aids
to seminaries of learning already established by the institution of a
national university or by any other expedients, will be well worthy of
a place in the deliberations of the Legislature."

Addressing himself then particularly to the representatives, he said:
"I saw with peculiar pleasure, at the close of the last session, the
resolution entered into by you, expressive of your opinion that an
adequate provision for the support of the public credit is a matter of
high importance to the national honor and prosperity. In this sentiment
I entirely concur, and to a perfect confidence in your best endeavors
to devise such a provision as will be truly consistent with the end, I
add an equal reliance on the cheerful cooperation of the other branch
of the Legislature. It would be superfluous to specify inducements to a
measure in which the character and permanent interests of the United
States are so obviously and so deeply concerned, and which has received
so explicit a sanction from your declaration."

Addressing himself again to both houses he observed that the estimates
and papers respecting the objects particularly recommended to their
attention would be laid before them, and concluded with saying: "The
welfare of our country is the great object to which our cares and
efforts ought to be directed, and I shall derive great satisfaction
from a cooperation with you in the pleasing though arduous task of
insuring to our fellow-citizens the blessings which they have a right
to expect from a free, efficient, and equal government."

The answers of both houses were indicative of the harmony which
subsisted between the executive and legislative departments.

Congress had been so occupied during its first session with those bills
which were necessary to bring the new system into full operation and to
create an immediate revenue, that some measures which possessed great
and pressing claims to immediate attention had been unavoidably
deferred. The neglect under which the creditors of the public had been
permitted to languish could not fail to cast an imputation on the
American republic, and had been sincerely lamented by the wisest among
those who administered the former government. The power to comply
substantially with the engagements of the United States being at length
conferred on those who were bound by them, it was confidently expected
by the friends of the constitution that their country would retrieve
its reputation, and that its fame would no longer be tarnished with the
blots which stain a faithless people.

On the 9th of January (1790), a letter from Mr. Hamilton, the Secretary
of the Treasury, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, was
read, stating that, in obedience to the resolution of the 21st of
September (1789), he had prepared a plan for the support of public
credit, which he was ready to report when the House should be pleased
to receive it, and, after a short debate in which the personal
attendance of the secretary, for the purpose of making explanations,
was urged by some and opposed by others, it was resolved that the
report should be received in writing on the succeeding Thursday.

Availing himself of the latitude afforded by the terms of the
resolution under which he acted, the secretary had introduced into his
report an able and comprehensive argument elucidating and supporting
the principles it contained. After displaying, with strength and
perspicuity, the justice and the policy of an adequate provision for
the public debt, he proceeded to discuss the principles on which it
should be made.

"It was agreed," he said, "by all, that the foreign debt should be
provided for according to the precise terms of the contract. It was to
be regretted that, with respect to the domestic debt, the same
unanimity of sentiment did not prevail."

The first point on which the public appeared to be divided, involved
the question, "whether a discrimination ought not to be made between
original holders of the public securities and present possessors by
purchase." After reviewing the arguments generally urged in its
support, the secretary declared himself against this discrimination. He
deemed it "equally unjust and impolitic, highly injurious even to the
original holders of public securities, and ruinous to public credit."
To the arguments with which he enforced these opinions, he added the
authority of the government of the Union. From the circular address of
Congress to the States of the 26th of April, 1783, accompanying their
revenue system of the 18th of the same month, passages were selected
indicating, unequivocally, that in the view of that body the original
creditors, and those who had become so by assignment, had equal claims
upon the nation.

After reasoning at great length against a discrimination between the
different creditors of the Union, the secretary proceeded to examine
whether a difference ought to be permitted to remain between them and
the creditors of individual States.

Both descriptions of debt were contracted for the same objects and were
in the main the same. Indeed, a great part of the particular debts of
the States had arisen from assumptions by them on account of the Union,
and it was most equitable that there should be the same measure of
retribution for all. There were many reasons, some of which were
stated, for believing this would not be the case, unless the State
debts should be assumed by the nation.

In addition to the injustice of favoring one class of creditors more
than another which was equally meritorious, many arguments were urged
in support of the policy of distributing to all with an equal hand from
the same source.

After an elaborate discussion of these and some other points connected
with the subject, the secretary proposed that a loan should be opened
to the full amount of the debt, as well of the particular States as of
the Union.

The terms to be offered were--

First. That for every $100 subscribed payable in the debt, as well
interest as principal, the subscriber should be entitled to have
two-thirds funded on a yearly interest of six per cent, (the capital
redeemable at the pleasure of government by the payment of the
principal), and to receive the other third in lands of the western
territory at their then actual value. Or,

Secondly. To have the whole sum funded at a yearly interest of four per
cent., irredeemable by any payment exceeding five dollars per annum
both on account of principal and interest, and to receive as a
compensation for the reduction of interest, fifteen dollars and eighty
cents, payable in lands as in the preceding case. Or,

Thirdly. To have sixty-six and two-thirds of a dollar funded at a
yearly interest of six per cent., irredeemable also by any payment
exceeding four dollars and two-thirds of a dollar per annum on account
both of principal and interest, and to have at the end of ten years
twenty-six dollars and eighty-eight cents funded at the like interest
and rate of redemption.

In addition to these propositions, the creditors were to have an option
of vesting their money in annuities on different plans, and it was also
recommended to open a loan at five per cent, for ten millions of
dollars, payable one-half in specie and the other half in the debt,
irredeemable by any payment exceeding six dollars per annum both of
principal and interest.

By way of experiment, a tontine, on principles stated in the report,
was also suggested.

The secretary was restrained from proposing to fund the whole debt
immediately at the current rate of interest, by the opinion, "that
although such a provision might not exceed the abilities of the
country, it would require the extension of taxation to a degree and to
objects which the true interests of the creditors themselves would
forbid. It was therefore to be hoped and expected that they would
cheerfully concur in such modifications of their claims, on fair and
equitable principles as would facilitate to the government an
arrangement substantial, durable, and satisfactory to the community.
Exigencies might ere long arise which would call for resources greatly
beyond what was now deemed sufficient for the current service, and
should the faculties of the country be exhausted or even strained to
provide for the public debt, there could be less reliance on the
sacredness of the provision.

"But while he yielded to the force of these considerations, he did not
lose sight of those fundamental principles of good faith which dictate
that every practicable exertion ought to be made, scrupulously to
fulfill the engagements of government; that no change in the rights of
its creditors ought to be attempted without their voluntary consent,
and that this consent ought to be voluntary in fact, as well as in
name. Consequently, that every proposal of a change ought to be in the
shape of an appeal to their reason and to their interest, not to their
necessities. To this end, it was requisite that a fair equivalent
should be offered for what might be asked to be given up and
unquestionable security for the remainder." This fair equivalent for
the proposed reduction of interest was, he thought, offered in the
relinquishment of the power to redeem the whole debt at pleasure.

That a free judgment might be exercised by the holders of public
securities in accepting or rejecting the terms offered by the
government, provision was made in the report for paying to
nonsubscribing creditors a dividend of the surplus which should remain
in the treasury after paying the interest of the proposed loans; but,
as the funds immediately to be provided were calculated to produce only
four per cent. on the entire debt, the dividend, for the present, was
not to exceed that rate of interest.

To enable the treasury to support this increased demand upon it, an
augmentation of the duties on imported wines, spirits, tea, and coffee
was proposed and a duty on homemade spirits was also recommended.

This celebrated report, which has been alike the fruitful theme of
extravagant praise and bitter censure, merits the more attention,
because the first regular and systematic opposition to the principles
on which the affairs of the Union were administered, originated in the
measures which were founded on it.

On the 28th of January (1790), says Marshall, this subject was taken
up, and, after some animadversions on the speculations in the public
debt to which the report, it was said, had already given birth, the
business was postponed until the 8th of February, when it was again
brought forward.

Several resolutions affirmative of the principles contained in the
report, were moved by Mr. Fitzsimmons. To the first, which respected a
provision for the foreign debt, the House agreed without a dissenting
voice. The second, in favor of appropriating permanent funds for
payment of the interest on the domestic debt and for the gradual
redemption of the principal, gave rise to a very animated debate. [1]

Mr. Jackson declared his hostility to funding systems generally. To
prove their pernicious influence, he appealed to the histories of
Florence, Genoa, and Great Britain, and contending that the subject
ought to be deferred until North Carolina should be represented, moved
that the committee should rise. This question being decided in the
negative, Mr. Scott declared the opinion that the United States were
not bound to pay the domestic creditors the sums specified in the
certificates of debts in their possession. He supported this opinion by
urging, not that the public had received less value than was expressed
on the face of the paper which had been issued, but that those to whom
it had been delivered by parting with it at two shillings and sixpence
in the pound, had themselves fixed the value of their claims, and had
manifested their willingness to add to their other sacrifices this
deduction from their demand upon the nation. He therefore moved to
amend the resolution before the committee so as to require a
resettlement of the debt.

The amendment was opposed by Mr. Boudinot, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Ames, Mr.
Sherman, Mr. Hartley, and Mr. Goodhue. They stated at large the terms
on which the debt had been contracted, and urged the confidence which
the creditors had a right to place in the government for its discharge
according to settlements already made, and acknowledgments already
given. The idea that the legislative body could diminish an ascertained
debt was reprobated with great force, as being at the same time unjust,
impolitic, and subversive of every principle on which public contracts
are founded. The evidences of debt possessed by the creditors of the
United States were considered as public bonds, for the redemption of
which the property and the labor of the people were pledged.

After the debate had been protracted to some length, the question was
taken on Mr. Scott's amendment, and it passed in the negative.

Mr. Madison then rose, and, in an eloquent speech, replete with
argument, proposed an amendment to the resolution, the effect of which
was to discriminate between the public creditors, so as to pay the
present holder of assignable paper the highest price it had borne in
the market, and give the residue to the person with whom the debt was
originally contracted. Where the original creditor had never parted
with his claim, he was to receive the whole sum acknowledged to be due
on the face of the certificate.

This motion was supported by Mr. Jackson, Mr. White, Mr. Moore, Mr.
Page, Mr. Stone, Mr. Scott, and Mr. Seney.

It was opposed with great earnestness and strength of argument by Mr.
Sedgewic, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, Mr. Ames, Mr.
Gerry, Mr. Boudinot, Mr. Wadsworth, Mr. Goodhue, Mr. Hartley, Mr.
Bland, Mr. Benson, Mr. Burke, and Mr. Livermore.

The argument was ably supported on both sides, was long, animated, and
interesting. At length the question was put and the amendment was
rejected by a great majority.

This discussion deeply engaged the public attention. The proposition
was new and interesting. That the debt ought to be diminished for the
public advantage, was an opinion which had frequently been advanced,
and was maintained by many. But a reduction from the claims of its
present holders for the benefit of those who had sold their rights, was
a measure which saved nothing to the public purse, and was therefore
recommended only by considerations, the operation of which can never be
very extensive. Against it were arrayed all who had made purchases, and
a great majority of those who conceived that sound policy and honest
dealing require a literal observance of public contracts.

Although the decision of Congress against a discrimination in favor of
the original creditor produced no considerable sensation, the
determination on that part of the secretary's report which was the
succeeding subject of deliberation, affecting political interests and
powers which are never to be approached without danger, seemed to
unchain all those fierce passions which a high respect for the
government, and for those who administered it, had in a great measure
restrained.

The manner in which the several States entered into and conducted the
war of the Revolution, is well known. Acting in some respects
separately, and in others conjointly, for the attainment of a common
object, their resources were exerted, sometimes under the authority of
Congress, sometimes under the authority of the local government, to
repel the enemy wherever he appeared. The debt incurred in support of
the war was, therefore, in the first instance, contracted partly by
Congress and partly by the States. When the system of requisitions was
adopted, the transactions of the Union were carried on almost entirely
through the agency of the States, and, when the measure of compensating
the army for the depreciation of their pay became necessary, this
burden, under the recommendation of Congress, was assumed by the
respective States. Some had funded this debt, and paid the interest
upon it. Others had made no provision for the interest; but all, by
taxes, paper money, or purchase, had in some measure reduced the
principal. In their exertions some degree of inequality had obtained,
and they looked anxiously to a settlement of accounts, for the
ascertainment of claims which each supposed itself to have upon the
Union. Measures to effect this object had been taken by the former
government, but they were slow in their progress, and intrinsic
difficulties were found in the thing itself, not easily to be overcome.

Hamilton proposed to assume these debts and to fund them in common with
that which continued to be the proper debt of the Union.

The resolution which comprehended this principle of the report was
vigorously opposed.

It was contended that the general government would acquire an undue
influence, and that the State governments would be annihilated by the
measure. Not only would all the influence of the public creditors be
thrown into the scale of the former, but it would absorb all the powers
of taxation, and leave to the latter only the shadow of a government.
This would probably terminate in rendering the State governments
useless, and would destroy the system so recently established. The
Union, it was said, had been compared to a rope of sand, but gentlemen
were cautioned not to push things to the opposite extreme. The attempt
to strengthen it might be unsuccessful, and the cord might be strained
until it should break.

The constitutional authority of the Federal government to assume the
debts of the States was questioned. Its powers, it was said, were
specified, and this was not among them.

The policy of the measure, as it affected merely the government of the
Union, was controverted, and its justice was arraigned.

On the ground of policy, it was objected that the assumption would
impose on the United States a burden, the weight of which was
unascertained, and which would require an extension of taxation beyond
the limits which prudence would prescribe. An attempt to raise the
impost would be dangerous, and the excise added to it would not produce
funds adequate to the object. A tax on real estate must be resorted to,
objections to which had been made in every part of the Union. It would
be more advisable to leave this source of revenue untouched in the
hands of the State governments, who could apply to it with more
facility, with a better understanding of the subject, and with less
dissatisfaction to individuals, than could possibly be done by the
government of the United States.

There existed no necessity for taking up this burden. The State
creditors had not required it. There was no petition from them upon the
subject. There was not only no application from the States, but there
was reason to believe that they were seriously opposed to the measure.
Many of them would certainly view it with a jealous--a jaundiced eye.
The convention of North Carolina which adopted the constitution had
proposed, as an amendment to it, to deprive Congress of the power of
interfering between the respective States and their creditors, and
there could be no obligation to assume more than the balances which on
a final settlement would be found due to creditor States.

That the debt by being thus accumulated would be perpetuated, was also
an evil of real magnitude. Many of the States had already made
considerable progress in extinguishing their debts, and the process
might certainly be carried on more rapidly by them than by the Union. A
public debt seemed to be considered by some as a public blessing, but
to this doctrine they were not converts. If, as they believed, a public
debt was a public evil, it would be enormously increased by adding
those of the States to that of the Union.

The measure was unwise, too, as it would affect public credit. Such an
augmentation of the debt must inevitably depreciate its value, since it
was the character of paper, whatever denomination it might assume, to
diminish in value in proportion to the quantity in circulation.

It would also increase an evil which was already sensibly felt. The
State debts, when assumed by the continent, would, as that of the Union
had already done, accumulate in large cities; and the dissatisfaction
excited by the payment of taxes would be increased by perceiving that
the money raised from the people flowed into the hands of a few
individuals. Still greater mischief was to be apprehended. A great part
of this additional debt would go into the hands of foreigners, and the
United States would be heavily burdened to pay an interest which could
not be expected to remain in the country.

The measure was unjust, because it was burdening those States which had
taxed themselves highly to discharge the claims of their creditors with
the debts of those which had not made the same exertions. It would
delay the settlement of accounts between the individual States and the
United States, and the supporters of the measure were openly charged
with intending to defeat that settlement.

It was also said that in its execution the scheme would be found
extremely embarrassing, perhaps impracticable. The case of a partial
accession to the measure by the creditors, a case which would probably
occur, presented a difficulty for which no provision was made, and of
which no solution had been given. Should the creditors in some States
come into the system, and those in others refuse to change their
security, the government would be involved in perplexities from which
no means of extricating itself had been shown. Nor would it be
practicable to discriminate between the debts contracted for general
and for local objects.

In the course of the debate severe allusions were made to the conduct
of particular States, and the opinions advanced in favor of the measure
were ascribed to local interests.

In support of the assumption, the debts of the States were traced to
their origin. America, it was said, had engaged in a war the object of
which was equally interesting to every part of the Union. It was not
the war of a particular State, but of the United States. It was not the
liberty and independence of a part, but of the whole, for which they
had contended, and which they had acquired. The cause was a common
cause. As brethren, the American people had consented to hazard
property and life in its defense. All the sums expended in the
attainment of this great object, whatever might be the authority under
which they were raised or appropriated, conduced to the same end.
Troops were raised, and military stores purchased, before Congress
assumed the command of the army or the control of the war. The
ammunition which repulsed the enemy at Bunker's Hill was purchased by
Massachusetts, and formed a part of the debt of that State.

Nothing could be more erroneous than the principle which had been
assumed in argument, that the holders of securities issued by
individual States were to be considered merely as State creditors, as
if the debt had been contracted on account of the particular State. It
was contracted on account of the Union, in that common cause in which
all were equally interested.

From the complex nature of the political system which had been adopted
in America, the war was, in a great measure, carried on through the
agency of the State governments, and the debts were, in truth, the
debts of the Union, for which the States had made themselves
responsible. Except the civil list, the whole State expenditure was in
the prosecution of the war, and the State taxes had undeniably exceeded
the provision for their civil list. The foundation for the several
classes of the debt was reviewed in detail, and it was affirmed to be
proved from the review, and from the books in the public offices, that,
in its origin, a great part of it, even in form, and the whole, in
fact, was equitably due from the continent. The States individually
possessing all the resources of the nation, became responsible to
certain descriptions of the public creditors. But they were the agents
of the continent in contracting the debt, and its distribution among
them for payment arose from the division of political power which
existed under the old confederation. A new arrangement of the system
had taken place, and a power over the resources of the nation was
conferred on the general government. With the funds the debt also ought
to be assumed. This investigation of its origin demonstrated that the
assumption was not the creation of a new debt, but the reacknowledgment
of liability for an old one, the payment of which had devolved on those
members of the system who, at the time, were alone capable of paying
it. And thence was inferred not only the justice of the measure, but a
complete refutation of the arguments drawn from the constitution. If,
in point of fact, the debt was in its origin continental and had been
transferred to the States for greater facility of payment, there could
be no constitutional objection to restoring its original and real
character.

The great powers of war, of taxation, and of borrowing money, which
were vested in Congress to pay the debts and provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States, comprised that in
question. There could be no more doubt of their right to charge
themselves with the payment of a debt contracted in the past war, than
to borrow money for the prosecution of a future war. The impolicy of
leaving the public creditors to receive payment from different sources
was also strongly pressed, and the jealousy which would exist between
the creditors of the Union and of the States was considered as a
powerful argument in favor of giving them one common interest. This
jealousy, it was feared, might be carried so far as even to create an
opposition to the laws of the Union.

If the State should provide for their creditors, the same sum of money
must be collected from the people as would be required if the debt
should be assumed, and it would probably be collected in a manner more
burdensome than if one uniform system should be established. If all
should not make such provision, it would be unjust to leave the soldier
of one State unpaid, while the services of the man who fought by his
side were amply compensated, and, after having assumed the funds, it
would dishonor the general government to permit a creditor, for
services rendered or property advanced for the continent, to remain
unsatisfied, because his claim had been transferred to the State at a
time when the State alone possessed the means of payment. By the
injured and neglected creditor such an arrangement might justly be
considered as a disreputable artifice.

Instead of delaying, it was believed to be a measure which would
facilitate the settlement of accounts between the States. Its advocates
declared that they did not entertain and never had entertained any wish
to procrastinate a settlement. On the contrary it was greatly desired
by them. They had themselves brought forward propositions for that
purpose, and they invited their adversaries to assist in improving the
plan which had been introduced.

The settlement between the States, it was said, either would or would
not be made. Should it ever take place, it would remedy any
inequalities which might grow out of the assumption. Should it never
take place, the justice of the measure became the more apparent. That
the burdens in support of a common war, which from various causes had
devolved unequally on the States, ought to be apportioned among them,
was a truth too clear to be controverted, and this, if the settlement
should never be accomplished, could be effected only by the measure now
proposed. Indeed, in any event, it would be the only certain, as well
as only eligible plan. For how were the debtor States to be compelled
to pay the balances which should be found against them?

If the measure was recommended by considerations which rendered its
ultimate adoption inevitable, the present was clearly preferable to any
future time. It was desirable immediately to quiet the minds of the
public creditors by assuring them that justice would be done, to
simplify the forms of public debt, and to put an end to that
speculation which had been so much reprobated and which could be
terminated only by giving the debt a real and permanent value.

That the assumption would impair the just influence of the States was
controverted with great strength of argument. The diffusive
representation in the State Legislatures, the intimate connection
between the representative and his constituents, the influence of the
State Legislatures over the members of one branch of the national
Legislature, the nature of the powers exercise by the State
governments, which perpetually presented them to the people in a point
of view calculated to lay hold of the public affections, were
guarantees that the States would retain their due weight in the
political system and that a debt was not necessary to the solidity or
duration of their power.

But the argument, it was said, proved too much. If a debt was now
essential to the preservation of State authority it would always be so.
It must therefore never be extinguished, but must be perpetuated in
order to secure the existence of the State governments. If, for this
purpose, it was indispensable that the expenses of the Revolutionary
War should be borne by the States, it would not be less indispensable
that the expenses of future wars should be borne in the same manner.
Either the argument was unfounded or the constitution was wrong, and
the powers of the sword and the purse ought not to have been conferred
on the government of the Union. Whatever speculative opinions might be
entertained on this point, they were to administer the government
according to the principles of the constitution as it was framed. But,
it was added, if so much power followed the assumption as the objection
implies, is it not time to ask--is it safe to forbear assuming? If the
power is so dangerous it will be so when exercised by the States. If
assuming tends to consolidation, is the reverse, tending to disunion, a
less weighty objection? If it is answered that the non-assumption will
not necessarily tend to disunion, neither, it may be replied, does the
assumption necessarily tend to consolidation.

It was not admitted that the assumption would tend to perpetuate the
debt. It could not be presumed that the general government would be
less willing than the local governments to discharge it; nor could it
be presumed that the means were less attainable by the former than the
latter.

It was not contended that a public debt was a public blessing. Whether
a debt was to be preferred to no debt was not the question. The debt
was already contracted, and the question so far as policy might be
consulted, was, whether it was more for the public advantage to give it
such a form as would render it applicable to the purposes of a
circulating medium, or to leave it a mere subject of speculation,
incapable of being employed to any useful purpose. The debt was
admitted to be an evil, but it was an evil from which, if wisely
modified, some benefit might be extracted, and which, in its present
state, could have only a mischievous operation.

If the debt should be placed on adequate funds, its operation on public
credit could not be pernicious; in its present precarious condition,
there was much more to be apprehended in that respect.

To the objection that it would accumulate in large cities, it was
answered it would be a moneyed capital, and would be held by those who
chose to place money at interest, but by funding the debt the present
possessors would be enabled to part with it at its nominal value,
instead of selling it at its present current rate. If it should center
in the hands of foreigners, the sooner it was appreciated to its proper
standard, the greater quantity of specie would its transfer bring into
the United States.

To the injustice of charging those States which had made great
exertions for the payment of their debts with the burden properly
belonging to those which had not made such exertions, it was answered
that every State must be considered as having exerted itself to the
utmost of its resources, and that if it could not or would not make
provision for creditors to whom the Union was equitably bound, the
argument in favor of an assumption was the stronger.

The arguments drawn from local interests were repelled and retorted,
and a great degree of irritation was excited on both sides.

After a very animated discussion of several days, the question was
taken, and the resolution was carried by a small majority. Soon after
this decision, while the subject was pending before the House, the
delegates from North Carolina took their seats, and changed the
strength of parties. By a majority of two voices, the resolution was
recommitted, and, after a long and ardent debate, was negatived by the
same majority.

This proposition continued to be supported with a degree of earnestness
which its opponents termed pertinacious, but not a single opinion was
changed. It was brought forward in the new and less exceptionable form
of assuming specific sums from each State. Under this modification of
the principle, the extraordinary contributions of particular States
during the war, and their exertions since the peace, might be regarded,
and the objections to the measure, drawn from the uncertainty of the
sum to be assumed, would be removed. But these alterations produced no
change of sentiment, and the bill was sent up to the Senate with a
provision for those creditors only whose certificates of debt purported
to be payable by the Union.

In this state of things the measure is understood to have derived aid
from another, which was of a nature strongly to interest particular
parts of the Union.

From the month of June, 1783, when Congress was driven from
Philadelphia by the mutiny of a part of the Pennsylvania line, the
necessity of selecting some place for a permanent residence, in which
the government of the Union might exercise sufficient authority to
protect itself from violence and insult, had been generally
acknowledged. Scarcely any subject had occupied more time, or had more
agitated the members of the former Congress than this.

In December, 1784, an ordinance was passed for appointing commissioners
to purchase land on the Delaware, in the neighborhood of its falls, and
to erect thereon the necessary public buildings for the reception of
Congress and the officers of government; but the southern interest had
been sufficiently strong to arrest the execution of this ordinance by
preventing an appropriation of funds, which required the assent of nine
States. Under the existing government, this subject had received the
early attention of Congress, and many different situations, from the
Delaware to the Potomac inclusive, had been earnestly supported, but a
majority of both houses had not concurred in favor of any one place.
With as little success, attempts had been made to change the temporary
residence of Congress. Although New York was obviously too far to the
east, so many conflicting interests were brought into operation
whenever the subject was touched, that no motion designating a more
central place could succeed. At length, a compact respecting the
temporary and permanent seat of government was entered into between the
friends of Philadelphia and the Potomac, stipulating that Congress
should adjourn to and hold its sessions in Philadelphia for ten years,
during which time buildings for the accommodation of the government
should be erected at some place on the Potomac, to which the government
should remove at the expiration of the term. This compact having united
the representatives of Pennsylvania and Delaware with the friends of
the Potomac, in favor both of the temporary and permanent residence
which had been agreed on between them, a majority was produced in favor
of the two situations, and a bill which was brought into the Senate in
conformity with this previous arrangement, passed both houses by small
majorities. This act was immediately followed by an amendment to the
bill then depending before the Senate for funding the debt of the
Union. The amendment was similar in principle to that which had been
unsuccessfully proposed in the House of Representatives. By its
provisions, $21,500,000 of the State debts were assumed in specified
proportions, and it was particularly enacted that no certificate should
be received from a State creditor which could be "ascertained to have
been issued for any purpose other than compensations and expenditures
for services or supplies toward the prosecution of the late war and the
defense of the United States, or of some part thereof, during the
same."

When the question was taken in the House of Representatives on this
amendment two members, representing districts on the Potomac, who, in
all the previous stages of the business, had voted against the
assumption, declared themselves in its favor, and thus the majority was
changed. [2]

Thus was a measure carried which was supported and opposed with a
degree of zeal and earnestness not often manifested, and which
furnished presages, not to be mistaken, that the spirit with which the
opposite opinions had been maintained, would not yield, contentedly, to
the decision of a bare majority. This measure has constituted one of
the great grounds of accusation against the first administration of the
general government, and it is fair to acknowledge that though, in its
progress, it derived no aid from the President, whose opinion remained
in his own bosom, it received the full approbation of his judgment.

A bill at length passed both houses, funding the debt upon principles
which lessened considerably the weight of the public burdens and was
entirely satisfactory to the public creditors. The proceeds of the
sales of the lands lying in the western territory and, by a subsequent
act of the same session, the surplus product of the revenue, after
satisfying the appropriations which were charged upon it with the
addition of $2,000,000, which the President was authorized to borrow at
5 per cent., constituted a sinking fund to be applied to the reduction
of the debt.

The effect of this measure was great and rapid. The public paper
suddenly rose and was for a short time above par. The immense wealth
which individuals acquired by this unexpected appreciation could not be
viewed with indifference. Those who participated in its advantages
regarded the author of a system to which they were so greatly indebted,
with an enthusiasm of attachment to which scarcely any limits were
assigned. To many others this adventitious collection of wealth in
particular hands was a subject rather of chagrin than of pleasure, and
the reputation which the success of his plans gave to the Secretary of
the Treasury was not contemplated with unconcern. As if the debt had
been created by the existing government, not by a war which gave
liberty and independence to the United States, its being funded was
ascribed by many, not to a sense of justice and to a liberal and
enlightened policy, but to the desire of bestowing on the government an
artificial strength, by the creation of a moneyed interest which would
be subservient to its will. The effects produced by giving the debt a
permanent value justified the predictions of those whose anticipations
had been most favorable. The sudden increase of moneyed capital derived
from it invigorated commerce and gave a new stimulus to agriculture.

About this time there was a great and visible improvement in the
circumstances of the people. Although the funding system was certainly
not inoperative in producing this improvement it cannot be justly
ascribed to any single cause. Progressive industry had gradually
repaired the losses sustained by the war, and the influence of the
constitution on habits of thinking and acting, though silent, was
considerable. In depriving the States of the power to impair the
obligation of contracts or to make anything but gold and silver a
tender in payment of debts, the conviction was impressed on that
portion of society which had looked to the government for relief from
embarrassment that personal exertions alone could free them from
difficulties, and an increased degree of industry and economy was the
natural consequence of this opinion. [3]

Various other matters besides those already noticed, occupied the
attention of Congress during this laborious session. The question of
the slave trade was brought up by a petition from the Quakers in
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and other States, and the venerable Dr.
Franklin, as president of the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the
Abolition of Slavery, sent in a memorial, early in February, asking the
serious attention of Congress to the importance and duty of extending
to the negroes the blessings of freedom. The subject was discussed at
great length and with much warmth on both sides, and toward the close
of March it was resolved, "That Congress have no authority to interfere
in the emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them within any
of the States." Laws for the naturalization of aliens, after two years'
residence, for the patenting of useful inventions, and for securing to
authors the copyright of their works; and others, regulating the
mercantile marine of the Union, in respect to the seamen engaged in it;
and forming a groundwork for a criminal code; for the ordering of what
was called "the military establishment," only 1,216 rank and file; and
for arranging the means of intercourse with the Indians in respect to
trade and the acquisition of their hunting-grounds, and with European
governments for the larger commerce which required the superintendence
of resident ministers--these were duly considered and framed. Much
other business was done, such as voting for the public service, under
the heads of the civil list, pensions for revolutionary services, the
military establishment, lighthouses, embassies, and outstanding debts,
the moderate sum of about $725,000.

Both houses, having returned thanks to the corporation of the city of
New York, "for the elegant and convenient accommodations furnished the
Congress of the United States," adjourned on the 12th of August (1790),
to meet again in December, in the city of Philadelphia.

Washington's old and valued friend, Dr. Franklin, after painful and
protracted sufferings, closed a life of four-score and four years on
the 17th of April, 1790. He was buried in the cemetery of Christ
Church, Philadelphia, and his funeral was attended by more than 20,000
of his fellow-citizens. Congress resolved to wear the customary badge
of mourning for one month, "as a mark of veneration due to the memory
of a citizen, whose native genius was not more an ornament to human
nature than his various exertions of it have been precious to science,
to freedom, and to his country." In the National Assembly of France,
Mirabeau eloquently dilated in praise of the illustrious deceased, and
Lafayette seconded the motion for a decree, ordering the members to
wear the usual badge of mourning for three days, and there was not a
land blessed with the light of civilization which did not lament his
death and pour forth expressions of sorrow for the loss which not only
America, but the world had sustained.

An act was passed by Congress to accept the cession of the claims of
the State of North Carolina, to a certain district of western
territory, and on the 20th of May, provision was made for its
government, under the title of "The Territory of the United States
south of the river Ohio."

On the 29th of May, 1790, Rhode Island, having become somewhat more
alive to her true interests and to the ill results which must certainly
follow her exclusion from the Union, adopted the constitution and cast
in her lot with the sister States for the great future which was
opening before them all.

A treaty of peace was concluded in August of this year with the Creek
Indians which restored tranquility to the people of Georgia. The
pacific overtures made to the Indians of the Wabash and the Miamis had
not been equally successful. The western frontiers were still exposed
to their incursions, and there was much reason to apprehend that the
people of Kentucky and of the western counties of the middle States
could only be relieved from the horrors of savage warfare by an
exertion of the military strength of the Union. In the opinion of the
President, the emergency required the immediate employment of a force
competent to the object and which should carry terror and destruction
into the heart of the hostile settlements. The people of the West,
however, declared their opinion in favor of desultory military
expeditions, and Congress indulged their wishes. The desire of the
executive for a military establishment equal to the exigency was not
regarded and the distresses of the frontier inhabitants therefore still
continued.

The conduct of Spain in relation to the disputed boundary, and its
pretensions to the navigation of the Mississippi, was such as to give
ground to fear that its dispositions toward the United States were
unfriendly. Between the United States and England the nonexecution of
several articles of the treaty of peace still furnished matter for
reciprocal crimination which there was the more difficulty in removing
because there was no diplomatic intercourse maintained between them.
Under the old government, Mr. Adams' mission had been treated with
neglect, and the new administration was not disposed to subject itself
to a similar mark of disrespect. Mr. Gouverneur Morris was instructed,
as an informal agent to the British government, to sound its views
respecting amicable and permanent arrangements of the matters in
dispute. But Mr. Morris remarked, "that there never was, perhaps, a
moment in which this country (Britain) felt herself greater, and,
consequently, it is the most unfavorable moment to obtain advantageous
terms from her in any bargain." He conducted his mission with ability
and address, but was unable to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion.
The communications laid before the American government at the same time
by Major Beckwith, an English gentlemen, who had come in an informal
manner to learn the dispositions of the American government towards
England and Spain, between which a rupture was expected, gave
Washington an insight of the object of the delays which had been
practiced with Mr. Morris. He was persuaded that a disposition existed
in the cabinet of London to retain things in their actual situation
until the intentions of the American government should be ascertained
with respect to the war supposed to be approaching. If America would
make a common cause with Great Britain against Spain, the way would be
smoothed to the attainment of all their objects, but if America should
incline toward Spain, no adjustment of the points of difference between
the two nations would be made. He therefore determined to hold himself
free to pursue without reproach, in the expected war, such a course as
the interest and honor of the United States might dictate. The want of
official authenticity in the communications of Mr. Beckwith was,
therefore, signified to that gentleman as a reason for reserve on the
part of the government and the powers given to Mr. Morris were
withdrawn. It was determined that things should remain in their actual
situation until a change of circumstances should require a change of
conduct. Scarcely had this resolution been adopted when the dispute
between Britain and Spain was adjusted, and thus both the fear of
inconveniences, and the hope of advantages which might result to
America from war between the two powers, were terminated.

By his incessant application to public business and the consequent
change of active for sedentary habits, the constitution of the
President seemed much impaired and during the second session of
Congress he had, for the second time since entering upon the duties of
his office, been attacked by a severe disease, which reduced him to the
brink of the grave. Exercise, and a temporary relief from the cares of
office, being essential to the restoration of his health, he determined
for the short interval afforded by the recess of the Legislature to
retire from the fatigues of public life to the tranquil shades of Mount
Vernon. Previously, however, he made a visit to Rhode Island, which,
not having been a member of the Union at the time of his late tour
through New England, had not been visited by him at that time.

His final departure from New York was not less affecting than his
arrival had been, when he came to assume the reins of government. "It
was always his habit," says Custis in his "Recollections," "to endeavor
to avoid the manifestations of affection and gratitude that met him
everywhere. He strove in vain--he was closely watched and the people
would have their way. He wished to slip off unobserved from New York
and thus steal a march upon his old companions in arms. But there were
too many of the dear glorious old veterans of the Revolution at that
time of day in and near New York to render such an escape possible.

"The baggage had all been packed up; the horses, carriages, and
servants ordered to be over the ferry to Paulus Hook by daybreak and
nothing was wanting for departure but the dawn. The lights were yet
burning, when the President came into the room where his family were
assembled, evidently much pleased in the belief that all was right,
when, immediately under the windows, the band of the artillery struck
up Washington's March. 'There,' he exclaimed, 'it's all over, we are
found out. Well, well, they must have their own way.' New York soon
after appeared as if taken by storm--troops and persons of all
descriptions hurrying down Broadway toward the place of embarkation,
all anxious to take a last look on him whom so many could never expect
to see again.

"The embarkation was delayed until all the complimentary arrangements
were completed. The President, after taking leave of many dear and
cherished friends, and many an old companion in arms, stepped into the
barge that was to convey him from New York forever. The coxswain gave
the word 'let fall;' the spray from the oars sparkled in the morning
sunbeams; the bowman shoved off from the pier, and, as the barge swung
round to the tide, Washington rose, uncovered, in the stern, to bid
adieu to the masses assembled on the shore; he waved his hat, and, in a
voice tremulous from emotion, pronounced--Farewell. It may be supposed
that Major Bauman, who commanded the artillery on this interesting
occasion, who was first captain of Lamb's regiment, and a favorite
officer of the war of the Revolution, would, when about to pay his last
respects to his beloved commander, load his pieces with something more
than mere blank cartridges. But ah! the thunders of the cannon were
completely hushed when the mighty shout of the people arose that
responded to the farewell of Washington. Pure from the heart it came,
right up to Heaven it went, to call down a blessing upon the Father of
his Country.

"The barge had scarcely gained the middle of the Hudson when the
trumpets were heard at Paulus Hook, where the Governor and the chivalry
of Jersey were in waiting to welcome the chief to those well-remembered
shores. Escorts of cavalry relieved each other throughout the whole
route up to the Pennsylvania line; every village, and even hamlet,
turned out its population to greet with cordial welcome the man upon
whom all eyes were fixed and in whom all hearts rejoiced.

"What must have been the recollections that crowded on the mind of
Washington during this triumphant progress? Newark, Brunswick,
Princeton, Trenton! What a contrast between the glorious burst of
sunshine that now illumined and made glad everything around these
memorable spots, with the gloomy and desolate remembrances of '76! Then
his country's champion, with the wreck of a shattered host, was flying
before a victorious and well-appointed foe, while all around him was
shrouded in the darkness of despair; now, in his glorious progress over
the self-same route, his firm footstep presses upon the soil of an
infant empire, reposing in the joys of peace, independence, and
happiness.

"Among the many who swelled his triumph, the most endeared to the heart
of the chief were the old associates of his toils, his fortunes, and
his fame. Many of the Revolutionary veterans were living in 1790, and,
by their presence, gave a dignified tone and character to all public
assemblages; and when you saw a peculiarly fine-looking soldier in
those old days, and would ask: 'To what corps of the American army did
you belong?' drawing himself up to his full height, with a martial air,
and back of the hand thrown up to his forehead, the veteran would
reply: 'Life Guard, your honor.'

"And proud and happy were these veterans in again beholding their own
good Lady Washington. Greatly was she beloved in the army. Her many
intercessions with the chief for the pardon of offenders--her kindness
to the sick and wounded--all caused her annual arrival in camp to be
hailed as an event that would serve to dissipate the gloom of the
winter quarters.

"Arrived at the line, the Jersey escort was relieved by the cavalry of
Pennsylvania, and, when near to Philadelphia, the President was met by
Governor Mifflin and a brilliant cortege of officers, and escorted by a
squadron of horse to the city. Conspicuous among the Governors suite,
as well for his martial bearing as for the manly beauty of his person,
was General Walter Stewart, a son of Erin, and a gallant and
distinguished officer of the Pennsylvania line. To Stewart, as to
Cadwallader, Washington was most warmly attached; indeed, those
officers were among the very choicest of the contributions of
Pennsylvania to the army and cause of independence. Mifflin, small in
stature, was active, alert, 'every inch a soldier.' He was a patriot of
great influence in Pennsylvania in the 'times that tried men's souls,'
and nobly did he exert that influence in raising troops, with which to
reinforce the wreck of the grand army at the close of the campaign of
'76.

"Arrived within the city, the crowd became intense, the President left
his carriage and mounted the white charger, and, with the Governor on
his right, proceeded to the city tavern in Third street, where quarters
were prepared for him, the light infantry, after some time, having
opened a passage for the carriages. At the city tavern the President
was received by the authorities of Philadelphia, who welcomed the chief
magistrate to their city as to his home for the remainder of his
Presidential term. A group of old and long-tried friends were also in
waiting. Foremost among these, and first to grasp the hand of
Washington, was one who was always nearest to his heart, a patriot and
public benefactor, Robert Morris.

"After remaining a short time in Philadelphia, the President speeded on
his journey to that home where he ever found rest from his weighty
labors, and enjoyed the sweets of rural and domestic happiness amid his
farms and at his fireside of Mount Vernon."

Whenever Washington was residing at Mount Vernon, he was accustomed to
receive visits from his old and intimate friends, and to relieve his
mind from the cares of state by lively and familiar conversation, and
social and convivial intercourse. On one occasion, some years before
the period of which we are now writing, Mr. Drayton and Mr. Izard, of
South Carolina, were on a visit to Mount Vernon. [4]

After dinner, while the party were still sitting at table, the
conversation turned on Arnold's treason. Mr. Lear, Washington's private
secretary, was present, and after retiring he wrote down in his diary
Washington's own account of that remarkable incident in our history in
his own words. The extract from Mr. Lear's diary has recently been
published for the first time in Mr. Rush's "Washington in Domestic
Life." It is as follows:

"After dinner, Washington was, in the course of conversation, led to
speak of Arnold's treachery, when he gave the following account of it,
which I shall put in his own words, thus: 'I confess I had a good
opinion of Arnold before his treachery was brought to light; had that
not been the case I should have had some reason to suspect him sooner,
for when he commanded in Philadelphia, the Marquis Lafayette brought
accounts from France of the armament which was to be sent to cooperate
with us in the ensuing campaign. Soon after this was known, Arnold
pretended to have some private business to transact in Connecticut, and
on his way there he called at my quarters, and in the course of
conversation expressed a desire of quitting Philadelphia and joining
the army the ensuing campaign. I told him that it was probable we
should have a very active one, and that if his wound and state of
health would permit, I should be extremely glad of his services with
the army. He replied that he did not think his wound would permit him
to take a very active part, but still he persisted in his desire of
being with the army. He went on to Connecticut and on his return called
again upon me. He renewed his request of being with me next campaign,
and I made him the same answer I had done before. He again repeated
that he did not think his wound would permit him to do active duty, and
intimated a desire to have the command at West Point. I told him I did
not think that would suit him, as I should leave none in the garrison
but invalids, because it would be entirely covered by the main army.
The subject was dropped at that time, and he returned to Philadelphia.
It then appeared somewhat strange to me that a man of Arnold's known
activity and enterprise should be desirous of taking so inactive a
part. I however thought no more of the matter. When the French troops
arrived at Rhode Island, I had intelligence from New York that General
Clinton intended to make an attack upon them before they could get
themselves settled and fortified. In consequence of that I was
determined to attack New York, which would be left much exposed by his
drawing off the British troops, and accordingly formed my line of
battle and moved down with the whole army to King's ferry, which we
passed. Arnold came to camp that time, and, having no command, and
consequently no quarters (all the houses thereabouts being occupied by
the army), he was obliged to seek lodgings at some distance from the
camp. While the army was crossing at King's ferry I was going to see
the last detachment over, and met Arnold, who asked me if I had thought
of anything for him. I told him that he was to have the command of the
light troops, which was a post of honor, and which his rank indeed
entitled him to. Upon this information his countenance changed, and he
appeared to be quite fallen; and, instead of thanking me, or expressing
any pleasure at the appointment, never opened his mouth. I desired him
to go on to my quarters and get something to refresh himself, and I
would meet him there soon. He did so. Upon his arrival there he found
Colonel Tilghman, whom he took aside, and, mentioning what I had told
him, seemed to express great uneasiness at it--as his leg, he said,
would not permit him to be long on horseback, and intimated a great
desire to have the command at West Point. When I returned to my
quarters Colonel Tilghman informed me of what had passed. I made no
reply to it, but his behavior struck me as strange and unaccountable.
In the course of that night, however, I received information from New
York that General Clinton had altered his plan and was debarking his
troops. This information obliged me likewise to alter my disposition
and return to my former station, where I could better cover the
country. I then determined to comply with Arnold's desire, and
accordingly gave him the command of the garrison at West Point. Things
remained in this situation about a fortnight, when I wrote to the Count
Rochambeau, desiring to meet him at some intermediate place (as we
could neither of us be long enough from our respective commands to
visit the other), in order to lay the plan for the siege of Yorktown,
and proposed Hartford, where I accordingly went and met the count. On
my return I met the Chevalier Luzerne toward evening within about
fifteen miles of West Point (on his way to join the count at Rhode
Island), which I intended to reach that night, but he insisted upon
turning back with me to the next public house, where, in politeness to
him, I could not but stay all night, determining, however, to get to
West Point to breakfast very early. I sent off my baggage, and desired
Colonel Hamilton to go forward and inform General Arnold that I would
breakfast with him. Soon after he arrived at Arnold's quarters a letter
was delivered to Arnold which threw him into the greatest confusion. He
told Colonel Hamilton that something required his immediate attendance
at the garrison, which was on the opposite side of the river to his
quarters, and immediately ordered a horse to take him to the river, and
the barge, which he kept to cross, to be ready, and desired Major
Franks, his aide, to inform me when I should arrive that he was gone
over the river and would return immediately. When I got to his quarters
and did not find him there I desired Major Franks to order me some
breakfast, and, as I intended to visit the fortifications, I would see
General Arnold there. After I had breakfasted I went over the river,
and, inquiring for Arnold, the commanding officer told me that he had
not been there. I likewise inquired at the several redoubts, but no one
could give me any information where he was. The impropriety of his
conduct, when he knew I was to be there, struck me very forcibly, and
my mind misgave me, but I had not the least idea of the real cause.
When I returned to Arnold's quarters about two hours after, and told
Colonel Hamilton that I had not seen him, he gave me a packet which had
just arrived for me from Colonel Jemmison, which immediately brought
the matter to light. I ordered Colonel Hamilton to mount his horse and
proceed with the greatest dispatch to a post on the river about eight
miles below, in order to stop the barge if she had not passed, but it
was too late. It seems that the letter which Arnold received which
threw him into such confusion was from Colonel Jemmison, informing him
that Andr was taken, and that the papers found upon him were in his
possession. Colonel Jemmison, when Andr was taken with these papers,
could not believe that Arnold was a traitor, but rather thought it was
an imposition of the British in order to destroy our confidence in
Arnold. He, however, immediately on their being taken, dispatched an
express after me, ordering him to ride night and day till he came up
with me. The express went the lower road, which was the road by which I
had gone to Connecticut, expecting that I would return by the same
route, and that he would meet me, but before he had proceeded far he
was informed that I was returning by the upper road. He then cut across
the country and followed in my track till I arrived at West Point. He
arrived about two hours after and brought the above packet. When Arnold
got down to the barge, he ordered his men, who were very clever fellows
and some of the better sort of soldiery, to proceed immediately on
board the Vulture, sloop-of-war, as a flag, which was lying down the
river, saying that they must be very expeditious, as he must return in
a short time to meet me, and promised them two gallons of rum if they
would exert themselves. They did, accordingly, but when they got on
board the Vulture, instead of their two gallons of rum, he ordered the
coxswain to be called down into the cabin, and informed him that he and
the men must consider themselves as prisoners. The coxswain was very
much astonished, and told him that they came on board under the
sanction of a flag. He answered that that was nothing to the purpose;
they were prisoners. But the captain of the Vulture had more generosity
than this pitiful scoundrel, and told the coxswain that he would take
his parole for going on shore to get clothes, and whatever else was
wanted for himself and his companions. He accordingly came, got his
clothes, and returned on board. When they got to New York, General
Clinton, ashamed of so low and mean an action, set them all at
liberty.'"

This narrative, from the lips of Washington himself, throws much
additional light on Arnold's treason. It is also interesting to the
general reader, as affording a specimen of Washington's style in
conversation, when the events of the Revolution formed the topic of
discourse.


1. Footnote: On account of the great importance of this debate, we give
Marshall's synopsis of the arguments used on both sides. It brought up
the question of State rights as opposed to centralization for the first
time; and on many other accounts is particularly interesting for the
political reader, as well as for all who are curious respecting our
early colonial history.

2. Footnote: It has ever been understood that these members were, on
principle, in favor of the assumption as modified in the amendment made
by the Senate; but they withheld their assent from it when originally
proposed in the House of Representatives in the opinion that the
increase of the national debt added to the necessity of giving to the
departments of the national government a more central residence. It is
understood that a greater number would have changed had it been
necessary.

3. Footnote: Marshall.

4. Footnote: October 23, 1786, was the date of Messrs. Drayton and
Izard's visit.




CHAPTER IV.


THE NATIONAL BANK ESTABLISHED. 1790.


On his way from New York to Mount Vernon Washington stopped for a short
time, as we have seen, in Philadelphia. While there he addressed a
letter to his private secretary, Mr. Lear, which is interesting not
only for the information it contains respecting his residence, but from
its illustrating that remarkable attention to the details of business,
which we have already had occasion to notice.

"After a pleasant journey," he writes, "we arrived in this city on
Thursday last (September 2, 1790), and tomorrow we proceed--if Mrs.
Washington's health will permit, for she has been much indisposed since
we came here--toward Mount Vernon. The house of Mr. Robert Morris had,
previous to my arrival, been taken by the corporation for my residence.
[1]

"It is the best they could get. It is, I believe, the best single house
in the city. Yet without additions it is inadequate to the commodious
accommodation of my family. These additions, I believe, will be made.
The first floor contains only two public rooms (except one for the
upper servants). The second floor will have two public (drawing) rooms,
and with the aid of one room with a partition in it, in the back
building, will be sufficient for the use of Mrs. Washington and the
children, and their maids, besides affording her a small place for a
private study and dressing-room. The third story will furnish you and
Mrs. Lear with a good lodging-room, a public office (for there is no
room below for one), and two rooms for the gentlemen of the family. The
garret has four good rooms, which must serve Mr. and Mrs. Hyde
[2]--unless they should prefer the room over the workhouse--William,
and such servants as it may not be better to place in the proposed
additions to the back building. There is a room over the stable which
may serve the coachman and postillions, and there is a smokehouse,
which may possibly be more valuable for the use of servants than for
the smoking of meats. The intention of the addition to the back
building is to provide a servant's hall and one or two lodging-rooms
for the servants. There are good stables, but for twelve horses only,
and a coach-house, which will hold all my carriages. Speaking of
carriages, I have left my coach to receive a thorough repair, by the
time I return, which I expect will be before the 1st of December."

The Legislature, meantime, had appropriated for his residence an
elegant house in South Ninth street, which was taken down a few years
since, having been occupied by the University, and other buildings were
erected on the same lot for the same purpose. But Washington refused to
occupy the house offered by the State authorities, because he would not
live in a house which was not hired and paid for by himself. He was
desirous, however, to have the rent fixed before he entered the house,
and he wrote repeatedly to Mr. Lear from Mount Vernon to ascertain what
the rent would be. On the 14th of November, 1790, he wrote to Mr. Lear
as follows:

"I am, I must confess, exceedingly unwilling to go into any house
without first knowing on what terms I do it, and wish that this
sentiment could be again hinted in delicate terms to the parties
concerned with me. I cannot, if there are no latent motives which
govern in this case, see any difficulty in the business. Mr. Morris has
most assuredly formed an idea of what ought in equity to be the rent of
the tenement in the condition he left it, and with this aid the
committee ought, I conceive, to be as little at a loss in determining
what it should rent for, with the additions and alterations which are
about to be made, and which ought to be done in a plain and neat, not
by any means in an extravagant style, because the latter is not only
contrary to my wish but would really be detrimental to my interest and
convenience, principally because it would be the means of keeping me
out of the use and comforts of the house to a late period, and because
the furniture and everything else would require to be accordant
therewith, besides making me pay an extravagant price, perhaps to
accommodate the alterations to the taste of another or to the
exorbitant rates of workmen.

"I do not know, nor do I believe, that anything unfair is intended by
either Mr. Morris or the committee, but let us for a moment suppose
that the rooms (the new ones I mean) were to be hung with tapestry or a
very rich and costly paper, neither of which would suit my present
furniture; that costly ornaments for the bow windows, extravagant
chimney-pieces, and the like were to be provided; that workmen, from
extravagance of the times for every twenty shillings' worth of work
would charge forty shillings, and that advantage should be taken of the
occasion to new paint every part of the house and buildings, would
there be any propriety in adding ten or twelve and a half per cent. for
all this to the rent of the house in its original state for the two
years that I am to hold it? If the solution of these questions is in
the negative, wherein lies the difficulty of determining that the
houses and lots, when finished according to the proposed plan, ought to
rent for so much? When all is done that can be done, the residence will
not be so commodious as the house I left in New York, for there (and
the want of it will be found a real inconvenience at Mr. Morris') my
office was in a front room below, where persons on business were at
once admitted, whereas now they will have to ascend two pair of stairs
and to pass by the public rooms to go to it. Notwithstanding which I am
willing to allow as much as was paid to Mr. Macomb, and shall say
nothing if more is demanded, unless there is apparent extortion or the
policy of delay is to see to what height rents will rise before mine is
fixed. In either of these cases I should not be pleased, and to occupy
the premises at the expense of any public body I will not.

"I had rather have heard that my repaired coach was plain and elegant
than rich and elegant."

The rent of Mr. Morris' house was finally settled at $3,000 a year, and
at this rate it was occupied by Washington till the expiration of his
second term as President and his final retirement to Mount Vernon.

Our readers will excuse us for dwelling a little longer on the domestic
arrangements of Washington, as disclosed in his letters to Mr. Lear.
These details are not only curious and entertaining, as showing the
style of living half a century ago, but as exhibiting the modest and
economical style in which Washington chose to live; and they refute the
calumnies of his political enemies, who, a little later, charged him
with anti-republican state and splendor in his style of living. One of
his letters to Mr. Lear relates to the servants. "The pressure of
business," he writes, "under which I labored for several days before I
left New York, allowed me no time to inquire who of the female servants
it was proposed or thought advisable to remove here, besides the wives
of the footmen, James and Fidas. With respect to Mr. Hyde and his wife,
if it is not stated on some paper handed in by Mr. Hyde, it is
nevertheless strong on my recollection that his wife's services were
put down at $100 and his own at $200 per annum. I have no wish to part
with Mr. or Mrs. Hyde; first, because I do not like to be changing,
and, second, because I do not know where or with whom to supply their
places. On the score of accounts I can say nothing, having never taken
a comparative view of his and Fraunces', but I am exceedingly mistaken
if the expenses of the second table, at which Mr. Hyde presides, have
not greatly exceeded those of the tables kept by Fraunces, for I
strongly suspect (but in this I may be mistaken) that nothing is
brought to my table of liquors, fruits, or other luxuries that is not
used as profusely at his. If my suspicions are unfounded I shall be
sorry to have entertained them, and if they are not, it is at least
questionable whether under his successor the same things might not be
done; in which case (if Hyde is honest and careful, of which you are
better able to judge than I am), a change without benefit might take
place, which is not desirable if they are to be retained on proper
terms. I say they, for if Mrs. Hyde is necessary for the purposes
enumerated in your letter, and the cook is not competent to prepare the
dessert, make cake, etc., I do not see of what use Hyde will be, more
than William, without her. Fraunces, besides being an excellent cook,
knowing how to provide genteel dinners, and giving aid in dressing
them, prepared the dessert, made the cake, and did everything that is
done by Hyde and his wife together; consequently the services of Hyde
alone are not to be compared with those of Fraunces; and if his
accounts exceed those of Fraunces, in the same seasons--4 or 5 a
week--and at the same time appear fair, I shall have no scruple to
acknowledge that I have entertained much harder thoughts of him than I
ought to have done, although it is unaccountable to me how other
families, on $2,500 or $3,000 a year, should be enabled to entertain
more company or at least entertain more frequently than I could do for
$25,000."

Respecting the furniture, Washington writes: "Mr. and Mrs. Morris have
insisted upon leaving the two large looking-glasses which are in their
best rooms, because they have no place, they say, proper to remove them
to, and because they are unwilling to hazard the taking of them down.
You will, therefore, let them have, instead, the choice of mine; the
large ones I purchased of the French minister they do not incline to
take, but will be glad of some of the others. They will also leave a
large glass lamp in the entry or hall, and will take one or more of my
glass lamps in lieu of it. Mrs. Morris has a mangle (I think it is
called) for ironing clothes, which, as it is fixed in the place where
it is commonly used, she proposes to leave and take mine. To this I
have no objection, provided mine is equally good and convenient; but if
I should obtain any advantages, besides that of its being up and ready
for use, I am not inclined to receive it.

"I have no particular direction to give respecting the appropriation of
the furniture. By means of the bow-windows the back rooms will become
the largest, and, of course, will receive the furniture of the largest
dining and drawing-rooms; and in that case, though there are no closets
in them, there are some in the steward's room, directly opposite, which
are not inconvenient. There is a small room adjoining the kitchen that
might, if it is not essential for other purposes, be appropriated for
the Sevres china and other things of that sort, which are not in common
use.

"Mrs. Morris, who is a notable lady in family arrangements, can give
you much information on all the conveniences about the house and
buildings, and I dare say would rather consider it as a compliment to
be consulted in these matters, as she is so near, than a trouble to
give her opinion of them.

"I approve, at least till inconvenience or danger shall appear, of the
large table ornaments remaining on the sideboard, and of the pagodas
standing in the smallest drawing-room. Had I delivered my sentiment
from here, respecting this fixture, that is the apartment I should have
named for it. Whether the green, which you have, or a new yellow
curtain, should be appropriated to the staircase above the hall may
depend on your getting an exact match in color and so forth of the
latter. For the sake of appearances one would not, in instances of this
kind, regard a small additional expense."

In these letters, written to Mr. Lear during Washington's residence at
Mount Vernon, in the autumn of 1790, he frequently refers to the
children under Mrs. Washington's care, who composed a part of the
family. In a letter, dated October 3d, he requests Mr. Lear to make
inquiries respecting the schools in Philadelphia, with a view to
placing Washington Custis, Mrs. Washington's grandson, at the best. If
the college is under good regulations, he inquires if it would not be
better to put him there at once. Again, in a letter dated October 10th,
after speaking of the proper care and instruction of his niece, Miss
Harriet Washington, when he should be established in Philadelphia, he
refers again to Washington Custis' education, whom he had adopted as a
son, and in whom he appears to have taken great interest. [3] He also
wishes inquiry to be made as to the higher branches taught at the
college, with a view to placing his nephews, George and Lawrence
Washington, at that institution in Philadelphia. Having studied the
languages, they are engaged, he adds, under Mr. Harrow, in Alexandria,
in learning mathematics and French. In a letter dated November 7, 1790,
Washington expresses renewed anxiety respecting the education of his
adopted son, Washington Custis, who appears to have been about eight
years old at this time, and discusses the question of placing him at
the college, if his age will admit of it.

On the 17th of November (1790), Washington, writing from Mount Vernon
to Mr. Lear at Philadelphia, mentions that he is just setting out for
Alexandria to a public dinner given to him by the citizens of that
place. In his letter of November 23d, he dates from a tavern on the
road, about twelve miles from Baltimore. He was then on his journey
from Mount Vernon to Philadelphia in his own traveling carriage with
Mrs. Washington, the children, and the servants in attendance on the
children, accompanying them in a stage-coach hired for their
accommodation.

The party arrived in Philadelphia on Saturday, the 28th of November
(1790), and immediately took possession of the house which had been
hired for the accommodation of the President and his family. The
members of Congress and other public functionaries were mostly at their
posts, and a crowd of strangers were resorting to the city, in
expectation of the gay and brilliant pleasures and society which are
usual in the metropolis in the winter season.

In the President's family, "the rules for receiving visitors and
entertaining company," says Dr. Griswold, [4] "continued to be very
nearly the same as in New York. Respectable citizens and strangers,
properly introduced, were seen by the President every other Tuesday,
between the hours of 3 and 4 in the afternoon. The receptions were in
the dining-room, on the first floor, in the back part of the house. At
3 o'clock, all the chairs having been removed, the door was opened, and
the President, usually surrounded by members of his cabinet, or other
distinguished men, was seen by the approaching visitor standing before
the fireplace, his hair powdered and gathered behind in a silk bag,
coat and breeches of plain black velvet, white or pearl-colored vest,
yellow gloves, a cocked hat in his hand, silver knee and shoe-buckles,
and a long sword, with a finely-wrought and glittering steel hilt, the
coat worn over it, and its scabbard of polished white leather. On these
occasions he never shook hands, even with his most intimate friends.
The name of everyone was distinctly announced, and he rarely forgot
that of a person who had been once introduced to him. The visitor was
received with a dignified bow and passed on to another part of the
room. At a quarter past 3 the door was closed, the gentlemen present
moved into a circle, and he proceeded, beginning at his right hand, to
exchange a few words with each. When the circuit was completed he
resumed his first position and the visitors approached him in
succession, bowed, and retired.

"At the levees of Mrs. Washington he did not consider any visits made
to himself, and he appeared as a private gentleman, with neither hat
nor sword, conversing without restraint, generally with women, who
rarely had other opportunities of meeting him."

Congress assembled for its third session on the 6th of December, 1790,
the day which had been appointed by adjournment. But the members had
not yet learned to be punctual in their attendance, and it was not till
the 8th that a sufficient number took their seats to authorize their
entering upon the business of the session. Among the members we
recognize some celebrated names. From Massachusetts were Elbridge
Gerry, afterward Vice-President of the United States, and Fisher Ames,
one of the most illustrious of American orators; from Connecticut, the
veteran statesman, Roger Sherman; from New Jersey, the philanthropist,
Elias Boudinot; from Pennsylvania, Peter and Frederick Augustus
Muhlenberg and George Clymer; from Virginia, James Madison; from North
Carolina, Hugh Williamson, and from Georgia, Gen. James Jackson. This
is but a portion of the strong array of historical names which adorned
the First Congress of the United States under the constitution.

In his speech delivered to Congress at the commencement of their third
session, Washington expressed much satisfaction at the favorable
prospect of public affairs, and particularly noticed the progress of
public credit and the productiveness of the revenue.

Adverting to foreign nations, he said: "The disturbed situation of
Europe, and particularly the critical posture of the great maritime
powers, whilst it ought to make us more thankful for the general peace
and security enjoyed by the United States, reminds us at the same time
of the circumspection with which it becomes us to preserve these
blessings. It requires, also, that we should not overlook the tendency
of a war, and even of preparations for war, among the nations most
concerned in active commerce with this country, to abridge the means
and thereby, at least, to enhance the price of transporting its
valuable productions to their proper market." To the serious reflection
of Congress was recommended the prevention of embarrassments from these
contingencies, by such encouragement to American navigation as would
render the commerce and agriculture of the United States less dependent
on foreign bottoms.

After expressing to the House of Representatives his confidence arising
from the sufficiency of the revenues already established, for the
objects to which they were appropriated, he added: "Allow me moreover
to hope that it will be a favorite policy with you not merely to secure
a payment of the interest of the debt funded, but, as far and as fast
as the growing resources of the country will permit, to exonerate it of
the principal itself." Many subjects relative to the interior
government were succinctly and briefly mentioned, and the speech
concluded with the following impressive and admonitory sentiment: "In
pursuing the various and weighty business of the present session, I
indulge the fullest persuasion that your consultations will be marked
with wisdom and animated by the love of country. In whatever belongs to
my duty you shall have all the cooperation which an undiminished zeal
for its welfare can inspire. It will be happy for us both, and our best
reward, if, by a successful administration of our respective trusts, we
can make the established government more and more instrumental in
promoting the good of our fellow-citizens, and more and more the object
of their attachment and confidence."

The addresses of the two Houses, in answer to the speech, proved that
the harmony between the executive and legislative departments, with
which the government had gone into operation, had sustained no
essential interruption. But in the short debate which took place on the
occasion in the House of Representatives a direct disapprobation of one
of the measures of the executive government was, for the first time,
openly expressed.

In the treaty lately concluded with the Creek Indians, an extensive
territory claimed by Georgia, under treaties, the validity of which was
contested by the chiefs, had been entirely, or in great part,
relinquished. This relinquishment excited serious discontents in that
State and was censured by General Jackson, with considerable warmth, as
an unjustifiable abandonment of the rights and interests of Georgia. No
specific motion, however, was made, and the subject was permitted to
pass away for the present.

Scarcely were the debates on the address concluded when several
interesting reports were received from Hamilton, the Secretary of the
Treasury, suggesting such further measures as were deemed necessary for
the establishment of public credit.

It will be recollected that, in his original report on this subject,
the secretary had recommended the assumption of the State debts and had
proposed to enable the treasury to meet the increased demand upon it,
which this measure would occasion, by an augmentation of the duties on
imported wines, spirits, tea, and coffee and by imposing duties on
spirits distilled within the country. The assumption not having been
adopted until late in the session, the discussion on the revenue which
would be required for this portion of the public debt did not commence
until the House had become impatient for an adjournment. As much
contrariety of opinion was disclosed, and the subject was not of
immediate importance, it was deferred to the ensuing session, and an
order was made requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to prepare and
report such further provision as might, in his opinion, be necessary
for establishing the public credit. In obedience to this order, several
reports had been prepared, the first of which repeated the
recommendation of an additional impost on foreign distilled spirits and
of a duty on spirits distilled within the United States. The estimated
revenue from these sources was $877,500, affording a small excess over
the sum which would be required to pay the interest on the assumed
debt. The policy of the measure was discussed in a well-digested and
able argument, detailing many motives, in addition to those assigned in
his original report, for preferring the system now recommended to
accumulated burdens on commerce or to a direct tax on lands.

A new tax is the certain rallying point for all those who are
unfriendly to the administration or to the minister by whom it is
proposed. But that recommended by the secretary contained intrinsic
causes of objection which would necessarily add to the number of its
enemies. All that powerful party in the United States which attached
itself to the local rather than to the general government, would
inevitably contemplate any system of internal revenue with jealous
disapprobation. They considered the imposition of a tax by Congress on
any domestic manufacture as the intrusion of a foreign power into their
particular concerns, which excited serious apprehensions for State
importance and for liberty. In the real or supposed interests of many
individuals was also found a distinct motive for hostility to the
measure. A large portion of the American population, especially that
which had spread itself over the extensive regions of the West,
consuming imported articles to a very inconsiderable amount, was not
much affected by the impost on foreign merchandise. But the duty on
spirits distilled within the United States reached them, and
consequently rendered them hostile to the tax.

A bill which was introduced in pursuance of the report (1791) was
opposed with great vehemence by a majority of the southern and western
members. By some of them it was insisted that no sufficient testimony
had yet been exhibited that the taxes already imposed would not be
equal to the exigencies of the public. But, admitting the propriety of
additional burdens on the people, it was contended that other sources
of revenue less exceptionable and less odious than this might be
pointed out. The duty was branded with the hateful epithet of an
excise, a species of taxation, it was said, so peculiarly oppressive as
to be abhorred even in England, and which was totally incompatible with
the spirit of liberty. The facility with which it might be extended to
other objects was urged against its admission into the American system,
and declarations made against it by the Congress of 1775 were quoted in
confirmation of the justice with which inherent vices were ascribed to
this mode of collecting taxes. So great was the hostility manifested
against it in some of the States that the revenue officers might be
endangered from the fury of the people, and in all it would increase a
ferment which had been already extensively manifested.

When required to produce a system in lieu of that which they objected
to, the opponents of the bill alternately mentioned an increased duty
on imported articles generally, a particular duty on molasses, a direct
tax, a tax on salaries, pensions, and lawyers, a duty on newspapers,
and a stamp act. The friends of the bill contended that the reasons for
believing the existing revenue would be insufficient to meet the
engagements of the United States were as satisfactory as the nature of
the case would admit or as ought to be required. The estimates were
founded on the best data which were attainable, and the funds already
provided had been calculated by the proper officer to pay the interest
on that part of the debt only for which they were pledged. Those
estimates were referred to as documents from which it would be unsafe
to depart. They were also in possession of official statements showing
the productiveness of the taxes from the time the revenue bill had been
in operation, and arguments were drawn from these demonstrating the
danger to which the infant credit of the United States would be exposed
by relying on the existing funds for the interest on the assumed debt.
It was not probable that the proposed duties would yield a sum much
exceeding that which would be necessary, but should they fortunately do
so, the surplus revenue might be advantageously employed in
extinguishing a part of the principal. They were not, they said, of
opinion that a public debt was a public blessing, or that it ought to
be perpetuated. An augmentation of the revenue being indispensable to
the solidity of the public credit, a more eligible system than that
proposed in the bill could not, it was believed, be devised. Still
further to burden commerce would be a hazardous experiment, which might
afford no real supplies to the treasury. Until some lights should be
derived from experience, it behooved the Legislature to be cautious not
to lay such impositions upon trade as might probably introduce a spirit
of smuggling, which, with a nominal increase, would occasion a real
diminution of revenue. In the opinion of the best judges, the impost on
the mass of foreign merchandise could not safely be carried further for
the present. The extent of the mercantile capital of the United States
would not justify the attempt. Forcible arguments were also drawn from
the policy and the justice of multiplying the subjects of taxation and
diversifying them by a union of internal with external objects.

Neither would a direct tax be advisable. The experience of the world
had proved that a tax on consumption was less oppressive and more
productive than a tax on either property or income. Without discussing
the principles on which the fact was founded, the fact itself was
incontestable that, by insensible means, much larger sums might be
drawn from any class of men than could be extracted from them by open
and direct taxes.

Against the substitution of a duty on internal negotiations, it was
said that revenue to any considerable extent could be collected from
them only by means of a stamp act, which was not less obnoxious to
popular resentment than an excise, would be less certainly productive
than the proposed duties, and was, in every respect, less eligible.

The honor, the justice, and the faith of the United States were
pledged, it was said, to that class of creditors for whose claims the
bill under consideration was intended to provide. No means of making
the provision had been suggested, which, on examination, would be found
equally eligible with a duty on ardent spirits. Much of the public
prejudice which appeared in certain parts of the United States against
the measure was to be ascribed to their hostility to the term "excise,"
a term which had been inaccurately applied to the duty in question.
When the law should be carried into operation, it would be found not to
possess those odious qualities which had excited resentment against a
system of excise. In those States where the collection of a duty on
spirits distilled within the country had become familiar to the people,
the same prejudices did not exist. On the good sense and virtue of the
nation they could confidently rely for acquiescence in a measure which
the public exigencies rendered necessary, which tended to equalize the
public burdens and which, in its execution, would not be oppressive.

A motion made by General Jackson to strike out that section which
imposed a duty on domestic distilled spirits was negatived by 36 to 16,
and the bill was carried by 35 to 21. Some days after the passage of
this bill another question was brought forward which was understood to
involve principles of deep interest to the government.

Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury, had been the uniform advocate
of a national bank. Believing that such an institution would be "of
primary importance to the prosperous administration of the finances and
of the greatest utility in the operations connected with the support of
public credit," he had earnestly recommended its adoption in the first
general system which he presented to the view of Congress, and, at the
present session, had repeated that recommendation in a special report,
containing a copious and perspicuous argument on the policy of the
measure. A bill conforming to the plan he suggested was sent down from
the Senate and was permitted to proceed, unmolested, in the House of
Representatives, to the third reading. On the final question a great,
and, it would seem, an unexpected opposition was made to its passage.
Mr. Madison, Mr. Giles, General Jackson, and Mr. Stone spoke against
it. The general utility of banking systems was not admitted, and the
particular bill before the House was censured on its merits; but the
great strength of the argument was directed against the constitutional
authority of Congress to pass an act for incorporating a national bank.

The government of the United States, it was said, was limited, and the
powers which it might legitimately exercise were enumerated in the
constitution itself. In this enumeration the power now contended for
was not to be found. Not being expressly given it must be implied from
those which were given or it could not be vested in the government. The
clauses under which it could be claimed were then reviewed and
critically examined, and it was contended that, on fair construction,
no one of these could be understood to imply so important a power as
that of creating a corporation.

The clause which enables Congress to pass all laws necessary and proper
to execute the specified powers must, according to the natural and
obvious force of the terms and the context, be limited to means
necessary to the end and incident to the nature of the specified
powers. The clause, it was said, was in fact merely declaratory of what
would have resulted by unavoidable implication, as the appropriate, and
as it were technical, means of executing those powers. Some members
observed that "the true exposition of a necessary mean to produce a
given end was that mean without which the end could not be produced."

The bill was supported by Mr. Ames, Mr. Sedgwick, Mr. Smith, of South
Carolina, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Boudinot, Mr. Gerry, and Mr. Vining.

The utility of banking institutions was said to be demonstrated by
their effects. In all commercial countries they had been resorted to as
an instrument of great efficacy in mercantile transactions; and even in
the United States their public and private advantages had been felt and
acknowledged.

Respecting the policy of the measure no well-founded doubt could be
entertained, but the objections to the constitutional authority of
Congress deserved to be seriously considered.

That the government was limited by the terms of its creation was not
controverted; and that it could exercise only those powers which were
conferred on it by the constitution was admitted. If, on examination,
that instrument should be found to forbid the passage of the bill, it
must be rejected, though it would be with deep regret that its friends
would suffer such an opportunity of serving their country to escape for
the want of a constitutional power to improve it.

In asserting the authority of the Legislature to pass the bill it was
contended that incidental as well as express powers must necessarily
belong to every government, and that, when a power is delegated to
effect particular objects, all the known and usual means of effecting
them must pass as incidental to it. To remove all doubts on this
subject, the constitution of the United States had recognized the
principle by enabling Congress to make all laws which may be necessary
and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested in the
government. They maintained the sound construction of this grant to be
a recognition of an authority in the national Legislature to employ all
the known and usual means for executing the powers vested in the
government. They then took a comprehensive view of those powers and
contended that a bank was a known and usual instrument by which several
of them were exercised.

After a debate of great length, which was supported on both sides with
ability and with that ardor which was naturally excited by the
importance attached by each party to the principle in contest, the
question was put and the bill was carried in the affirmative by a
majority of nineteen votes.

The point which had been agitated with so much zeal in the House of
Representatives was examined with equal deliberation by the executive.
The cabinet was divided upon it. Jefferson, the Secretary of State, and
Randolph, the Attorney-General, conceived that Congress had clearly
transcended their constitutional powers, while Hamilton, the Secretary
of the Treasury, with equal clearness, maintained the opposite opinion.
The advice of each minister, with his reasoning in support of it, was
required in writing, and their arguments were considered by the
President with all that attention which the magnitude of the question
and the interest taken in it by the opposing parties so eminently
required. This deliberate investigation of the subject terminated in a
conviction that the constitution of the United States authorized the
measure, and the sanction of the Executive was given to the act. [5]

In February, 1791, Vermont, having, in convention, adopted the
constitution of the United States, was admitted to the Union. The
result of the census of the United States, which had been ordered in
1790, was a total of 3,929,827 souls, of whom 697,897 were slaves.

Besides the establishment of the Bank of the United States and the
passage of the excise law, Congress resolved upon having a mint for the
national coinage; it authorized an increase of the army and the raising
a military force to resist the Indians, and provided for the
maintenance of these additional troops; it also appropriated above
$1,200,000 to various branches of the public service, making the
expenses of the year $4,000,000, part of which had to be met by loans,
since the surplus of the former year had been applied to the paying off
part of the national debt, as a former act of Congress had directed. We
may mention, in this connection, that the exports of the year were
computed to amount to some $19,000,000 and the imports to about
$20,000,000.

Among the last acts of the present Congress, as already mentioned, was
an act to augment the military establishment of the United States.

The earnest endeavors of Washington to give security to the
northwestern frontiers, by pacific arrangements, having been entirely
unavailing, it became his duty to employ such other means as were
placed in his hands for the protection of the country. Confirmed by all
his experience in the opinion that vigorous offensive operations alone
could bring an Indian war to a happy conclusion, he had planned an
expedition against the hostile tribes northwest of the Ohio as soon as
the impracticability of effecting a treaty with them had been
ascertained.

General Harmar, a veteran of the Revolution, who had received his
appointment under the former government, was placed at the head of the
Federal troops. On the 30th of September (1790) he marched from Fort
Washington with 320 regulars. The whole army, when joined by the
militia of Pennsylvania and Kentucky, amounted to 1,453 men. About the
middle of October Colonel Harden, who commanded the Kentucky militia,
and who had been also a continental officer of considerable merit, was
detached at the head of 600 men, chiefly militia, to reconnoiter the
ground and to ascertain the intentions of the enemy. On his approach
the Indians set fire to their principal village and fled with
precipitation to the wood. As the object of the expedition would be
only half accomplished unless the savages could be brought to action
and defeated, Colonel Harden was again detached at the head of 210 men,
30 of whom were regulars. About ten miles west of Chilicothe, where the
main body of the army lay, he was attacked by a party of Indians. The
Pennsylvanians, who composed his left column, had previously fallen in
the rear, and the Kentuckians, disregarding the exertions of their
colonel and of a few other officers, fled on the first appearance of
the enemy. The small corps of regulars, commanded by Lieutenant
Armstrong, made a brave resistance. After twenty-three of them had
fallen in the field the surviving seven made their escape and rejoined
the army.

Notwithstanding this check the remaining towns on the Scioto were
reduced to ashes, and the provisions laid up for the winter were
entirely destroyed. This service being accomplished the army commenced
its march toward Fort Washington. Being desirous of wiping off the
disgrace which his arms had sustained, General Harmar halted about
eight miles from Chilicothe and once more detached Colonel Harden with
orders to find the enemy and bring on an engagement. His command
consisted of 360 men, of whom 60 were regulars, commanded by Major
Wyllys. Early the next morning this detachment reached the confluence
of the St. Joseph and St. Mary, where it was divided into three
columns. The left division, commanded by Colonel Harden in person,
crossed the St. Joseph and proceeded up its western bank. The center,
consisting of the Federal troops, was led by Major Wyllys up the
eastern side of that river, and the right, under the command of Major
M'Millan, marched along a range of heights which commanded the right
flank of the center division. The columns had proceeded but a short
distance when each was met by a considerable body of Indians, and a
severe engagement ensued. The militia retrieved their reputation, and
several of their bravest officers fell. The heights on the right having
been, from some cause not mentioned, unoccupied by the American troops,
the savages seized them early in the action, and attacked the right
flank of the center with great fury. Although Major Wyllys was among
the first who fell the battle was maintained by the regulars with
spirit, and considerable execution was done on both sides. At length
the scanty remnant of this small band, quite overpowered by numbers,
was driven off the ground, leaving fifty of their comrades, exclusive
of Major Wyllys and Lieutenant Farthingham, dead upon the field. The
loss sustained by the militia was also considerable. It amounted to
upwards of 100 men, among whom were nine officers. After an engagement
of extreme severity the detachment joined the main army, which
continued its march to Fort Washington.

General Harmar, with what propriety it is not easy to discern, claimed
the victory. He conceived, not entirely without reason, that the loss
of a considerable number of men would be fatal to the Indians, although
a still greater loss should be sustained by the Americans, because the
savages did not possess a population from which they could replace the
warriors who had fallen. The event, however, did not justify this
opinion.

The information respecting this expedition was quickly followed by
intelligence stating the deplorable condition of the frontiers. An
address from the representatives of all the counties of Virginia, and
those of Virginia bordering on the Ohio, was presented to the
President, praying that the defense of the country might be committed
to militia unmixed with regulars, and that they might immediately be
drawn out to oppose "the exulting foe." To this address the President
gave a conciliatory answer, but he understood too well the nature of
the service to yield to the request it contained. Such were his
communications to the Legislature that a regiment was added to the
permanent military establishment, and he was authorized to raise a body
of 2,000 men for six months, and to appoint a major-general, and a
brigadier-general, to continue in command so long as he should think
their services necessary.

With the 3d of March, 1791, terminated the first Congress elected under
the constitution of the United States. "The party denominated Federal,"
says Marshall, "having prevailed at the elections, a majority of the
members were steadfast friends of the Constitution, and were sincerely
desirous of supporting a system they had themselves introduced, and on
the preservation of which, in full health and vigor, they firmly
believed the happiness of their fellow-citizens, and the respectability
of the nation, greatly to depend. To organize a government, to retrieve
the national character, to establish a system of revenue, and to create
public credit, were among the arduous duties which were imposed upon
them by the political situation of their country. With persevering
labor, guided by no inconsiderable portion of virtue and intelligence,
these objects were, in a great degree, accomplished. Out of the
measures proposed for their attainment, questions alike intricate and
interesting unavoidably arose. It is not in the nature of man to
discuss such questions without strongly agitating the passions, and
exciting irritations which do not readily subside.

"Had it ever been the happy and singular lot of America to see its
national Legislature assemble uninfluenced by those prejudices which
grew out of the previous divisions of the country, the many delicate
points which they were under the necessity of deciding, could not have
failed to disturb this enviable state of harmony, and to mingle some
share of party spirit with their deliberations. But when the actual
state of the public mind was contemplated, and due weight was given to
the important consideration that at no very distant day a successor to
the present chief magistrate must be elected, it was still less to be
hoped that the first Congress could pass away without producing strong
and permanent dispositions in parties, to impute to each other designs
unfriendly to the public happiness. As yet, however, these imputations
did not extend to the President. His character was held sacred, and the
purity of his motives was admitted by all. Some divisions were
understood to have found their way into the cabinet. It was insinuated
that between the Secretaries of State and of the Treasury very serious
differences had arisen, but these high personages were believed to be
equally attached to the President, who was not suspected of undue
partiality to either. If his assent to the bill for incorporating the
national bank produced discontent, the opponents of that measure seemed
disposed to ascribe his conduct, in that instance, to his judgment,
rather than to any prepossession in favor of the party by whom it was
carried. The opposition, therefore, in Congress, to the measures of the
government, seemed to be levelled at the Secretary of the Treasury, and
at the northern members by whom those measures were generally
supported, not at the President by whom they were approved. By taking
this direction it made its way into the public mind, without being
encountered by that devoted affection which a great majority of the
people felt for the chief magistrate of the Union. In the meantime, the
national prosperity was in a state of rapid progress; and the
government was gaining, though slowly, in the public opinion. But in
several of the State assemblies, especially in the southern division of
the continent, serious evidences of dissatisfaction were exhibited,
which demonstrated the jealousy with which the local sovereignties
contemplated the powers exercised by the Federal Legislature."

A recent writer, speaking of the discussions in the cabinet respecting
the bill establishing a national bank, says:

"Jefferson and Randolph were of opinion that Congress, in passing the
bill, transcended the powers vested in them by the constitution.
Hamilton, on the other hand, maintained it to be purely constitutional.

"It was not an easy task to unite two men of such opposite natures as
Hamilton and Jefferson, and make them act in concert in the same
cabinet. The critical state of affairs at the first adoption of the
constitution, and the impartial preponderance of Washington alone could
accomplish it. He applied himself to it with consummate perseverance
and wisdom. At heart he felt a decided preference for Hamilton and his
views. 'By some,' said he, 'he is considered an ambitious man and
therefore a dangerous one. That he is ambitious I readily grant, but
his ambition is of that laudable kind which prompts a man to excel in
whatever he takes in hand. He is enterprising, quick in his
perceptions, and in his judgment intuitively great.'

"But it was only in 1798, in the freedom of retirement, that Washington
spoke so explicitly. While in office, and between his two secretaries,
he maintained toward them a strict reserve, and testified the same
confidence in both. He believed both of them to be sincere and able;
both of them necessary to the country and to himself. Jefferson was to
him, not only a connecting tie, a means of influence with the popular
party which rarely became the opposition; but he made use of him in the
internal administration of his government as a counterpoise to the
tendencies, and especially to the language, sometimes extravagant and
inconsiderate, of Hamilton and his friends. He had interviews and
consultations with each of them separately, upon the subjects which
they were to discuss together, in order to remove or lessen beforehand
their differences of opinion. He knew how to turn the merit and
popularity of each, with his own party, to the general good of the
government, even to their own mutual advantage. He skilfully availed
himself of every opportunity to employ them in a common responsibility.
And when a disagreement too wide, and passions too impetuous, seemed to
threaten an immediate rupture, he interposed, used exhortation and
entreaty, and by his personal influence, by a frank and touching appeal
to the patriotism and right-mindedness of the two rivals, he postponed
the breaking forth of the evil which it was not possible to eradicate.
On the bank question he required from each his arguments in writing,
and after maturely weighing them both, he gave the sanction of his
signature to the act passed by Congress for its incorporation. From the
moment of the incorporation of the Bank of the United States parties
assumed the almost perfect forms of organization and principles by
which they are marked in our own day. The arguments and imputations of
the Republican party, however, were not so much intended to apply to
Washington and his measures as to Hamilton, who was considered and
acknowledged by all as the head of the Federal party. This fact was
sufficiently proved when Washington, at the close of the session of
Congress, made an excursion into the southern States. His reception by
men of all parties was ample testimony of the fact that he united all
hearts, and that, however the measures or the constitution of
government might be censured and disapproved, none would refuse to pour
the grateful homage of free hearts into the bosom of their veteran
chief." Of this excursion we shall give an account in the next chapter.


1. Footnote: This house was in Market street, on the south side, near
Sixth street. The market-house buildings then reached only to Fourth
street; the town in this street extended westward scarcely so far as
Ninth street; good private dwellings were seen above Fifth street; Mr.
Morris' was perhaps the best; the garden was well enclosed by a
wall.--(Richard Rush, "Washington in Domestic Life," from Original
Letters and Manuscripts. Philadelphia, 1857.)

2. Footnote: Mr. Hyde was butler.

3. Footnote: Mr. Curtis was the writer of the "Reminiscences" we have
so frequently quoted. He died on the 10th of October, 1857, aged
seventy-six years.

4. Footnote: Republican Court.

5. Footnote: Marshall.




CHAPTER V.


POLITICAL PARTIES DEVELOPED. 1791-1792.


Washington, having received from Congress more ample means for the
protection of the frontiers against the Indians, now directed his
attention (March, 1791) to an expedition which should carry the war
into their own country; this, as we have already seen, being his
favorite method of dealing with Indian hostilities. He accordingly
appointed Maj.-Gen. Arthur St. Clair, governor of the territory
northwest of the Ohio, commander-in-chief of the forces to be employed
in the meditated expedition. This officer had served through the war of
the Revolution with reputation, though it had never been his fortune to
distinguish himself. The evacuation of Ticonderoga had indeed, at one
time, subjected him to much public censure, but it was found, upon
inquiry, to be unmerited. Other motives, in addition to the persuasion
of his fitness for the service, induced Washington to appoint him. With
the sword, the olive branch was still to be tendered, and it was
thought advisable to place them in the same hands. The governor, having
been made officially the negotiator with the tribes inhabiting the
territories over which he presided, being a military man acquainted
with the country into which the war was to be carried, possessing
considerable influence with the inhabitants of the frontiers, and being
so placed as to superintend the preparations for the expedition
advantageously, seemed to have claims to the station which were not to
be overlooked. It was also a consideration of some importance that the
high rank he had held in the American army would obviate those
difficulties in filling the inferior grades with men of experience,
which might certainly be expected should a person who had acted in a
less elevated station be selected for the chief command.

After making the necessary arrangements for recruiting the army
Washington prepared to make his long contemplated tour through the
southern States.

On the 19th of March (1791), in writing to Lafayette, he says: "The
tender concern which you express on my late illness awakens emotions
which words will not explain, and to which your own sensibility can
best do justice. My health is now quite restored, and I flatter myself
with a hope of a long exemption from sickness. On Monday next I shall
enter on the practice of your friendly prescription of exercise,
intending, at that time, to begin a journey to the southward, during
which I propose visiting all the southern States."

This tour he performed in his own carriage, drawn by six horses, which
were not changed during the journey, which occupied nearly three
months. He was accompanied by one of his private secretaries, Major
Jackson. Leaving his residence in Market street, Philadelphia, he set
off in the latter part of March, and was escorted into Delaware by Mr.
Jefferson and General Knox. On the 25th of March he arrived at
Annapolis, where he was met by the people in a body, entertained at
public dinners and a ball, and, after staying two days, was accompanied
on his journey by the governor of Maryland, as far as Georgetown. From
this place, on the 29th of March, he writes to Gov. Charles Pinckney,
of South Carolina: "I had the pleasure of receiving your Excellency's
obliging letter of the 8th instant last evening. I am thus far on my
tour through the southern States, but as I travel with only one set of
horses, and must make occasional halts, the progress of my journey is
exposed to such uncertainty as admits not of fixing a day for my
arrival at Charleston. While I express the grateful sense which I
entertain of your Excellency's polite offer to accommodate me at your
house during my stay in Charleston, your goodness will permit me to
deny myself that pleasure. Having, with a view to avoid giving
inconvenience to private families, early prescribed to myself the rule
of declining all invitations to quarters on my journeys, I have been
repeatedly under a similar necessity to the present, of refusing those
offers of hospitality which would, otherwise, have been both pleasing
and acceptable."

From Georgetown he proceeded to Mount Vernon, where the necessary
attention to his private affairs, and some important correspondence on
public business, detained him a week. Leaving Mount Vernon, and passing
through Fredericksburg, where he dined with some of his old personal
friends, he arrived at Richmond on the 11nth of April (1791). His
reception there was enthusiastic. He entered the city amidst the roar
of cannon and the acclamations of the crowds of people who lined the
streets through which he passed. In the evening there was a grand
illumination; and during the two days which he remained there, the city
was given up to festivities in honor of the favorite hero of Virginia.
Similar tokens of welcome were exhibited at Petersburg, Halifax,
Newburn, and Wilmington. On leaving the last-mentioned place he was
rowed across Cape Fear river in a splendid barge, by six masters of
vessels; and on his arrival at Charleston (May 2d) a similar token of
honor was accorded to him on a larger scale. From Hadrill's Point,
attended by a cortege of distinguished Carolinians, he was conveyed to
the city in a twelve-oared barge, manned by thirteen captains of
American ships, while other barges and floats, with bands of music and
decorations, formed an imposing nautical procession. On landing he was
received by Governor Pinckney, the civic authorities, the Cincinnati,
and a brilliant military escort, who attended him in procession, amidst
the ringing of bells, the firing of cannon, and the acclamations of the
people, first to the Exchange, where he was welcomed in a formal
address, and then to the house prepared for his reception. [1]

During the week he remained in Charleston, he received the most lively
and touching tokens of welcome and affection from the warm-hearted
Carolinians, who strove to render him every species of honor. A
corporation ball on a grand scale, a large dinner party at Governor
Pinckney's mansion, another at Maj. Pierce Butler's, a concert, and a
splendid public entertainment given by the merchants of the city,
formed a portion only of the testimonials of homage and welcome given
on this occasion to their illustrious guest.

He left Charleston on the 9th of May (1791), escorted to Ashley ferry
by the governor and a large cavalcade. "At Perrysburg," says Dr.
Griswold, "he was met the next day by a committee from Savannah, and,
with General Wayne, Major Butler, Mr. Baillie, and Major Jackson, was
conducted on board a richly decorated boat, in which the party were
rowed down the river by nine sea captains, dressed in light-blue silk
jackets, black satin breeches, white silk stockings, and round hats
with black ribbons, inscribed with 'Long live the President,' in golden
letters. Ten miles from the city they were met by other barges, from
one of which a company of gentlemen sung the popular song, 'He comes,
the hero comes!' As they drew near the harbor, every vessel and all the
shore were discovered to be thronged with people. When the President
stepped on the landing he was received by Gen. James Jackson, who
introduced him to the mayor and aldermen; and he was soon after
conducted, in the midst of a procession, through crowds of spectators,
to the house prepared for his accommodation in St. James' square. The
same evening he dined with the city authorities and a large number of
other gentlemen, at Brown's Coffee House. Cannons were fired during the
day, and at night the streets and the shipping were brilliantly
illuminated. On Friday he dined with the Cincinnati of the State of
Georgia, and attended a ball. On Saturday, accompanied by General
McIntosh, who had been second in command under General Lincoln in
storming them, he examined the remaining traces of the lines
constructed by the British for the defense of Savannah in 1779, and
dined with 200 citizens and strangers under a beautiful arbor,
supported by numerous columns and ornamented with laurel and bay
leaves, erected on an elevation which commanded a view of the town and
the harbor.

"It has been frequently said of Washington, that 'no man in the army
had a better eye for a horse,' and many of his letters show that he was
by no means indifferent as to the qualities or treatment of his stud,
during the war and afterward. A tour of 1,900 miles, with the same
animals, was a severe test of their capacities, and before reaching
Charleston he wrote to Mr. Lear, that though, all things considered,
they had got on very well, yet his horses were decidedly worsted, and
if brought back would 'not cut capers, as they did on setting out.' On
the 13th of May, he says in a letter to the same correspondent:

"'I shall leave this place to-morrow; my horses, especially the two I
bought just before I left Philadelphia, and my old white horse, are
much worn down, and I have yet 150 or 200 miles of heavy sand to pass
before I get fairly into the upper and firmer road.'

"On the way to Augusta he stopped to dine with the widow of his old
friend and companion in arms, General Greene, at her seat called
Mulberry Grove. On Wednesday, the 18th (May, 1791), Governor Telfair
and the principal officers of the State left the capital, with a
numerous train of citizens, and proceeded five miles toward Savannah to
meet him, and he was conducted to his lodgings accompanied by thousands
of people, who filled the air with joyous acclamations. That day he
dined with a large party at the Grove, the governor's private
residence, near Augusta, where Mrs. Telfair assembled the ladies of the
town to meet him at a ball in the evening; on Thursday he received and
answered an address from the people, attended a public dinner, and was
present at another ball; on Friday he visited the academy and dined
again with the governor; and on Saturday he started again on his
return, Augusta being the further point of his journey.

"Coming again into South Carolina, he was conducted to Columbia by
General Winne, Col. Wade Hampton, and a large number of other citizens,
and the next day dined with more than 200 of the principal men and
women of the town and neighboring country at the State house, and in
the evening attended a ball.

"On Wednesday, the 25th (May, 1791), he dined at Camden, and on the
following morning visited this grave of the Baron de Kalb, the places
where the British redoubts had been erected, Hobkirk Hill, where
General Greene was attacked by Lord Rawdon, and the plains where
General Gates was engaged by Lord Cornwallis in 1780. Passing through
Charlotte, Salisbury, Salem, Guilford, and other towns, in all of which
the love and reverence of the people were exhibited in every variety of
manner which taste and ingenuity could suggest, he arrived at Mount
Vernon on the 12th of June.

"He remained at his seat between three and four weeks, during which he
was occupied with his private affairs, and, with Major L'Enfant and
others, with the location of the new seat of government, on the banks
of the Potomac. On Thursday, the last day of June (1791), he started
for Philadelphia by way of Frederick, York, and Lancaster, and arrived
at the presidential residence about noon on the 6th of July, having
been absent nearly three months, and during that period performed a
journey of 1,887 miles." [2]

Washington was highly pleased with the result of his observations
during this tour. In a letter to Hamilton (June 13th), from Mount
Vernon on his return, we have occasion to notice the benefit he derived
from his habits of method and forethought in any undertaking which he
contemplated. "My return to this place," he writes, "is sooner than I
expected, owing to the uninterruptedness of my journey by sickness,
from bad weather, or accidents of any kind whatsoever. Having obtained,
before I left Philadelphia, the most accurate accounts I could get
there of the places and roads through and by which I was to perform my
tour, and the distances between the former, I formed my line of march
accordingly, fixing each day's journey and the day to halt; from
neither of which have I departed in a single instance, except staying,
from a particular circumstance, two days in Columbia, and none at
Charlotte, instead of one at each, and crossing James river at Carter's
ferry, in place of Taylor's, as was my original intention. But the
improbability of performing a tour of 1,700 miles (I have already rode
more) with the same set of horses, without encountering any accident,
by which a deviation would be rendered unavoidable, appeared so great,
that I allowed eight days for casualties, and six to refresh at this
place, when I should have returned to it. None of the former having
happened, accounts for the fourteen days I shall remain here before the
meeting of the commissioners." [3]

In relation to this tour in the southern States Marshall says: "In
passing through them he was received universally with the same marks of
affectionate attachment which he had experienced in the northern and
central parts of the Union. To the sensibilities which these
demonstrations of the regard and esteem of good men could not fail to
inspire, was added the high gratification produced by observing the
rapid improvements of the country, and the advances made by the
government in acquiring the confidence of the people." The numerous
letters written by him after his return to Philadelphia, attest the
agreeable impressions made by these causes. "In my late tour through
the southern States," said he, in a letter of the 28th of July, to Mr.
Gouverneur Morris, "I experienced great satisfaction in seeing the good
effects of the general government in that part of the Union. The people
at large have felt the security which it gives, and the equal justice
which it administers to them. The farmer, the merchant, and the
mechanic have seen their several interests attended to, and from thence
they unite in placing a confidence in their representatives, as well as
in those in whose hands the execution of the laws is placed. Industry
has there taken place of idleness, and economy of dissipation. Two or
three years of good crops, and a ready market for the produce of their
lands, have put everyone in good humor, and, in some instances, they
even impute to the government what is due only to the goodness of
Providence.

"The establishment of public credit is an immense point gained in our
national concerns. This, I believe, exceeds the expectation of the most
sanguine among us; and a late instance, unparalleled in this country,
has been given of the confidence reposed in our measures, by the
rapidity with which the subscriptions to the Bank of the United States
were filled. In two hours after the books were opened by the
commissioners the whole number of shares was taken up, and 4,000 more
applied for than were allowed by the institution. This circumstance was
not only pleasing, as it related to the confidence in government, but
also as it exhibited an unexpected proof of the resources of our
citizens."

This visit had undoubtedly some tendency to produce the good
disposition which Washington observed with so much pleasure. The
affections are, perhaps, more intimately connected with the judgment
than we are disposed to admit; and the appearance of the chief
magistrate of the Union, who was the object of general love and
reverence, could not be without its influence in conciliating the minds
of many to the government he administered, and to its measures. But
this progress toward conciliation was, perhaps, less considerable than
was indicated by appearances. The hostility to the government, which
was coeval with its existence, though diminished, was far from being
subdued; and under this smooth exterior was concealed a mass of
discontent, which, though it did not obtrude itself on the view of the
man who united almost all hearts, was active in its exertions to effect
its objects.

The difficulties which must impede the recruiting service in a country
where coercion is not employed, and where the common wages of labor
greatly exceed the pay of a soldier, protracted the completion of the
regiments to a late season of the year, but the summer was not
permitted to waste in total inaction.

The act passed at the last session for the defense of the frontiers, in
addition to its other provisions, had given to the President an
unlimited power to call mounted militia into the field. Under this
authority two expeditions had been conducted against the villages on
the Wabash, in which a few of the Indian warriors were killed, some of
their old men, women, and children were made prisoners, and several of
their towns and fields of corn were destroyed. The first was led by
General Scott, in May, and the second by General Wilkinson, in
September. These desultory incursions had not much influence on the
war.

It was believed in the United States that the hostility of the Indians
was kept up by the traders living in their villages. These persons had,
generally, resided in the United States, and, having been compelled to
leave the country, in consequence of the part they had taken during the
war of the Revolution, felt the resentments which banishment and
confiscation seldom fail to inspire. Their enmities were ascribed by
many, perhaps unjustly, to the temper of the government in Canada; but
some countenance seemed to be given to this opinion by intelligence
that, about the commencement of the preceding campaign, large supplies
of ammunition had been delivered from the British posts on the lakes to
the Indians at war with the United States. While Washington was on his
southern tour, he addressed a letter to the Secretary of State, to be
communicated to Colonel Beckwith, who still remained in Philadelphia as
the informal representative of his nation, in which he expressed his
surprise and disappointment at this interference, by the servants or
subjects of a foreign State, in a war prosecuted by the United States
for the sole purpose of procuring peace and safety for the inhabitants
of their frontiers.

On receiving this communication Colonel Beckwith expressed his
disbelief that the supplies mentioned had been delivered; but, on being
assured of the fact, he avowed the opinion that the transaction was
without the knowledge of Lord Dorchester, to whom he said he should
communicate, without delay, the ideas of the American government on the
subject.

On the 24th of October (1791) the second Congress assembled in
Philadelphia. In his speech, at the opening of the session, the
President expressed his great satisfaction at the prosperous situation
of the country, and particularly mentioned the rapidity with which the
shares in the Bank of the United States were subscribed, as "among the
striking and pleasing evidences which presented themselves, not only of
confidence in the government, but of resources in the community."

Adverting to the measures which had been taken in execution of the laws
and resolutions of the last session, "the most important of which," he
observed, "respected the defense and security of the western
frontiers," he had, he said "negotiated provisional treaties and used
other proper means to attach the wavering, and to confirm in their
friendship the well-disposed tribes of Indians. The means which he had
adopted for a pacification with those of a hostile description having
proved unsuccessful, offensive operations had been directed, some of
which had proved completely successful, and others were still
depending. Overtures of peace were still continued to the deluded
tribes, and it was sincerely to be desired that all need of coercion
might cease, and that an intimate intercourse might succeed, calculated
to advance the happiness of the Indians, and to attach them firmly to
the United States."

In marking the line of conduct which ought to be maintained for the
promotion of this object, he strongly recommended "justice to the
savages, and such rational experiments for imparting to them the
blessings of civilization, as might from time to time suit their
condition;" and then concluded this subject with saying: "A system
corresponding with the mild principles of religion and philanthropy,
toward an unenlightened race of men whose happiness materially depends
on the conduct of the United States, would be as honorable to the
national character, as conformable to the dictates of sound policy."

After stating that measures had been taken for carrying into execution
the act laying duties on distilled spirits, he added: "The impressions
with which this law has been received by the community have been, upon
the whole, such as were to have been expected among enlightened and
well-disposed citizens, from the propriety and necessity of the
measure. The novelty, however, of the tax, in a considerable part of
the United States, and a misconception of some of its provisions, have
given occasion, in particular places, to some degree of discontent. But
it is satisfactory to know that this disposition yields to proper
explanations, and more just apprehensions of the true nature of the
law. And I entertain a full confidence that it will, in all, give way
to motives which arise out of a just sense of duty, and a virtuous
regard to the public welfare.

"If there are any circumstances in the law, which, consistently with
its main design, may be so varied as to remove any well-intentioned
objections that may happen to exist, it will comport with a wise
moderation to make the proper variations. It is desirable, on all
occasions, to unite with a steady and firm adherence to constitutional
and necessary acts of government, the fullest evidence of a
disposition, as far as may be practicable, to consult the wishes of
every part of the community, and to lay the foundations of the public
administration in the affections of the people."

The answers of the two houses noticed, briefly and generally, the
various topics of the speech; and, though perhaps less warm than those
of the preceding Congress, manifested great respect for the executive
magistrate, and an undiminished confidence in his patriotic exertions
to promote the public interests.

Soon after Congress was organized for business a warm debate sprung up
in relation to the new apportionment of representatives, in accordance
with the census, which had been taken in the preceding year, and the
results of which were now ready for the consideration of Congress. The
contest was not put to rest till the following April (1792); and not
till the third bill was constructed did the two houses agree. The first
proposal made by the representatives was to adopt the lowest ratio
allowed by the constitution--30,000, which would have raised their
numbers to 113, but there would have been large fractions of population
in the northern States left unrepresented. The Senate, to lessen those
disfranchised remnants, raised the ration to 33,000; but it was alleged
that then there were fractions, though not so large, remaining in the
southern States. The house would not accept the change, and reiterated
its former proposal in a new bill, which also arranged the taking of
another census before the expiration of ten years; but the Senate
refused its assent to this, and, instead, increased the numbers to 120
by assigning representatives to the largest fractions. This, which
violated the letter of the constitution, excited greater heat than
ever, and the old threat of breaking up the Union was resorted to. A
committee of conference was demanded at length, and in the end the
scheme of the Senate was carried by a majority of two out of sixty
votes. This decision has been remarked upon as having a curious bearing
upon the old political controversies, the representatives of the
southern States being found rejecting the amendment of the Senate,
which embodied their own State sovereignty principle; and those of the
North accepting it, although they were most in favor of the opposite
principle of polity.

Washington very justly considered this mode of apportionment as
contrary to the constitution, and on the 5th of April returned the bill
to Congress, with his objections. The first was, that the constitution
had prescribed that representatives should be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers, and that there
was no one proportion or division which, applied to the respective
States, would yield the number and allotment of representatives
proposed by the bill; the second, that by the constitution, the number
of representatives should not exceed one for every 30,000, which
restriction, by the fair and obvious construction, was to be applied to
the separate and respective States, and that the bill had allotted to
eight States more than one for every 30,000. This was the _first_
instance in which the President had exercised his _veto_ upon any act
of Congress. [4]

The bill, not being repassed by two-thirds of both houses, was
rejected. A bill afterward passed, April 9, 1792, by a vote of thirty-
four to thirty, apportioning the representatives agreeable to a ratio
of one for every 33,000 in each State, which received the sanction of
the President, and thus, this interesting part of the constitution was
finally settled.

During this session of Congress an act passed for establishing a
uniform militia.

Washington had manifested, from the commencement of his administration,
a peculiar degree of solicitude on this subject, and had repeatedly
urged it on Congress.

In his speech at the opening of the present session, he again called
the attention of the Legislature to it, and at length a law was
enacted, though it was less efficacious than the plan reported by
General Knox, the Secretary of War.

In December (1791) intelligence was received by the President, and
immediately communicated to Congress, that the American army had been
totally defeated on the 4th of the preceding month.

Although the most prompt and judicious measures had been taken to raise
the troops and to march them to the frontiers, they could not be
assembled in the neighborhood of Fort Washington until the month of
September, nor was the establishment even then completed.

The immediate objects of the expedition were to destroy the Indian
villages on the Miami, to expel the savages from that country, and to
connect it with the Ohio by a chain of posts which would prevent their
return during the war.

On the 7th of September (1791) the regulars moved from their camp in
the vicinity of Fort Washington, and marching directly north, toward
the object of their destination, established two intermediate posts,
Forts Hamilton and Jefferson, at the distance of rather more than forty
miles from each other, as places of deposit and of security either for
convoys of provisions which might follow the army, or for the army
itself should any disaster befall it. The last of these works, Fort
Jefferson, was not completed until the 24th of October, before which
time reinforcements were received of about 360 militia. After placing
garrisons in the forts the effective number of the army, including
militia, amounted to rather less than 2,000 men. With this force the
general continued his march, which was rendered both slow and laborious
by the necessity of opening a road. Small parties of Indians were
frequently seen hovering about them and some unimportant skirmishes
took place. As the army approached the country in which they might
expect to meet an enemy about sixty of the militia deserted in a body.
This diminution of force was not in itself an object of much concern.
But there was reason to fear that the example, should those who set it
be permitted to escape with impunity, would be extensively followed,
and it was reported to be the intention of the deserters to plunder
convoys of provisions which were advancing at some distance in the
rear. To prevent mischiefs of so serious a nature the general detached
Major Hamtranck with the first regiment in pursuit of the deserters,
and directed him to secure the provisions under a strong guard.

The army, consisting of about 1,400 effective rank and file, continued
its march, and, on the 3d of November, encamped about fifteen miles
south of the Miami villages. The right wing, under the command of
General Butler, formed the first line and lay with a creek, about
twelve yards wide, immediately in its front. The left wing, commanded
by Lieutenant-Colonel Darke, formed the second, and between the two
lines was an interval of about seventy yards. The right flank was
supposed to be secured by the creek, by a steep bank, and by a small
body of troops; the left was covered by a party of cavalry and by
piquets. The militia crossed the creek and advanced about a quarter of
a mile in front, where they also encamped in two lines. On their
approach a few Indians who had shown themselves on the opposite side of
the creek fled with precipitation.

At this place the general intended to throw up a slight work for the
security of the baggage, and, after being joined by Major Hamtranck, to
march, as unencumbered and as expeditiously as possible, to the
villages he purposed to destroy.

In both of these designs he was anticipated. About half an hour before
sunrise on the day following, just after the troops had been dismissed
from the parade, an unexpected attack was made upon the militia, who
fled in the utmost confusion, and rushing into camp through the first
line of Continental troops, which had been formed the instant the first
gun was discharged, threw them too into disorder. The exertions of the
officers to restore order were not entirely successful. The Indians
pressed close upon the heels of the flying militia and engaged General
Butler with great intrepidity. The action instantly became extremely
warm, and the fire of the assailants, passing round both flanks of the
first line, was, in a few minutes, poured with equal fury on the rear
division. Its greatest weight was directed against the center of each
wing, where the artillery was posted, and the artillerists were mowed
down in great numbers. Firing from the ground and from the shelter
which the woods afforded, the assailants were scarcely seen but when
springing from one cover to another, in which manner they advanced
close up to the American lines and to the very mouths of the field
pieces. They fought with the daring courage of men whose trade is war
and who are stimulated by all those passions which can impel the savage
mind to vigorous exertions.

While some of the American soldiers performed their duty with the
utmost resolution, others seemed dismayed and terrified. Of this
conduct the officers were, as usual, the victims. With a fearlessness
which the occasion required, they exposed themselves to the most
imminent dangers, and, in their efforts to change the face of affairs,
fell in great numbers.

For several days the Commander-in-Chief had been afflicted with a
severe disease, under which he still labored, and which must have
greatly affected him, but, though unable to display that activity which
would have been useful in this severe conflict, neither the feebleness
of his body nor the peril of his situation could prevent his delivering
his orders with judgment and with self-possession.

It was soon perceived that the American fire could produce, on a
concealed enemy, no considerable effect, and that the only hope of
victory was placed in the bayonet. At the head of the second regiment,
which formed the left of the left wing, Lieutenant-Colonel Darke made
an impetuous charge upon the enemy, forced them from their ground with
some loss and drove them about 400 yards. He was followed by that whole
wing, but the want of a sufficient number of riflemen to press this
advantage deprived him of the benefit which ought to have been derived
from this effort, and, as soon as he gave over the pursuit, the Indians
renewed their attack. In the meantime General Butler was mortally
wounded, the left of the right wing was broken, the artillerists almost
to a man killed, the guns seized, and the camp penetrated by the enemy.
With his own regiment and with the battalions commanded by Majors
Butler and Clarke, Darke was ordered again to charge with the bayonet.
These orders were executed with intrepidity and momentary success. The
Indians were driven out of the camp, and the artillery recovered. But
while they were pressed in one point by the bravest of the American
troops, their fire was kept up from every other with fatal effect.
Several times particular corps charged them, always with partial
success, but no universal effort could be made, and in every charge a
great loss of officers was sustained, the consequences of which were
severely felt. Instead of keeping their ranks, and executing the orders
which were given, a great proportion of the soldiers flocked together
in crowds and were shot down without resistance. To save the remnant of
his army was all that remained to be done, and about half past 9 in the
morning General St. Clair ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Darke, with the
Second regiment, to charge a body of Indians who had intercepted their
retreat and to gain the road. Major Clarke, with his battalion, was
directed to cover the rear. These orders were executed and a disorderly
flight commenced. The pursuit was kept up about four miles, when,
fortunately for the surviving Americans, that avidity for plunder which
is a ruling passion among savages, called back the victorious Indians
to the camp, where the spoils of their vanquished foes were to be
divided. The routed troops continued their flight to Fort Jefferson, a
distance of about thirty miles, throwing away their arms on the road.
At this place they met Major Hamtranck with the First regiment, and a
council of war was called to deliberate on the course to be pursued. As
this regiment was far from restoring the strength of the morning, it
was determined not to attempt to retrieve the fortune of the day, and,
leaving the wounded at Fort Jefferson, the army continued its retreat
to Fort Washington.

In this disastrous battle the loss on the part of the Americans was
very great when compared with the numbers engaged. Thirty-eight
commissioned officers were killed upon the field, and 593
noncommissioned officers and privates were slain and missing. Twenty-
one commissioned officers, several of whom afterward died of their
wounds, and 242 noncommissioned officers and privates were wounded.
Among the dead was the brave and much-lamented General Butler. This
gallant officer had served through the war of the Revolution, and had,
on more than one occasion, distinguished himself in a remarkable
manner. In the list of those who shared his fate were the names of many
other excellent officers who had participated in all the toils, the
dangers, and the glory of that long conflict which terminated in the
independence of their country. At the head of the list of wounded were
Lieutenant-Colonels Gibson and Darke, Major Butler, and Adjutant-
General Sargent, all of whom were veteran officers of great merit, who
displayed their accustomed bravery on this unfortunate day. General St.
Clair, in his official letter, observed: "The loss the public has
sustained by the fall of so many officers, particularly of General
Butler and Major Ferguson, cannot be too much regretted, but it is a
circumstance that will alleviate the misfortune in some measure, that
all of them fell most gallantly doing their duty."

From the weight of the fire and the circumstance of his being attacked
nearly at the same time in front and rear, General St. Clair was of
opinion that he was overpowered by numbers. The intelligence afterward
collected would make the Indian force to consist of from 1,000 to 1,500
warriors. Of their loss no estimate could be made; the probability is
that it bore no proportion to that sustained by the American army.

Nothing could be more unexpected than this severe disaster. The public
had confidently anticipated a successful campaign and could not believe
that the general who had been unfortunate had not been culpable.

General St. Clair requested with earnestness that a court-martial
should sit on his conduct, but this request could not be granted,
because the army did not furnish a sufficient number of officers of a
grade to form a court for his trial on military principles. Late in the
session a committee of the House of Representatives was appointed to
inquire into the cause of the failure of the expedition, whose report,
in explicit terms, exculpated St. Clair. This inquiry, however, was
instituted rather for the purpose of investigating the conduct of civil
than of military officers, and was not conducted by military men. More
satisfactory testimony in favor of St. Clair is furnished by the
circumstance that he still retained the undiminished esteem and good
opinion of the President. [5]

The confidence of Washington in St. Clair, however, had been very
severely shaken on his first receiving intelligence of his defeat. This
fact is known by the recent publication of an anecdote communicated by
Mr. Lear to the Hon. Richard Rush, and by him inserted in his
"Washington in Domestic Life," as follows:

"An anecdote I derived from Colonel Lear shortly before his death in
1816," says Mr. Rush, "may here be related, showing the height to which
his (Washington's) passion would rise yet be controlled. It belongs to
his domestic life which I am dealing with, having occurred under his
own roof, whilst it marks public feeling the most intense and points to
the moral of his life. I give it in Colonel Lear's words as nearly as I
can, having made a note of them at the time.

"Toward the close of a winter's day in 1791, an officer in uniform was
seen to dismount in front of the President's in Philadelphia, and,
giving the bridle to his servant, knocked at the door of his mansion.
Learning from the porter that the President was at dinner, he said he
was on public business and had dispatches for the President. A servant
was sent into the dining-room to give the information to Mr. Lear, who
left the table and went into the hall, where the officer repeated what
he had said. Mr. Lear replied that, as the President's secretary, he
would take charge of the dispatches and deliver them at the proper
time. The officer made answer that he had just arrived from the western
army, and his orders were to deliver them with all promptitude, and to
the President in person, but that he would wait his directions. Mr.
Lear returned and in a whisper imparted to the President what had
passed. General Washington rose from the table and went to the officer.
He was back in a short time, made a word of apology for his absence,
but no allusion to the cause of it. He had company that day. Everything
went on as usual. Dinner over, the gentlemen passed to the drawing-room
of Mrs. Washington, which was open in the evening. The general spoke
courteously to every lady in the room, as was his custom. His hours
were early, and by 10 o'clock all the company had gone. Mrs. Washington
and Mr. Lear remained. Soon Mrs. Washington left the room.

"The general now walked backward and forward slowly for some minutes
without speaking. Then he sat down on a sofa by the fire, telling Mr.
Lear to sit down. To this moment there had been no change in his manner
since his interruption at table. Mr. Lear now perceived emotion. This
rising in him, he broke out suddenly: 'It's all over! St. Clair's
defeated--routed--the officers nearly all killed--the men by
wholesale--the rout complete--too shocking to think of--and a surprise
into the bargain!'

"He uttered all this with great vehemence. Then he paused, got up from
the sofa, and walked about the room several times, agitated but saying
nothing. Near the door he stopped short and stood still a few seconds,
when his wrath became terrible.

"'Yes,' he burst forth, 'here on this very spot I took leave of him; I
wished him success and honor. You have your instructions, I said, from
the Secretary of War; I had a strict eye to them, and will add but one
word--beware of a surprise! I repeat it--beware of a surprise! You
know how the Indians fight us. He went off with that as my last solemn
warning thrown into his ears. And yet! to suffer that army to be cut to
pieces--hacked, butchered, tomahawked--by a surprise--the very thing I
guarded him against! O God, O God, he's worse than a murderer! How can
he answer it to his country! The blood of the slain is upon him--the
curse of widows and orphans--the curse of Heaven!'

"This torrent came out in tones appalling. His very frame shook. It was
awful said Mr. Lear. More than once he threw his hands up as he hurled
imprecations upon St. Clair. Mr. Lear remained speechless--awed into
breathless silence.

"The roused chief sat down on the sofa once more. He seemed conscious
of his passion and uncomfortable. He was silent. His warmth beginning
to subside, he at length said in an altered voice: 'This must not go
beyond this room.' Another pause followed--a longer one--when he said
in a tone quite low: 'General St. Clair shall have justice. I looked
hastily through the dispatches, saw the whole disaster, but not all the
particulars. I will receive him without displeasure; I will hear him
without prejudice. He shall have full justice.'

"He was now, said Mr. Lear, perfectly calm. Half an hour had gone by.
The storm was over, and no sign of it was afterward seen in his conduct
or heard in his conversation. The result is known. The whole case was
investigated by Congress. St. Clair was exculpated and regained the
confidence Washington had in him when appointing him to that command.
He had put himself into the thickest of the fight, and escaped unhurt,
though so ill as to be carried on a litter, and unable to mount his
horse without help."

This anecdote might, at first, seem discreditable to Washington, as
exhibiting the mighty strength of his passions when aroused. But upon
mature consideration it does him great honor, affording equal evidence
of his power of self-control, his public spirit, his disinterestedness,
and his candor.

The Indian war now assumed a still more serious aspect. There was
reason to fear that the hostile tribes would derive a great accession
of strength from the impression which their success would make upon
their neighbors; and the reputation of the government was deeply
concerned in retrieving the fortune of its arms, and affording
protection to its citizens. The President, therefore, lost no time in
causing the estimates for a competent force to be prepared and laid
before Congress. In conformity with a report made by the Secretary of
War, a bill was brought into the House of Representatives, directing
three additional regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry to be
raised, to serve for three years, if not sooner discharged. The whole
military establishment, if completed, would amount to about 5,000 men.
The additional regiments, however, were to be disbanded as soon as
peace should be concluded with the Indians; and the President was
authorized to discharge, or to forbear to raise any part of them, "in
case events should, in his judgment, render his so doing consistent
with the public safety."

This bill met with great opposition. A motion was made to strike out
the section which authorized an augmentation of force. This led to a
very animated debate, in which the opposition exhibited a determination
to embarrass the administration by defeating even the most necessary
and useful measures it might propose. The public spirit and good sense
of the majority, however, prevailed. The motion for striking out the
section was lost, and the bill was carried for the augmentation of
force required by the executive.

The treasury was not in a condition to meet the demands upon it, which
the increased expenses of the war would unavoidably occasion, and
sources of additional revenue were to be explored. A select committee,
to whom this subject was referred, brought in a resolution directing
Mr. Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury, to report his opinion to
the House, on the best mode of raising those additional supplies which
the public service might require for the current year.

This proposition gave rise to a very animated debate.

It will be recollected that when the act for establishing the Treasury
Department was under consideration, the clause which rendered it the
duty of the secretary to digest and report plans for the improvement
and management of the revenue, and for the support of public credit,
was earnestly opposed. A large majority, however, was in favor of the
principle, and, after being so modified as only to admit a report if
required by the House, it was retained in the bill.

In complying with the various resolutions of Congress, calling for
reports on subjects connected with his department, Hamilton had
submitted plans which, having been profoundly considered, were well
digested, and accompanied by arguments, the force of which it was
difficult to resist. His measures were generally supported by a
majority of Congress; and, while the high credit of the United States
was believed to attest their wisdom, the masterly manner in which his
reports were drawn, contributed to raise still higher that reputation
for great talents which he had long possessed. To the further admission
of these reports, it was determined, on this occasion, to make a
vigorous resistance.

But the opposition was not successful. On taking the question the
resolution was carried, thirty-one members voting in its favor, and
twenty-seven against it.

The report made by Hamilton, in pursuance of this resolution,
recommended certain augmentations of the duties on imports, and was
immediately referred to the consideration of a committee of the whole
House. Resolutions were then passed which were to form the basis of a
bill; and which adopted, not only the principles, but, with the
exception of a few unimportant alterations, the minute details of the
report.

Before the question was taken on the bill a motion was made to limit
its duration, the vote upon which marked the progress of opinion in the
House respecting those systems of finance which were believed to have
established the credit of the United States.

Hamilton had deemed it indispensable to the creation of public credit
that the appropriations of funds for the payment of the interest, and
the gradual redemption of the principal of the national debt, should be
not only sufficient, but permanent also. A party was found in the first
Congress who opposed this principle, and were in favor of retaining a
full power over the subject in each branch of the Legislature, by
making annual appropriations. The arguments which had failed in
Congress appear to have been more successfully employed with the
people. Among the multiplied vices which were ascribed to the funding
system, it was charged with introducing a permanent and extensive
mortgage of funds, which was alleged to strengthen unduly the hands of
the executive magistrate, and to be one of the many evidences which
existed of monarchical propensities in those who administered the
government.

The report lately made by Hamilton, and the bill founded on that
report, contemplated a permanent increase of the duties on certain
specified articles, and a permanent appropriation of the revenue
arising from them to the purposes of the national debt. Thirty-one
members were in favor of the motion for limiting the duration of the
bill, and only thirty against it. By the rules of the House, the
speaker has a right first to vote as a member, and, if the numbers
should then be equally divided, to decide as speaker. Being opposed to
the limitation, the motion was lost by his voice, and Hamilton's
measure was carried through in its original form.

On the 8th of May (1792), after an active and interesting session,
Congress adjourned to the first Monday in November.

Among the bills passed at this session of Congress the most important
were that for the apportionment of the representatives, and that for
the augmentation of the military force, inasmuch as the discussion of
these measures served to develop the political parties which had begun
to divide Congress and the people. In apportioning the representatives
many members of Congress endeavored to obtain the largest possible
number, in order to preserve the rights of the States and check the
power of the executive. On the same principles the army bill was
opposed, as having a tendency to increase executive power and
patronage, and thus endanger the liberties of the country.

Throughout the United States the party opposed to the constitution had
charged its supporters with a desire to establish a monarchy on the
ruins of Republican government; and the constitution itself was alleged
to contain principles which would prove the truth of this charge. The
leaders of that party had, therefore, been ready, from the instant the
government came into operation, to discover, in all its measures, those
monarchical tendencies which they had perceived in the instrument they
opposed.

The salaries allowed to public officers, though so low as not to afford
a decent maintenance to those who resided at the seat of government,
were declared to be so enormously high, as clearly to manifest a total
disregard of that simplicity and economy which were the characteristics
of republics. [6]

The levees of the President, and the evening parties of Mrs.
Washington, were said to be imitations of regal institutions, designed
to accustom the American people to the pomp and manners of European
courts. The Vice-President, too, was said to keep up the state and
dignity of a monarch, and to illustrate, by his conduct, the principles
which were inculcated in his political works.

The Indian war, they alleged, was misconducted, and unnecessarily
prolonged, for the purposes of expending the public money, and of
affording a pretext for augmenting the military establishment, and
increasing the revenue.

All this prodigal waste of the money of the people was designed to keep
up the national debt, and the influence it gave the government; which,
united with standing armies and immense revenues, would enable their
rulers to rivet the chains which they were secretly forging. Every
prediction which had been uttered respecting the anti-Republican
principles of the government, was said to be rapidly verifying, and
that which was disbelieved as prophecy, was daily becoming history. If
a remedy for these ills was not found in the increased representation
of the people which would take place at the ensuing elections, they
would become too monstrous to be borne; and when it was recollected
that the division of opinion was marked by a geographical line, there
was reason to fear that the Union would be broken into one or more
confederacies.

These irritable symptoms had assumed appearances of increased malignity
during the session of Congress which had just terminated; and, to
Washington, who firmly believed that the Union and the liberty of the
States depended on the preservation of the government, they were the
more unpleasant and the more alarming because they were displayed in
full force in his cabinet.

The feud between Jefferson and Hamilton, to which we have already
referred, still continued in full force, and they were regarded, as in
fact they were, respectively, the heads of the two parties. They
disagreed not only on the internal affairs but on the foreign policy of
the government: Jefferson having a leaning towards the Revolutionists
of France, and Hamilton favoring a conciliatory policy toward Great
Britain.

In all popular governments the press is the most ready channel by which
the opinions and the passions of the few are communicated to the many;
and of the press, the two great parties forming in the United States
sought to avail themselves. The "Gazette of the United States"
supported the systems of Hamilton, while other papers enlisted
themselves under the banners of the opposition. Conspicuous among these
was the "National Gazette," a paper edited by Philip Freneau, the poet,
a clerk in the Department of State. The avowed purpose for which
Jefferson patronized this paper was to present to the eye of the
American people European intelligence derived from the "Leyden
Gazette," instead of English papers; but it soon became the vehicle of
calumny against the funding and banking systems; against the duty on
home-made spirits, which was denominated an excuse, and against the men
who had proposed and supported those measures. With, perhaps, equal
asperity, the papers attached to the party which had defended these
systems, assailed the motives of the leaders of the opposition.

This schism in his cabinet was a subject of extreme mortification to
Washington. Entertaining a high respect for the talents, and a real
esteem for the characters of both gentlemen, he was unwilling to part
with either, and exerted all the influence he possessed to effect a
reconciliation between them. In a letter of the 23d of August (1792),
addressed to Jefferson, after reviewing the critical situation of the
United States with respect to its external relations, he thus expressed
himself on this delicate subject: "How unfortunate, and how much is it
to be regretted then, that while we are encompassed on all sides with
avowed enemies and insidious friends, internal dissensions should be
harassing and tearing our vitals. The last, to me, is the most serious,
the most alarming, and the most afflicting of the two, and, without
more charity for the opinions of one another in governmental matters,
or some more infallible criterion by which the truth of speculative
opinions, before they have undergone the test of experience, are to be
forejudged, than has yet fallen to the lot of fallibility, I believe it
will be difficult, if not impracticable, to manage the reins of
government, or to keep the parts of it together; for if, instead of
laying our shoulders to the machine, after measures are decided on, one
pulls this way, and another that, before the utility of the thing is
fairly tried, it must inevitably be torn asunder; and, in my opinion,
the fairest prospect of happiness and prosperity that ever was
presented to man will be lost, perhaps forever.

"My earnest wish and my fondest hope, therefore, is, that instead of
wounding suspicions and irritating charges, there may be liberal
allowances, mutual forbearances, and temporizing yielding on all sides.
Under the exercise of these, matters will go on smoothly; and, if
possible, more prosperously. Without them everything must rub; the
wheels of government will clog; our enemies will triumph, and, by
throwing their weight into the disaffected scale, may accomplish the
ruin of the goodly fabric we have been erecting.

"I do not mean to apply this advice, or these observations, to any
particular person or character. I have given them in the same general
terms to other officers of the government, because the disagreements
which have arisen from difference of opinions and the attacks which
have been made upon almost all the measures of government, and most of
its executive officers, have for a long time past filled me with
painful sensations, and cannot fail, I think, of producing unhappy
consequences at home and abroad."

In a subsequent letter to Jefferson, in answer to one which enclosed
some documents designed to prove that, though desirous of amending the
constitution, he had favored its adoption, the President said: "I did
not require the evidence of the extracts which you enclosed me, to
convince me of your attachment to the constitution of the United
States, or of your disposition to promote the general welfare of this
country, but I regret, deeply regret, the difference of opinion which
has arisen and divided you and another principal officer of the
government, and wish devoutly there could be an accommodation of them
by mutual yieldings.

"A measure of this sort would produce harmony and consequent good in
our public councils, and the contrary will inevitably produce confusion
and serious mischiefs--and for what? because mankind cannot think
alike, but would adopt different means to attain the same end. For I
will frankly and solemnly declare that I believe the views of both to
be pure and well meant, and that experience only will decide with
respect to the salubrity of the measures which are the subjects of this
dispute.

"Why, then, when some of the best citizens of the United States, men of
discernment, uniform and tried patriots, who have no sinister views to
promote, but are chaste in their ways of thinking and acting, are to be
found, some on one side and some on the other, of the questions which
have caused these agitations--why should either of you be so tenacious
of your opinions as to make no allowance for those of the other?

"I could and, indeed, was about to add more on this interesting
subject, but will forbear, at least for the present, after expressing a
wish that the cup which has been presented to us may not be snatched
from our lips by a discordance of action, when I am persuaded there is
no discordance in your views. I have a great, a sincere esteem and
regard for you both, and ardently wish that some line could be marked
out by which both of you could walk."

On the same subject Washington addressed a letter to Hamilton, from
which the following is an extract:

"Differences in political opinions are as unavoidable as, to a certain
point, they may be necessary; but it is exceedingly to be regretted
that subjects cannot be discussed with temper, on the one hand, or
decisions submitted to on the other, without improperly implicating the
motives which led to them; and this regret borders on chagrin when we
find that men of abilities, zealous patriots, having the same general
objects in view, and the same upright intentions to prosecute them,
will not exercise more charity in deciding on the opinions and actions
of each other. When matters get to such lengths, the natural inference
is that both sides have strained the cords beyond their bearing, that a
middle course would be found the best, until experience shall have
decided on the right way; or, which is not to be expected, because it
is denied to mortals, until there shall be some infallible rule by
which to forejudge events.

"Having premised these things, I would fain hope that liberal
allowances will be made for the political opinions of each other, and
instead of those wounding suspicions and irritating charges, with which
some of our gazettes are so strongly impregnated, and which cannot
fail, if persevered in, of pushing matters to extremity, and thereby
tearing the machine asunder, that there might be mutual forbearance and
temporizing yieldings on all sides. Without these, I do not see how the
reins of government are to be managed or how the union of the States
can be much longer preserved.

"How unfortunate would it be if a fabric so goodly, erected under so
many providential circumstances, after acquiring in its first stages so
much respectability, should, from diversity of sentiment, or internal
obstructions to some of the acts of government (for I cannot prevail on
myself to believe that these measures are as yet the acts of a
determined party), be brought to the verge of dissolution! Melancholy
thought! But while it shows the consequences of diversified opinions,
where pushed with too much tenacity, it exhibits evidence also of the
necessity of accommodation, and of the propriety of adopting such
healing measures as may restore harmony to the discordant members of
the Union, and the governing powers of it.

"I do not mean to apply this advice to any measures which are passed or
to any particular character. I have given it, in the same general
terms, to other officers of the government. My earnest wish is that
balm may be poured into all the wounds which have been given, to
prevent them from gangrening, and to avoid those fatal consequences
which the community may sustain if it is withheld. The friends of the
Union must wish this; those who are not, but who wish to see it rended,
will be disappointed; and all things, I hope, will go well."

These earnest endeavors to soothe the angry passions and to conciliate
the jarring discords of the cabinet were unsuccessful. The hostility
which was so much and so sincerely lamented sustained no diminution,
and its consequences became every day more diffusive.

Among the immediate effects of these internal dissensions was the
encouragement they afforded to a daring and criminal resistance which
was made to the execution of the laws imposing a duty on spirits
distilled within the United States.

To the inhabitants of that part of Pennsylvania which lies west of the
Alleghany mountains this duty was, from local considerations,
peculiarly odious; nor was their hostility to the measure diminished by
any affection for the source in which it originated. The constitution
itself had encountered the most decided opposition from that part of
the State, and that early enmity to the government, which exerted every
faculty to prevent its adoption, had sustained no abatement. Its
measures generally, and the whole system of finance particularly, had
been reprobated with peculiar bitterness by many of the most popular
men of that district. With these dispositions a tax law, the operation
of which was extended to them, could not be favorably received, however
generally it might be supported in other parts of the Union. But when,
to this pre-existing temper, were superadded the motives which arose
from perceiving that the measure was censured on the floor of Congress
as unnecessary and tyrannical; that resistance to its execution was
treated as probable; that a powerful and active party, pervading the
Union, arraigned with extreme acrimony the whole system of finance as
being antagonistic to liberty, and, with all the passionate vehemence
of conviction, charged its advocates with designing to subvert the
republican institutions of America, we ought not to be surprised that
the awful impressions, which usually restrain combinations to resist
the laws, were lessened, and that the malcontents were emboldened to
hope that those combinations might be successful.

The opposition to the duty on distilled spirits had been carried so
far, and so daring had become the resistance to the law, as to require
a proclamation from the President, warning all persons against unlawful
combinations and proceedings tending to obstruct the operations of the
laws. But such was the state of feeling that the proclamation produced
no salutary effect.

Anxious to avoid extremities, the government resolved upon another
course. Prosecutions were instituted against delinquents. The spirits
distilled in the noncomplying counties were intercepted in their way to
market and seized by the officers of the revenue, and the agents for
the army were directed to purchase only those spirits on which the duty
had been paid. Could the distillers have obeyed their wishes, these
measures would have produced the desired effect. But, impelled by a
furious multitude, they found it much more dangerous to obey the laws
than to resist them.

Diplomatic intercourse had at length been opened with Great Britain,
who had sent, on her own motion, Mr. George Hammond as minister
Plenipotentiary to the United States. Mr. Hammond arrived at
Philadelphia in the autumn of 1791, and soon after entered upon a long
correspondence with the Secretary of State respecting the nonexecution
of the treaty of peace. The British minister having entrusted to him
only powers to negotiate, not to conclude, to make, not to adjust,
complaints, the course of the discussion, and the principles avowed by
the respective parties, speedily demonstrated the slight probability
which existed of their being able to agree upon a commercial treaty.

The Indians in the Northwest still maintaining their attitude of
hostility preparations for prosecuting the war with vigor were
earnestly pressed. General Wayne was appointed to succeed St. Clair in
the command, but the inducements to enter the service were so small
that the ranks filled up very slowly and the meditated expedition could
not be undertaken prudently during the present year. Meanwhile, the
clamor against the war continued to be loud and violent. From respect
for opinions extensively professed it was thought advisable to make
still another effort to procure peace by a direct communication of the
views of the executive. The fate of those who were employed in these
efforts was still more to be lamented than their failure. Colonel
Harden and Major Truman, two brave officers and estimable men, were
severally dispatched with propositions of peace, and each was murdered
by the savages.

During the session of Congress Thomas Pinckney was nominated minister
plenipotentiary to England, and Gouverneur Morris as minister
plenipotentiary to France. Both these nominations were confirmed by the
Senate. William Short was appointed minister resident at the Hague and
was commissioned, with Mr. Carmichael, to effect a treaty with Spain.
Paul Jones, during the summer, was appointed a commissioner for
treating with the Dey of Algiers on the subject of peace and the
ransoming of American captives. The letter informing of his appointment
did not, however, reach him, for Jones died at Paris on the 18th of
July, 1792, in abject poverty and destitution.

In May (1792), Washington wrote to the Earl of Buchan, transmitting his
portrait, painted by Mr. Robertson, which had been solicited by the
earl. In the same letter he thanked the earl for a box made of the oak
that sheltered William Wallace after the battle of Falkirk. In making
this present the earl had requested Washington, in the event of his
decease, to leave it to the man in his own country who should appear,
in his judgment, to merit it best. Washington wisely decided otherwise,
and, in his will, directed it to be returned to the Earl of Buchan.

On the 9th of May (1792), the day after the rising of Congress,
Washington set out from Philadelphia for Mount Vernon, but returned
early in June. In July he went again to Mount Vernon, accompanied by
Mrs. Washington and her two little grandchildren, intending to remain
there till near the meeting of Congress, which was to take place in
November. During this short residence at his beloved home Washington
had much to distract his attention from his favorite rural pursuits. He
was in constant correspondence with the members of the cabinet and
public affairs. To Hamilton he was writing about the resistance to the
tax on spirituous liquors, on the dissension between him and Jefferson,
and on politics; to General Knox, Secretary of War, on the preparations
for Wayne's campaign against the Indians; to Jefferson, Secretary of
State, on foreign affairs, on the troubles with the Spaniards in
Florida, and on the Indian war, as well as on his quarrel with
Hamilton, and to Randolph, Attorney-General, on the state of parties
and the licentiousness of the press.

On the subject of newspaper abuse Washington appears to have felt a
degree of sensitiveness which, at the present, is rare among public
men. Hitherto he appears to have been personally free from this
annoyance, but he was unwilling to see his administration calumniated
by political demagogues.

Writing to Gouverneur Morris, the American minister in France (October
20, 1792), he says. "From the complexion of some of our newspapers
foreigners would be led to believe that inveterate political
dissensions exist among us, and that we are on the very verge of
disunion, but the fact is otherwise. The great body of the people now
feel the advantages of the general government, and would not, I am
persuaded, do anything that should destroy it, but this kind of
representations is an evil which must be placed in opposition to the
infinite benefits resulting from a free press, and I am sure you need
not be told that in this country a personal difference in political
sentiments is often made to take the garb of general dissensions."

Besides the public business which pressed heavily on Washington during
his present residence at Mount Vernon he found a new source of anxiety
in the alarming illness of his nephew, George Augustine Washington, to
whom the care of the estate had been entrusted since 1789, when the
duties of the Presidency had called the chief to the seat of
government. This gentleman had served in the Revolutionary War as aid
to Lafayette, with the rank of major. Writing to Lafayette (June 10,
1792), Washington says: "I am afraid my nephew George, your old aid,
will never have his health perfectly re-established. He has lately been
attacked with the alarming symptom of spitting large quantities of
blood, and the physicians give no hope of a restoration, unless it can
be effected by a change of air and a total dereliction of business, to
which he is too anxiously attentive. He will, if he should be taken
from his family and friends, leave three fine children, two sons and a
daughter. To the eldest of the boys he has given the name of Fayette,
and a fine-looking child he is."

George Augustine Washington sunk rapidly after this and died at the
residence of Colonel Bassett, where he had gone for a change of air, on
the 5th of February, 1793. Washington, on hearing of his decease, wrote
immediately from Philadelphia, to his widow, [7] condoling with her on
the heavy loss, and inviting her to reside, with her children, at Mount
Vernon.

In the latter part of October Washington returned to Philadelphia, in
anticipation of the meeting of Congress.

On the 5th of November (1792), Congress again convened. In Washington's
speech, delivered at the commencement of the session, Indian affairs
were treated at considerable length, and the continuance of the war was
mentioned as a subject of much regret. "The reiterated endeavors," it
was said, "which had been made to effect a pacification had hitherto
issued in new and outrageous proofs of persevering hostility on the
part of the tribes with whom the United States were in contest.

"A detail of the measures that had been pursued and of their
consequences, which would be laid before Congress, while it would
confirm the want of success thus far, would evince that means, as
proper and as efficacious as could have been devised, had been
employed. The issue of some of them was still depending, but a
favorable one, though not to be despaired of, was not promised by
anything that had yet happened."

That a sanction, commonly respected even among savages, had been found
insufficient to protect from massacre the emissaries of peace, was
particularly noticed, and the families of those valuable citizens who
had thus fallen victims to their zeal for the public service were
recommended to the attention of the Legislature.

That unprovoked aggression had been made by the southern Indians, and
that there was just cause for apprehension that the war would extend to
them also, was mentioned as a subject of additional concern.

"Every practicable exertion had been made to be prepared for the
alternative of prosecuting the war in the event of a failure of pacific
overtures. A large proportion of the troops authorized to be raised had
been recruited, though the numbers were yet incomplete, and pains had
been taken to discipline them and put them in a condition for the
particular kind of service to be performed. But a delay of operations,
besides being dictated by the measures that were pursuing toward a
pacific termination of the war, had been in itself deemed preferable to
immature efforts."

The humane system which has since been pursued with partial success, of
gradually civilizing the savages by improving their condition, of
diverting them in some degree from hunting to domestic and agricultural
occupations, by imparting to them some of the most simple and useful
acquisitions of society, and of conciliating them to the United States
by a beneficial and well-regulated commerce, had ever been a favorite
object with the President, and the detailed view which was not taken of
Indian affairs was concluded with a repetition of his recommendations
of these measures.

The subject next adverted to in the speech was the impediments which,
in some places, continued to embarrass the collection of the duties on
spirits distilled within the United States. After observing that these
impediments were lessening in local extent, but that symptoms of such
increased opposition had lately manifested themselves in certain places
as, in his judgment, to render his special interposition advisable, the
President added: "Congress may be assured that nothing within
constitutional and legal limits, which may depend on me, shall be
wanting to assert and maintain the just authority of the laws. In
fulfilling this trust I shall count entirely on the full cooperation of
the other departments of government and upon the zealous support of all
good citizens."

After noticing various objects which would require the attention of the
Legislature, the President addressed himself particularly to the House
of Representatives, and said: "I entertain a strong hope that the state
of the national finances is now sufficiently matured to enable you to
enter upon a systematic and effectual arrangement for the regular
redemption and discharge of the public debt, according to the right
which has been reserved to the government. No measure can be more
desirable, whether viewed with an eye to its intrinsic importance, or
to the general sentiments and wish of the nation."

The addresses of the two Houses in answer to the speech were, as usual,
respectful and affectionate. The several subjects recommended to the
attention of Congress, were noticed either in general terms, or in a
manner to indicate a coincidence of sentiment between the legislative
and executive departments. The turbulent spirit which had manifested
itself in certain parts of the Union, was mentioned by both houses with
a just degree of censure and the measures adopted by the President, as
well as the resolution he expressed to compel obedience to the laws,
were approved, and the House of Representatives, in the most
unqualified terms, declared opinions in favor of systematic and
effectual arrangements for discharging the public debt. But the
subsequent proceedings of the Legislature did not fulfill the
expectations excited by this auspicious commencement of the session.

At an early day in a committee of the whole House on the President's
speech, Mr. Fitzsimmons moved "that measures for the reduction of so
much of the public debt as the United States have a right to redeem,
ought to be adopted, and that the Secretary of the Treasury be directed
to report a plan for that purpose."

This motion was objected to by Mr. Madison as being premature. The
state of the finances, he thought, was not sufficiently understood to
authorize the adoption of the measure it contemplated. The debate,
however, soon took a different direction.

On a motion made, directing the Secretaries of the Treasury and of War
to attend the House and to give information, severe denunciations were
poured forth against the unconstitutionality of subjecting the
representatives to the control of the heads of the executive
departments. The motions for requiring a report from Hamilton on a plan
for redeeming the public debt, and for paying a debt owing to the bank,
which were brought in by Mr. Fitzsimmons, renewed the contest, but,
although Madison and others opposed the reference to the Secretary of
the Treasury, the resolution was carried.

Hamilton's report proposed a plan for the redemption of the debt. But
the expenses of the Indian war rendering it unsafe, in his opinion, to
rest absolutely on the existing revenue, he also proposed to extend the
internal taxes to pleasure horses, or pleasure carriages, as might be
deemed most advisable. For the reimbursement of the bank, he
recommended that power be conferred to negotiate a loan for two million
dollars--the dividends on the shares held by the government to be
pledged for the interest, and, as the government paid six per cent, to
the bank, he relied on the saving that would be effected by borrowing
at a lower rate of interest. The consideration of this report was
deferred on various grounds, and a motion was made to reduce the
military establishment. The debate was long and earnestly contested,
but the motion was rejected on the 5th of January, 1793.

A few weeks later another subject was introduced into the House which
absorbed the attention of the members and put an end, for the present
session, to every measure connected with the finances.

Mr. Giles, on the 23d of January (1793), moved several resolutions,
requiring information, among other things, on various points growing
out of the loans authorized by Congress in August, 1790. The object was
to inculpate the Secretary of the Treasury respecting the management
and application of these loans, and of the revenue generally. Mr. Giles
indulged himself in remarks which clearly showed the animus of his
proceedings, and it was his determination to prove to the House that
there was a large balance in the funds unaccounted for. The resolutions
were agreed to without debate, as was only due to Mr. Hamilton, and
soon after, three successive and able reports were sent in, containing
the information required.

In these reports a full exposition was given of the views and motives
of the secretary, in the conduct of the treasury department. It is also
evident that Hamilton felt aggrieved at this attack upon his
reputation, and he did not hesitate to use language of great plainness
and severity, observing in conclusion: "Thus have I not only furnished
a just and affirmative view of the real situation of the public
accounts, but have likewise shown, I trust, in a conspicuous manner,
fallacies enough in the statements, from which the inference of an
unaccounted-for balance is drawn, to evince that it is one tissue of
error."

But the matter did not end here. Mr. Giles, on the 28th of February
(1793), submitted to the House a series of nine resolutions, containing
charges against the secretary. The substance of them was, that he had
failed to give Congress information, in due time, of moneys drawn from
Europe; that he had violated the law of the 4th of August, 1790, by an
unauthorized application of money borrowed under it; that he had drawn
part of the money into the United States, without any instructions from
the President; that he had exceeded his authority in making loans,
under the acts; that, without instructions from the President, he had
drawn more of the money borrowed in Holland than he was authorized by
those acts, and that he had been guilty of an indecorum to the House,
in undertaking to judge its motives in calling for information. The
debate was continued until the night of March 1st (1793), and was
characterized by unusual bitterness. It terminated in a rejection of
the resolutions and consequently in an entire exculpation of Hamilton
from all just censure. The highest number voting in favor of any one of
the resolutions was sixteen.

"The whole of the session was spent," says Mr. Gibbs, "in sifting the
conduct of the secretary. [8] The investigation served one purpose of
the opposition--it prevented any question being taken on the report. It
seems somewhat anomalous, that a party which had charged the
administration with a wish to perpetuate the debt, should thus have
thwarted its measures to discharge it; and an explanation of the fact
can only be found in a fixed determination to break down the
secretary."

The other business of the session may be briefly stated. The claim for
compensation for loss on the certificates in which they had been paid,
advanced by the officers of the old Continental army, was rejected. An
act respecting "fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from the
service of their masters," was passed, early in February, by a vote of
forty-eight to seven. The trade with the Indians was regulated, and an
attempt was made to initiate an amendment to the constitution, because
the State of Georgia, sued in the Federal courts for a debt due to a
citizen of another State, had suffered judgment by default. And nearly
two millions of dollars were appropriated to the public service, in
addition to the almost three millions more for interest on the debt. On
Saturday, the 3d of March (1793), a constitutional period was put to
the existence of the present Congress. The members separated with
obvious symptoms of extreme irritation. "Various causes," says
Marshall, "the most prominent of which have already been noticed, had
combined to organize _two distinct parties_ in the United States, which
were rapidly taking the form of a ministerial and an opposition party.
By that in opposition, the President was not yet openly denounced. His
personal influence was too great to be encountered by a direct avowal
that he was at the head of their adversaries, and his public conduct
did not admit of a suspicion that he could allow himself to rank as the
chief of a party. Nor could public opinion he seduced to implicate him
in the ambitious plans and dark schemes for the subversion of liberty,
which were ascribed to a part of the administration, and to the leading
members who had supported the measures of finance adopted by the
Legislature."

Yet it was becoming apparent that things were taking a course which
must inevitably involve him in the political conflicts which were about
to take place. It was apparent that the charges against the Secretary
of the Treasury would not be relinquished, and that they were of a
nature to affect the chief magistrate materially, should his
countenance not be withdrawn from that officer. It was equally apparent
that the fervor of democracy, which was perpetually manifesting itself
in the papers, in invectives against levees, against the trappings of
royalty, and against the marks of peculiar respect which were paid to
the President, must soon include him more pointedly in its strictures.

These divisions, which are inherent in the nature of popular
governments, by which the chief magistrate, however unexceptionable his
conduct, and however exalted his character, must, sooner or later, be
more or less affected, were beginning to be essentially influenced by
the great events of Europe.

That revolution which has been the admiration, the wonder, and the
terror of the civilized world, had, from its commencement, been viewed
in America with the deepest interest. In its first stage, but one
sentiment respecting it prevailed, and that was a belief, accompanied
with an ardent wish, that it would improve the condition of France,
extend the blessings of liberty, and promote the happiness of the human
race. When the labors of the convention had terminated in a written
constitution, this unanimity of opinion was in some degree impaired. By
a few who had thought deeply on the science of government, and who, if
not more intelligent, certainly judge more dispassionately than their
fellow-citizens, that instrument was believed to contain the principles
of self-destruction. It was feared that a system so ill balanced could
not be permanent. A deep impression was made on the same persons by the
influence of the galleries over the Legislature, and of mobs over the
executive; by the tumultuous assemblages of the people, and their
licentious excesses during the short and sickly existence of the regal
authority. These did not appear to be the symptoms of a healthy
constitution or of genuine freedom. Persuaded that the present state of
things could not last, they doubted and they feared for the future.

In total opposition to this sentiment was that of the public generally.
There seems to be something infectious in the example of a powerful and
enlightened nation verging toward democracy, which impose on the human
mind, and leads human reason in fetters. Novelties, introduced by such
a nation, are stripped of the objections which had been preconceived
against them, and long-settled opinions yield to the overwhelming
weight of such dazzling authority. It wears the semblance of being the
sense of mankind, breaking loose from the shackles which had been
imposed by artifice, and asserting the freedom and the dignity of his
nature.

The constitution of France, therefore, was generally received with
unqualified plaudits. The establishment of a legislature consisting of
a single body was defended not only as being adapted to the particular
situation of that country, but as being right in itself. Certain
anonymous writers, who supported the theory of a balanced government,
were branded as the advocates of royalty and of aristocracy. To
question the duration of the present order of things was thought to
evidence an attachment to unlimited monarchy, or a blind prejudice in
favor of the institutions of Great Britain, and the partiality of
America in favor of a senate was visibly declining.

In this stage of the revolution, however, the division of sentiment was
not marked with sufficient distinctness, nor the passions of the people
agitated with sufficient violence, for any powerful effect to be
produced on the two parties in America. But when the monarchy was
completely overthrown and a republic decreed, [9] the people of the
United States seemed electrified by the measure, and its influence was
felt by the whole society. The war in which the several potentates of
Europe were engaged against France, although in almost every instance
declared by that power, was pronounced to be a war for the extirpation
of human liberty and for the banishment of free government from the
face of the earth. The preservation of the constitution of the United
States was supposed to depend on its issue, and the coalition against
France was treated as a coalition against America also.

A cordial wish for the success of the French arms, or rather that the
war might terminate without any diminution of French power, and in such
a manner as to leave the people of that country free to choose their
own form of government, was perhaps universal, but, respecting the
probable issue of their internal conflicts, perfect unanimity of
opinion did not prevail. By some few individuals, the practicability of
governing by a system formed on the republican model, an immense,
populous, and military nation, whose institutions, habits, and morals
were adapted to monarchy, and which was surrounded by armed neighbors,
was deemed a problem which time alone could solve. The circumstances
under which the abolition of royalty was declared, the massacres which
preceded it, the scenes of turbulence and violence which were acted in
every part of the nation, appeared to them to present an awful and
doubtful state of things, respecting which no certain calculations
could be made, and the idea that a republic was to be introduced and
supported by force, was, to them, a paradox in politics. Under the
influence of these appearances the apprehension was entertained that,
if the ancient monarchy should not be restored a military despotism
would be established. By the many, these unpopular doubts were deemed
unpardonable heresies, and the few to whom they were imputed, were
pronounced hostile to liberty. A suspicion that the unsettled state of
things in France had contributed to suspend the payment of the debt to
that nation had added to the asperity with which the resolutions on
that subject were supported, and the French revolution will be found to
have had great influence on the strength of parties and on the
subsequent political transactions of the United States.

1. Footnote: Griswold, "Republican Court."

2. Footnote: "Republican Court."

3. Footnote: For designating the site of the new seat of government.
Washington remained with the commissioners several days engaged in this
business.

4. Footnote: The following is the message which he delivered on this
occasion:

GENTLEMEN OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

I have maturely considered the act passed by the two Houses, entitled
"An act for the apportionment of representatives among the several
States according to the first enumeration," and I return it to your
House, wherein it originated, with the following objections.

First. The constitution has prescribed that representatives shall be
apportioned among the several States according to their respective
numbers, and there is no proportion or divisor which, applied to the
respective numbers of the States, will yield the number and allotment
of representatives proposed by the bill.

Secondly. The constitution has also provided that the number of
representatives shall not exceed one for thirty thousand--which
restriction is by the context, and by fair and obvious construction, to
be applied to the separate and respective numbers of the States--and
the bill has allotted to eight of the States more than one for thirty
thousand.

5. Footnote: Marshall.

6. Footnote: The salary of the Secretary of State, which was the
highest, was $3,500; that of the Secretary of the Treasury was $2,000.
Hamilton was finally obliged to resign, to gain a living.

7. Footnote: Mrs. Washington's maiden name was Frances Bassett. She was
the daughter of Colonel Bassett, an intimate friend of Washington.

8. Footnote: "Administrations of Washington and Adams."

9. Footnote: This event was announced to the President by the minister
plenipotentiary of France, at Philadelphia, in February, 1793. Through
the Secretary of State an answer was returned, of which the following
is an extract:

"The President receives with great satisfaction this attention of the
executive council, and the desire they have manifested of making known
to us the resolution entered into by the National Convention, even
before a definitive regulation of their new establishment could take
place. Be assured, sir, that the government and the citizens of the
United States view with the most sincere pleasure every advance of your
nation towards its happiness, an object essentially connected with its
liberty; and they consider the union of principles and pursuits between
our two countries as a link which binds still closer their interests
and affections.

"We earnestly wish, on our part, that these our mutual dispositions may
be improved to mutual good, by establishing our commercial intercourse
on principles as friendly to natural right and freedom as are those of
our governments."




CHAPTER VI.


WASHINGTON INAUGURATES THE SYSTEM OF NEUTRALITY. 1793.


As the time approached for the expiration of Washington's first term of
office as President of the United States, a great deal of anxiety was
felt lest he should determine on a final retirement from public life.
It was well known that he had originally accepted the office with
extreme reluctance, that his attention to its duties had impaired his
health, and that he was very desirous to pass the remainder of his life
in retirement and repose. But at the same time it was felt that a
crisis in public affairs was impending which imperatively demanded the
whole force of his character and the whole influence of his popularity
to sustain the government. Even at the period when the Federal
government was first inaugurated, the call of his country to give it
strength and permanence was not more urgent than that which now
summoned him to save it from the rage of party spirit. Troubles and
difficulties were also threatening the country from abroad as well as
internal factions at home, and the true friends of the country felt
that none but Washington was equal to the emergency. He received many
letters urging his continuance in office. Three of these were from
members of the cabinet--Jefferson, Hamilton, and Randolph.

Jefferson expressed himself as follows:

"When you first mentioned to me your purpose of retiring from the
government, though I felt all the magnitude of the event, I was in a
considerable degree silent. I knew that to such a mind as yours
persuasion was idle and impertinent; that, before forming your
decision, you had weighed all the reasons for and against the measure,
had made up your mind on full view of them, and that there could be
little hope of changing the result. Pursuing my reflections, too, I
knew we were some day to try to walk alone, and if the essay should be
made while you should be alive and looking on, we should derive
confidence from that circumstance and resource if it failed. The public
mind, too, was then calm and confident, and therefore in a favorable
state for making the experiment. Had no change of circumstances
supervened, I should not, with any hope of success, have now ventured
to propose to you a change of purpose. But the public mind is no longer
so confident and serene, and that from causes in which you are no ways
personally mixed.

"The confidence of the whole Union is centered in you. Your being at
the helm will be more than an answer to every argument which can be
used to alarm and lead the people in any quarter into violence or
secession. North and South will hang together, if they have you to hang
on; and if the first corrective of a numerous representation should
fail in its effect, your presence will give time for trying others not
inconsistent with the union and peace of the States.

"I am perfectly aware of the oppression under which your present office
lays your mind, and of the ardor with which you pant for retirement to
domestic life. But there is sometimes an eminence of character on which
society have such peculiar claims, as to control the predilection of
the individual for a particular walk of happiness and restrain him to
that alone arising from the present and future benedictions of mankind.
This seems to be your condition, and the law imposed on you by
Providence in forming your character and fashioning the events on which
it was to operate, and it is to motives like these and not to personal
anxieties of mine or others, who have no right to call on you for
sacrifices, that I appeal from your former determination, and urge a
revisal of it, on the ground of change in the aspect of things. Should
an honest majority result from the new and enlarged representation,
should those acquiesce, whose principles or interests they may control,
your wishes for retirement would be gratified with less danger, as soon
as that shall be manifest, without awaiting the completion of the
second period of four years. One or two sessions will determine the
crisis, and I cannot but hope that you can resolve to add one or two
more to the many years you have already sacrificed to the good of
mankind.

"The fear of suspicion that any selfish motive of continuance in office
may enter into this solicitation on my part obliges me to declare that
no such motive exists. It is a thing of mere indifference to the public
whether I retain or relinquish my purpose of closing my tour with the
first periodical renovation of the government. I know my own measure
too well to suppose that my services contribute anything to the public
confidence or the public utility. Multitudes can fill the office in
which you have been pleased to place me, as much to their advantage and
satisfaction. I, therefore, have no motive to consult but my own
inclination, which is bent irresistibly on the tranquil enjoyment of my
family, my farm, and my books. I should repose among them, it is true,
in far greater security, if I were to know that you remained at the
watch, and I hope it will be so. To the inducements urged from a view
of our domestic affairs I will add a bare mention of what indeed need
only be mentioned, that weighty motives for your continuance are to be
found in our foreign affairs. I think it probable that both the Spanish
and English negotiations, if not completed before your purpose is
known, will be suspended from the moment it is known, and that the
latter nation will then use double diligence in fomenting the Indian
war.

"With my wishes for the future I shall, at the same time, express my
gratitude of the past, at least my portion of it, and beg permission to
follow you, whether in public or private life, with those sentiments of
sincere attachment and respect with which I am unalterably, dear sir,
your affectionate friend and humble servant."

Extract from Hamilton's letter:

"I received the most sincere pleasure at finding, in our last
conversation, that there was some relaxation in the disposition you had
before discovered to decline a re-election. Since your departure I have
lost no opportunity of sounding the opinions of persons whose opinions
were worth knowing on these two points: First, the effect of your
declining upon the public affairs, and upon your own reputation;
secondly, the effect of your continuing in reference to the
declarations you have made of your disinclination to public life. And I
can truly say that I have not found the least difference of sentiment
on either point. The impression is uniform, that your declining would
be to be deplored as the greatest evil that could befall the country at
the present juncture, and as critically hazardous to your own
reputation; that your continuance will be justified in the mind of
every friend to his country by the evident necessity for it.

"It is clear, says everyone with whom I have conversed, that the
affairs of the national government are not yet firmly established; that
its enemies, generally speaking, are as inveterate as ever; that their
enmity has been sharpened by its success, and by all the resentments
which flow from disappointed predictions and mortified vanity; that a
general and strenuous effort is making in every State to place the
administration of it in the hands of its enemies, as if they were its
safest guardians; that the period of the next House of Representatives
is likely to prove the crisis of its permanent character; that, if you
continue in office, nothing materially mischievous is to be
apprehended, if you quit much is to be dreaded; that the same motives
which induced you to accept originally ought to decide you to continue
till matters have assumed a more determinate aspect; that indeed it
would have been better, as it regards your own character, that you had
never consented to come forward than now to leave the business
unfinished and in danger of being undone; that, in the event of storms
arising, there would be an imputation either of want of foresight or
want of firmness, and, in fine, that on public and personal accounts,
on patriotic and prudential considerations, the clear path to be
pursued by you will be again to obey the voice of your country, which
it is not doubted will be as earnest and as unanimous as ever.

"I trust, sir, and I pray God, that you will determine to make a
further sacrifice of your tranquility and happiness to the public good.
I trust that it need not continue above a year or two more. And I think
that it will be more eligible to retire from office before the
expiration of the term of election than to decline a re-election.

"The sentiments I have delivered upon this occasion I can truly say
proceed exclusively from an anxious concern for the public welfare and
an affectionate personal attachment. These dispositions must continue
to govern, in every vicissitude, one who has the honor to be very truly
and respectfully, sir, yours, etc."

Randolph wrote as follows:

"I have persuaded myself that this letter, though unconnected with any
official relation, and upon a subject to the decision of which you
alone are competent, will be received in the spirit with which it is
written. The Union, for the sake of which I have encountered various
embarrassments, not wholly unknown to you, and sacrificed some
opinions, which, but for its jeopardy, I should never have surrendered,
seems to me to be, now, at the eve of a crisis. It is feared by those
who take a serious interest in the affairs of the United States that
you will refuse the chair of government at the approaching election. If
such an event must happen indulge me, at least, in the liberty of
opening to you a course of thought, which a calm attention to the
Federal government has suggested, and no bias of party has influenced.

"It cannot have escaped you that divisions are formed in our politics
as systematic as those which prevail in Great Britain. Such as opposed
the constitution, from a hatred to the Union, can never be conciliated
by any overture or atonement. By others it is meditated to push the
construction of Federal powers to every tenable extreme. A third class,
republican in principle, and, thus far, in my judgment, happy in their
discernment of our welfare, have, notwithstanding, mingled with their
doctrines a fatal error--that the State assemblies are to be resorted
to as the engines of correction to the Federal administration. The
honors belonging to the chief magistracy are objects of no common
solicitude to a few, who compose a fourth denomination.

"The fuel which has been already gathered for combustion wants no
addition. But how awfully might it be increased were the violence,
which is now suspended by a universal submission to your pretensions,
let loose by your resignation! Permit me, then, in the fervor of a
dutiful and affectionate attachment to you, to beseech you to penetrate
the consequences of a dereliction of the reins. The constitution would
never have been adopted, but from a knowledge that you had once
sanctioned it, and an expectation that you would execute it. It is in a
state of probation. The most inauspicious struggles are past, but the
public deliberations need stability. You alone can give them stability.
You suffered yourself to yield when the voice of your country summoned
you to the administration. Should a civil war arise you cannot stay at
home. And now much easier will it be to disperse the factions which are
rushing to this catastrophe than to subdue them after they shall appear
in arms? It is the fixed opinion of the world that you surrender
nothing incomplete.

"I am not unapprised of many disagreeable sensations which have labored
in your breast. But, let them spring from any cause whatsoever, of one
thing I think I am sure (and I speak this from a satisfactory inquiry
lately made), that, if a second opportunity shall be given to the
people of showing their gratitude, they will not be less unanimous than
before."

Washington's own views we learn from the following letter in answer to
Randolph:

"The purpose of this letter is merely to acknowledge the receipt of
your favors of the 5th and 13th instant, and to thank you for the
information contained in both, without entering into the details of
either.

"With respect, however, to the interesting subject treated in that of
the 5th, I can express but one sentiment at this time, and that is a
wish, a devout one, that, whatever my ultimate determination shall be,
it may be for the best. The subject never recurs to my mind but with
additional poignancy, and, from the declining state of the health of my
nephew, to whom my concerns of a domestic and private nature are
entrusted, it comes with aggravated force. But as the all-wise Disposer
of events has hitherto watched over my steps, I trust that, in the
important one I may soon be called upon to take, He will mark the
course so plainly as that I cannot mistake the way. In full hope of
this I will take no measures for the present that will not leave me at
liberty to decide from circumstances and the best lights I can obtain
on the subject.

"I shall be happy, in the meantime, to see a cessation of the abuses of
public officers and of almost every measure of government with which
some of the gazettes are so strongly impregnated, and which cannot
fail, if persevered in with the malignancy with which they now teem, of
rendering the Union asunder. The seeds of discontent, distrust, and
irritation which are so plentifully sown, can scarcely fail to produce
this effect, and to mar that prospect of happiness which, perhaps,
never beamed with more effulgence upon any people under the sun, and
this too at a time when all Europe is gazing with admiration at the
brightness of our prospects. And for what is all this? Among other
things, to afford nuts for our transatlantic--(what shall I call
them?)--foes.

"In a word, if government and the officers of it are to be the constant
theme for newspaper abuse, and this too without condescending to
investigate the motives or the facts, it will be impossible, I
conceive, for any man living to manage the helm or to keep the machine
together. But I am running from my text, and therefore will only add
assurances of the affectionate esteem and regard with which I am, etc."

To the remonstrances of his immediate advisers in the Cabinet were
added many more of the same tenor from other friends and
correspondents. He had, in fact, already determined to retire at this
time, and had accordingly prepared a farewell address to the people for
the occasion. But he had never publicly declared this intention, and,
urged thus strongly by leading men of all parties, he finally consented
to remain in office.

"Respecting the person who should fill the office of Vice-President,"
says Marshall, "the public was divided. The profound statesman who had
been called to the duties of that station had drawn upon himself a
great degree of obloquy by some political tracts, in which he had
labored to maintain the proposition that a balance in government was
essential to the preservation of liberty. In these disquisitions he was
supposed by his opponents to have discovered sentiments in favor of
distinct orders in society, and, although he had spoken highly of the
constitution of the United States, it was imagined that his balance
could be maintained only by hereditary classes. He was also understood
to be friendly to the system of finance which had been adopted, and was
believed to be among the few who questioned the durability of the
French republic. His great services and acknowledged virtues were
therefore disregarded, and a competitor was sought for among those who
had distinguished themselves in the opposition. The choice was directed
from Mr. Jefferson by a constitutional restriction on the power of the
electors, which would necessarily deprive him of the vote to be given
by Virginia. It being necessary to designate some other opponent to Mr.
Adams, George Clinton, the Governor of New York, was selected for this
purpose.

"Throughout the war of the Revolution, this gentleman had filled the
office of chief magistrate of his native State, and, under
circumstances of real difficulty, had discharged its duties with a
courage and an energy which secured the esteem of the Commander-in-
Chief and gave him a fair claim to the favor of his country. Embracing
afterward with ardor the system of State supremacy, he had contributed
greatly to the rejection of the resolutions for investing Congress with
the power of collecting an impost on imported goods, and had been
conspicuous for his determined hostility to the constitution of the
United States. His sentiments respecting the measures of the government
were known to concur with those of the minority in Congress."

Both parties seemed confident in their strength, and both made the
utmost exertions to insure success. On opening the ballots in the
Senate chamber (Feb. 13, 1793), it appeared that the unanimous suffrage
of his country had been once more conferred on General Washington, and
that Mr. Adams had received a plurality of the votes. [1]

The ceremonial to be observed at the inauguration was the subject of a
difference of opinion, and a Cabinet council was called to take the
matter into consideration. Jefferson and Hamilton thought that the oath
ought to be administered in private, and that one of the judges of the
Supreme Court should attend to this duty at the President's own house.
Knox and Randolph were of a different opinion and decided that the
ceremony should take place in public. Washington coincided with them in
their views, and it was finally decided at a subsequent Cabinet
meeting, on the 1st of March, that the inauguration should take place
in the Senate chamber.

Among the senators who were present on this occasion were John Langdon
of New Hampshire, one of the purest and most disinterested of the
Revolutionary veterans; Oliver Ellsworth, from Connecticut, afterward
chief justice of the United States; Roger Sherman, also from
Connecticut, one of the committee for preparing the Declaration of
Independence; Rufus King, the eloquent statesman from New York; Robert
Morris, the great financier, from Pennsylvania, and James Monroe,
afterward President of the United States, from Virginia.

The proceedings, as recorded in Mr. Benton's "Abridgment of the Debates
of Congress," were as follows:

"Agreeably to notice given by the President of the United States on the
second instant, he came to the Senate chamber and took his seat in the
chair usually assigned to the president of the Senate, who, on this
occasion was seated at the right, and in advance of the President of
the United States; a seat on the left, and also in advance, being
provided for Judge Cushing, appointed to administer the oath. The doors
of the Senate chamber being open, the heads of the departments, foreign
ministers, the late speaker, and such members of the late House of
Representatives as were in town, together with as many other spectators
as could be accommodated, were present.

"After a short pause the president of the Senate arose and addressed
the President of the United States as follows:

"'Sir:--One of the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States is
now present and ready to administer to you the oath required by the
constitution to be taken by the President of the United States.'

"On which the President of the United States, rising from his seat, was
pleased to address the audience as follows:

"'FELLOW-CITIZENS:--I am again called upon, by the voice of my country,
to execute the functions of its chief magistrate. When the occasion
proper for it shall arrive, I shall endeavor to express the high sense
I entertain of this distinguished honor, and of the confidence which
has been reposed in me by the people of United America.

"'Previous to the execution of any official act of the President, the
constitution requires an oath of office. This oath I am now about to
take, and in your presence; that, if it shall be found during my
administration of the government, I have, in any instance, violated,
willingly, or knowingly, the injunction thereof, I may (besides
incurring constitutional punishment) be subject to the upbraidings of
all who are now witnesses of the present solemn ceremony.'

"Judge Cushing then administered the oath of office required by the
constitution, after which the President of the United States retired,
and the spectators dispersed."

The record of the proceedings thus given by Mr. Benton gives but a very
imperfect idea of the actual scene. Fortunately, an eye-witness, Arthur
J. Stansbury, for twenty-five years a reporter of Congress, has given
us a very lively and graphic description of the scene in his
"Recollections and Anecdotes of the Presidents of the United States."
[2]

We copy his description in full:

"But I once had," says Mr. Stansbury, "an opportunity far more
favorable of beholding this greatest of men, under circumstances the
best possible for exhibiting him to the fullest advantage. It was a
privilege which could happen but once to any man, and I esteem the hour
when I enjoyed it as one of the brightest moments I was ever permitted
to know. Its remembrance yet glows vividly on my mind; years have not
dimmed it; the whole scene is yet before me; and I need not say with
what force repeated public occasions of a like kind have since recalled
it to remembrance. Yes, it was my favored lot to see and hear President
Washington address the Congress of the United States, when elected for
the last time. Of men now living, how few can say the same!

"I was but a schoolboy at the time, and had followed one of the many
groups of people who, from all quarters, were making their way to the
hall in Chestnut street, at the corner of Fifth, where the two Houses
of Congress then held their sittings, and where they were that day to
be addressed by the President, on the opening of his second term of
office. Boys can often manage to work their way through a crowd better
than men can; at all events, it so happened that I succeeded in
reaching the steps of the hall, from which elevation, looking in every
direction, I could see nothing but human heads--a vast fluctuating sea,
swaying to and fro, and filling every accessible place which commanded
even a distant view of the building. They had congregated, not with the
hope of getting into the hall, for that was physically impossible, but
that they might see Washington. Many an anxious look was cast in the
direction from which he was expected to come, till at length, true to
the appointed hour (he was the most punctual of men), an agitation was
observable on the outskirts of the crowd, which gradually opened and
gave space for the approach of an elegant white coach, drawn by six
superb white horses, having on its four sides beautiful designs of the
four seasons, painted by Cipriani. It slowly made its way till it drew
up immediately in front of the hall. The rush was now tremendous. But
as the coach door opened, there issued from it two gentlemen, with long
white wands, who, with some difficulty, parted the people, so as to
open a passage from the carriage to the steps, on which the fortunate
schoolboy had achieved a footing, and whence the whole proceeding could
be distinctly seen. As the person of the President emerged from the
carriage, a universal shout rent the air, and continued, as he very
deliberately mounted the steps. On reaching the platform, he paused,
looking back on the carriage, thus affording to the anxiety of the
people the indulgence they desired, of feasting their eyes upon his
person. Never did a more majestic personage present himself to the
public gaze. He was within two feet of me; I could have touched his
clothes; but I should as soon have thought of touching an electric
battery. Boy as I was, I felt as in the presence of a Divinity. As he
turned to enter the hall, the gentlemen with the white wands preceded
him, and, with still greater difficulty than before, repressed the
people, and cleared a way to the great staircase. As he ascended, I
ascended with him, step by step, creeping close to the wall, and almost
hidden by the skirts of his coat. Nobody looked at me; everybody was
looking at him; and thus I was permitted, unnoticed, to glide along,
and, happily, to make my way (where so many were vainly longing and
struggling to enter) into the lobby of the chamber of the House of
Representatives. Once in, I was safe; for had I even been seen by the
officers in attendance, it would have been impossible to get me out
again. I saw near me a large pyramidal stove, which, fortunately, had
but little fire in it, and on which I forthwith clambered, until I had
attained a secure perch, from which every part of the hall could be
deliberately and distinctly surveyed. Depend upon it, I made use of my
eyes.

"On either side of the broad aisle that was left vacant in the center
were assembled the two houses of Congress. As the President entered,
all rose, and remained standing till he had ascended the steps at the
upper end of the chamber and taken his seat in the speaker's chair. It
was an impressive moment. Notwithstanding that the spacious apartment,
floor, lobby, galleries, and all approaches were crowded to their
utmost capacity, not a sound was heard; the silence of expectation was
unbroken and profound; every breath seemed suspended. He was dressed in
a full suit of the richest black velvet; his lower limbs in short
clothes with diamond knee buckles and black silk stockings. His shoes,
which were brightly japanned, were surmounted with large square silver
buckles. His hair, carefully displayed in the manner of the day, was
richly powdered, and gathered behind into a black silk bag, on which
was a bow of black ribbon. In his hand he carried a plain cocked hat,
decorated with the American cockade. He wore by his side a light,
slender dress-sword, in a green shagreen scabbard, with a richly
ornamented hilt. His gait was deliberate, his manner solemn but self-
possessed, and he presented, altogether, the most august human figure I
had then or have since beheld.

"At the head of the Senate stood Thomas Jefferson, in a blue coat,
single breasted, with large bright basket-buttons, his vest and small-
clothes of crimson. I remember being struck with his animated
countenance, of a brick-red hue, his bright eye and foxy hair, as well
as by his tall, gaunt, ungainly form and square shoulders. A perfect
contrast was presented by the pale reflective face and delicate figure
of James Madison, and above all, by the short, burly, bustling form of
General Knox, with ruddy cheek, prominent eye, and still more prominent
proportions of another kind. In the semicircle which was formed behind
the chair, and on either hand of the President, my boyish gaze was
attracted by the splendid attire of the Chevalier d'Yrujo, the Spanish
ambassador, then the only foreign minister near our infant government.
His glittering star, his silk chapeau bras, edged with ostrich
feathers, his foreign air and courtly bearing, contrasted strongly with
those nobility of nature's forming who stood around him. It was a very
fair representation of the old world and the new. How often has the
same reflection occurred to me since, on witnessing the glittering and
now numerous company of foreign dignitaries collected round our
President by an inauguration day, or the recurrence of our national
anniversary! True, the individuals who form that brilliant coterie are,
for the most part, men eminent for general intelligence, as well as the
virtues of private life--men who meet, and well deserve, a cordial
welcome on our shores and often carry from it the sincerest regret. But
how do the personal sentiments and characters of the men themselves put
out the blaze of the gold and diamonds with which their governments had
covered them! And if, even in the unadorned presence of his successors,
these decorations seem puerile in Republican eyes, how would they have
faded away and been lost in the chilling grandeur of the public
presence of Washington!

"Having retained his seat for a few moments, while the members resumed
their seats, the President rose, and, taking from his breast a roll of
manuscript, proceeded to read his address. His voice was full and
sonorous, deep and rich in its tones, free from that trumpet ring which
it could assume amid the tumult of battle (and which is said to have
been distinctly heard above all its roar), but sufficiently loud and
clear to fill the chamber, and be heard, with perfect ease, in its most
remote recesses. The address was of considerable length; its topics, of
course, I forget, for I was too young to understand them; I only
remember, in its latter part, some reference to the Wabash river (then
a new name to my ear), and to claims or disputes on the part of the
Indian tribes. He read, as he did everything else, with a singular
serenity and composure, with manly ease and dignity, but without the
smallest attempt at display.

"Having concluded, he laid the manuscript upon the table before him and
resumed his seat, when, after a slight pause, he rose and withdrew, the
members rising and remaining on their feet until he left the chamber.

"The paper was then taken up by Mr. Beckley, the clerk of the House,
and again read from beginning to end. Beckley's enunciation, by the by,
was admirably clear, giving every syllable of every word, and I may
say, he was almost the only officer, whose official duty it is to read,
whom I ever heard read well.

"This form having been gone through, the members of the Senate retired
and I took advantage of the bustle to descend from my unwonted and
presumptuous elevation, and mingle with the dissolving crowd."

These recollections of Mr. Stansbury present a much livelier view of
the transactions of that memorable day; than that which any reader's
imagination can supply by the aid of the official record.

Washington was now once more plunged into the troubled ocean of public
affairs. Before following him into new scenes of self-sacrifice and
disinterestedness in the service of his country, we pause to notice a
pleasing act of private friendship, which, with his usual delicacy, he
calls an act of simple justice. In consequence of the active part which
he had taken in the French revolution, Washington's bosom friend,
Lafayette, had become a prisoner to the King of Prussia, and was
detained in captivity. The Marchioness Lafayette, after being a
prisoner in Paris, had been suffered to retire to her husband's estate,
and reside there under the safeguard of the municipality, without
permission to correspond with her friends. Ignorant of her actual
residence, but supposing that she might be suffering for want of ready
money, Washington sent her a considerable sum, and wrote as follows:

"MADAM:--If I had words that could convey to you an adequate idea of my
feelings on the present situation of the Marquis de Lafayette, this
letter would appear to you in a different garb. The sole object in
writing to you now is, to inform you that I have deposited in the hands
of Mr. Nicholas Van Staphorst, of Amsterdam, two thousand three hundred
and ten guilders, Holland currency, equal to two hundred guineas,
subject to your orders.

"This sum is, I am certain, the least I am indebted for services
rendered to me by the Marquis de Lafayette, of which I never yet have
received the account. I could add much, but it is best, perhaps, that I
should say little on this subject. Your goodness will supply any
deficiency.

"The uncertainty of your situation, after all the inquiries I have
made, has occasioned a delay in this address and remittance, and even
now, the measure adopted is more the effect of a desire to find where
you are, than from any knowledge I have obtained of your residence.

"At all times, and under all circumstances, you and yours will possess
the affectionate regards of him who has the honor to be, etc."

Shortly after writing this letter Washington received one from the
marchioness, and still later another, both written before the above
letter reached her. She requested Washington's interference with the
Prussian government on behalf of Lafayette, and was desirous, if he
could be released, that he and his family should reside in the United
States. Everything was done that could be done, by Washington and the
American ministers in Europe, to obtain Lafayette's release, but it was
not effected till several years after, and then through other means.

During the recess of Congress, Washington twice visited Mount Vernon,
once for a few days in April (1793), and again, for two or three weeks
in June and July. On the 4th of July he was present at the celebration
of the national anniversary by the citizens of Alexandria. He was
prevented from spending more time at Mount Vernon by the pressure of
public business, which was now assuming a new and very unpleasant
aspect.

During Washington's short visit to Mount Vernon in April, he received a
letter from Jefferson, dated April 7th, (1793), informing him that
France had declared war against England and Holland. Instantly
perceiving the danger of the United States becoming involved in the
hostilities of these nations, Washington, on the 12th of April, wrote
in reply to Jefferson: "War having actually commenced between France
and Great Britain, it behooves the government of this country to use
every means in its power to prevent the citizens thereof from
embroiling us with either of those powers, by endeavoring to maintain a
strict neutrality. I therefore require that you will give the subject
mature consideration, that such measures as shall be deemed most likely
to effect this desirable purpose may be adopted without delay, for I
have understood that vessels are already designated as privateers, and
are preparing accordingly. Such other measures as may be necessary for
us to pursue against events, which it may not be in our power to avoid
or control, you will also think of, and lay them before me on my
arrival in Philadelphia; for which place I shall set out tomorrow, but
will leave it to the advices which I may receive tonight by the post,
to determine whether it is to be by the direct route or by the one I
proposed to come, that is, by Reading."

The tenor of this letter shows that Washington was fully aware of the
importance of the emergency in our foreign relations which had now
arisen, and the result showed that, as usual, he was fully equal to the
occasion. The difficulty of the position arose from the fact already
adverted to--that of the two great political parties then existing, one
was in favor of direct aid to the French revolutionists, while the
other, desirous to remain neutral while the European contest was going
on, was charged by its opponents with partiality to England. It
remained for Washington, by that decision of character and inflexible
firmness for which he was so remarkable, to inaugurate that system of
neutrality and noninterference in the affairs of Europe, which has ever
since constituted the foreign policy of this country.

On his return to Philadelphia, Washington summoned a meeting of the
Cabinet, at the same time sending to each member a series of questions
to be considered as preparatory to the meeting. These questions,
thirteen in number, all referred to the measures to be taken by the
President in consequence of the revolution which had overthrown the
French monarchy; of the new organization of a republic in that country;
of the appointment of a minister from that republic to the United
States, and of the war declared by the National Convention of France
against Great Britain. The first of these questions, says Mr. Adams,
[3] was, whether a proclamation should issue to prevent interferences
of our citizens in the war, and whether the proclamation should or
should not contain a declaration of neutrality. The second was, whether
a minister from the Republic of France should be received. Upon these
two questions the opinion of the Cabinet was unanimous in the
affirmative--that a proclamation of neutrality should issue, and that
the minister from the French Republic should be received. But upon all
the other questions, the opinions of the four heads of the departments
were equally divided. They were indeed questions of difficulty and
delicacy equal to their importance. No less than whether, after a
revolution in France annihilating the government with which the
treaties of alliance and of commerce had been contracted, the treaties
themselves were to be considered binding as between the nations, and
particularly whether the stipulation of guarantee to France of her
possessions in the West Indies, was binding upon the United States to
the extent of imposing upon them the obligation of taking side with
France in the war. As the members of the Cabinet disagreed in their
opinions upon these questions, and as there was no immediate necessity
for deciding them, the further consideration of them was postponed, and
they were never afterwards resumed. While these discussions of the
Cabinet of Washington were held, the minister plenipotentiary from the
French republic arrived in this country. He had been appointed by the
National Convention of France, which had dethroned, tried, sentenced to
death, and executed Louis the Sixteenth, abolished the monarchy, and
proclaimed a republic one and indivisible, under the auspices of
liberty, equality, and fraternity, as thenceforth the government of
France. By all the rest of Europe they were then considered as revolted
subjects in rebellion against their sovereign, and were not recognized
as constituting an independent government.

Hamilton and Knox were of opinion that the minister from France should
be conditionally received, with the reservation of the question whether
the United States were still bound to fulfill the stipulations of the
treaties. They inclined to the opinion that treaties themselves were
annulled by the revolution of the government in France--an opinion to
which the example of the revolutionary government had given
plausibility by declaring some of the treaties made by the abolished
monarchy no longer binding upon the nation. Mr. Hamilton thought, also,
that France had no just claim to the fulfillment of the stipulation of
guarantee, because that stipulation, and the whole treaty of alliance
in which it was contained, were professedly, and on the face of them,
only defensive, while the war which the French convention had declared
against Great Britain, was on the part of France offensive, the first
declaration having been issued by her--that the United States were at
all events absolved from the obligation of the guarantee by their
inability to perform it, and that under the constitution of the United
States the interpretation of treaties, and the obligations resulting
from them, were within the competency of the executive department, at
least concurrently with the Legislature. It does not appear that these
opinions were debated or contested in the Cabinet. By their unanimous
advice the proclamation was issued, and it was decided to receive a
minister plenipotentiary of the French republic. Thus the executive
administration did assume and exercise the power of recognizing a
revolutionary foreign government as a legitimate sovereign, with whom
the ordinary diplomatic relations were to be entertained. But the
proclamation contained no allusion whatever to the United States and
France, nor of course to the article of guarantee or its obligations.

Whatever doubts may have been entertained by a large portion of people
of the right of the executive to acknowledge a new and revolutionary
government, not recognized by any other sovereign State, or of the
sound policy of receiving, without waiting for the sanction of
Congress, a minister from a republic which had commenced her career by
putting to death the King whom she had dethroned, and which had rushed
into war with almost all the rest of Europe, no manifestation of such
doubts was publicly made. A current of popular favor sustained the
French revolution, at that stage of its progress, which nothing could
resist, and far from indulging any question of the right of the
President to recognize a new revolutionary government, by receiving
from it the credentials which none but sovereigns can grant, the
American people would, at that moment, have scarcely endured an instant
of hesitation on the part of the President, which should have delayed
for an hour the reception of the minister from the republic of France.
But the proclamation enjoining neutrality upon the people of the United
States, indirectly counteracted the torrent of partiality in favor of
France, and was immediately assailed with intemperate violence in many
of the public journals. The right of the executive to issue any
proclamation of neutrality was fiercely and pertinaciously denied as a
usurpation of legislative authority, and in that particular case it was
charged with forestalling and prematurely deciding the question whether
the United States were bound, by the guarantee to France of her West
India possessions in the treaty of alliance, to take side in the war
with her against Great Britain--and with deciding it against France.

The proclamation of neutrality was signed on the 22d of April, 1793,
and was immediately published. "This measure," says Mr. Sparks, "both
in regard to its character and its consequences, was one of the most
important of Washington's administration. It was the basis of a system
by which the intercourse with foreign nations was regulated, and which
was rigidly adhered to. In fact, it was the only step that could have
saved the United States from being drawn into the vortex of European
wars, which raged with so much violence for a long time afterward. Its
wisdom and its good effects are now so obvious, on a calm review of
past events, that one is astonished at the opposition it met with, and
the strifes it enkindled, even after making due allowance for the
passions and prejudices which had hitherto been at work in producing
discord and divisions."

The proclamation of neutrality furnished the first occasion which was
thought a fit one for openly assaulting a character, around which the
affections of the people had thrown an armor theretofore deemed sacred,
and for directly criminating the conduct of the President himself. It
was only by opposing passions to passions, by bringing the feeling in
favor of France into conflict with those in favor of the chief
magistrate, that the enemies of his administration could hope to obtain
the victory.

For a short time the opponents of this measure treated it with some
degree of delicacy. The opposition prints occasionally glanced at the
executive, considered all governments, including that of the United
States, as naturally hostile to the liberty of the people, and ascribed
to this disposition the combination of European governments against
France, and the apathy with which this combination was contemplated by
the executive. At the same time the most vehement declamations were
published for the purpose of inflaming the resentments of the people
against Britain; of enhancing the obligations of America to France; of
confirming the opinions that the coalition of European monarchs was
directed not less against the United States than against Great Britain,
and that those who did not avow this sentiment were the friends of that
coalition, and equally the enemies of America and France.

These publications, in the first instance sufficiently bitter, quickly
assumed a highly increased degree of acrimony.

As soon as the commotions which succeeded the deposition of Louis XVI
had, in some degree, subsided, the attention of the French government
was directed to the United States, and the resolution was taken to
recall the minister who had been appointed by the King, and to replace
him with one who might be expected to enter with more enthusiasm into
the views of the republic.

Edmund Charles Genet, a man of considerable talents, and of an ardent
temper, was selected for this purpose. The letters he brought to the
executive of the United States and his instructions, which he
occasionally communicated, were in a high degree flattering to the
nation, and decently respectful to its government. But Mr. Genet was
also furnished with private instructions, which the course of
subsequent events tempted him to publish. These indicated that if the
American executive should not be found sufficiently compliant with the
views of France, the resolution had been taken to appeal to the people
of the United States against their own government, and thus to effect
an object which legitimate negotiations might fail to accomplish.

Mr. Genet possessed many qualities which were peculiarly adapted to the
objects of his mission, but he seems to have been betrayed by the
flattering reception which was given him and by the universal fervor
expressed for his republic, into a too speedy disclosure of his
intentions.

On the 8th of April (1793) he arrived, not at Philadelphia, but at
Charleston in South Carolina, a port whose contiguity to the West
Indies would give it peculiar convenience as a resort for privateers.
He was received by the governor of that State, and by its citizens,
with an enthusiasm well calculated to dissipate every doubt he might
previously have entertained concerning the dispositions on which he was
to operate. At this place he continued for several days, receiving
extravagant marks of public attachment, during which time he undertook
to authorize the fitting and arming of vessels in that port, enlisting
men, and giving commissions to cruise and commit hostilities on nations
with whom the United States were at peace.

The captures made by these cruisers were brought into port and the
consuls of France were assuming, under the authority of Mr. Genet, to
hold courts of admiralty on them, to try, condemn, and authorize their
sale.

From Charleston Mr. Genet proceeded by land to Philadelphia, receiving
on his journey at the different towns through which he passed such
marks of enthusiastic attachment as had never before been lavished on a
foreign minister. On the 16th of May (1793) he arrived at Philadelphia,
preceded by the intelligence of his transactions in South Carolina.
This information did not diminish the extravagant transports of joy
with which he was welcomed by the great body of the inhabitants. Means
had been taken to render his entry pompous and triumphal, and the
opposition papers exultingly stated that he was met at Gray's ferry by
"crowds who flocked from every avenue of the city to meet the
republican ambassador of an allied nation."

The day succeeding his arrival he received addresses of congratulation
from particular societies, and from the citizens of Philadelphia, who
waited on him in a body, in which they expressed their fervent
gratitude for the "zealous and disinterested aids" which the French
people had furnished to America, unbounded exultation at the success
with which their arms had been crowned, and a positive conviction that
the safety of the United States depended on the establishment of the
republic. The answers to these addresses were well calculated to
preserve the idea of a complete fraternity between the two nations, and
that their interests were identified.

The day after being thus accredited by the citizens of Philadelphia he
was presented to the President, by whom he was received with frankness
and with expressions of a sincere and cordial regard for his nation. In
the conversation which took place on this occasion Mr. Genet gave the
most explicit assurances that, in consequence of the distance of the
United States from the theater of action, and of other circumstances,
France did not wish to engage them in war, but would willingly leave
them to pursue their happiness and prosperity in peace. The more ready
faith was given to these declarations, because it was believed that
France might derive advantages from the neutrality of America, which
would be a full equivalent for any services which she could render as a
belligerent.

Before Genet had reached Philadelphia, however, a long catalogue of
complaints, partly founded on his proceedings in Charleston, had been
made by the British minister to the American executive.

This catalogue was composed of the assumptions of sovereignty already
mentioned--assumptions calculated to render America an instrument of
hostility to be wielded by France against those powers with which she
might be at war.

These were still further aggravated by the commission of actual
hostilities within the territories of the United States. The ship
Grange, a British vessel which had been cleared out from Philadelphia,
was captured by the French frigate L'Ambuscade within the capes of the
Delaware, while on her way to the ocean.

The prizes thus unwarrantably made, being brought within the power of
the American government, Mr. Hammond, among other things, demanded a
restitution of them.

On many of the points suggested by the conduct of Mr. Genet, and by the
memorials of the British minister, it would seem impossible that any
difference of opinion could exist among intelligent men not under the
dominion of a blind infatuation. Accordingly it was agreed in the
Cabinet, without a dissenting voice, that the jurisdiction of every
independent nation, within the limits of its own territory, being of a
nature to exclude the exercise of any authority therein by a foreign
power, the proceedings complained of, not being warranted by any
treaty, were usurpations of national sovereignty and violations of
neutral rights, a repetition of which it was the duty of the government
to prevent.

It was also agreed that the efficacy of the laws should be tried
against those citizens of the United States who had joined in
perpetrating the offense.

The question of restitution, except as to the "Grange," was more
dubious. The cabinet agreed, however, that the original owners might
claim indemnification, and that if the property was not restored by the
captors, the value of it ought to be paid by the government of the
United States.

Genet was much dissatisfied with these decisions of the American
government. He denounced them as contrary to natural right, and
subversive of the treaties by which the two nations were connected. In
his exposition of these treaties, he claimed, for his own country, all
that the two nations were restricted from conceding to others, thereby
converting negative limitations into an affirmative grant of privileges
to France.

Without noticing a want of decorum in some of the expressions which
Genet had employed, he was informed that the subjects on which his
letter treated had, from respect to him, been reconsidered by the
executive; but that no cause was perceived for changing the system
which had been adopted. He was further informed that, in the opinion of
the President, the United States owed it to themselves and to the
nations in their friendship, to expect, as a reparation for the offense
of infringing their sovereignty, that the vessels thus illegally
equipped would depart from their ports.

Genet was not disposed to acquiesce in these decisions. Adhering to his
own construction of the existing treaty, he affected to consider the
measures of the American government as infractions of it, which no
power in the nation had a right to make, unless the United States in
Congress assembled should determine that their solemn engagements
should no longer be performed. Intoxicated with the sentiments
expressed by a great portion of the people, and unacquainted with the
firm character of Washington, he seems to have expected that the
popularity of his nation would enable him to overthrow the
administration, or to render it subservient to his views. It is
difficult otherwise to account for his persisting to disregard its
decisions, and for passages with which his letters abound, such as the
following:

"Every obstruction by the government of the United States to the arming
of French vessels must be an attempt on the rights of man, upon which
repose the independence and laws of the United States; a violation of
the ties which unite the people of France and America; and even a
manifest contradiction of the system of neutrality of the President;
for, in fact, if our merchant vessels, as others, are not allowed to
arm themselves, when the French alone are resisting the league of all
the tyrants against the liberty of the people, they will be exposed to
inevitable ruin in going out of the ports of the United States, which
is certainly not the intention of the people of America. Their
fraternal voice has resounded from every quarter around me, and their
accents are not equivocal. They are pure as the hearts of those by whom
they are expressed, and the more they have touched my sensibility, the
more they must interest in the happiness of America the nation I
represent;--the more I wish, sir, that the Federal government should
observe, as far as in their power, the public engagements contracted by
both nations; and that, by this generous and prudent conduct, they will
give at least to the world the example of a true neutrality, which does
not consist in the cowardly abandonment of their friends in the moment
when danger menaces them, but in adhering strictly, if they can do no
better, to the obligations they have contracted with them. It is by
such proceedings that they will render themselves respectable to all
the powers; that they will preserve their friends and deserve to
augment their numbers."

A few days previous to the reception of the letter from which the above
is an extract, two citizens of the United States, who had been engaged
by Genet in Charleston to cruise in the service of France, were
arrested by the civil magistrate, in pursuance of the determination
formed by the executive for the prosecution of persons having thus
offended against the laws. Genet demanded their release in the
following extraordinary terms:

"I have this moment been informed that two officers in the service of
the republic of France, citizen Gideon Henfield and John Singletary,
have been arrested on board the privateer of the French republic, the
Citizen Genet, and conducted to prison. The crime laid to their
charge--the crime which my mind cannot conceive, and which my pen
almost refuses to state--is the serving of France, and defending with
her children the common glorious cause of liberty.

"Being ignorant of any positive law or treaty which deprives Americans
of this privilege, and authorizes officers of police arbitrarily to
take mariners in the service of France from on board their vessels, I
call upon your intervention, sir, and that of the President of the
United States, in order to obtain the immediate releasement of the
above-mentioned officers, who have acquired, by the sentiments
animating them and by the act of their engagement, anterior to every
act to the contrary, the right of French citizens, if they have lost
that of American citizens."

Such an insolent style of address as this could not be otherwise than
deeply offensive to Washington. He must have regarded this, and most of
the other effusions of Genet, as studied insults, net only to himself,
but to the country of which he was the chief magistrate. Yet, in no
single instance did the administration in its communications with
Genet, permit itself to be betrayed into the use of one intemperate
expression. The firmness with which his extravagant pretensions were
resisted, proceeding entirely from a sense of duty and conviction of
right, was unaccompanied with any marks of that resentment which his
language and his conduct were alike calculated to inspire.

Genet's intemperate language and insolent conduct arose from a belief
that the people were ready to support his pretensions, in opposition to
their own government. This belief was strengthened by the proceedings
and publications of the party opposed to the administration. Civic
festivals and other public assemblages of people, at which the ensigns
of France were displayed in union with those of America--at which the
red cap, as a symbol of French liberty and fraternity, triumphantly
passed from head to head--at which toasts were given expressive of a
desire to identify the people of America with those of France, and,
under the imposing guise of adhering to principles not to men,
containing allusions to the influence of the President which could not
be mistaken--appeared to Genet to indicate a temper extremely
favorable to his hopes, and very different from that which would be
required for the preservation of an honest neutrality.

Through the medium of the press, these sentiments were communicated to
the public, and were represented as flowing from the hearts of the
great body of the people.

Soon after the arrival of Genet, a democratic society was formed in
Philadelphia on the model of the Jacobin clubs in Paris. An anxious
solicitude for the preservation of freedom, the very existence of which
was menaced by a "European confederacy transcendent in power and
unparalleled in iniquity," which was endangered also by "the pride of
wealth and arrogance of power" displayed within the United States, was
the motive assigned for the association. "A constant circulation of
useful information, and a liberal communication of republican
sentiments, were thought to be the best antidotes to any political
poison with which the vital principle of civil liberty might be
attacked;" and to give the more extensive operation to their labors, a
corresponding committee was appointed, through whom they would
communicate with other societies which might be established on similar
principles throughout the United States.

Faithful to their founder, and true to the real objects of their
association, these societies continued during the term of their
existence to be the resolute champions of all the encroachments
attempted by the agents of the French republic on the government of the
United States, and the steady defamers of the views and measures of the
American executive.

Thus strongly supported, Genet persisted in his construction of the
treaties between the two nations, and, in defiance of the positive
determination of the government, continued to act according to that
construction.

At this period Washington was called to Mount Vernon by urgent
business, which detained him less than three weeks; and, in his
absence, the heads of departments superintended the execution of those
rules which had been previously established.

In this short interval a circumstance occurred, strongly marking the
rashness of Genet, and his disrespect to the executive of the United
States.

The Little Sarah, an English merchantman, had been captured by a French
frigate and brought into the port of Philadelphia, where she was
completely equipped as a privateer, and was just about to sail on a
cruise, under the name of le Petit Democrat, when Hamilton communicated
her situation to Jefferson and Knox, the Secretaries of State and of
War; in consequence of which, Governor Mifflin was desired to cause an
examination of the fact. The warden of the port was directed to
institute the proper inquiries, and, late in the evening of the 6th of
July, he reported her situation, and that she was to sail the next day.

In pursuance of the instructions which had been given by the President,
the governor immediately sent Secretary Dallas for the purpose of
prevailing on Genet to relieve him from the employment of force, by
detaining the vessel in port until the arrival of Washington, who was
then on his way from Mount Vernon. Mr. Dallas communicated this message
to the French minister in terms as conciliatory as its nature would
permit. On receiving it, he gave aloose to the most extravagant
passion. After exclaiming with vehemence against the measure, he
complained, in strong terms, and with many angry epithets, of the ill
treatment which he had received from some of the officers of the
general government, which he contrasted with the cordial attachment
that was expressed by the people at large for his nation. He ascribed
the conduct of those officers to principles inimical to the cause of
France and of liberty. He insinuated that, by their influence,
Washington had been misled, and observed, with considerable emphasis,
that the President was not the sovereign of this country. The powers of
peace and war being vested in Congress, it belonged to that body to
decide those questions growing out of treaties which might involve
peace or war, and the President, therefore, ought to have assembled the
national Legislature before he ventured to issue his proclamation of
neutrality, or to prohibit, by his instructions to the State governors,
the enjoyment of the particular rights which France claimed under the
express stipulations of the treaty of commerce. The executive
construction of that treaty was neither just nor obligatory, and he
would make no engagement which might be construed into a relinquishment
of rights which his constituents deemed indispensable. In the course of
this vehement and angry declamation, he spoke of publishing his
correspondence with the officers of government, together with a
narrative of his proceedings, and said that, although the existing
causes would warrant an abrupt departure, his regard for the people of
America would induce him to remain here, amidst the insults and
disgusts that he daily suffered in his official character from the
public officers, until the meeting of Congress, and if that body should
agree in the opinions and support the measures of the President, he
would certainly withdraw, and leave the dispute to be adjusted between
the two nations themselves. His attention being again called by Mr.
Dallas to the particular subject, he peremptorily refused to enter into
any arrangements for suspending the departure of the privateer, and
cautioned him against any attempt to seize her, as she belonged to the
republic, and, in defense of the honor of her flag, would
unquestionably repel force by force.

On receiving the report of Mr. Dallas, Governor Mifflin ordered out 120
militia, for the purpose of taking possession of the privateer, and
communicated the case, with all its circumstances, to the officers of
the executive government. On the succeeding day, Jefferson waited on
Genet, in the hope of prevailing on him to pledge his word that the
privateer should not leave the port until the arrival of the President.
The minister was not less intemperate with Jefferson than he had been
with Dallas. He indulged himself in a repetition of nearly the same
passionate language, and again spoke, with extreme harshness of the
conduct of the executive. He persisted in refusing to make any
engagements for the detention of the vessel, and, after his rage had in
some degree spent itself, he entreated that no attempt might be made to
take possession of her, as her crew was on board, and force would be
repelled by force.

He then also said that she was not ready to sail immediately. She would
change her position and fall down the river a small distance on that
day, but was not yet ready to sail.

In communicating this conversation to Governor Mifflin, Jefferson
stated his conviction that the privateer would remain in the river
until the President should decide on her case, in consequence of which,
the governor dismissed the militia, and requested the advice of the
heads of departments on the course which it would be proper for him to
pursue. Both the governor and Jefferson stated, that in reporting the
conversation between Genet and himself, Dallas had said that Genet
threatened, in express terms, "to appeal from the President to the
people."

Thus braved and insulted in the very heart of the country, Hamilton and
Knox were of opinion that it was expedient to take immediate measures
for establishing a battery on Mud Island, under cover of a party of
militia, with directions, that if the vessel should attempt to depart
before the pleasure of the President should be known concerning her,
military coercion should be employed to arrest her progress.

The Secretary of State dissenting from this opinion, the measure was
not adopted. The vessel fell down to Chester before the arrival of
Washington and sailed on her cruise before the power of the government
could be interposed.

On the 11th of July (1793), Washington reached Philadelphia, and
requested that the Cabinet ministers would convene at his house the
next day at 9 in the morning.

Among the important papers placed in his hands, which required
immediate attention were those which related to the Little Democrat. On
reading them, a messenger was immediately dispatched for Jefferson, but
he had retired, indisposed, to his seat in the country. Upon hearing
this, the President instantly addressed a letter to him, of which the
following is an extract:

"What is to be done in the case of the Little Sarah, now at Chester? Is
the minister of the French republic to set the acts of this government
at defiance with impunity and then threaten the executive with an
appeal to the people? What must the world think of such conduct, and of
the government of the United States in submitting to it?

"These are serious questions. Circumstances press for decision, and as
you have had time to consider them (upon me they come unexpectedly), I
wish to know your opinion upon them even before to-morrow, for the
vessel may then be gone."

In answer to this letter, Jefferson stated the assurances which had on
that day been given to him by Genet, that the vessel Would not sail
before the President's decision respecting her should be made. In
consequence of this information, immediate coercive measures were
suspended, and in the council of the succeeding day it was determined
to retain in port all privateers which had been equipped by any of the
belligerent powers within the United States. Genet was informed of this
determination, but in contempt of it, the Little Democrat proceeded on
her cruise. This proceeding furnished a subject of exultation to the
opponents of the government, as did also the acquittal by a Charleston
jury of Gideon Henfield, who had been arrested for shipping on board a
French privateer, he being an American citizen.

While the correspondence between Genet and Jefferson concerning this
affair was still going on, the former obtained cause of complaint on
his part, and urged that the British were in the habit of taking French
property out of American vessels, in contravention of the principles of
neutrality avowed by the rest of Europe. His letters to Jefferson on
this subject were still more insulting than those which had preceded
them. On the 9th of July (1793), he wrote to Jefferson, demanding
an instant answer to the question--What measures the President had
taken, or would take, to cause the American flag to be respected?
Receiving no answer, toward the end of July he again addressed the
Secretary of State on the subject. In this extraordinary letter, after
complaining of the insults offered to the American flag by seizing the
property of Frenchmen confided to its protection, he added: "Your
political rights are counted for nothing. In vain do the principles of
neutrality establish that friendly vessels make friendly goods; in
vain, sir, does the President of the United States endeavor, by his
proclamation, to reclaim the observation of this maxim; in vain does
the desire of preserving peace lead to sacrifice the interests of
France to that of the moment; in vain does the thirst of riches
preponderate over honor in the political balance of America--all this
management, all this condescension, all this humility, end in nothing;
our enemies laugh at it; and the French, too confident, are punished
for having believed that the American nation had a flag, that they had
some respect for their laws, some conviction of their strength, and
entertained some sentiment of their dignity. It is not possible for me,
sir, to paint to you all my sensibility at this scandal, which tends to
the diminution of your commerce, to the oppression of ours, and to the
debasement and vilification of republics. It is for the Americans to
make known their generous indignation at this outrage, and I must
confine myself to demand of you, a second time, to inform me of the
measures which you have taken in order to obtain restitution of the
property plundered from my fellow-citizens under the protection of your
flag. It is from our government they have learned that the Americans
were our allies, that the American nation was sovereign, and that they
knew how to make themselves respected. It is then under the very same
sanction of the French nation that they have confided their property
and persons to the safeguard of the American flag, and on her they
submit the care of causing those rights to be respected. But if our
fellow-citizens have been deceived, if you are not in a condition to
maintain the sovereignty of your people, speak; we have guaranteed it
when slaves, we shall be able to render it formidable, having become
freemen."

On the day preceding the date of this offensive letter, Jefferson had
answered that of the 9th of July, and, without noticing the unbecoming
style in which the decision of the executive was demanded, had avowed
and defended the opinion that, "by the general law of nations, the goods
of an enemy found in the vessels of a friend, are lawful prize." This
fresh insult might therefore be passed over in silence.

While a hope remained that the temperate forbearance of the President,
and the unceasing manifestations of his friendly dispositions toward
the French republic might induce the minister of that nation to respect
the rights of the United States, and to abstain from violations of
their sovereignty, an anxious solicitude not to impair the harmony
which he wished to maintain between the two republics had restrained
him from adopting those measures respecting Genet which his conduct
required. He had seen a foreign minister usurp, within the territories
of the United States, some of the most important rights of sovereignty,
and persist, after the prohibition of the government in the exercise of
those rights. In asserting this extravagant claim, so incompatible with
national independence, the spirit in which it originated had been
pursued, and the haughty style of a superior had been substituted for
the respectful language of diplomacy. He had seen the same minister
undertake to direct the civil government, and to pronounce, in
opposition to the decisions of the executive, in what departments the
constitution of the United States had placed certain great national
powers. To render this state of things more peculiarly critical and
embarrassing, the person most instrumental in producing it had, from
his arrival, thrown himself into the arms of the people, stretched out
to receive him, and was emboldened by their favor to indulge the hope
of succeeding in his endeavors, either to overthrow their government,
or to bend it to his will. But the' full experiment had now been made,
and the result was a conviction not to be resisted, that moderation
would only invite additional injuries, and that the present
insufferable state of things could be terminated only by procuring the
removal of the French minister, or by submitting to become, in his
hands, the servile instrument of hostility against the enemies of his
nation. Information was continually received from every quarter of
fresh aggressions on the principles established by the government, and,
while the executive was thus openly disregarded and contemned, the
members of the administration were reproached, in all the papers of an
active and restless opposition, as the violators of the national faith,
the partisans of monarchy, and the enemies of liberty and of France.

The unwearied efforts to preserve that station in which the various
treaties in existence had placed the nation were incessantly
calumniated as infractions of those treaties, and ungrateful attempts
to force the United States into a war against France.

The judgment of Washington was never hastily formed, but, once made up,
it was seldom to be shaken. Before the last letter of Genet was
communicated to him he had decided to terminate future intercourse with
him.

In a Cabinet council the whole matter was carefully reviewed, and it
was unanimously agreed that Gouverneur Morris, the American minister at
Paris, should present the whole case to the French government and
request Genet's recall. The faction by whom he had been originally sent
out having passed out of power, this was easily effected.

At the same time the Cabinet, under Washington's direction, drew up a
system of rules to be observed by the belligerents in the ports of the
United States. These rules evidence the settled purpose of the
executive faithfully to observe all the national engagements and
honestly to perform the duties of that neutrality in which the war
found them and in which those engagements left them free to remain.

Neutrality between belligerents is a difficult and delicate part to
sustain. It was not France alone that advanced extraordinary
pretensions. The British government issued orders for stopping all
neutral ships, laden with provisions, bound for the ports of France,
thus declaring that country in a state of blockade. The National
Convention of France had, indeed, set the example of this by an act of
the same tendency, doubly rash, because impotent. But this, however
strong a plea for retaliating upon France, was none for making America
suffer. Corn, indeed, formed the chief export of the United States, and
to prohibit them from shipping it at all--for the new regulation
amounted in fact to this--was a grievance which the most pacific
neutral could scarcely submit to. Another continually recurring source
of complaint on the part of the United States against England was the
pressing of their seamen, which the difficulty of distinguishing
between natives of the two countries rendered of frequent occurrence
and tardy rectification. These causes came to swell the tide of faction
in America as the enemies of England and of authoritative institutions
took advantage of them to raise their cry, whilst the anti-gallican, on
the other hand, were as indignant against the arrogance of the French
and of their envoy.

Genet was in New York receiving all sorts of demonstrations of
approbation and attachment from his political friends when he received
notice of his recall (September, 1793). His rage was indescribable. He
wrote to Jefferson a letter full of the most atrocious abuse of
Washington and the administration generally, in which Jefferson himself
was not spared. But as his powers of mischief were now at an end very
slight notice was taken of his splenetic effusions. It appeared in the
sequel, however, that he had not confined his attempts to employ the
force of America against the enemies of his country to maritime
enterprises. On his first arrival he is understood to have planned an
expedition against the Floridas, to be carried on from Georgia, and
another against Louisiana, to be carried on from the western parts of
the United States. Intelligence was received that the principal
officers were engaged, and the temper of the people inhabiting the
western country was such as to furnish some ground for the apprehension
that the restraints which the executive was capable of imposing, would
be found too feeble to prevent the execution of this plan. The
remonstrances of the Spanish commissioners on this subject, however,
were answered with explicit assurances that the government would
effectually interpose to defeat any expedition from the territories of
the United States against those of Spain, and the governor of Kentucky
was requested to cooperate in frustrating this improper application of
the military resources of his State.

While Genet was in New York a schooner, brought as a prize into the
port of Boston by a French privateer, was claimed by the British owner,
who instituted proceedings at law against her for the purpose of
obtaining a decision on the validity of her capture. She was rescued
from the possession of the marshal by an armed force, acting under the
authority of Mr. Duplaine, the French consul, which was detached from a
frigate then lying in port. Until the frigate sailed she was guarded by
a part of the crew, and, notwithstanding the determination of the
American government that the consular courts should not exercise a
prize jurisdiction within the territories of the United States, Mr.
Duplaine declared his purpose to take cognizance of the case.

To this act of open defiance it was impossible for Washington to
submit. The facts being well attested, the exequatur which had been
granted to Mr. Duplaine was revoked and he was forbidden further to
exercise the consular functions. It will excite surprise that even this
necessary measure could not escape censure. The self-proclaimed
champions of liberty discovered in it a violation of the constitution
and a new indignity to France.

Meantime events were transpiring in Europe which added not a little to
the excitement in the public mind against Great Britain. For many years
war had existed between Portugal and Algiers. In consequence of this
Algerian cruisers had been confined to the Mediterranean by a
Portuguese fleet, and the commerce of the United States, as well as
that of Portugal herself, had been protected in the Atlantic from
piratical depredations. In September, 1793, an unexpected truce for a
year was concluded between Portugal and Algiers. The Dey's cruisers,
therefore, immediately, and without previous notice, passed into the
Atlantic, and American vessels, while on their way to Portugal and
other parts of Europe, and without the smallest suspicion of danger,
became a prey to these lawless freebooters, and many American seamen
were doomed to slavery. There was no reasonable doubt that England had
a great deal to do with this matter and that, besides her determination
to carry on war against France, she was not very unwilling that the
United States should also suffer the evils incident to their commerce
being entirely unprotected by any naval force.

The causes of discontent which were furnished by Spain, as Marshall
states, though less the theme of public declamation, continued to be
considerable. That which related to the Mississippi was peculiarly
embarrassing. The opinion had been industriously circulated that an
opposition of interests existed between the eastern and the western
people, and that the endeavors of the executive to open this great
river were feeble and insincere. At a meeting of the Democratic Society
in Lexington, Kentucky, this sentiment was unanimously avowed in terms
of extreme disrespect to the government, and a committee was appointed
to open a correspondence with the inhabitants of the entire west for
the purpose of uniting them on this subject and of preparing a
remonstrance to the President and Congress of the United States, to be
expressed "in the bold, decent, and determined language proper to be
used by injured freemen when they address the servants of the people."
They claimed much merit for having thus long abstained from using the
means they possessed, for the assertion of "a natural and unalienable
right," and indicated their opinion that this forbearance could not be
long continued. The probability that the public expression of these
dangerous dispositions would perpetuate the evil could not moderate
them. This restless temper gave additional importance to the expedition
of Genet projected against Louisiana.

Private communications strengthened the apprehensions entertained by
the President that hostilities with Spain were not far distant. The
government had received intelligence from their ministers in Europe
that propositions had been made by the Cabinet of Madrid to that of
London, the object of which was the United States. The precise nature
of these propositions was not ascertained, but it was understood
generally that their tendency was hostile, and Washington, writing to
the Secretary of War, in June, urged the importance of ascertaining the
Spanish force in the Floridas and such other matters as might be
necessary in view of the possible outbreak of a contest with Spain.

We must now return to Washington, who, the reader will have perceived,
surrounded by the urgent nature of his official duties and the
disturbed state of public affairs, had been detained at Philadelphia
during a great portion of the recess of Congress. He left that place
for Mount Vernon toward the end of September, after the ravages of the
terrible yellow fever of 1793 had already commenced in the city. He
remained at Mount Vernon till near the end of October. [4]

During this time he was in constant correspondence with the members of
the Cabinet, of whom Jefferson appears to have retired to Virginia and
the other heads of departments to other places to avoid the contagion
of the fever.

The principal topic discussed in this correspondence was the
constitutional power of the President to change the place in which
Congress were to reassemble in December--Philadelphia being considered
unsafe. Germantown, Wilmington, Trenton, Annapolis, Reading, and
Lancaster were suggested each in turn as suitable places, but the power
of the President to change the place was doubted on all hands. As the
fever subsided, however, the meeting actually took place in
Philadelphia on the day appointed by adjournment.

Among those whom Washington consulted on the subject of the
constitutional power to change the place for the meeting of Congress
was Mr. Madison. Washington's letter to him, dated Mount Vernon,
October 14, 1793, evinces his anxiety to avoid a violation of the
constitution, while it presents a lively picture of the state of
disorder in the departments, occasioned by the pestilence at the seat
of government. "The calamitous situation of Philadelphia," he writes,
"and the little prospect, from the present appearance, of its
eligibility to receive Congress by the first Monday in December,
involve a serious difficulty. It has been intimated by some that the
President ought, by proclamation, to convene Congress a few days before
the above-mentioned period, at some other place, and by others that,
although in extraordinary cases he has the power to convene, he has
none to change the place. Mr. Jefferson, when here on his way home, was
of the latter opinion, but the laws were not fully examined, nor was
the case at that time so serious as it now is. From the Attorney-
General (Randolph), to whom I have since written on this subject,
requesting an official opinion, I have received no answer, nor is it
likely I shall soon, as I believe he has no communication with
Philadelphia. Time presses and the malady at the usual place of meeting
is becoming more and more alarming. What then do you think is the most
advisable course for me to pursue in the present exigency--summon
Congress to meet at a certain time and place in their legislative
capacity? Simply state facts and say that I will meet the members at
the time and place just mentioned for ulterior arrangements? Or leave
matters as they are if there is no power in the executive to alter the
place legally? In the first and second cases, especially the first, the
delicacy of my naming a place will readily occur to you. My wish would
be that Congress could be assembled at Germantown to show that I meant
no partiality, leaving it to themselves, if there should be no prospect
of getting into Philadelphia soon, to decide what should be done
thereafter. But accounts say that some people have died in Germantown
also of the malignant fever. Every death, now, however, is ascribed to
that cause, be the disorder what it may. Wilmington and Trenton are
almost equidistant from Philadelphia in opposite directions, but both
are on the great thoroughfare and equally exposed to danger from the
multitude of travelers, and neither may have a chamber sufficient for
the House of Representatives. Annapolis and Lancaster are more secure
and both have good accommodations. But to name either of them,
especially the first, would be thought to favor the southern
convenience, and, perhaps, might be attributed to local views,
especially as New York is talked of for this purpose. Reading, if there
are proper conveniences there, would favor neither the southern nor
northern interest most, but would be alike to both.

"I have written to Mr. Jefferson on this subject. Notwithstanding
which, I would thank you for your opinion and that fully, as you see my
embarrassment. I even ask more. I would thank you, not being acquainted
with forms, to sketch some instrument for publication, adapted to the
course you may think it would be most expedient for me to pursue in the
present state of things, if the members are called together as before
mentioned.

"The difficulty of keeping clerks in the public offices had in a manner
put a stop to business before I left Philadelphia, and the heads of
departments having matters of their own, which called them away, has
prevented my return thither longer than I had intended. I have now
desired the different secretaries to meet me there, or in the vicinity,
the 1st of next month, for which I shall set out the 27th or the 28th
of the present.

"The accounts from the city are really affecting. Two gentlemen now
here from New York, Colonels Platt and Sergeant, say that they were
told at the Swede's ford of Schuylkill, by a person who had it from
Governor Mifflin, that, by an official report from the mayor of the
city, upward of 3,500 had died, and that the disorder was raging more
violently than ever. If cool weather, accompanied by rain, does not put
a stop to the malady, distressing indeed must be the case of that city,
now almost depopulated by removals and deaths." [5]


1. Footnote: The precise return was: For President George Washington,
132. For Vice-President--John Adams, 77; George Clinton, 50; Thomas
Jefferson, 4; Aaron Burr, 1.

2. Footnote: Published in Arthur's "Home Gazette."

3. Footnote: John Quincy Adams on Washington's Proclamation of
Neutrality.

4. Footnote: On the 8th of October John Hancock died at Boston.

5. Footnote: The whole number that died during the prevalence of the
yellow fever in Philadelphia was over 4,000.




CHAPTER VII.


WASHINGTON SENDS JAY TO ENGLAND. 1793-1794.


The time appointed for the reassembling of Congress was the first
Monday in December. Washington had arrived at Philadelphia, and the
heads of departments were at their posts before the end of November.

Although the fear of contagion was not entirely dispelled when the time
for the meeting of Congress arrived, yet, such was the active zeal of
parties, and such the universal expectation that important executive
communications would be made, and that legislative measures not less
important would be founded on them, that both Houses were full on the
first day, and a joint committee waited on the President with the usual
information that they were ready to receive his communications.

On the 4th of December (1793), at 12, the President met both Houses in
the Senate chamber. His speech was moderate, firm, dignified, and
interesting. It commenced with his own re-election, his feelings at
which were thus expressed:

"Since the commencement of the term for which I have been again called
into office, no fit occasion has arisen for expressing to my fellow-
citizens at large, the deep and respectful sense which I feel of the
renewed testimony of public approbation. While, on the one hand, it
awakened my gratitude for all those instances of affectionate
partiality with which I have been honored by my country, on the other,
it could not prevent an earnest wish for that retirement, from which no
private consideration could ever have torn me. But, influenced by the
belief that my conduct would be estimated according to its real
motives, and that the people, and the authorities derived from them,
would support exertions having nothing personal for their object, I
have obeyed the suffrage which commanded me to resume the executive
power, and I humbly implore that Being on whose will the fate of
nations depends, to crown with success our mutual endeavors for the
general happiness." Passing to those measures which had been adopted by
the executive for the regulation of its conduct toward the belligerent
nations, he observed: "As soon as the war in Europe had embraced those
powers with whom the United States have the most extensive relations,
there was reason to apprehend that our intercourse with them might be
interrupted, and our disposition for peace drawn into question by
suspicions too often entertained by belligerent nations. It seemed
therefore to be my duty to admonish our citizens of the consequence of
a contraband trade, and of hostile acts to any of the parties, and to
obtain, by a declaration of the existing state of things, an easier
admission of our rights to the immunities belonging to our situation.
Under these impressions the proclamation which will be laid before you
was issued.

"In this posture of affairs, both new and delicate, I resolved to adopt
general rules which should conform to the treaties, and assert the
privileges of the United States. These were reduced into a system which
shall be communicated to you."

After suggesting those legislative provisions on this subject, the
necessity of which had been pointed out by experience, he proceeded to
say:

"I cannot recommend to your notice measures for the fulfillment of our
duties to the rest of the world, without again pressing upon you the
necessity of placing ourselves in a condition of complete defense, and
of exacting from them the fulfillment of their duties toward us. The
United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, contrary to the
order of human events, they will forever keep at a distance those
painful appeals to arms with which the history of every nation abounds.
There is a rank due to the United States among nations which will be
withheld, if not absolutely lost by the reputation of weakness. If we
desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it: if we desire to
secure peace--one of the most powerful instruments of our prosperity--
it must be known that we are at all times ready for war."

These observations were followed by a recommendation to augment the
supply of arms and ammunition in the magazines, and to improve the
militia establishment.

After referring to a communication to be subsequently made for
occurrences relative to the connection of the United States with
Europe, which had, he said, become extremely interesting, and, after
reviewing Indian affairs, he particularly addressed the House of
Representatives. Having presented to them in detail some subjects of
which it was proper they should be informed, he added:

"No pecuniary consideration is more urgent than the regular redemption
and discharge of the public debt; on none can delay be more injurious,
or an economy of time more valuable.

"The productiveness of the public revenues hitherto has continued to be
equal to the anticipations which were formed of it; but it is not
expected to prove commensurate with all the objects which have been
suggested. Some auxiliary provisions will therefore, it is presumed, be
requisite; and it is hoped that these may be made consistently with a
due regard to the convenience of our citizens who cannot but be
sensible of the true wisdom of encountering a small present addition to
their contributions, to obviate a future accumulation of burdens."

The speech was concluded with the following impressive exhortation:

"The several subjects to which I have now referred, open a wide range
to your deliberations and involve some of the choicest interests of our
common country. Permit me to bring to your remembrance the magnitude of
your task. Without an unprejudiced coolness, the welfare of the
government may be hazarded; without harmony, as far as consists with
freedom of sentiment, its dignity may be lost. But as the legislative
proceedings of the United States will never, I trust, be reproached for
the want of temper or of candor, so shall not the public happiness
languish from the want of my strenuous and warmest cooperation."

The day succeeding that on which this speech was delivered, a special
message was sent to both houses containing some of the promised
communications relative to the connection of the United States with
foreign powers.

After suggesting, as a motive for this communication, that it not only
disclosed "matter of interesting inquiry to the Legislature," but
"might indeed give rise to deliberations to which they alone were
competent," the President added:

"The representative and executive bodies of France have manifested
generally a friendly attachment to this country; have given advantages
to our commerce and navigation; and have made overtures for placing
these advantages on permanent ground. A decree, however, of the
National Assembly, subjecting vessels laden with provisions to be
carried into their ports, and making enemy goods lawful prize in the
vessel of a friend, contrary to our treaty, though revoked at one time
as to the United States, has been since extended to their vessels also,
as has been recently stated to us. Representations on the subject will
be immediately given in charge to our minister there, and the result
shall be communicated to the Legislature.

"It is with extreme concern I have to inform you that the person whom
they have unfortunately appointed their minister plenipotentiary here,
has breathed nothing of the friendly spirit of the nation which sent
him. Their tendency, on the contrary, has been to involve us in a war
abroad and discord and anarchy at home. So far as his acts, or those of
his agents, have threatened an immediate commitment in the war, or
flagrant insult to the authority of the laws, their effect has been
counteracted by the ordinary cognizance of the laws and by an exertion
of the powers confided to me. Where their danger was not imminent, they
have been borne with, from sentiments of regard of his nation, from a
sense of their friendship toward us, from a conviction that they would
not suffer us to remain long exposed to the actions of a person who has
so little respected our mutual dispositions, and, I will add, from a
reliance on the firmness of my fellow-citizens in their principles of
peace and order. In the meantime I have respected and pursued the
stipulations of our treaties, according to what I judged their true
sense, and have withheld no act of friendship which their affairs have
called for from us, and which justice to others left us free to
perform. I have gone further. Rather than employ force for the
restitution of certain vessels which I deemed the United States bound
to restore, I thought it more advisable to satisfy the parties by
avowing it to be my opinion that, if restitution were not made, it
would be incumbent on the United States to make compensation."

The message next proceeded to state that inquiries had been instituted
respecting the vexations and spoliations committed on the commerce of
the United States, the result of which, when received, would be
communicated.

The order issued by the British government on the 8th of June (1793),
and the measures taken by the executive of the United States in
consequence thereof, were briefly noticed, and the discussions which
had taken place in relation to the nonexecution of the treaty of peace,
were also mentioned. The message was then concluded with a reference to
the negotiations with Spain. "The public good," it was said, "requiring
that the present state of these should be made known to the Legislature
in confidence only, they would be the subject of a separate and
subsequent communication."

This message was accompanied with copies of the correspondence between
the Secretary of State and the French minister, on the points of
difference which subsisted between the two governments, together with
several documents necessary for the establishment of particular facts,
and with the letter written by Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Morris, which
justified the conduct of the United States by arguments too clear to be
misunderstood, and too strong ever to be controverted.

The extensive discussions which had taken place relative to the
nonexecution of the treaty of peace, and the correspondence produced by
the objectionable measures which had been adopted by the British
government during the existing war, were also laid before the
Legislature.

In a popular government the representatives of the people may generally
be considered as a mirror, reflecting truly the passions and feelings
which govern their constituents. In the late elections, the strength of
parties had been tried, and the opposition had derived so much aid from
associating the cause of France with its own principles, as to furnish
much reason to suspect that, in one branch of the Legislature at least,
it had become the majority. The first act of the House of
Representatives served to strengthen this suspicion. By each party a
candidate for the chair was brought forward, and Mr. Muhlenberg, who
was supported by the opposition, was elected by a majority of ten
votes, against Mr. Sedgewick, whom the Federalists supported.

The answer, however, to Washington's speech, bore no tinge of that
malignant and furious spirit which had infused itself into the
publications of the day. Breathing the same affectionate attachment to
his person and character which had been professed in other times, and
being approved by every part of the House, it indicated that the
leaders, at least, still venerated their chief magistrate, and that no
general intention as yet existed to involve him in the obloquy directed
against his measures.

Noticing that unanimous suffrage by which he had been again called to
his present station, "it was," they said, "with equal sincerity and
promptitude they embraced the occasion for expressing to him their
congratulations on so distinguished a testimony of public approbation,
and their entire confidence in the purity and patriotism of the motives
which had produced this obedience to the voice of his country. It is,"
proceeded the address, "to virtues which have commanded long and
universal reverence, and services from which have flowed great and
lasting benefits, that the tribute of praise may be paid without the
reproach of flattery; and it is from the same sources that the fairest
anticipations may be derived in favor of the public happiness."

The proclamation of neutrality was approved in guarded terms, and the
topics of the speech were noticed in a manner which indicated
dispositions cordially to cooperate with the executive.

On the part of the Senate, also, the answer to the speech was
unfeignedly affectionate. In warm terms they expressed the pleasure
which the re-election of Washington gave them. "In the unanimity," they
added, "which a second time marks this important national act, we trace
with particular satisfaction, besides the distinguished tribute paid to
the virtues and abilities which it recognizes, another proof of that
discernment, and constancy of sentiments and views, which have hitherto
characterized the citizens of the United States." Speaking of the
proclamation, they declared it to be "a measure well timed and wise,
manifesting a watchful solicitude for the welfare of the nation, and
calculated to promote it."

In a few days a confidential message from Washington was delivered,
communicating the critical situation of affairs with Spain. The
negotiations attempted with that power in regard to the interesting
objects of boundary, navigation, and commerce, had been exposed to much
delay and embarrassment, in consequence of the changes which the French
revolution had effected in the political state of Europe. Meanwhile,
the neighborhood of the Spanish colonies to the United States had given
rise to various other subjects of discussion, one of which had assumed
a very serious aspect.

Having the best reason to suppose that the hostility of the southern
Indians was excited by the agents of Spain, Washington had directed the
American commissioners at Madrid to make the proper representations on
the subject and to propose that each nation should, with good faith,
promote the peace of the other with their savage neighbors.

About the same time the Spanish government entertained, or affected to
entertain, corresponding suspicions of like hostile excitements by the
agents of the United States, to disturb their peace with the same
nations. The representations which were induced by these real or
affected suspicions were accompanied with pretensions and made in a
style to which the American executive could not be inattentive. The
King of Spain asserted these claims as a patron and protector of those
Indians. He assumed a right to mediate between them and the United
States, and to interfere in the establishment of their boundaries. At
length, in the very moment when those savages were committing daily
inroads on the American frontier, at the instigation of Spain, as was
believed, the representatives of that power, complaining of the
aggressions of American citizens on the Indians, declared "that the
continuation of the peace, good harmony, and perfect friendship of the
two nations was very problematical for the future, unless the United
States should take more convenient measures, and of greater energy than
those adopted for a long time past."

Notwithstanding the zeal and enthusiasm with which the pretensions of
the French republic, as asserted by their minister Genet, continued to
be supported out of doors, they found no open advocate in either branch
of the Legislature. This circumstance is, in a great measure, to be
ascribed to the temperate conduct of the executive, and to the
convincing arguments with which its decisions were supported.

But when it is recollected that the odium which these decisions excited
sustained no diminution; that the accusation of hostility to France and
to liberty, which originated in them, was not retracted; that, when
afterwards many of the controverted claims were renewed by France, her
former advocates still adhered to her; it is not unreasonable to
suppose that other considerations mingled themselves with the
conviction which the correspondence laid before the Legislature was
calculated to produce.

An attack on the administration could be placed on no ground more
disadvantageous than on its controversy with Mr. Genet. The conduct and
language of that minister were offensive to reflecting men of all
parties. The President had himself taken so decisive a part in favor of
the measures which had been adopted that they must be ascribed to him,
not to his Cabinet, and, of consequence, the whole weight of his
personal character must be directly encountered in an attempt to
censure those measures. From this censure it would have been difficult
to extricate the person who was contemplated by the party in opposition
as its chief; for the Secretary of State had urged the arguments of the
administration with a degree of ability and earnestness, which ought to
have silenced the suspicion that he might not feel their force. [1]

The expression of a legislative opinion, in favor of the points
insisted on by the French minister, would probably have involved the
nation in a calamitous war, the whole responsibility for which would
rest on them. To these considerations was added another, which could
not be disregarded. The party in France, to which Mr. Genet owed his
appointment, had lost its power, and his fall was the inevitable
consequence of the fall of his patrons. That he would probably be
recalled was known in America, and that his conduct had been
disapproved by his government, was generally believed. The future
system of the French republic, with regard to the United States, could
not be foreseen, and it would be committing something to hazard not to
wait its development.

These objections did not exist to an indulgence of the partialities and
prejudices of the nation towards the belligerent powers in measures
suggested by its resentment against Great Britain. But, independent of
these considerations, it is scarcely possible to doubt that Congress
really approved the conduct of the executive with regard to France, and
was also convinced that a course of hostility had been pursued by Great
Britain which the national interest and national honor required them to
repel. In the irritable state of the public mind, it was not difficult
to produce this opinion.

Early in the session a report was made by Mr. Jefferson, Secretary of
State, in pursuance of a resolution of the House of Representatives,
passed on the 23d of February, 1791, requiring him "to report to
Congress the nature and extent of the privileges and restrictions of
the commercial intercourse of the United States with foreign nations,
and the measures which he should think proper to be adopted for the
improvement of the commerce and navigation of the same."

This report stated the exports of the United States in articles of
their own produce and manufacture, at $19,587,055, and the imports at
$19,823,060.

Of the exports, nearly one-half was carried to the kingdom of Great
Britain and its dominions; of the imports, about four-fifths were
brought from the same countries. The American shipping amounted to
277,519 tons, of which not quite one-sixth was employed in the trade
with Great Britain and its dominions.

In all the nations of Europe, most of the articles produced in the
United States were subject to heavy duties, and some of them were
prohibited. In England, the trade of the United States was in general
on as good a footing as the trade of other countries, and several
articles were more favored than the same articles, the growth of other
countries.

The statements and arguments of this report tended to enforce the
policy of making discriminations which might favor the commerce of the
United States with France and discourage that with England, and which
might promote the increase of American navigation as a branch of
industry and a resource of defense.

This was the last official act of the Secretary of State. Early in the
preceding summer he had signified to the President his intention to
retire in September from the public service, and had, with some
reluctance, consented to postpone the execution of this intention to
the close of the year. Retaining his purpose, he resigned his office on
the last day of December. He was succeeded by Edmund Randolph, whose
place as Attorney-General was supplied by William Bradford, of
Pennsylvania.

On the 4th of January (1794), the House resolved itself into a
committee of the whole, on the report of the Secretary of State,
relative to the restrictions of the commerce of the United States, when
Mr. Madison, after some prefatory observations, laid on the table a
series of resolutions for the consideration of the members.

These memorable resolutions embraced almost completely the idea of the
report. They imposed an additional duty on the manufactures, and on the
tonnage of vessels of nations having no commercial treaty with the
United States; while they reduced the duties already imposed by law on
the tonnage of vessels belonging to nations having such commercial
treaty, and they reciprocated the restrictions which were imposed on
American navigation.

The resolutions were taken up on the 13th of January (1794), and the
consideration of them led to protracted and very animated debates. The
friends of the administration regarded Mr. Madison's scheme as directly
hostile to England and subservient to the views of France, in a degree
utterly inconsistent with the policy of neutrality. On the other hand,
the opposition insisted that the proposed measures were absolutely
necessary to protect the commerce of the country from aggression and
plunder.

Mr. Madison, in advocating the views which he held, looked especially
to measures correspondent to the British navigation act, which had
given England the command of the sea. He contended that America would
thrive more from exclusion and contest, than from conciliating and
stooping to a power that slighted her; and that now was the moment, if
ever, when England was engaged in mortal strife with France, to bring
her to reason. [2] Mr. Madison's plan was debated at different periods
of the session, and underwent considerable modification in its progress
through the House, where a resolution was finally adopted retaining the
principle of commercial restrictions. It was rejected in the Senate by
the casting vote of Mr. Adams, the Vice-President.

Early in January, a resolution was agreed to in the House, declaring
"that a naval force, adequate to the protection of the commerce of the
United States against the Algerine corsairs, ought to be provided." The
force proposed was to consist of six frigates.

This measure was founded on the communications of the President
respecting the improbability of being able to negotiate a peace with
the Dey of Algiers; and on undoubted information that these pirates
had, during their first short cruise in the Atlantic, captured eleven
American merchantmen, and made upwards of 100 prisoners, and were
preparing to renew their attack on the unprotected vessels of the
United States. This bill was strongly opposed, but finally passed both
houses, and was approved by the President.

While these debates were going on, the news of the British order in
council of the 6th of November (which had not become known to the
American minister in England until the close of December, 1793),
relative to the French West India trade, arrived in the United States,
and roused afresh the hostility against England. Such was the
threatening aspect of affairs, that early in the session a committee of
the House was instructed to prepare and report an estimate of the
expense requisite to place the principal seaports of the country in a
state of defense.

That some steps should be taken to resist aggressions on the part of
England, was very evident; but the members of Congress differed as to
what measures ought to be adopted. The opponents of the administration
urged the adoption of commercial restrictions, while its supporters,
with the President himself, were in favor of a different course.
Various plans were submitted to the House by members, in accordance
with their different views of the subject.

On the 12th of March (1794) Mr. Sedgwick moved several resolutions, the
objects of which were to raise a military force, and to authorize the
President to lay an embargo. The armament was to consist of 15,000 men,
who should be brought into actual service in case of war with any
European power, but not until war should break out. In the meantime
they were to receive pay while assembled for the purpose of discipline,
which was not to exceed twenty-four days in each year.

After stating the motives which led to the introduction of these
resolutions they were laid on the table for the consideration of the
members.

On the 21st of March Mr. Sedgwick's motion, authorizing the President
to lay an embargo, was negatived by a majority of two votes, but in a
few days the consideration of that subject was resumed, and a
resolution passed prohibiting all trade from the United States to any
foreign port or place for thirty days, and empowering the President to
carry the resolution into effect.

On the 27th of March Mr. Dayton moved a resolution for sequestering all
debts due to British subjects, and for taking means to secure their
payment into the treasury, as a fund out of which to indemnify the
citizens of the United States for depredations committed on their
commerce by British cruisers, in violation of the laws of nations.

The debate on this resolution was such as was to be expected from the
irritable state of the public mind. The invectives against the British
nation were uttered with peculiar vehemence, and were mingled with
allusions to the exertions of the government for the preservation of
neutrality, censuring strongly the system which had been pursued.

Before any question was taken on the proposition for sequestering
British debts, and without a decision on those proposed by Mr. Madison,
Mr. Clarke moved a resolution which in some degree suspended the
commercial regulations that had been so earnestly debated. This was to
prohibit all intercourse with Great Britain until her government should
make full compensation for all injuries done to the citizens of the
United States by armed vessels, or by any person or persons acting
under the authority of the British King, and until the western posts
should be delivered up.

On the 4th of April (1794) before any decision was made on the several
propositions which have been stated, the President laid before Congress
a letter just received from Thomas Pinckney, the minister of the United
States at London, communicating additional instructions to the
commanders of British armed ships, which were dated the 8th of January.
These instructions revoked those of the 6th of November (1793), and,
instead of bringing in for adjudication all neutral vessels trading
with the French islands, British cruisers were directed to bring in
those only which were laden with cargoes the produce of the French
islands, and were on a direct voyage from those islands to Europe.

The letter detailed a conversation with Lord Grenville on this subject,
in which his lordship explained the motives which had originally
occasioned the order of the 6th of November, and gave to it a less
extensive signification than it had received in the courts of vice-
admiralty.

It was intended, he said, to be temporary and was calculated to answer
two purposes. One was to prevent the abuses which might take place in
consequence of the whole of the St. Domingo fleet having gone to the
United States; the other was on account of the attack designed upon the
French West India islands by the armament under Sir John Jervis and Sir
Charles Grey; but it was now no longer necessary to continue the
regulations for those purposes. His lordship added that the order of
the 6th of November did not direct the confiscation of all vessels
trading with the French islands, but only that they should be brought
in for legal adjudication, and he conceived that no vessel would be
condemned under it which would not have been previously liable to the
same sentence.

The influence of this communication on the party in the Legislature
which was denominated Federal was very considerable. Believing that the
existing differences between the two nations still admitted of
explanation and adjustment, they strenuously opposed all measures which
were irritating in their tendency or which might be construed into a
dereliction of the neutral character they were desirous of maintaining,
but they gave all their weight to those which, by putting the nation in
a posture of defense, prepared it for war should negotiation fail.

On the opposite party no change of sentiment or of views appears to
have been produced. Their system seems to have been matured, and not to
have originated in the feelings of the moment. They adhered to it,
therefore, with inflexible perseverance, but seemed not anxious to
press an immediate determination of the propositions which had been
made. These propositions were discussed with great animation, but,
notwithstanding an ascertained majority in their favor, were permitted
to remain undecided, as if their fate depended on some extrinsic
circumstance.

Meanwhile, great exertions were made to increase the public agitation
and to stimulate the resentments which were felt against Great Britain.
The artillery of the press was played with unceasing fury on the
minority of the House of Representatives and the democratic societies
brought their whole force into operation. Language will scarcely afford
terms of greater outrage than were employed against those who sought to
stem the torrent of public opinion and to moderate the rage of the
moment. They were denounced as a British faction, seeking to impose
chains on their countrymen. Even the majority was declared to be but
half roused and to show little of that energy and decision which the
crisis required.

The proceedings of Congress continued to manifest a fixed purpose to
pursue the system which had been commenced, and the public sentiment
seemed to accord with that system. That the nation was advancing
rapidly to a state of war was firmly believed by many intelligent men,
who doubted the necessity and denied the policy of abandoning the
neutral position which had been thus long maintained. In addition to
the extensive calamities which must, in any state of things, result to
the United States from a rupture with a nation which was the mistress
of the ocean, and which furnished the best market for the sale of their
produce and the purchase of manufactures of indispensable necessity,
there were considerations belonging exclusively to the moment, which,
though operating only in a narrow circle, were certainly entitled to
great respect. [3]

That war with Britain, during the continuance of the passionate and
almost idolatrous devotion of a great majority of the people to the
French republic, would throw America so completely into the arms of
France as to leave her no longer mistress of her own conduct, was not
the only fear which the temper of the day suggested. That the spirit
which triumphed in that nation and deluged it with the blood of its
revolutionary champions might cross the Atlantic, and desolate the
hitherto safe and peaceful dwellings of the American people, was an
apprehension not so entirely unsupported by appearances as to be
pronounced chimerical. With a blind infatuation, which treated reason
as a criminal, immense numbers applauded a furious despotism, trampling
on every right, and sporting with life as the essence of liberty; and
the few who conceived freedom to be a plant which did not flourish the
better for being nourished with human blood, and who ventured to
disapprove the ravages of the guillotine, were execrated as the tools
of the coalesced despots, and as persons who, to weaken the affection
of America for France, became the calumniators of that republic.
Already had an imitative spirit, captivated with the splendor, but
copying the errors, of a great nation, reared up in every part of the
continent self-created corresponding societies, who, claiming to be the
people, assumed a control over the government and were loosening its
bands. Already were the Mountain, [4] and a revolutionary tribunal,
favorite toasts, and already were principles familiarly proclaimed,
which, in France, had been the precursors of that tremendous and savage
despotism, which, in the name of the people and by the instrumentality
of affiliated societies, had spread its terrific sway over that fine
country and had threatened to extirpate all that was wise and virtuous.
That a great majority of those statesmen who conducted the opposition
would deprecate such a result furnished no security against it. When
the physical force of a nation usurps the place of its wisdom, those
who have produced such a state of things no longer control it.

These apprehensions, whether well or ill founded, produced in those who
felt them an increased solicitude for the preservation of peace. Their
aid was not requisite to confirm the judgment of Washington on this
interesting subject. Fixed in his purpose of maintaining the neutrality
of the United States until the aggressions of a foreign power should
clearly render neutrality incompatible with honor, and conceiving from
the last advices received from England that the differences between the
two nations had not yet attained that point, he determined to make one
decisive effort, which should either remove the ostensible causes of
quarrel or demonstrate the indisposition of Great Britain to remove
them. This determination was executed by the nomination of an envoy
extraordinary to his Britannic majesty, which was announced to the
Senate on the 16th of April (1794), in the following terms:

"The communications which I have made to you during your present
session, from the dispatches of our minister in London, contain a
serious aspect of our affairs with Great Britain. But as peace ought to
be pursued with unremitted zeal, before the last resource--which has so
often been the scourge of nations and cannot fail to check the advanced
prosperity of the United States--is contemplated, I have thought proper
to nominate and do hereby nominate John Jay as envoy extraordinary of
the United States to his Britannic majesty. [5]

"My confidence in our minister plenipotentiary in London continues
undiminished. But a mission like this, while it corresponds with the
solemnity of the occasion, will announce to the world a solicitude for
the friendly adjustment of our complaints and a reluctance to
hostility. Going immediately from the United States, such an envoy will
carry with him a full knowledge of the existing temper and sensibility
of our country, and will thus be taught to vindicate our rights with
firmness and to cultivate peace with sincerity."

To those who believed the interests of the nation to require a rupture
with England and a still closer connection with France nothing could be
more unlooked for or more unwelcome than this decisive measure. That it
would influence the proceedings of Congress could not be doubted, and
that it would materially affect the public mind was probable. Evincing
the opinion of the executive that negotiation, not legislative
hostility, was still the proper medium for accommodating differences
with Great Britain, it threw on the Legislature a great responsibility,
if they should persist in a system calculated to defeat that
negotiation. By showing to the people that their President did not yet
believe war to be necessary, it turned the attention of many to peace,
and, by suggesting the probability, rekindled the almost extinguished
desire of preserving that blessing.

Scarcely has any public act of the President drawn upon his
administration a greater degree of censure than this. That such would
be its effect could not be doubted by a person who had observed the
ardor with which opinions that it thwarted were embraced, or the
extremity to which the passions and contests of the moment had carried
all orders of men. But it is the province of real patriotism to consult
the utility more than the popularity of a measure, and to pursue the
path of duty, although it may be rugged.

In the Senate the nomination was approved by a majority of ten votes,
and, in the House of Representatives, it was urged as an argument
against persevering in the system which had been commenced. On the 18th
of April a motion for taking up the report of the committee of the
whole house on the resolution for cutting off all commercial
intercourse with Great Britain was opposed chiefly on the ground that,
as an envoy had been nominated to the court of that country, no
obstacle ought to be thrown in his way. The adoption of the resolution
would be a bar to negotiation, because it used the language of menace
and manifested a partiality to one of the belligerents which was
incompatible with neutrality. It was also an objection to the
resolution that it prescribed the terms on which alone a treaty should
be made, and was, consequently, an infringement of the right of the
executive to negotiate, and an indelicacy to that department.

The resolution having undergone some modifications, a bill in
conformity with it was brought in and carried by a considerable
majority. In the Senate it was lost by the casting vote of Mr. Adams,
the Vice-President. The system which had been taken up in the House of
Representatives was pressed no further.

A bill for punishing infringements of the neutrality laws and
prohibiting the condemnation and sale of prizes in the ports of the
United States, brought in by the belligerent powers, was suggested by
Washington and reported in the Senate, where it met a violent
opposition and was finally passed by the casting vote of the
Vice-President. In the House of Representatives it was passed after
striking out the provision relative to the sale of prizes. In
maintaining his system of strict neutrality Washington had to fight
every inch of the ground. The opposition omitted no means of bringing
the administration into discredit. Attacks in Congress on the executive
officers of the government was resorted to.

In both houses inquiries were set on foot respecting the treasury
department, which obviously originated in the hope of finding some
foundation for censuring Mr. Hamilton, the secretary, but which failed
entirely. In a similar hope, as respected Gouverneur Morris, the
minister of the United States at Paris, the Senate passed a vote
requesting the President to lay before that body his correspondence
with the French republic, and also with the Department of State.

As a war with Great Britain seemed inevitable should the mission of Mr.
Jay prove unsuccessful, Congress did not adjourn without passing the
absolutely necessary laws for putting the country in a state of
defense. Provision was made for fortifying the principal harbors, and
80,000 militia were ordered to be in readiness for active service. Arms
and munitions of war were allowed to be imported free of duty, and the
President was authorized to purchase galleys and lay an embargo if he
should deem that the public interest required it. To meet the expenses
thus incurred duties were levied on a number of additional articles of
importation.

On the 9th of June (1794) this active and stormy session was closed by
an adjournment to the first Monday in the succeeding November.

"The public," says Marshall, "was not less agitated than the
Legislature had been by those interesting questions which had
occasioned some of the most animated and eloquent discussions that had
ever taken place on the floor of the House of Representatives. Mr.
Madison's resolutions especially continued to be the theme of general
conversation, and, for a long time, divided parties throughout the
United States. The struggle for public opinion was ardent, and each
party supported its pretensions, not only with those arguments which
each deemed conclusive, but also by those reciprocal criminations
which, perhaps, each in part believed.

"The opposition declared that the friends of the administration were an
aristocratic and corrupt faction, who, from a desire to introduce
monarchy, were hostile to France, and under the influence of Britain;
that they sought every occasion to increase expense, to augment debt,
to multiply the public burdens, to create armies and navies, and, by
the instrumentality of all this machinery, to govern and enslave the
people; that they were a paper nobility, whose extreme sensibility at
every measure which threatened the funds, induced a tame submission to
injuries and insults, which the interest and the honor of the nation
required them to resist.

"The friends of the administration retorted that the opposition was
prepared to sacrifice the best interests of their country on the altar
of the French revolution; that they were willing to go to war for
French, not for American objects; that while they urged war they
withheld the means of supporting it in order the more effectually to
humble and disgrace the government; that they were so blinded by their
passion for France as to confound crimes with meritorious deeds, and to
abolish the natural distinction between virtue and vice; that the
principles which they propagated and with which they sought to
intoxicate the people were, in practice, incompatible with the
existence of government; that they were the apostles of anarchy, not of
freedom, and were, consequently, not the friends of real and rational
liberty."

Immediately after the adjournment of Congress, Washington paid a short
visit to Mount Vernon. On the 19th of June he writes from Baltimore to
Randolph, Secretary of State, respecting the commission and letters of
credence of John Quincy Adams, whom he had recently appointed minister
resident to the United Netherlands. From the same place, on the same
day, he writes to Gouverneur Morris, who had recently been recalled
from France at the request of the revolutionary authorities, he having
pretty openly expressed his disapprobation of the excesses of the party
in power. Washington had appointed as his successor James Monroe, who,
as senator, had uniformly opposed the measures of the administration.
Such an act of magnanimity in these times would excite considerable
surprise.

On the 25th of June (1794), after his arrival at Mount Vernon,
Washington again writes to Gouverneur Morris, who still retained his
warm friendship and confidence. Speaking of his political course, he
says: "My primary objects, to which I have steadily adhered, have been
to preserve the country in peace if I can, and to be prepared for war
if I cannot; to effect the first upon terms consistent with the respect
which is due to ourselves and with honor, justice, and good faith to
all the world."

On the same day he writes to Edmund Randolph, Secretary of State: "I
shall endeavor to be back by the time I allotted before I left
Philadelphia, if I am able, but an exertion to save myself and horse
from falling among the rocks at the lower falls of the Potomac, whither
I went on Sunday morning to see the canal and locks, has wrenched my
back in such a manner as to prevent my riding, and hitherto has
defeated the purposes for which I came home. My stay here will only be
until I can ride with ease and safety, whether I accomplish my own
business or not."

In July (1794) Washington returned to Philadelphia, where very weighty
matters were demanding his attention.


1. Footnote: Marshall.

2. Footnote: Madison, on this and other occasions, appears to have been
earnestly desirous to build up an extensive mercantile marine, with a
view to the formation of an efficient navy. It is pleasant to recollect
that, under his administration as President, the proudest triumphs of
our navy were achieved.

3. Footnote: Marshall.

4. Footnote: A well-known term designating the most violent party in
France.

5. Footnote: Mr. Jay's secretary on this mission was Col. John
Trumbull. Colonel Trumbull may be considered one of the most
interesting among the many remarkable characters called into action and
developed by our Revolutionary War. All that we know of him tends to
raise him in our estimation as a soldier, a gentleman, and an artist.
When accidentally, as he thought, but providentially, as the event
proved, he was excluded from the army, he deemed it a great misfortune,
but it forced upon him the cultivation of his art, and made him the
painter of the Revolution. His noble historical paintings are the most
precious relics of that heroic age which the nation possesses. They are
justly prized above all price; and the latest posterity will rejoice
that Trumbull laid down the sword to take up the pallet and pencil.




CHAPTER VIII.


WASHINGTON QUELLS THE WESTERN INSURRECTION. 1794.


While Congress was in session several important matters had claimed the
consideration of Washington, to which we will now call the reader's
attention. It will be recollected that a request of the executive for
the recall of Mr. Genet had been transmitted to the French government.
During the time which elapsed before an answer could be returned
Genet's proceedings had been such as to call for all the prudence,
foresight, and moderation of Washington.

In that spirit of conciliation which adopts the least irritating means
for effecting its objects, Washington had resolved to bear with the
insults, the resistance, and the open defiance of Genet until his
appeal to the friendship and the policy of the French republic should
be fairly tried. Early in January (1794) this resolution was shaken by
fresh proofs of the perseverance of that minister in a line of conduct
not to be tolerated by a nation which has not surrendered all
pretensions to self-government. Genet had meditated and deliberately
planned two expeditions, to be carried on from the territories of the
United States against the dominions of Spain, and had, as minister of
the French republic, granted commissions to citizens of the United
States, who were privately recruiting troops for the proposed service.
The first was destined against Florida and the second against
Louisiana. The detail of the plans had been settled. The pay, rations,
clothing, plunder, and division of the conquered lands to be allotted
to the military and the proportion of the acquisitions to be reserved
to the republic of France were arranged. The troops destined to act
against Florida were to be raised in the three southern States, were to
rendezvous in Georgia, were to be aided by a body of Indians, and were
to cooperate with the French fleet, should one arrive on the coast.
This scheme had been the subject of a correspondence between the
executive and Genet, but was in full progress in the preceding
December, when, by the vigilance of the Legislature of South Carolina,
it was more particularly developed, and some of the principal agents
were arrested.

About the same time, intelligence less authentic, but wearing every
circumstance of probability, was received, stating that the expedition
against Louisiana, which was to be carried on down the Ohio from
Kentucky, was in equal maturity.

This intelligence seemed to render a further forbearance incompatible
with the dignity of the United States. The question of superseding the
diplomatic functions of Genet and depriving him of the privileges
attached to that character was brought before the Cabinet, and a
message to Congress was prepared, communicating these transactions and
avowing a determination to adopt that measure, unless one or the other
House should signify the opinion that it was not advisable so to do,
when the business was arrested by receiving a letter from Mr. Morris
announcing officially the recall of this rash minister. Mr. Fauchet,
the successor of Genet, arrived in February (1794), and brought with
him strong assurances that his government totally disapproved the
conduct of his predecessor. He avowed a determination to avoid whatever
might be offensive to those to whom he was deputed, and a wish to carry
into full effect the friendly dispositions of his nation toward the
United States. For some time his actions were in the spirit of these
professions.

Not long after the arrival of Mr. Fauchet, the executive government of
France requested the recall of Gouverneur Morris. With this request
Washington, as we have already seen, immediately complied, and James
Monroe was appointed to succeed him.

The discontents which had been long fomented in the western country had
assumed a serious and alarming appearance. A remonstrance to the
President and Congress of the United States from the inhabitants of
Kentucky, respecting the navigation of the Mississippi, was laid before
the executive and each branch of the Legislature. The style of this
paper accorded well with the instructions under which it had been
prepared. It demanded the free navigation of the Mississippi as a
right, and arraigned the government for not having secured its
enjoyment. The paper was submitted to both Houses of Congress.

In the Senate the subject was referred to a committee who reported
"that in the negotiation now carrying on at Madrid between the
United States and Spain, the right of the former to the free navigation
of the Mississippi is well asserted and demonstrated, and their claim
to its enjoyment is pursued with all the assiduity and firmness which
the magnitude of the subject demands, and will doubtless continue to be
so pursued until the object shall be obtained or adverse circumstances
shall render the further progress of the negotiation impracticable.
That in the present state of the business it would improper for
Congress to interfere, but, in order to satisfy the citizens of the
United States more immediately interested in the event of this
negotiation, that the United States, have uniformly asserted their
right to the free use of the navigation of the river Mississippi, and
have employed and will continue to pursue such measures as are best
adapted to obtain the enjoyment of this important territorial right,
the committee recommend that it be resolved by the Senate:

"That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is requested
to cause to be communicated to the executive of the State of Kentucky,
such part of the existing negotiation between the United States and
Spain relative to this subject, as he may deem advisable and consistent
with the course of the negotiation."

In the House of Representatives also a resolution was passed,
expressing the conviction of the House, that the executive was urging
the claim of the United States to the navigation of the Mississippi in
the manner most likely to prove successful.

This answer was not satisfactory to the Kentuckians. Later developments
showed that they had a different object from that of obtaining the free
navigation of the Mississippi by negotiation.

In October, 1793, it was alleged by the Spanish commissioners that four
Frenchmen had left Philadelphia, empowered by the minister of the
French republic to prepare an expedition, in Kentucky, against New
Orleans. This fact was immediately communicated by Mr. Jefferson to the
governor of that State, with a request that he would use those means of
prevention which the law enabled him to employ. This letter was
accompanied by one from the Secretary of War, conveying the request of
the President, that, if preventive means should fail, effectual
military force should then be employed to arrest the expedition, and
General Wayne was ordered to hold a body of troops at the disposal of
the governor should he find the militia insufficient for his purpose.

The governor had already received information that a citizen of
Kentucky was in possession of a commission appointing him
Commander-in-Chief of the proposed expedition; and that the Frenchmen
alluded to in the letter of Mr. Jefferson had arrived, and, far from
affecting concealment, declared that they only waited for money, which
they expected soon to receive, in order to commence their operations.

The governor, however, in a letter, containing very singular views of
his duty in the affair, declined to interfere with the proposed
expedition.

Upon the receipt of this extraordinary letter, Washington directed
General Wayne to establish a military post at Fort Massac, on the Ohio,
for the purpose of stopping by force, if peaceful means should fail,
any body of armed men who should be proceeding down that river.

This precaution appears to have been necessary. The preparations for
the expedition were, for some time, carried on with considerable
activity; and there is reason to believe that it was not absolutely
relinquished until the war ceased between France and Spain.

It will be recollected that, in the preceding year, the attempt to
treat with the hostile Indians had suspended the operations of General
Wayne until the season for action had nearly passed away. After the
total failure of negotiation, the campaign was opened with as much
vigor as a prudent attention to circumstances would permit.

The Indians had expected an attempt upon their villages, and had
collected in full force, with the apparent determination of risking a
battle in their defense. A battle was desired by the American general,
but the consequences of another defeat were too serious to warrant him
in putting more to hazard by precipitate movements than the
circumstances of the war required. The negotiations with the Indians
were not terminated till September, and it was then too late to
complete the preparations which would enable General Wayne to
accomplish his object. He, therefore, contented himself with collecting
his army and penetrating about six miles in advance of Fort Jefferson,
where he established himself for the winter in a camp called
Greensville. After fortifying his camp, he took possession of the
ground on which the Americans had been defeated in 1791, where he
erected Fort Recovery. These positions afforded considerable protection
to the frontiers, and facilitated the opening of the ensuing campaign.

Seeing only the dark side of every measure adopted by the government,
and not disinclined to militia expeditions made at the expense of the
United States, the people of Kentucky loudly charged the President with
a total disregard of their safety, pronounced the Continental troops
entirely useless, declared that the Indians should be kept in awe alone
by the militia, and insisted that the power should be deposited with
some person in their State to call them out at his discretion, at the
charge of the United States.

Meanwhile, some steps were taken by the Governor of Upper Canada, which
were well calculated to increase suspicions respecting the dispositions
of Great Britain.

It was believed by Washington, not without cause, that the cabinet of
London was disposed to avail itself of the nonexecution of that article
of the treaty of peace which stipulates for the payment of debts, to
justify a permanent detention of the posts on the southern side of the
lakes, and to establish a new boundary line, whereby those lakes should
be entirely comprehended in Upper Canada. Early in the spring a
detachment from the garrison of Detroit repossessed and fortified a
position nearly fifty miles south of that station, on the Miami, a
river which empties into Lake Erie at its westernmost point.

This movement, and other facts which strengthened the belief that the
hostile Indians were at least countenanced by the English, were the
subjects of a correspondence between the Secretary of State and Mr.
Hammond, in which crimination was answered by recrimination, in which a
considerable degree of mutual irritation was displayed, and in which
each supported his charges against the nation of the other, much better
than he defended his own. It did not, however, in any manner, affect
the operations of the army.

The delays inseparable from the transportation of necessary supplies
through an uninhabited country, infested by an active enemy peculiarly
skilled in partisan war, unavoidably protracted the opening of the
campaign until near midsummer. Meanwhile several sharp skirmishes took
place, in one of which a few white men were stated to be mingled with
the Indians.

On the 8th of August (1794) General Wayne reached the confluence of the
Au Glaize, where he threw up some works of defense and protection for
magazines. The richest and most extensive settlements of the western
Indians lay about this place.

The mouth of the Au Glaize is distant about thirty miles from the post
occupied by the British, in the vicinity of which the whole strength of
the enemy, amounting, according to intelligence on which General Wayne
relied, to rather less than 2,000 men, was collected. The Continental
legion was not much inferior in number to the Indians, and a
reinforcement of about 1,100 mounted militia from Kentucky, commanded
by General Scott, gave a decided superiority of strength to the army of
Wayne. That the Indians had determined to give him battle was well
understood, and the discipline of his legion, the ardor of all his
troops, and the superiority of his numbers, authorized him confidently
to expect a favorable issue. Yet, in pursuance of that policy by which
the United States had been uniformly actuated, he determined to make
one more effort for the attainment of peace without bloodshed.
Messengers were dispatched to the several hostile tribes who were
assembled in his front, inviting them to appoint deputies to meet him
on his march, in order to negotiate a lasting peace.

On the 15th of August (1794) the American army advanced down the Miami,
with its right covered by that river, and on the 18th arrived at the
rapids. Here they halted on the 19th, in order to erect a temporary
work for the protection of the baggage and to reconnoiter the situation
of the enemy.

The Indians were advantageously posted behind a thick wood, and behind
the British fort.

At 8 in the morning of the 20th the American army advanced in columns,
the legion with its right flank covered by the Miami. One brigade of
mounted volunteers, commanded by General Todd, was on the left; and the
other, under General Barbee, was in the rear. A select battalion,
commanded by Major Price, moved in front of the legion, sufficiently in
advance to give timely notice for the troops to form in case of action.

After marching about five miles Major Price received a heavy fire from
a concealed enemy, and was compelled to retreat.

The Indians had chosen their ground with judgment. They had advanced
into the thick wood in front of the British works, which extends
several miles west from the Miami, and had taken a position rendered
almost inaccessible to horse by a quantity of fallen timber which
appeared to have been blown up in a tornado. They were formed in three
lines, within supporting distance of each other; and, as is their
custom, with a very extended front. Their line stretched to the west,
at right angles with the river, about two miles, and their immediate
effort was to turn the left flank of the American army.

On the discharge of the first rifle, the legion was formed in two
lines, and the front was ordered to advance with trailed arms and rouse
the enemy from his covert at the point of the bayonet; then, and not
until then, to deliver a fire, and to press the fugitives too closely
to allow them time to load after discharging their pieces. Soon
perceiving the strength of the enemy in front, and that he was
endeavoring to turn the American left, the general ordered the second
line to support the first. The legion cavalry, led by Captain Campbell,
was directed to penetrate between the Indians and the river, where the
wood was less thick and entangled, in order to charge their left flank;
and General Scott, at the head of the mounted volunteers, was directed
to make a considerable circuit, and to turn their right flank.

These orders were executed with spirit and promptitude, but such was
the impetuosity of the charge made by the first line of infantry, so
entirely was the enemy broken by it, and so rapid was the pursuit that
only a small part of the second line and of the mounted volunteers
could get into action. In the course of one hour the Indians were
driven more than two miles through thick woods, when the pursuit
terminated within gunshot of the British fort.

General Wayne remained three days on the banks of the Miami, in front
of the field of battle, during which time the houses and cornfields
above and below the fort, some of them within pistol-shot of it, were
reduced to ashes. In the course of these operations a correspondence
took place between General Wayne and Major Campbell, the commandant of
the fort, which is stated by the former in such a manner as to show
that hostilities between them were avoided only by the prudent
acquiescence of the latter in this devastation of property within the
range of his guns.

On the 28th (August, 1794), the army returned to Au Glaize by easy
marches, destroying on its route all the villages and corn within fifty
miles of the river.

In this decisive battle the loss of the Americans in killed and
wounded, amounted to 107, including officers. Among the dead were
Captain Campbell, who commanded the cavalry, and Lieutenant Towles of
the infantry, both of whom fell in the first charge. General Wayne
bestowed great and well-merited praise on the courage and alacrity
displayed by every part of the army.

The hostility of the Indians still continuing, their whole country was
laid waste, and forts were erected in the heart of their settlements to
prevent their return.

This seasonable victory rescued the United States from a general war
with all the Indians northwest of the Ohio. The Six Nations had
discovered a restless, uneasy temper, and the interposition of the
President to prevent a settlement which Pennsylvania was about to make
at Presque Isle seemed rather to suspend the commencement of
hostilities than to establish permanent pacific dispositions among
those tribes. The battle of the 20th of August, however, had an
immediate effect, and the clouds which had been long gathering in that
quarter were instantly dissipated.

In the South, too, its influence was felt. In that quarter the
inhabitants of Georgia and the Indians seemed equally disposed to war.
Scarcely was the feeble authority of the government competent to
restrain the aggressions of the former, or the dread of its force
sufficient to repress those of the latter. In this doubtful state of
things, the effect of a victory could not be inconsiderable.

About this time the seditions and violent resistance to the execution
of the law imposing duties on spirits distilled within the United
States had advanced to a point in the counties of Pennsylvania lying
west of the Allegheny mountains, which required the decisive
interposition of government.

The laws being openly set at defiance, Washington determined to test
their efficiency. Bills of indictment were found against the
perpetrators of certain outrages, and process was issued against them
and placed in the hands of the United States marshal for execution.

The marshal repaired in person to the country which was the scene of
disorder for the purpose of serving the processes. On the 15th of July
(1794), while in the execution of his duty, he was beset on the road by
a body of armed men, who fired on him, but fortunately did him no
personal injury. At daybreak the ensuing morning a party attacked the
house of General Nevil, the inspector, but he defended himself
resolutely and obliged the assailants to retreat.

Knowing well that this attack had been preconcerted, and apprehending
that it would be repeated, he applied to the militia officers and
magistrates of the county for protection. The answer was that, "owing
to the too general combination of the people to oppose the revenue
system, the laws could not be executed so as to afford him protection;
that should the _posse comitatus_ be ordered out to support the civil
authority they would favor the party of the rioters."

On the succeeding day the insurgents reassembled to the number of about
500 to renew their attack on the house of the inspector. That officer,
finding that no protection could be afforded by the civil authority,
had applied to the commanding officer at Fort Pitt, and had obtained a
detachment of eleven men from that garrison, who were joined by Major
Kirkpatrick. Successful resistance to so great a force being obviously
impracticable, a parley took place, at which the assailants, after
requiring that the inspector and all his papers should be delivered up,
demanded that the party in the house should march out and ground their
arms. This being refused, the parley terminated and the assault
commenced. The action lasted until the assailants set fire to several
adjacent buildings, the heat from which was so intense that the house
could no longer be occupied. From this cause, and from the apprehension
that the fire would soon be communicated to the main building, Major
Kirkpatrick and his party surrendered themselves.

The marshal and Col. Pressly Nevil were seized on their way to General
Nevil's house and detained until 2 the next morning. The marshal
especially was treated with extreme severity. His life was frequently
threatened, and was probably saved by the interposition of some leading
individuals, who possessed more humanity or more prudence than those
with whom they were associated. He could obtain his liberty only by
entering into a solemn engagement, which was guaranteed by Colonel
Nevil, to serve no more processes on the western side of the Allegheny
mountains.

The marshal and inspector having both retired to Pittsburgh, the
insurgents deputed two of their body, one of whom was a justice of the
peace, to demand that the former should surrender all his authority,
and that the latter should resign his office, threatening, in case of
refusal, to attack the place and seize their persons. These demands
were not acceded to, but Pittsburghh affording no security, these
officers escaped from the danger which threatened them by descending
the Ohio; after which they found their way, by a circuitous route, to
the seat of government.

The rioters next proceeded to intercept the mail and take out letters
from certain parties in Pittsburghh, containing expressions of
disapproval of their proceedings. The writers of these letters they
caused to be banished. They next held meetings on Braddock's Field and
at Parkinson's Ferry, at which the determination to resist the laws by
force of arms was openly avowed.

Affidavits attesting this serious state of things were laid before
Washington. Affairs had now reached a point which seemed to forbid the
continuance of a temporizing system. The efforts at conciliation,
which, for more than three years, the government had persisted to make,
and the alterations repeatedly introduced into the act for the purpose
of rendering it less exceptionable, instead of diminishing the
arrogance of those who opposed their will to the sense of the nation,
had drawn forth sentiments indicative of designs much deeper than the
evasion of a single act. The execution of the laws had at length been
resisted by open force, and a determination to persevere in these
measures was unequivocally avowed. The alternative of subduing this
resistance or of submitting to it was presented to the government.

The act of Congress which provided for calling forth the militia "to
execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions" required, as a prerequisite to the exercise of this power,
"that an associate justice, or the judge of the district, should
certify that the laws of the United States were opposed, or their
execution obstructed, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in
the marshals." In the same act it was provided, "that if the militia of
the State where such combinations may happen shall refuse, or be
insufficient, to suppress the same, the President may employ the
militia of other States."

The evidence which had been transmitted to Washington was laid before
one of the associate justices, who gave the certificate, which enabled
the chief magistrate to employ the militia in aid of the civil power.

Washington now called a cabinet to consider the subject, and the
Governor of Pennsylvania was also consulted respecting it. Randolph,
the Secretary of State, and the Governor of Pennsylvania urged reasons
against coercion by force of arms; Hamilton, Knox, and Bradford were in
favor of employing military force. These members of the Cabinet were
also of opinion that policy and humanity equally dictated the
employment of a force which would render resistance desperate. The
insurgent country contained 16,000 men able to bear arms, and the
computation was that they could bring 7,000 into the field. If the army
of the government should amount to 12,000 men, it would present an
imposing force which the insurgents would not venture to meet.

It was impossible that Washington could hesitate to embrace the latter
of these opinions. That a government entrusted to him should be
trampled under foot by a lawless section of the Union, which set at
defiance the will of the nation, as expressed by its representatives,
was an abasement to which neither his judgment nor his feelings could
submit. He resolved, therefore, to issue the proclamation which, by
law, was to precede the employment of force.

On the same day a requisition was made on the Governors of New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia for their several quotas of
militia to compose an army of 12,000 men, who were to be immediately
organized and prepared to march at a minute's warning. The force was
ultimately increased to 15,000. While steps were taking to bring this
force into the field, a last essay was made to render its employment
unnecessary. Three distinguished and popular citizens of Pennsylvania
were deputed by the government to be the bearers of a general amnesty
for past offenses, on the sole condition of future obedience to the
laws.

It having been deemed advisable that the executive of the State should
act in concert with that of the United States, Governor Mifflin also
issued a proclamation and appointed commissioners to act with those of
the general government.

These commissioners were met by a committee from the convention at
Parkinson's Ferry, and the conference resulted in a reference of the
offer of amnesty to the people. This reference only served to
demonstrate that, while a few persons were disposed to submit to the
laws, the masses in the disturbed districts were determined to obstruct
the re-establishment of civil authority.

On the 25th of September (1794), Washington issued a proclamation
describing in terms of great energy the obstinate and perverse spirit
with which the lenient propositions of the government had been
received, and declaring his fixed determination, in obedience to the
high and irresistible duty consigned to him by the constitution, "to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed," to reduce the
refractory to obedience.

The troops of New Jersey and Pennsylvania were directed to rendezvous
at Bedford, and those of Maryland and Virginia at Cumberland, on the
Potomac. The command of the expedition had been conferred on Governor
Lee, of Virginia, and the Governors of New Jersey and Pennsylvania
commanded the militia of their respective States under him.

Washington in person visited each division of the army, but, being
confident that the force employed must look down all resistance, he
left Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury, to accompany it, and
returned himself to Philadelphia, where the approaching session of
Congress required his presence. [1]

From Cumberland and Bedford the army marched in two divisions into the
country of the insurgents. The greatness of the force prevented the
effusion of blood. The disaffected did not venture to assemble in arms.
Several of the leaders, who had refused to give assurances of future
submission to the laws, were seized, and some of them detained for
legal prosecution.

But although no direct and open opposition was made, the spirit of
insurrection was not subdued. A sour and malignant temper displayed
itself, which indicated but too plainly that the disposition to resist
had only sunk under the pressure of the great military force brought
into the country, but would rise again should that force be withdrawn.
It was, therefore, thought advisable to station for the winter a
detachment, to be commanded by Major-General Morgan, in the center of
the disaffected country.

"Thus," says Marshall, "without shedding blood, did the prudent vigor
of the executive terminate an insurrection which, at one time,
threatened to shake the government of the United States to its
foundation. That so perverse a spirit should have been excited in the
bosom of prosperity, without the pressure of a single grievance, is
among those political phenomena which occur not infrequently in the
course of human affairs, and which the statesman can never safely
disregard. When real ills are felt there is something positive and
perceptible to which the judgment may be directed, the actual extent of
which may be ascertained and the cause of which may be discerned. But
when the mind, inflamed by suppositious dangers, gives full play to the
imagination, and fastens upon some object with which to disturb itself,
the belief that the danger exists seems to become a matter of faith,
with which reason combats in vain."

Washington's own view of the insurrection and its causes is contained
in a letter to John Jay, then on his mission to England. "As you have
been," he writes, "and will continue to be fully informed by the
Secretary of State of all transactions of a public nature which relate
to, or may have an influence on, the points of your mission, it would
be unnecessary for me to touch upon any of them in this letter were it
not for the presumption that the insurrection in the western counties
of this State has excited much speculation and a variety of opinions
abroad, and will be represented differently, according to the wishes of
some and the prejudices of others, who may exhibit, as an evidence of
what has been predicted, 'that we are unable to govern ourselves.'
Under this view of the subject, I am happy in giving it to you as the
general opinion that this event having happened at the time it did was
fortunate, although it will be attended with considerable expense.

"That the self-created societies which have spread themselves over this
country have been laboring incessantly to sow the seeds of distrust,
jealousy, and, of course, discontent, thereby hoping to effect some
revolution in the government, is not unknown to you. That they have
been the fomenters of the western disturbances admits of no doubt in
the mind of anyone who will examine their conduct, but, fortunately,
they precipitated a crisis for which they were not prepared, and
thereby have unfolded views which will, I trust, effectuate their
annihilation sooner than it might otherwise have happened, at the same
time that it has afforded an occasion for the people of this country to
show their abhorrence of the result and their attachment to the
constitution and the laws; for I believe that five times the number of
militia that was required would have come forward, if it had been
necessary, to support them.

"The spirit which blazed out on this occasion, as soon as the object
was fully understood, and the lenient measures of the government were
made known to the people, deserves to be communicated. There are
instances of general officers going at the head of a single troop and
of light companies; of field officers, when they came to the place of
rendezvous and found no command for them in that grade, turning into
the ranks and proceeding as private soldiers, under their own captains;
and of numbers, possessing the first fortunes in the country, standing
in the ranks as private men, and marching day by day with their
knapsacks and haversacks at their backs, sleeping on straw, with a
single blanket, in a soldier's tent, during the frosty nights which we
have had, by way of example to others. Nay, more; many young Quakers of
the first families, character, and property, not discouraged by the
elders, have turned into the ranks and are marching with the troops.

"These things have terrified the insurgents, who had no conception that
such a spirit prevailed, but, while the thunder only rumbled at a
distance, were boasting of their strength and wishing for and
threatening the militia by turns, intimating that the arms they should
take from them would soon become a magazine in their hands. Their
language is much changed, indeed, but their principles want correction.

"I shall be more prolix in my speech to Congress on the commencement
and progress of this insurrection than is usual in such an instrument,
or than I should have been on any other occasion, but as numbers at
home and abroad will hear of the insurrection, and will read the
speech, that may know nothing of the documents to which it might refer,
I conceived it would be better to encounter the charge of prolixity by
giving a cursory detail of facts, that would show the prominent
features of the thing, than to let it go naked into the world, to be
dressed up according to the fancy or inclination of the readers or the
policy of our enemies."

Sentiments similar to these were expressed in a letter to Washington's
old and intimate friend, Edmund Pendleton. "The successes of our army
to the westward," he writes, "have already been productive of good
consequences. They have dispelled a cloud which lowered very heavily in
the northern hemisphere (the Six Nations), and, though we have received
no direct advices from General Wayne since November, there is reason to
believe that the Indians with whom we are or were at war in that
quarter, together with their abettors, [2] begin to see things in a
different point of view."

One of the most important effects of the suppression of the western
rebellion was the fatal blow it gave to the democratic societies
founded by Genet.

Washington's opinion of these societies is thus expressed in a letter
to one of his friends: "The real people, occasionally assembled in
order to express their sentiments on political subjects, ought never to
be confounded with permanent self-appointed societies, usurping the
right to control the constituted authorities and to dictate to public
opinion. While the former is entitled to respect, the latter is
incompatible with all government and must either sink into general
disesteem or finally overturn the established order of things."


1. Footnote: General Knox, the Secretary of War, accompanied the army
to the expected scene of action. The command in chief was confided to
Gen. Henry Lee, Washington's old friend and companion in the
Revolutionary War. He was at this time Governor of Virginia.

2. Footnote: The British on the border.




CHAPTER IX.


WASHINGTON SIGNS JAY'S TREATY. 1794-1795.


Congress had adjourned to meet on the 4th of November (1794), but a
quorum of the Senate was not present until the 10th. Washington
addressed both Houses of Congress in a longer speech than usual,
giving, according to the intention he had expressed in his letter to
Mr. Jay, already quoted, a particular view of the insurrection in
Pennsylvania, and the measures which he had taken in order to suppress
it.

As Commander-in-Chief of the militia when called into actual service,
he had, he said, visited the places of general rendezvous, to obtain
more correct information and to direct a plan for ulterior movements.
Had there been reason for supposing that the laws were secure from
obstruction, he should have caught with avidity at the opportunity of
restoring the militia to their families and homes. But succeeding
intelligence had tended to manifest the necessity of what had been
done, it being now confessed by those who were not inclined to
exaggerate the ill conduct of the insurgents, that their malevolence
was not pointed merely to a particular law, but that a spirit inimical
to all order had actuated many of the offenders.

After bestowing a high encomium on the alacrity and promptitude with
which persons in every station had come forward to assert the dignity
of the laws, thereby furnishing an additional proof that they
understood the true principles of government and liberty, and felt the
value of their inseparable union, he added:

"To every description indeed of citizens let praise be given. But let
them persevere in their affectionate vigilance over that precious
depository of American happiness--the constitution of the United
States. And when, in the calm moments of reflection, they shall have
retraced the origin and progress of the insurrection, let them
determine whether it has not been fomented by combinations of men,
who--careless of consequences and disregarding the unerring truth that
those who rouse cannot always appease a civil convulsion--have
disseminated, from an ignorance or perversion of facts, suspicions,
jealousies, and accusations of the whole government."

Washington could not omit this fair occasion once more to press on
Congress a subject which had always been near his heart. After
mentioning the defectiveness of the existing system, he said:

"The devising and establishing a well-regulated militia would be a
general source of legislative honor and a perfect title to public
gratitude. I therefore entertain a hope that the present session will
not pass without carrying to its full energy the power of organizing,
arming, and disciplining the militia, and thus providing, in the
language of the constitution, for calling them forth to execute the
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions."

After mentioning the intelligence from the army under the command of
General Wayne and the state of Indian affairs, he again called the
attention of the House of Representatives to a subject scarcely less
interesting than a system of defense against external and internal
violence.

"The time," he said, "which has elapsed since the commencement of our
fiscal measures has developed our pecuniary resources so as to open the
way for a definitive plan for the redemption of the public debt. It is
believed that the result is such as to encourage Congress to consummate
this work without delay. Nothing can more promote the permanent welfare
of the Union, and nothing would be more grateful to our constituents.
Indeed, whatever is unfinished of our system of public credit cannot be
benefited by procrastination, and, as far as may be practicable, we
ought to place that credit on grounds which cannot be disturbed, and to
prevent that progressive accumulation of debt which must ultimately
endanger all governments."

In alluding to the intercourse of the United States with foreign
nations, he said: "It may not be unseasonable to announce that my
policy in our foreign transactions has been to cultivate peace with all
the world; to observe treaties with pure and inviolate faith; to check
every deviation from the line of impartiality; to explain what may have
been misapprehended, and correct what may have been injurious to any
nation, and having thus acquired the right, to lose no time in
acquiring the ability to insist upon justice being done to ourselves."

In the Senate an answer was reported which contained the following
clause: "Our anxiety, arising from the licentious and open resistance
to the laws in the western counties of Pennsylvania, has been increased
by the proceedings of certain self-created societies relative to the
laws and administration of the government, proceedings in our
apprehension, founded in political error, calculated, if not intended,
to disorganize our government, and which, by inspiring delusive hopes
of support, have been instrumental in misleading our fellow-citizens in
the scene of insurrection."

The address proceeded to express the most decided approbation of the
conduct of Washington in relation to the insurgents, and, after
noticing the different parts of the speech, concluded with saying:

"At a period so momentous in the affairs of nations the temperate,
just, and firm policy that you have pursued in respect to foreign
powers, has been eminently calculated to promote the great and
essential interest of our country, and has created the fairest title to
the public gratitude and thanks."

To this unequivocal approbation of the policy adopted by the executive
with regard to foreign nations, no objections were made. The clause
respecting democratic societies was seriously opposed, but the party in
favor of the administration had been strengthened in the Senate by
recent events, and the address reported by the committee was agreed to
without alteration.

In the House, Mr. Madison, Mr. Sedgwick, and Mr. Scott were the
committee to report an answer to the speech of the President. It was
silent, not only with respect to the self-created societies, but also
as to the success of General Wayne, and the foreign policy of
Washington. His interference with a favorite system of commercial
restrictions was not forgotten, and the mission of John Jay still
rankled in the memory of the republicans. No direct censure of the
societies or approbation of the foreign policy of the President could
be carried, and after an animated debate the opposition party triumphed
in the House.

This triumph over the administration revived for a moment the drooping
energies of these turbulent societies, but it was only for a moment.
The agency ascribed to them by the opinion of the public as well as of
the President, in producing an insurrection which was generally
execrated, had essentially affected them, and while languishing under
this wound they received a deadly blow from a quarter whence hostility
was least expected. The remnant of the French convention, rendered
desperate by the ferocious despotism of the Jacobins, and of the
sanguinary tyrant who had become their chief, had at length sought for
safety by confronting danger, and, succeeding in a desperate attempt to
bring Robespierre to the guillotine, had terminated the reign of
terror. The colossal powers of the clubs fell with that of their
favorite member, and they sunk into long-merited disgrace. Not more
certain is it that the boldest streams must disappear, if the fountain
that fed them be emptied, than was the dissolution of the democratic
societies in America, when the Jacobin clubs were denounced in France.
As if their destinies depended on the same thread the political death
of the former was the unerring signal for that of the latter. [1]

Notwithstanding the disagreement between the executive and one branch
of the Legislature concerning self-created societies, and the policy
observed toward foreign nations, the speech of the President was
treated with marked respect, and the several subjects which it
recommended engaged the immediate attention of Congress. A bill was
passed authorizing the President to station a detachment of militia in
the four western counties of Pennsylvania; provision was made to
compensate those whose property had been destroyed by the insurgents,
should those who had committed the injury be unable to repair it, and
an appropriation exceeding $1,100,000 was made to defray the expenses
occasioned by the insurrection.

Many of the difficulties which had occurred in drawing out the militia
were removed, and a bill was introduced to give greater energy to the
militia system generally, but this subject possessed so many intrinsic
difficulties that the session passed away without effecting anything
respecting it.

A bill for the gradual redemption of the national debt was more
successful. The President had repeatedly and earnestly recommended to
the Legislature the adoption of measures which might effect this
favorite object, but, although that party, which had been reproached
with a desire to accumulate debt as a means of subverting the
republican system, had uniformly manifested a disposition to carry this
recommendation into effect, their desire had hitherto been opposed by
obstacles they were unable to surmount. The party in opposition to the
government, while professing always a desire to reduce the debt took
good care to oppose in detail every proposition having this object in
view. While the subject was under discussion Colonel Hamilton,
Secretary of the Treasury, addressed a letter to the House of
Representatives, through their speaker, informing them that he had
digested and prepared a plan on the basis of the actual revenues, for
the further support of public credit, which he was ready to
communicate. This comprehensive and valuable report was the last
official act of Hamilton.

The penurious provision made for those who filled the high executive
departments in the American government, excluded from a long
continuance in office all those whose fortunes were moderate and whose
professional talents placed a decent independence within their reach.
While slandered as the accumulator of thousands by illicit means,
Hamilton had wasted in the public service great part of the property
acquired by his previous labors, and had found himself compelled to
decide on retiring from his political station. The accusations brought
against him in the last session of the second Congress had postponed
the execution of this design until opportunity should be afforded for a
more full investigation of his official conduct, but he informed
Washington that, on the close of the session to meet in December, 1793,
he should resign his situation in the administration. The events which
accumulated about that time, and which were, he said, in a letter to
Washington, of a nature to render the continuance of peace in a
considerable degree precarious, deferred his meditated retreat. "I do
not perceive," he added, "that I could voluntarily quit my post at such
a juncture, consistently with considerations either of duty or
character, and, therefore, I find myself reluctantly obliged to defer
the offer of my resignation."

"But if any circumstances should have taken place in consequence of the
intimation of an intention to resign, or should otherwise exist, which
serve to render my continuance in office in any degree inconvenient or
ineligible, I beg to leave to assure you, sir, that I should yield to
them with all the readiness naturally inspired by an impatient desire
to relinquish a situation in which even a momentary stay is opposed by
the strongest personal and family reasons, and could only be produced
by a sense of duty or reputation."

Assurances being given by Washington of the pleasure with which the
intelligence that he would continue at his post through the crisis was
received; he remained in office until the commencement of the ensuing
year. Immediately on his return from the western country, the dangers
of domestic insurrection or foreign war having subsided, he gave notice
that he should on the last day of January (1795) give in his
resignation.

In the esteem and good opinion of Washington, to whom he was best
known, Hamilton at all times maintained a high place. While deciding on
the mission to England and searching for a person to whom the
interesting negotiation with that government should be confided, the
mind of the chief magistrate was directed, among others, to him. He
carried with him out of office the same cordial esteem for his
character and respect for his talents which had induced his
appointment.

The vacant office of Secretary of the Treasury was filled by Oliver
Wolcott, of Connecticut, a gentleman of sound judgment, who was well
versed in its duties. He had served as Comptroller for a considerable
time, and in that situation had been eminently useful to the head of
the department.

The bill for the gradual reduction of the public debt, on the basis of
Hamilton's plan, was resisted in detail through nearly the whole
session of Congress, but by the persevering exertions of the Federal
party was finally carried, and the system inaugurated by Hamilton
became a permanent portion of the financial policy of the country.

On the 3d of March (1795) this important session was ended. Although
the party hostile to the administration had obtained a small majority
in one branch of the Legislature several circumstances had concurred to
give great weight to the recommendations of Washington. Among these may
be reckoned the victory obtained by General Wayne and the suppression
of the western insurrection. In some points, however, which he had
pressed with earnestness, his sentiments did not prevail. One of these
was a bill introduced into the Senate for preserving peace with the
Indians, by protecting them from the intrusions and incursions of the
whites.

General Knox, Secretary of War, like Hamilton, was driven from the
service of his country by the scantiness of the compensation allowed
him. He resigned at the close of the year 1794. Colonel Pickering, a
gentleman who had filled many important offices through the war of the
Revolution, who had discharged several trusts of considerable
confidence under the present government, and who at the time was
Postmaster-General, was appointed to succeed him.

After the rising of Congress, Washington made a short visit to Mount
Vernon. He returned to Philadelphia about the 1st of May. Meantime, on
the 7th of March (1795) the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation
between the United States and Great Britain, which had been signed by
the ministers of the two nations on the 19th of the preceding November,
was received.

From his arrival in London, on the 15th of June, 1794, Mr. Jay had been
assiduously and unremittingly employed on the arduous duties of his
mission. By a deportment respectful, yet firm, mingling a decent
deference for the government to which he was deputed with a proper
regard, for the dignity of his own, this minister avoided those little
asperities which frequently embarrass measures of great concern, and
smoothed the way to the adoption of those which were suggested by the
real interests of both nations. Many and intricate were the points to
be discussed. On some of them an agreement was found to be
impracticable, but at length a treaty was concluded, which Mr. Jay
declared to be the best that was attainable, and which he believed it
for the interests of the United States to accept. Indeed it was
scarcely possible to contemplate the evidences of extreme exasperation
which were given in America, and the nature of the differences which
subsisted between the two countries, without feeling a conviction that
war was inevitable, should this attempt to adjust those differences
prove unsuccessful.

The constitution had provided that all treaties should be ratified by
the Senate, and Washington summoned that body to meet on Monday, the
8th of June, in order to take it into consideration. In the meantime
Washington devoted himself to the task of examining its provisions with
the utmost care. It was not, in all respects, what he had wished and
expected. Many points were omitted which he had desired to be
introduced and settled, others were arranged so as to leave room for
future misunderstandings between the two nations. But he felt satisfied
that Mr. Jay had obtained the best terms in his power, and that this
treaty was the best that could have been made under all circumstances.
Important privileges were secured, no great national advantages had
been sacrificed, nothing detrimental to the national honor had been
admitted, and peace was maintained. That the rejection of the treaty
would be followed by a calamitous war did not admit of a doubt. In the
existing state of Europe a war with Great Britain would have involved
the United States in the long-continued agitations of Europe and
deprive them of all the advantages of neutrality and undisturbed
commerce. Fully aware of all these considerations, Washington
determined that if the Senate should ratify the treaty he would give it
the sanction of his signature.

On Monday, the 8th of June (1795), the Senate, in conformity with the
summons of the President, convened in the Senate chamber, and the
treaty, with the documents connected with it, were submitted to their
consideration.

On the 24th of June, after a minute and laborious investigation, the
Senate, by precisely a constitutional majority, advised and consented
to its conditional ratification.

An insuperable objection existed to an article regulating the
intercourse with the British West Indies, founded on a fact which is
understood to have been unknown to Mr. Jay. The intention of the
contracting parties was to admit the direct intercourse between the
United States and those islands, but not to permit the productions of
the latter to be carried to Europe in the vessels of the former. To
give effect to the intention, the exportation from the United States of
those articles which were the principal productions of the islands was
to be relinquished. Among these was cotton. This article, which a few
years before was scarcely raised in sufficient quantity for domestic
consumption, was becoming one of the richest staples of the southern
States. The Senate, being informed of this act, advised and consented
that the treaty should be ratified on condition that an article be
added thereto, suspending that part of the twelfth article which
related to the intercourse with the West Indies.

This resolution of the Senate presented difficulties which required
consideration. Whether they could advise and consent to an article
which had not been laid before them, and whether their resolution was
to be considered as the final exercise of their power, were questions
not entirely free from difficulty. Nor was it absolutely clear that the
executive could ratify the treaty, under the advice of the Senate,
until the suspending article should be introduced into it. A few days
were employed in the removal of these doubts, at the expiration of
which, intelligence was received from Europe which suspended the
resolution the President had formed.

The English newspapers reported that the British government had renewed
the order in council for seizing provisions in neutral vessels bound to
French ports. Washington directed the Secretary of State to prepare a
strong memorial to the British government against this order, and
postponed the signing of the treaty until it should be ready. In the
meantime his private affairs required that he should visit Mount
Vernon, for which place he set off about the middle of July (1795).

Meanwhile, one of the Virginia senators, S. T. Mason, in violation of
the obligation of secrecy and the evident demands of propriety, sent a
copy of the treaty to the "Aurora," a violent partisan paper in
Philadelphia. On the 2nd of July it was published and spread before the
community without the authority of the executive, and without any of
the official documents and correspondence necessary to a fair
appreciation and understanding of its various provisions.

If, in the existing state of parties and the embittered feelings which
widely prevailed, the mission of Jay was censured, and the result of
his labors condemned in advance, before it was known at all what the
treaty contained, the reader can imagine what an effect must have been
produced by the publication of the treaty in this clandestine manner.
Great Britain was hated and reviled, and France was almost adored by a
large and powerful party in the United States, and there were numbers
ready, in their blind political fury and excitement, to sacrifice
everything rather than be on any terms of concord with the mother
country, and rather than moderate in any degree their passionate
devotion to France.

In the populous cities meetings of the people were immediately
summoned, in order to take into consideration and to express their
opinions respecting the treaty. It may well be supposed that persons
feeling some distrust of their capacity to form a correct judgment on a
subject so complex, would be unwilling to make so hasty a decision, and
consequently be disinclined to attend such meetings. Many intelligent
men stood aloof, while the most intemperate assumed, as usual, the name
of the people--pronounced a definitive and unqualified condemnation of
every article in the treaty, and, with the utmost confidence, assigned
reasons for their opinions which, in many instances, had only an
imaginary existence, and in some were obviously founded on the strong
prejudices which were entertained with respect to foreign powers. It is
difficult to review the various resolutions and addresses to which the
occasion gave birth without feeling some degree of astonishment,
mingled with humiliation, at perceiving such proofs of the fallibility
of human reason.

The first meeting was held in Boston. The example of that city was soon
followed by New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston, and, as
if their addresses were designed at least as much for their
fellow-citizens as for their President, while one copy was transmitted
to him another was committed to the press. The precedent set by these
large cities was followed with wonderful rapidity throughout the Union,
and the spirit in which this system of opposition originated sustained
no diminution of violence in its progress. The party which supported
the administration, however, were not idle; they held meetings and sent
addresses to Washington, approving his principles of neutrality and
peace. On the 18th of July (1795), at Baltimore, on his way to Mount
Vernon, the President received the resolutions passed by the meeting at
Boston, which were enclosed to him in a letter from the selectmen of
that town. The answer to this letter and to these resolutions, given in
a subsequent page, evinced the firmness with which he had resolved to
meet the effort that was obviously making to control the exercise of
his constitutional functions, by giving a promptness and vigor to the
expression of the sentiments of a party which might impose it upon the
world as the deliberate judgment of the public.

Addresses to Washington, and resolutions of town and country meetings
were not the only means which were employed to enlist the American
people against the measure which had been advised by the Senate. In an
immense number of essays, the treaty was critically examined and every
argument which might operate on the judgment or prejudice of the public
was urged in the warm and glowing language of passion. To meet these
efforts by counter efforts was deemed indispensably necessary by the
friends of that instrument, and the gazettes of the day are replete
with appeals to the passions and to the reason of those who are the
ultimate arbiters of every political question. That the treaty affected
the interests of France not less than those of the United States, was,
in this memorable controversy, asserted by the one party with as much
zeal as it was denied by the other. These agitations furnished matter
to Washington for deep reflection and for serious regret, but they
appear not to have shaken the decision he had formed or to have
affected his conduct otherwise than to induce a still greater degree of
circumspection in the mode of transacting the delicate business before
him. On their first appearance, therefore, he resolved to hasten his
return to Philadelphia, for the purpose of considering at that place,
rather than at Mount Vernon, the memorial against the provision order
and the conditional ratification of the treaty.

The following confidential letters are extremely interesting, as
evincing the precise state of Washington's mind at this momentous and
exciting period:

"_To Edmund Randolph, Secretary of State_.

"Private.

"MOUNT VERNON, July 29, 1795.

"My Dear Sir.--Your private letters of the 24th and 25th instant have
been received, and you will learn by the official letter of this date
my determination of returning to Philadelphia after Monday, if nothing
in the interim casts up to render it unnecessary.

"I am excited to this resolution by the violent and extraordinary
proceedings which have and are about taking place in the northern parts
of the Union, and may be expected in the southern; because I think that
the Memorial, the Ratification, and the Instructions, which are
framing, are of such vast magnitude as not only to require great
individual consideration, but a solemn conjunct revision. The latter
could not take place if you were to come here, nor would there be that
source of information which is to be found at, and is continually
flowing to, the seat of government; and, besides, in the course of
deliberation on these great objects, the examination of official papers
may more than probably be found essential, which could be resorted to
at no other place than Philadelphia.

"To leave home so soon will be inconvenient. A month hence it would
have been otherwise; and it was, as I hinted to you before I left the
city, in contemplation by me for the purpose of Mrs. Washington's
remaining here till November, when I intended to come back for her. But
whilst I am in office I shall never suffer private convenience to
interfere with what I conceive to be my official duty.

"I view the opposition which the treaty is receiving from the meetings
in different parts of the Union in a very serious light, not because
there is more weight in any of the objections which are made to it than
was foreseen at first, for there is none in some of them and gross
misrepresentations in others, nor as it respects myself personally, for
this shall have no influence on my conduct--plainly perceiving, and I
am accordingly preparing my mind for it, the obloquy which
disappointment and malice are collecting to heap upon me. But I am
alarmed at the effect it may have on and the advantage the French
government may be disposed to take of the spirit which is at work to
cherish a belief in them, that the treaty is calculated to favor Great
Britain at their expense. Whether they believe or disbelieve these
tales, the effect it will have upon the nation will be nearly the same;
for, whilst they are at war with that power, or so long as the
animosity between the two nations exists, it will, no matter at whose
expense, be their policy, and it is to be feared will be their conduct,
to prevent us from being on good terms with Great Britain, or her from
deriving any advantages from our trade, which they can hinder, however
much we may be benefited thereby ourselves. To what length this policy
and interest may carry them is problematical, but, when they see the
people of this country divided, and such a violent opposition given to
the measures of their own government, pretendedly in their favor, it
may be extremely embarrassing, to say no more of it."

"To sum the whole up in a few words, I have never, since I have been in
the administration of the government, seen a crisis which in my
judgment has been so pregnant with interesting events, nor one from
which more is to be apprehended, whether viewed on one side or the
other. From New York there is, and I am told will further be, a counter
current, but how formidable it may appear, I know not. If the same does
not take place at Boston and other towns, it will afford but too strong
evidence that the opposition is in a manner universal, and would make
the ratification a very serious business indeed. But, as it respects
the French, even counter resolutions would, for the reasons I have
already mentioned, do little more than weaken, in a small degree, the
effect the other side would have."

"I have written, and do now enclose the letter, the draught of which
was approved by the heads of departments, to the selectmen of the town
of Boston; but if new lights have been had upon the subject, since it
was agreed to, or if upon reconsideration any alteration should be
deemed necessary, I request you to detain it until I see you. Let me
also request that the same attention may be given to the draught of a
letter to Portsmouth and the Chamber of Commerce at New York as was
recommended on that occasion. I am, etc."

"_To Edmund Randolph, Secretary of State._"

"Private."

"Mount Vernon, _July 31, 1795._

"My Dear Sir.--On Wednesday evening I sent the packet, now under cover
with this, to the post-office in Alexandria, to be forwarded next
morning at the usual hour, 4 o'clock, by the Baltimore mail. But,
behold! when my letter-bag was brought back from the office and
emptied, I not only got those which were addressed to me, among which
yours of the 27th was one, but those also which I had sent up the
evening before."

"I have to regret this blunder of the postmaster on account of the
enclosures, some of which I wished to have got to your hands without
delay, that they might have undergone the consideration and acting upon
which were suggested in the letter accompanying them. On another
account I am not sorry for the return of the packet, as I resolved
thereupon and on reading some letters which I received at the same
time, to wait your acknowledgment of the receipt of my letter of the
24th instant before I would set out, as I should thereby be placed on a
certainty whether your journey hither or mine to Philadelphia would,
under all circumstances, be deemed most eligible, or whether the
business could not be equally well done without either; repeating now
what I did in my letter of the 24th, that I do not require more than a
day's notice to repair to the seat of government, and that if you and
the confidential officers with you are not clear in the measures which
are best to be pursued in the several matters mentioned in my last, my
own opinion is, and for the reasons there given, that difficult and
intricate or delicate questions had better be settled there, where the
streams of information are continually flowing in, and that I would set
out accordingly. To be wise and temperate, as well as firm, the
present crisis most eminently calls for. There is too much reason to
believe, from the pains which have been taken before, at, and since the
advice of the Senate respecting the treaty, that the prejudices against
it are more extensive than is generally imagined. This I have lately
understood to be the case in this quarter, from men who are of no
party, but well disposed to the present administration. How should it
be otherwise, when no stone has been left unturned that could impress
on the minds of the people the most arrant misrepresentation of facts:
that their rights have not only been neglected, but absolutely sold;
that there are no reciprocal advantages in the treaty; that the
benefits are all on the side of Great Britain; and, what seems to have
had more weight with them than all the rest, and to have been most
pressed, that the treaty is made with the design to oppress the French,
in open violation of our treaty with that nation, and contrary, too, to
every principle of gratitude and sound policy? In time, when passion
shall have yielded to sober reason, the current may possibly turn; but,
in the meanwhile, this government, in relation to France and England,
may be compared to a ship between the rocks of Scylla and Charybdis. If
the treaty is ratified, the partisans of the French, or rather of war
and confusion, will excite them to hostile measures, or at least to
unfriendly sentiments; if it is not, there is no foreseeing all the
consequences which may follow as it respects Great Britain."

"It is not to be inferred from hence that I am disposed to quit the
ground I have taken, unless circumstances more imperious than have yet
come to my knowledge should compel it, for there is but one straight
course, and that is to seek truth and pursue it steadily. But these
things are mentioned to show that a close investigation of the subject
is more than ever necessary, and that they are strong evidences of the
necessity of the most circumspect conduct in carrying the determination
of government into effect, with prudence as it respects our own people,
and with every exertion to produce a change for the better from Great
Britain."

"The memorial seems well designed to answer the end proposed, and by
the time it is revised and new dressed you will probably (either in the
resolutions, which are or will be handed to me, or in the newspaper
publications, which you promised to be attentive to) have seen all the
objections against the treaty which have any real force in them, and
which may be fit subjects for representation in the memorial, or in the
instructions, or both. But how much longer the presentation of the
memorial can be delayed without exciting unpleasant sensations here, or
involving serious evils elsewhere, you, who are at the scene of
information and action can decide better than I. In a matter, however,
so interesting and pregnant with consequences as this treaty, there
ought to be no precipitation, but, on the contrary, every step should
be explored before it is taken and every word weighed before it is
uttered or delivered in writing."

"The form of the ratification requires more diplomatic experience and
legal knowledge than I possess or have the means of acquiring at this
place, and, therefore, I shall say nothing about it. I am, etc."

The answer to the selectmen of Boston, already referred to, is too
characteristic to be omitted. It is as follows:

"_To the Selectmen of the Town of Boston._"

"United States, _July 28, 1795._

"Gentlemen.--In every act of my administration I have sought the
happiness of my fellow-citizens. My system for the attainment of this
object has uniformly been to overlook all personal, local, and partial
considerations; to contemplate the United States as one great whole; to
consider that sudden impressions, when erroneous, would yield to candid
reflection, and to consult only the substantial and permanent interests
of our country. Nor have I departed from this line of conduct on the
occasion which has produced the resolutions contained in your letter of
the 13th instant."

"Without a predilection for my own judgment, I have weighed with
attention every argument which has at any time been brought into view.
But the constitution is the guide which I can never abandon. It has
assigned to the President the power of making treaties, with the advice
and consent of the Senate. It was doubtless supposed that these two
branches of government would combine, without passion and with the best
means of information, those facts and principles upon which the success
of our foreign relations will always depend; that they ought not to
substitute for their own conviction the opinions of others, or to seek
truth through any channel but that of a temperate and well-informed
investigation." "Under this persuasion, I have resolved on the manner
of executing the duty before me. To the high responsibility attached to
it, I freely submit; and you, gentlemen, are at liberty to make these
sentiments known, as the ground of my procedure. While I feel the most
lively gratitude for the many instances of approbation from my country,
I can no otherwise deserve it than by obeying the dictates of my
conscience."

"With due respect, I am, gentlemen, your obedient

"George Washington."


In nearly the same terms Washington replied to other committees and
public bodies who thought proper to remonstrate against his exercising
the constitutional right of signing the treaty.

In the afternoon of the 11th of August (1795), Washington arrived in
Philadelphia, and, on the next day, the question respecting the
immediate ratification of the treaty was brought before the Cabinet.
Randolph, Secretary of State, maintained, singly, the opinion that,
during the existence of the provision order, and during the war between
Britain and France, this step ought not to be taken. This opinion,
however, did not prevail. The resolution was adopted to ratify the
treaty immediately and to accompany the ratification with a strong
memorial against the provision order, which should convey, in explicit
terms, the sense of the American government on that subject. By this
course the views of the executive were happily accomplished. The order
was revoked and the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged.

Washington was most probably determined to adopt this course by the
extreme intemperance with which the treaty was opposed and the rapid
progress which this violence was apparently making. It was obvious
that, unless this temper could be checked, it would soon become so
extensive and would arrive at such a point of fury as to threaten
dangerous consequences. It was obviously necessary either to attempt a
diminution of its action, by rendering its exertions hopeless and by
giving to the treaty the weight of his character and influence, or to
determine ultimately to yield to it. A species of necessity, therefore,
seems to have been created for abandoning the idea, if it was ever
taken up, of making the ratification of the treaty dependent on the
revocation of the provision order. The soundness of the policy which
urged this decisive measure was proved by the event. The confidence
which was felt in the judgment and virtue of Washington induced many
who, swept away by the popular current, had yielded to the common
prejudices, to re-examine and discard opinions which had been too
hastily embraced; and many were called forth by a desire to support the
administration in measures actually adopted, to take a more active part
in the general contest than they would otherwise have pursued. The
consequence was that more moderate opinions respecting the treaty began
to prevail.

In a letter from Mount Vernon of the 20th of September (1795),
addressed to General Knox, who had communicated to him the change of
opinion which was appearing in the eastern States, Washington expressed
in warm terms the pleasure derived from that circumstance, and added:

"Next to a conscientious discharge of my public duties, to carry along
with me the approbation of my constituents would be the highest
gratification of which my mind is susceptible. But the latter being
secondary, I cannot make the former yield to it, unless some criterion
more infallible than partial (if they are not party) meetings can be
discovered as the touchstone of public sentiment. If any person on
earth could, or the great Power above would, erect the standard of
infallibility in political opinions, no being that inhabits this
terrestrial globe would resort to it with more eagerness than myself,
so long as I remain a servant of the public. But as I have hitherto
found no better guide than upright intentions and close investigations,
I shall adhere to them while I keep watch, leaving it to those who will
come after me to explore new ways, if they like, or think them better."

If the ratification of the treaty increased the number of its open
advocates, it seemed also to give increased acrimony to the opposition.
Such hold had Washington taken of the affections of the people that
even his enemies had deemed it generally necessary to preserve, with
regard to him, external marks of decency and respect. Previous to the
mission of Mr. Jay, charges against Washington, though frequently
insinuated, had seldom been directly made; and the cover under which
the attacks upon his character were conducted evidenced the caution
with which it was deemed necessary to proceed. That mission visibly
affected the decorum which had been usually observed toward him, and
the ratification of the treaty brought sensations into open view which
had long been ill concealed. His military and political character was
attacked with equal violence, and it was averred that he was totally
destitute of merit, either as a soldier or a statesman. The calumnies
with which he was assailed were not confined to his public conduct;
even his qualities as a man were the subjects of detraction. That he
had violated the constitution in negotiating a treaty without the
previous advice of the Senate, and in embracing within that treaty
subjects belonging exclusively to the Legislature, was openly
maintained, for which an impeachment was publicly suggested; and that
he had drawn from the treasury for his private use more than the salary
annexed to his office was asserted without a blush. This last
allegation was said to be supported from extracts from the treasury
accounts which had been laid before the Legislature, and was maintained
with the most persevering effrontery.

Though Wolcott, the Secretary of the Treasury, denied that the
appropriations made by the Legislature had ever been exceeded, the
atrocious charge was still confidently repeated, and the few who could
triumph in any spot which might tarnish the luster of Washington's fame
felicitated themselves on the prospect of obtaining a victory over the
reputation of a patriot, to whose single influence they ascribed the
failure of their political plans. With the real public, the confidence
felt in the integrity of Washington remained unshaken, but so imposing
was the appearance of the documents adduced as to excite an
apprehension that the transaction might be placed in a light to show
that some indiscretion, in which he had not participated, had been
inadvertently committed.

This state of anxious suspense was of short duration. Hamilton, late
Secretary of the Treasury, during whose administration of the finances
this peculation was said to have taken place, came forward with a full
explanation of the fact. It appeared that Washington himself had never
touched any part of the compensation annexed to his office, but that
the whole was received and disbursed by the gentleman who superintended
the expenses of his household. That it was the practice of the
treasury, when a sum had been appropriated for the current year, to pay
it to that gentleman occasionally, as the situation of the family might
require. The expenses at some periods of the year exceeded and at
others fell short of the allowance for the quarter, so that at some
times money was paid in advance on account of the ensuing quarter, and
at others, that which was due at the end of the quarter was not
completely drawn out. The secretary entered into an examination of the
constitution and laws to show that this practice was justifiable, and
illustrated his arguments by many examples in which an advance on
account of money appropriated to a particular object, before the
service was completed, would be absolutely necessary. However this
might be, it was a transaction in which Washington, personally, was
unconcerned.

When possessed of the entire facts, the public viewed with just
indignation this attempt to defame a character which was the nation's
pride. Americans felt themselves involved in this atrocious calumny on
their most illustrious citizen, and its propagators were frowned into
silence.

Meantime several changes were taking place in Washington's Cabinet.
Edmund Randolph, the Secretary of State, resigned his office on the
19th of August, 1795, immediately after the ratification of Jay's
treaty, which he had opposed. The circumstances which led to his
resignation were by no means creditable to him, but as they brought out
in bold relief one of Washington's noblest traits--his perfect openness
and candor--we are induced to notice them in detail.

A letter addressed to his government in October, 1794, by Fauchet, the
minister of the French republic, was intercepted by the captain of a
British frigate and forwarded to Mr. Hammond, by whom it was delivered,
about the last of July, to Mr. Wolcott, the Secretary of the Treasury,
who, on the arrival of Washington in Philadelphia, placed it in his
hands. This letter alluded to communications from Randolph, which, in
the opinion of Washington, were excessively improper. The
_claircissements_ which the occasion required were followed by the
resignation of the secretary. For the purpose, he alleged, of
vindicating his conduct, he demanded a sight of a confidential letter
which had been addressed to him by Washington, and which was left in
the office. His avowed design was to give this, as well as some others
of the same description, to the public, in order to support the
allegation that, in consequence of his attachment to France and to
liberty, he had fallen a victim to the intrigues of a British and an
aristocratic party. The answer given to this demand was a license which
few politicians, in turbulent times, could allow to a man who had
possessed the unlimited confidence of the person giving it. "I have
directed," said Washington, "that you should have the inspection of my
letter of the 22nd of July, agreeable to your request; and you are at
full liberty to publish, without reserve, any and every private and
confidential letter I ever wrote you; nay, more--every word I ever
uttered to or in your presence from whence you can derive any advantage
in your vindication."

Notwithstanding that Randolph was under the strongest personal
obligations to Washington, he did not hesitate, in his lame attempt to
vindicate himself, to resort to violent abuse of his late friend and
patron. Washington is said to have lost his temper on reading
Randolph's calumnies, [2] as well he might, for it is difficult to
conceive of blacker ingratitude than he suffered on this occasion. Late
in life Randolph seems to have been sensible of the enormity of his
conduct. On the 2nd of July, 1810, he used the following language in a
letter to the Hon. Bushrod Washington: "I do not retain the smallest
degree of that feeling which roused me fifteen years ago against some
individuals. For the world contains no treasure, deception, or charm
which can seduce me from the consolation of being in a state of good
will toward all mankind, and I should not be mortified to ask pardon of
any man with whom I have been at variance for any injury which I may
have done him. If I could now present myself before your venerated
uncle it would be my pride to confess my contrition that I suffered my
irritation, let the cause be what it might, to use some of those
expressions respecting him which, at this moment of my indifference to
the ideas of the world, I wish to recall, as being inconsistent with my
subsequent conviction. My life will, I hope, be sufficiently extended
for the recording of my sincere opinion of his virtues and merit, in a
style which is not the result of a mind merely debilitated by
misfortune, but of that Christian philosophy on which alone I depend
for inward tranquility."

Washington offered the vacant post to Patrick Henry, who was prevented
by private considerations from undertaking its duties. Rufus King, Gen.
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and two or three others were asked to
enter the Cabinet as Secretary of State, but they declined. Finally
Colonel Pickering, who had temporary charge of the post, was formally
appointed in December of the present year. James McHenry succeeded
Colonel Pickering as Secretary of War. Mr. Bradford's death, in August,
caused a vacancy in the attorney-generalship, which was also filled in
December by the appointment of Charles Lee, of Virginia. This office
had been previously offered to General Pinckney, Colonel Carrington, of
Virginia, and Governor Howard, of Maryland.

In August of this year (1795), General Wayne concluded a treaty of
peace, at Greenville, with the chiefs of the Wyandots, Delawares,
Chippeways, and other Indian tribes. By this treaty the Indians ceded
the post of Detroit and a considerable tract of adjacent land to the
United States. A tract of land was ceded on the main, to the north of
the island on which the post of Michilimackinac stood, measuring six
miles on lakes Huron and Michigan, and extending three miles back from
the water of the lake or strait. De Bois Blanc, or White Wood Island,
was also ceded--the voluntary gift of the Chippeways.

The foreign affairs of the United States had now begun to assume a more
favorable aspect. A treaty was concluded with Spain on the 27th of
October (1795). It was confined principally to the two great subjects
in dispute, and was styled a treaty of friendship, limits, and
navigation. By this the line between the United States and east and
west Florida was settled, and the western boundary of the United
States, which separated them from the Colony of Louisiana, was fixed in
the middle of the channel of the Mississippi river to the thirty-first
degree of north latitude; and it was also agreed that the navigation of
that river, from its source to the ocean, should be free only to the
subjects and citizens of the two countries.

It was further stipulated that both parties should use all the means in
their power to maintain peace and harmony among the Indian nations on
their borders, and both parties bound themselves to restrain, even by
force, the Indians within their limits from acts of hostilities against
the other, and it was also agreed that neither party would thereafter
make any treaties with those who did not live within their respective
limits. Provision was also made that free ships should make free goods,
and that no citizen or subject of either party should take a commission
or letters of marque for arming any vessel, to act as a privateer, from
their respective enemies, under the penalty of being considered and
punished as a pirate.

Thus, after a tedious and unpleasant negotiation of about fifteen
years, the boundaries between the countries belonging to the United
States and Spain, in America, were settled, and the right of navigating
every part of the Mississippi, a right so essential to the interests of
our vast western territory, was secured to the United States.

In November (1795) Washington had the gratification to bring to a close
the long negotiations with the Dey of Algiers, by which peace was
established with those piratical marauders and the release of American
captives obtained. This was accomplished through the agency of Colonel
Humphreys, Joel Barlow, and Mr. Donaldson, and about 120 prisoners were
released from cruel bondage, some of whom had been in this ignominious
condition more than ten years.

During the recess of Congress Washington paid a visit to Mount Vernon,
which lasted from the middle of September (1795) till near the end of
October. During this time his attention was divided between the
concerns of his estate and the public affairs of that exciting period.


1. Footnote: Marshall

2. Footnote: See Dr. Griswold's "Republican Court." Also, Sparks
"Writings of Washington," vol. XI, pp. 54, 479.




CHAPTER X.


WASHINGTON MAINTAINS THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE.
1795-1796.


The first session of the Fourth Congress commenced on the 7th of
December, 1795. Although the ratification of the treaties with Spain
and Algiers had not been officially announced at the meeting of
Congress the state of the negotiations with both powers was
sufficiently well understood to enable Washington with confidence to
assure the Legislature, in his speech at the opening of the session,
that those negotiations were in a train which promised a happy issue.

After expressing his gratification at the prosperous state of American
affairs the various favorable events which have been already enumerated
were detailed in a succinct statement, at the close of which he
mentioned the British treaty, which, though publicly known, had not
before been communicated officially to the House of Representatives.

"This interesting summary of our affairs," continued the speech, "with
regard to the powers between whom and the United States controversies
have subsisted, and with regard also to our Indian neighbors with whom
we have been in a state of enmity or misunderstanding, opens a wide
field for consoling and gratifying reflections. If by prudence and
moderation on every side, the extinguishment of all the causes of
external discord which have heretofore menaced our tranquility, on
terms compatible with our national faith and honor, shall be the happy
results, how firm and how precious a foundation will have been laid for
accelerating, maturing, and establishing the prosperity of our
country!"

After presenting an animated picture of the situation of the United
States, and recommending several objects to the attention of the
Legislature, Washington concluded with observing: "Temperate discussion
of the important subjects that may arise in the course of the session,
and mutual forbearance where there is a difference in opinion, are too
obvious and necessary for the peace, happiness, and welfare of our
country to need any recommendation of mine."

In the Senate an address was reported which echoed back the sentiments
of the speech.

In this House of Representatives, as in the last, the party in
opposition to the administration had obtained a majority. This party
was unanimously hostile to the treaty with Great Britain, and it was
expected that their answer to the speech of the President would
indicate their sentiments on a subject which continued to agitate the
whole American people. The answer reported by the committee contained a
declaration that the confidence of his fellow-citizens in the chief
magistrate remained undiminished.

On a motion to strike out the words importing this sentiment is was
averred that the clause asserted an untruth; that it was not true that
the confidence of the people in the President was undiminished; that by
a recent transaction it had been considerably impaired, and some
gentlemen declared that their own confidence in him was lessened.

By the friends of the administration this motion was opposed with great
zeal, and the opinion that the confidence of the people in their chief
magistrate remained unshaken, was maintained with ardor. But they were
outnumbered.

To avoid a direct vote on the proposition it was moved that the address
should be recommitted. This motion succeeded and, two members being
added to the committee, an answer was reported, in which the clause
objected to was so modified as to be free from exception.

That part of the speech which mentioned the treaty with Great Britain
was alluded to in terms which, though not directly expressive of
disapprobation, were sufficiently indicative of the prevailing
sentiment.

Early in the month of January (1796) Washington transmitted to both
houses of Congress a message, accompanying certain communications from
the French government which were well calculated to cherish those
ardent feelings that prevailed in the Legislature.

It was the fortune of Mr. Monroe to reach Paris soon after the death of
Robespierre and the fall of the Jacobins. On his reception as the
minister of the United States, which was public, and in the convention,
he gave free scope to the genuine feelings of his heart, and, at the
same time, delivered to the president of that body, with his
credentials, two letters addressed by the Secretary of State to the
committee of public safety. These letters were answers to one written
by the committee of safety to the Congress of the United States. The
executive department being the organ through which all foreign
intercourse was to be conducted, each branch of the Legislature had
passed a resolution directing this letter to be transmitted to the
President with a request that he would cause it to be answered in terms
expressive of their friendly dispositions toward the French republic.

So fervent were the sentiments expressed on this occasion that the
convention decreed that the flag of the American and French republics
should be united together and suspended in its own hall in testimony of
eternal union and friendship between the two people. To evince the
impression made on his mind by this act, and the grateful sense of his
constituents, Mr. Monroe presented to the convention the flag of the
United States, which he prayed them to accept as a proof of the
sensibility with which his country received every act of friendship
from its ally, and of the pleasure with which it cherished every
incident which tended to cement and consolidate the union between the
two nations.

The committee of safety again addressed Congress in terms adapted to
that department of government which superintends its foreign
intercourse and expressive, among other sentiments, of the sensibility
with which the French nation had perceived those sympathetic emotions
with which the American people had viewed the vicissitudes of her
fortune. Mr. Adet, who was to succeed Mr. Fauchet at Philadelphia, and
who was the bearer of this letter, also brought with him the colors of
France, which he was directed to present to the United States. He
arrived in the summer, but, probably in the idea that these
communications were to be made by him directly to Congress, did not
announce them to the executive until late in December (1795).

The first day of the new year (1796) was named for their reception,
when the colors were delivered to Washington, and the letter to
Congress also was placed in his hands.

In executing this duty Mr. Adet addressed a speech to the President,
which, in the glowing language of his country, represented France as
struggling not only for her own liberty, but for that of the human
race. "Assimilated to, or rather identified with, free people by the
form of her government, she saw in them," he said, "only friends and
brothers. Long accustomed to regard the American people as her most
faithful allies she sought to draw closer the ties already formed in
the fields of America, under the auspices of victory, over the ruins of
tyranny."

To answer this speech was a task of some delicacy. It was necessary to
express feelings adapted to the occasion without implying sentiments
with respect to the belligerent powers which might be improper to be
used by the chief magistrate of a neutral country. With a view to both
these objects Washington made the following reply:

"Born, sir, in a land of liberty; having early learned its value;
having engaged in a perilous conflict to defend it; having, in a word,
devoted the best years of my life to secure its permanent establishment
in my own country, my anxious recollections, my sympathetic feelings,
and my best wishes are irresistibly attracted, when-so-ever, in any
country, I see an oppressed nation unfurl the banners of freedom. But,
above all, the events of the French revolution have produced the
deepest solicitude as well as the highest admiration. To call your
nation brave were to pronounce but common praise. Wonderful people!
ages to come will read with astonishment the history of your brilliant
exploits, I rejoice that the period of your toils and of your immense
sacrifices is approaching. I rejoice that the interesting revolutionary
movements of so many years have issued in the formation of a
constitution designed to give permanency to the great object for which
you have contended. I rejoice that liberty, which you have so long
embraced with enthusiasm--liberty, of which you have been the
invincible defenders, now finds an asylum in the bosom of a regularly
organized government--a government which, being formed to secure the
happiness of the French people, corresponds with the ardent wishes of
my heart, while it gratifies the pride of every citizen of the United
States by its resemblance to their own. On these glorious events
accept, sir, my sincere congratulations."

"In delivering to you these sentiments I express not my own feelings
only, but those of my fellow-citizens in relation to the commencement,
the progress, and the issue of the French revolution, and they will
certainly join with me in purest wishes to the Supreme Being that the
citizens of our sister republic, our magnanimous allies, may soon enjoy
in peace that liberty which they have purchased at so great a price,
and all the happiness that liberty can bestow."

"I receive, sir, with lively sensibility the symbol of the triumphs and
of the enfranchisement of your nation, the colors of France, which you
have now presented to the United States. The transaction will be
announced to Congress and the colors will be deposited with the
archives of the United States, which are at once the evidence and the
memorials of their freedom and independence. May these be perpetual!
and may the friendship of the two republics be commensurate with their
existence!"

The address of Mr. Adet, the answer of the President, and the colors of
France, were transmitted to Congress with the letter from the committee
of safety.

In the House of Representatives a resolution was moved, requesting the
President to make known to the representatives of the French republic
the sincere and lively sensations which were excited by this honorable
testimony of the existing sympathy and affections of the two republics;
that the House rejoiced in an opportunity of congratulating the French
republic on the brilliant and glorious achievements accomplished during
the present afflictive war, and hoped that those achievements would be
attended with a perfect attainment of their object--the permanent
establishment of the liberty and happiness of that great and
magnanimous people.

In February (1796) the treaty with Great Britain was returned, in the
form advised by the Senate, ratified by his Britannic majesty. The
constitution declaring a treaty, when made, the supreme law of the
land, the President announced it officially to the people in a
proclamation, requiring from all persons its observance and execution,
a copy of which was transmitted to each House on the 1st of March.

The opposition having openly denied the right of the President to
negotiate a treaty of commerce was not a little dissatisfied at his
venturing to issue this proclamation before the sense of the House of
Representatives had been declared on the obligation of the instrument.

This dissatisfaction was not concealed. On the 2d of March Mr.
Livingston laid upon the table a resolution requesting the President
"to lay before the House a copy of the instructions to the minister of
the United States, who negotiated the treaty with the King of Great
Britain, communicated by his message of the 1st of March, together with
the correspondence and other documents relative to the said treaty."

On the 7th of March he amended this resolution by adding the words,
"excepting such of the said papers as any existing negotiation may
render improper to be disclosed."

The friends of the administration maintained that a treaty was a
contract between two nations, which, under the constitution, the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, had a
right to make, and that it was made when, by and with such advice and
consent, it had received his final act. Its obligations then became
complete on the United States, and to refuse to comply with its
stipulations was to break the treaty and to violate the faith of the
nation.

The opposition contended that the power to make treaties, if applicable
to every object, conflicted with powers which were vested exclusively
in Congress; that either the treaty-making power must be limited in its
operation, so as not to touch objects committed by the constitution to
Congress, or the assent and cooperation of the House of Representatives
must be required to give validity to any compact, so far as it might
comprehend those objects. A treaty, therefore, which required an
appropriation of money, or any act of Congress to carry it into effect,
had not acquired its obligatory force until the House of
Representatives had exercised its powers in the case. They were at full
liberty to make, or to withhold, such appropriation or other law,
without incurring the imputation of violating any existing obligation
or of breaking the faith of the nation.

The debate on this question was animated, vehement, and argumentative,
all the party passions were enlisted in it, and it was protracted until
the 24th of March (1796), when the resolution was carried in the
affirmative by sixty-two to thirty-seven votes. The next day, the
committee appointed to present it to the chief magistrate reported his
answer which was, "that he would take the resolution into
consideration."

The situation in which this vote placed the President was peculiarly
delicate. In an elective government, the difficulty of resisting the
popular branch of the Legislature is at all times great, but is
particularly so when the passions of the public have been strongly and
generally excited. The popularity of a demand for information, the
large majority by which that demand was supported, the additional force
which a refusal to comply with it would give to suspicions already
insinuated, that circumstances had occurred in the negotiation which
the administration dared not expose, and that the President was
separating himself from the representatives of the people, furnished
motives of no ordinary force for complying with the request of the
House of Representatives.

But Washington viewed every question which came before him with a
single eye to the performance of his duty to the country. Hitherto, on
more than one occasion, he had proved himself the defender of the
constitution, but he had never been called upon to defend it against so
formidable an attack as that which was now made.

That the future diplomatic transactions of the government might be
seriously and permanently affected by establishing the principle that
the House of Representatives could demand, as a right, the instructions
given to a foreign minister, and all the papers connected with a
negotiation, was too apparent to be unobserved. Nor was it less obvious
that a compliance with the request now made would go far in
establishing this principle. The form of the request, and the motives
which induced it, equally led to this conclusion. It left nothing to
the discretion of the President with regard to the public interests,
and the information was asked for the avowed purpose of determining
whether the House of Representatives would give effect to a public
treaty.

It was also a subject for serious reflection that, in a debate
unusually elaborate, the House of Representatives had claimed a right
of interference in the formation of treaties, which, in the judgment of
the President, the constitution had denied them. Duties the most sacred
requiring that he should resist this encroachment on the department
which was particularly confided to him, he could not hesitate
respecting the course it became him to take, and on the 30th of March
he returned to the House the following answer to their resolution:

"With the utmost attention I have considered your resolution of the
24th instant, requesting me to lay before your House a copy of the
instructions to the minister of the United States, who negotiated the
treaty with the King of Great Britain, together with the correspondence
and other documents relative to that treaty, excepting such of the said
papers as any existing negotiation may render improper to be disclosed.

"In deliberating upon this subject it was impossible for me to lose
sight of the principle which some have avowed in its discussion, or to
avoid extending my views to the consequences which must flow from the
admission of that principle.

"I trust that no part of my conduct has ever indicated a disposition to
withhold any information which the constitution has enjoined it upon
the President as a duty to give or which could be required of him by
either House of Congress as a right, and with truth I affirm, that it
has been, as it will continue to be, while I have the honor to preside
in the government, my constant endeavor to harmonize with the other
branches thereof, so far as the trust delegated to me by the people of
the United States, and my sense of the obligation it imposes to
preserve, protect and defend the constitution will permit.

"The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success
must often depend on secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion, a
full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions
which may have been proposed or contemplated, would be extremely
impolitic, for this might have a pernicious influence on future
negotiations or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and
mischief to other persons. The necessity of such caution and secrecy
was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, the principle on
which that body was formed confining it to a small number of members.

"To admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand and
to have as a matter of course, all the papers respecting a negotiation
with a foreign power, would be to establish a dangerous precedent.

"It does not occur that the inspection of the papers asked for can be
relative to any purpose under the cognizance of the House of
Representatives, except that of an impeachment, which the resolution
has not expressed. I repeat, that I have no disposition to withhold any
information which the duty of my station will permit or the public good
shall require to be disclosed, and, in fact, all the papers affecting
the negotiation with Great Britain were laid before the Senate, when
the treaty itself was communicated for their consideration and advice.

"The course which the debate has taken on the resolution of the House,
leads to some observations on the mode of making treaties under the
constitution of the United States.

"Having been a member of the general convention and knowing the
principles on which the constitution was formed, I have ever
entertained but one opinion upon this subject, and from the first
establishment of the government to this moment my conduct has
exemplified that opinion--that the power of making treaties is
exclusively vested in the President by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur, and
that every treaty so made and promulgated, thenceforward becomes the
law of the land. It is thus that the treaty-making power has been
understood by foreign nations, and in all the treaties made with them,
we have declared, and they have believed, that when ratified by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, they became
obligatory. In this construction of the constitution every House of
Representatives has heretofore acquiesced, and, until the present time,
not a doubt or suspicion has appeared, to my knowledge, that this
construction was not a true one. Nay, they have more than acquiesced,
for until now, without controverting the obligation of such treaties,
they have made all the requisite provisions for carrying them into
effect.

"There is also reason to believe that this construction agrees with the
opinions entertained by the State conventions when they were
deliberating on the constitution, especially by those who objected to
it because there was not required, in commercial treaties, the consent
of two-thirds of the whole number of the members of the Senate, instead
of two-thirds of the senators present, and because, in treaties
respecting territorial and certain other rights and claims, the
concurrence of three-fourths of the whole number of the members of both
Houses respectively was not made necessary.

"It is a fact declared by the general convention and universally
understood, that the constitution of the United States was the result
of a spirit of amity and mutual concession. And it is well known that
under this influence the smaller States were admitted to an equal
representation in the Senate with the larger States, and that this
branch of the government was invested with great powers, for on the
equal participation of those powers the sovereignty and political
safety of the smaller States were deemed essentially to depend.

"If other proofs than these, and the plain letter of the constitution
itself, be necessary to ascertain the points under consideration, they
may be found in the journals of the general convention, which I have
deposited in the office of the Department of State. In these journals
it will appear that a proposition was made 'that no treaty should be
binding on the United States which was not ratified by a law,' and that
the proposition was explicitly rejected.

"As, therefore, it is perfectly clear to my understanding that the
assent of the House of Representatives is not necessary to the validity
of a treaty, as the treaty with Great Britain exhibits in itself all
the objects requiring legislative provision--and on these the papers
called for can throw no light, and as it is essential to the due
administration of the government that the boundaries fixed by the
constitution between the different departments should be preserved, a
just regard to the constitution and to the duty of my office, under all
the circumstances of this case, forbids a compliance with your
request."

The terms in which this decided, and, it would seem, unexpected
negative to the call for papers was conveyed, appeared to break the
last cord of that attachment which had theretofore bound some of the
active leaders of the opposition to Washington. Amidst all the
agitations and irritations of party a sincere respect and real
affection for him, the remnant of former friendship, had still lingered
in the bosoms of some who had engaged with ardor in the political
contests of the day. But, if the last spark of this affection was not
now extinguished, it was at least concealed under the more active
passions of the moment.

Washington's message was referred to a committee of the whole house. It
was severely criticized and resolutions were adopted, by a vote of
fifty-seven to thirty-five, declaring the sense of the House on this
matter, and claiming the right to deliberate on the expediency of
carrying into effect stipulations made by treaty on subjects committed
by the constitution to Congress.

In March the subject came up incidentally. The treaties with the King
of Spain and with the Dey of Algiers were ratified by the President and
laid before Congress. On the 13th of April (1796), Mr. Sedgwick moved,
"that provision ought to be made by law for carrying into effect with
good faith the treaties lately concluded with the Dey and Regency of
Algiers, the King of Great Britain, the King of Spain, and certain
Indian tribes northwest of the Ohio." After much altercation on the
subject of thus joining all these treaties together, a division was
made, and the question taken on each. The resolution was amended by a
majority of eighteen so as to read, "that it is expedient to pass the
laws necessary for carrying into effect," &c.

The subject of the British treaty was again taken up on the 15th of
April. Its friends urged an immediate decision of the question,
alleging that every member had made up his mind already, and that
dispatch was necessary, in case the treaty was to be carried into
effect. The posts were to be delivered up on the 1st of June, and this
required previous arrangements on the part of the American government.
They appear to have entertained the opinion that the majority would not
dare to encounter the immense responsibility of breaking the treaty
without previously ascertaining that the great body of the people were
willing to meet the consequences of the measure. But its opponents,
though confident of their power to reject the resolution, called for
its discussion.

The minority soon desisted from urging an immediate decision of the
question, and the spacious field which was opened by the propositions
before the House was entered into with equal avidity and zeal by both
parties. Gallatin, Madison, Giles, Nicholas, Preston, and other eminent
members of the republican party, in animated terms opposed the
execution of the treaty and entered fully into the discussion of its
merits and demerits. Fisher Ames, Dwight, Foster, Harper, Lyman,
Dayton, and other men of note among the Federalists, urged every
possible argument in its favor.

The debate on this occasion is one of the most celebrated which has
ever taken place in Congress. Fisher Ames' speech is acknowledged to
have been the most remarkable and effective which he ever made. So
completely was the House carried away by his eloquence that an
adjournment was carried for the avowed reason that it was not possible
to decide calmly on the question until the members should have taken
time for reflection. Reflection convinced not only the members of
Congress, but the people, that the opposition to the execution of the
treaty was ill advised and unreasonable. The length of time consumed in
the debates was favorable to a just view of the subject, and finally a
majority of the members who had been opposed to the treaty yielded to
the exigency of the case and united in passing the laws which were
necessary for its fulfillment.

On the 29th of April (1796) the question was taken in committee of the
whole and was determined by the casting vote of the chairman in its
favor. The resolution was finally carried in the House by a vote of
fifty-one to forty-eight.

Besides the acts which arose out of the treaties, Congress passed
others, regulating the dealings of the inhabitants of the western
frontier with the Indians; authorizing the survey of certain public
lands, with a view to the sale of them; ordaining measures for the
protection and relief of American seamen, and equalizing the pay of
members of both Houses of Congress. There were some $6,000,000, which
was not quite the full amount of the income, appropriated to the public
service and the interest of the debt. But there were so many other
demands upon the treasury that, after vainly endeavoring to obtain
another loan, part of the bank stock was sold, a procedure which was
reprobated by Hamilton as a violation of system. The opposition party
would not agree to raise further revenue by indirect internal taxation,
and only that augmenting the duty on pleasure carriages was passed into
a law. Equally strenuous was their opposition to a naval force. Even
under the pressure of the Algerine piracies, the bill providing a
decent naval force in the Mediterranean could not be carried through
the House without inserting a section which should suspend all
proceedings under the act in case the contest with Algiers was brought
to an end. That event having occurred, not a single frigate could be
completed without further authority from the Legislature. Although no
peace had been concluded with Tunis or Tripoli it was with the utmost
difficulty that a bill for the completion of three, instead of six,
frigates could be carried. On the 1st of June (1796) this long and
important session of Congress was brought to its close.

Before Congress rose Washington had written (May 22, 1796) to Thomas
Pinckney, the American minister in England, who had desired his recall.
In this letter he refers to the recent debate in Congress on passing
the laws necessary to give effect to the treaty: "A long and animated
discussion," he writes, "in the House of Representatives respecting the
treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with Great Britain took place
and continued in one shape or another till the last of April,
suspending in a manner all other business, and agitating the public
mind in a higher degree than it has been at any period since the
Revolution. And nothing, I believe, but the torrent of petitions and
remonstrances, which were pouring in from all the eastern and middle
States and were beginning to come pretty strongly from that of
Virginia, requiring the necessary provisions for carrying the treaty
into effect, would have produced a division (fifty-one to forty-eight)
in favor of the appropriation.

"But as the debates, which I presume will be sent to you from the
Department of State, will give you a view of this business more in
detail than I am able to do, I shall refer you to them. The enclosed
speech, however, made by Mr. Ames at the close of the discussion, I
send to you, because, in the opinion of most who heard it delivered or
have read it since, his reasoning is unanswerable.

"The doubtful issue of the dispute and the real difficulty in finding a
character to supply your place at the court of London, has occasioned a
longer delay than may have been convenient or agreeable to you. But as
Mr. King of the Senate, who, it seems, had resolved to quit his seat at
that board, has accepted the appointment, and will embark as soon as
matters can be arranged, you will soon be relieved.

"In my letter of the 20th of February I expressed in pretty strong
terms my sensibility on account of the situation of the Marquis de
Lafayette. This is increased by the visible distress of his son, who is
now with me, and grieving for the unhappy fate of his parents. This
circumstance, giving a poignancy to my own feelings, has induced me to
go a step further than I did in the letter above mentioned, as you will
perceive by the enclosed address (a copy of which is also transmitted
for your information) to the Emperor of Germany, to be forwarded by you
in such a manner, and under such auspices, as in your judgment shall be
deemed best, or to be withheld, if from the evidence before you,
derived from former attempts, it shall appear clear that it would be of
no avail to send it. [1]

"Before I close this letter permit me to request the favor of you to
embrace some favorable occasion to thank Lord Grenville, in my behalf,
for his politeness in causing a special permit to be sent to Liverpool
for the shipment of two sacks of field peas and the like quantity of
winter vetches, which I had requested our consul at that place to send
me for seed, but which it seems could not be done without an order from
government, a circumstance which did not occur to me or I certainly
should not have given the trouble of issuing one for such a trifle."

Rufus King, senator from New York, above referred to, had been
nominated to the Senate as minister to London on the 19th of May, three
days before the date of Washington's letter to Mr. Pinckney. Hamilton,
writing to Washington respecting him, thus describes his character:
"Mr. King is a remarkably well-informed man, a very judicious one, a
man of address, a man of fortune and economy, whose situation affords
just ground of confidence; a man of unimpeached probity where he is
known, a firm friend to the government, a supporter of the measures of
the President; a man who cannot but feel that he has strong pretensions
to confidence and trust."

In June (1796) the President went to Mount Vernon where he continued
for more than two months. He kept up a constant correspondence with his
secretaries, and held himself ever in readiness to return to the seat
of government, if his presence should be needed.

During this visit to Mount Vernon the following letter was written to
Thomas Jefferson. It brought the correspondence, which, from time to
time, had taken place between them, to a final close.


"MOUNT VERNON, _July_ 6, 1796.

"DEAR SIR:--When I inform you that your letter of the 19th ultimo went
to Philadelphia and returned to this place before it was received by
me, it will be admitted, I am persuaded, as an apology for my not
having acknowledged the receipt of it sooner.

"If I had entertained any suspicions before that the queries which have
been published in Bache's paper proceeded from you the assurances you
have given of the contrary would have removed them, but the truth is, I
harbored none. I am at no loss to conjecture from what source they
flowed, through what channel they were conveyed, and for what purpose
they and similar publications appear. They were known to be in the
hands of Mr. Parker in the early part of the last session of Congress.
They were shown about by Mr. Giles during the session and they made
their public exhibition about the close of it.

"Perceiving, and probably hearing, that no abuse in the gazettes would
induce me to take notice of anonymous publications against me, those
who were disposed to do me such friendly offices have embraced, without
restraint, every opportunity to weaken the confidence of the people,
and, by having the whole game in their hands, they have scrupled not to
publish things that do not, as well as those which do exist, and to
mutilate the latter, so as to make them subserve the purposes which
they have in view.

"As you have mentioned the subject yourself, it would not be frank,
candid, or friendly to conceal that your conduct has been represented
as derogating from that opinion I had conceived you entertained of me,
that to your particular friends and connections you have described, and
they have denounced, me as a person under a dangerous influence, and
that if I would listen more to some other opinions all would be well.
My answer invariably has been that I had never discovered anything in
the conduct of Mr. Jefferson to raise suspicions in my mind of his
insincerity; that, if he would retrace my public conduct while he was
in the administration, abundant proofs would occur to him that truth
and right decisions were the sole objects of my pursuit; that there
were as many instances within his own knowledge of my having decided
against as in favor of the opinions of the person evidently alluded to,
and, moreover, that I was no believer in the infallibility of the
politics or measures of any man living. In short, that I was no party
man myself, and the first wish of my heart was, if parties did exist,
to reconcile them.

"To this I may add, and very truly, that, until within the last year or
two I had no conception that parties would, or even could, go the
length I have been witness to, nor did I believe until lately that it
was within the bounds of probability, hardly within those of
possibility, that, while I was using my utmost exertions to establish a
national character of our own, independent, as far as our obligations
and justice would permit, of every nation of the earth, and wished, by
steering a steady course, to preserve this country from the horrors of
a desolating war, I should be accused of being the enemy of one nation
and subject to the influence of another, and, to prove it, that every
act of my administration would be tortured and the grossest and most
insidious misrepresentations of them be made, by giving one side only
of a subject, and that too in such exaggerated and indecent terms as
could scarcely be applied to a Nero, a notorious defaulter, or even to
a common pickpocket. But enough of this. I have already gone further in
the expression of my feelings than I intended."

The queries referred to in the above letter were those which had been
addressed to the Cabinet by Washington previous to the arrival of Mr.
Genet. As they were strictly confidential and could not have been
obtained for publication without treachery somewhere, Jefferson had
written to Washington to exculpate himself. It will be seen that
Washington, with his usual magnanimity, accepts the explanation of
Jefferson; but, as the party of which the latter was the acknowledged
leader were constantly carrying on the war of politics by abusing and
misrepresenting the former's motives and purposes, it is not surprising
that their correspondence should have terminated at this time.

Of the numerous misrepresentations and fabrications which, with
unwearied industry, were passed upon the public in order to withdraw
the confidence of the nation from its chief, no one marked more
strongly the depravity of that principle which justifies the means by
the end, than the republication of certain forged letters, purporting
to have been written by General Washington in the year 1776.

These letters had been originally published in the year 1777, and in
them were interspersed, with domestic occurrences which might give them
the semblance of verity, certain political sentiments favorable to
Britain in the then existing contest.

But the original fabricator of these papers missed his aim. It was
necessary to assign the manner in which the possession of them was
acquired, and, in executing this part of his task, circumstances were
stated so notoriously untrue, that, at the time, the meditated
imposition deceived no person.

In the indefatigable research for testimony which might countenance the
charge that the executive was unfriendly to France and under the
influence of Britain, these letters were drawn from the oblivion into
which they had sunk, it had been supposed forever, and were republished
as genuine. The silence with which Washington treated this as well as
every other calumny, was construed into an acknowledgment of its truth,
and the malignant commentators on this spurious text would not admit
the possibility of its being apocryphal.

Those who labored incessantly to establish the favorite position that
the executive was under other than French influence, reviewed every act
of the administration connected with its foreign relations, and
continued to censure every part of the system with extreme bitterness.
Not only the treaty with Great Britain, but all those measures which
had been enjoined by the duties of neutrality, were reprobated as
justly offensive to France, and no opinion which had been advanced by
Mr. Genet, in his construction of the treaties between the two nations,
was too extravagant to be approved. The most ardent patriot could not
maintain the choicest rights of his country with more zeal than was
manifested in supporting all the claims of the French republic upon the
United States. This conduct of the opposition increased the disposition
of the French government to urge charges against that of this country,
and the French minister regulated his proceedings accordingly.

In the anxiety which was felt by Washington to come to a full and
immediate explanation with the French Directory on the treaty with
Great Britain, Colonel Monroe, the American minister at Paris, had been
furnished, even before its ratification, and still more fully
afterwards, with ample materials for the justification of his
government. But, misconceiving the views of the administration, he
reserved these representations until complaints should be made, and
omitted to urge them while the Directory was deliberating on the course
it should pursue. Meanwhile, his letters kept up the alarm with regard
to the dispositions of France, and intelligence from the West Indies
served to confirm it. Washington received information that the special
agents of the Directory in the islands were about to issue orders for
the capture of all American vessels laden in whole or in part with
provisions and bound for any port within the dominions of the British
Crown.

Knowing well that the intentions of the executive had been at all times
friendly to the French republic, Washington had relied with confidence
on early and candid communications for the removal of any prejudices or
misconceptions. That the Directory would be disappointed at the
adjustment of those differences which threatened to embroil the United
States with Great Britain, could not be doubted, but, as neither this
adjustment, nor the arrangements connected with it had furnished any
real cause of complaint, he had cherished the hope that it would
produce no serious consequences if the proper means of prevention
should be applied in time. He was therefore dissatisfied with delays
which he had not expected, and seems to have believed that they
originated in a want of zeal to justify a measure which neither the
minister himself, nor his political friends, had ever approved. To
insure an earnest and active representation of the true sentiments of
the executive, Washington was inclined to depute an envoy extraordinary
for the particular purpose, who should be united with the actual
minister, but an objection, drawn from the constitution, was suggested
to the measure. It was doubted whether the President could, in the
recess of the Senate, appoint a minister when no vacancy existed. From
respect to this construction of the constitution, the resolution was
taken to appoint a successor to Colonel Monroe. The choice of a person
calculated for this mission was not without its difficulty. While a
disposition friendly to the administration was indispensable, it was
desirable that the person employed should have given no umbrage to the
French government.

After some deliberation, Washington selected Gen. Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney, of South Carolina, for this critical and important service.
In the early part of the French revolution, he had felt and expressed
all the enthusiasm of his countrymen for the establishment of the
republic, but, after the commencement of its contests with the United
States, he stood aloof from both those political parties which divided
America.

He was recommended to the President by an intimate knowledge of his
worth, by a confidence in the sincerity of his personal attachment to
the chief magistrate, by a conviction that his exertions to effect the
objects of his mission would be ardent and sincere, and that, whatever
might be his partialities for France, he possessed a high and delicate
sense of national as well as individual honor, was jealous for the
reputation of his country, and tenacious of its rights. [2]

In July, immediately after the appointment of General Pinckney, letters
were received from Colonel Monroe communicating the official complaints
which had been made against the American government in March, by M. de
la Croix, the minister of exterior relations, with his answer to those
complaints. He had effectually refuted the criminations of M. de la
Croix, and the executive was satisfied with his answer. But the
Directory had decided on their system, and it was not by reasoning that
their decision was to be changed.

Washington's correspondence with the members of the Cabinet during his
summer residence at Mount Vernon was incessant. In his letters to James
McHenry, Secretary of War, we find evidence of his attention to minute
details of business, and his care of the public funds. In his letters
of the 8th of August, we find, besides a reference to the fact of the
delivery of the posts on the frontier by Great Britain, under the
treaty, some curious details respecting the army:

"Your letter of the 3d instant," he writes, "with the information of
our possession of Fort Ontario, lately occupied by the troops of Great
Britain, and the correspondence between Captain Bruff of the United
States troops, and Captain Clarke of the British, was brought to me by
the last post. Several matters are submitted by the former for
consideration--among them, the mode of supplying the garrison with
firewood, and furnishing it with a seine. With respect to the first of
these, providing it with a horse or pair of horses and a batteau, as
the fuel is to be transported so far, seems to be a matter of
necessity, but the practice of the American army should be consulted
for precedents, before the British allowance is made to the soldiers
for cutting and transporting it to the fort, when the means by which it
is done are furnished by the public. If no allowance of this sort has
been made heretofore in towns, where wood was to be bought, which, if I
remember rightly, was the case invariably while I commanded the army,
it would be a dangerous innovation to begin it now, for it would
instantly pervade all the garrisons and the whole army, be their
situation what it may. In time of peace, where no danger is to be
apprehended, and where the duty is light, I see no hardship in the
soldiers providing fuel for their own use and comfort. With regard to a
seine, as the expense would be small if it is taken care of, and the
convenience great, I think the garrison should be indulged with one."
He had always an eye to the comfort of the soldier as well as to
economy in the expenditure of the public money. The garrison might have
horses for draught, a batteau, and a seine to catch fish in the lake,
but in time of peace they were not to have extra pay for cutting wood
to keep themselves warm.


1. Footnote: This letter, dated May 15, 1796, contained an affecting
statement of Lafayette's case, and a request that he might be permitted
to come to the United States. The letter was transmitted to Mr.
Pinckney, to be conveyed to the Emperor through his minister at London.
How far it operated in mitigating immediately the rigor of Lafayette's
confinement, or in obtaining his liberation, remains unascertained.

2. Footnote: Before offering the appointment of minister to France to
General Pinckney, Washington had offered it to Gen. John Marshall,
afterward chief justice; but the situation of his private affairs would
not permit its acceptance.




CHAPTER XI.


WASHINGTON RETIRES FROM THE PRESIDENCY. 1796-1797.


Washington's fixed determination to retire from office at the end of
his second term had long been known to his confidential friends. Many
of them had opposed it from an apprehension of a political crisis
arising from the hostile demonstrations of France and the strong
support given to French pretensions by the opposition party in this
country. When, in July (1796), Washington proposed to declare publicly
his determination, Hamilton wrote to him, "If a storm gathers, how can
you retreat? This is a most serious question." Washington, yielding to
the wishes of Hamilton and other intimate friends, delayed the
announcement of his purpose. As the time for a new election approached
the people, uncertain of his intentions, became extremely anxious. The
strong hold, says Marshall, which Washington had taken of the
affections of his countrymen was, on this occasion, fully evinced. In
districts where the opposition to his administration was most powerful,
where all his measures were most loudly condemned, where those who
approved his system possessed least influence, the men who appeared to
control public opinion on every other subject found themselves unable
to move it on this. Even the most popular among the leaders of the
opposition were reduced to the necessity of surrendering their
pretensions to a place in the electoral body or of pledging themselves
to bestow their suffrage on the actual President. The determination of
his fellow-citizens had been unequivocally manifested, and it was
believed to be apparent that the election would again be unanimous when
he announced his fixed resolution to withdraw from the honors and the
toils of office.

Having long contemplated this event and having wished to terminate his
political course with an act which might be at the same time suitable
to his own character and permanently useful to his country, he had
prepared for the occasion a valedictory address in which, with the
solicitude of a person who, in bidding a final adieu to his friends,
leaves his affections and his anxieties for their welfare behind him,
he made a last effort to impress upon his countrymen those great
political truths which had been the guides of his own administration
and could alone, in his opinion, form a sure and solid basis for the
happiness, the independence, and the liberty of the United States.

This interesting paper was published on the 17th of September, at a
time when hopes were entertained that the discontents of France might
be appeased by proper representations. It contains precepts to which
the American statesman cannot too frequently recur.

WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.

FRIENDS AND FELLOW CITIZENS:--The period for a new election of a
citizen to administer the executive government of the United States
being not far distant, and the time actually arrived when your thoughts
must be employed in designating the person who is to be clothed with
that important trust, it appears to me proper, especially as it may
conduce to a more distinct expression of the public voice, that I
should not apprise you of the resolution I have formed, to decline
being considered among the number of those out of whom the choice is to
be made.

I beg you at the same time to do me the justice to be assured that this
resolution has not been taken without a strict regard to all the
considerations appertaining to the relation which binds a dutiful
citizen to his country, and that in withdrawing the tender of service,
which silence in my situation might imply, I am influenced by no
diminution of zeal for your future interest, no deficiency of grateful
respect for your past kindness, but am supported by a full conviction
that the step is compatible with both.

The acceptance of, and continuance hitherto in, the office to which
your suffrages have twice called me, have been a uniform sacrifice of
inclination to the opinion of duty and to a deference for what appeared
to be your desire. I constantly hoped that it would have been much
earlier in my power, consistently with motives which I was not at
liberty to disregard, to return to that retirement from which I had
been reluctantly drawn. The strength of my inclination to do this,
previous to the last election, had even led to the preparation of an
address to declare it to you, but mature reflection on the then
perplexed and critical posture of our affairs with foreign nations, and
the unanimous advice of persons entitled to my confidence, impelled me
to abandon the idea.

I rejoice that the state of your concerns, external as well as
internal, no longer renders the pursuit of inclination incompatible
with the sentiment of duty or propriety, and am persuaded, whatever
partiality may be retained for my services, that in the present
circumstances of our country, you will not disapprove of my
determination to retire.

The impressions with which I first undertook the arduous trust were
explained on the proper occasion. In the discharge of this trust I will
only say that I have, with good intentions, contributed toward the
organization and administration of the government the best exertions of
which a very fallible judgment was capable. Not unconscious, in the
outset, of the inferiority of my qualifications, experience in my own
eyes, perhaps still more in the eyes of others, has strengthened the
motives to diffidence of myself, and every day the increasing weight of
years admonishes me more and more that the shade of retirement is as
necessary to me as it will be welcome. Satisfied that if any
circumstances have given peculiar value to my services, they were
temporary, I have the consolation to believe, that while choice and
prudence invite me to quit the political scene, patriotism does not
forbid it.

In looking forward to the moment which is to terminate the career of my
political life, my feelings do not permit me to suspend the deep
acknowledgment of that debt of gratitude which I owe to my beloved
country for the many honors it has conferred upon me; still more for
the steadfast confidence with which it has supported me, and for the
opportunities I have thence enjoyed of manifesting my inviolable
attachment by services faithful and persevering, though in usefulness
unequal to my zeal. If benefits have resulted to our country from these
services, let it always be remembered to your praise and as an
instructive example in our annals, that, under circumstances in which
the passions, agitated in every direction, were liable to mislead--
amidst appearances sometimes dubious--vicissitudes of fortune often
discouraging--in situations in which not unfrequently want of success
has countenanced the spirit of criticism--the constancy of your support
was the essential prop of the efforts and a guarantee of the plans by
which they were effected. Profoundly penetrated with this idea, I shall
carry it with me to my grave, as a strong incitement to unceasing
wishes, that Heaven may continue to you the choicest tokens of its
beneficence--that your union and brotherly affection may be
perpetual--that the free constitution, which is the work of your hands,
may be sacredly maintained--that its administration in every department
may be stamped with wisdom and virtue--that, in fine, the happiness of
the people of these States, under the auspices of liberty, may be made
complete, by so careful a preservation and so prudent a use of this
blessing, as will acquire to them the glory of recommending it to the
applause, the affection, and the adoption of every nation which is yet
a stranger to it.

Here, perhaps, I ought to stop. But a solicitude for your welfare which
cannot end but with my life and the apprehension of danger natural to
that solicitude, urge me, on an occasion like the present, to offer to
your solemn contemplation and to recommend to your frequent review,
some sentiments, which are the result of much reflection of no
inconsiderable observation and which appear to me all-important to the
permanency of your felicity as a people. These will be offered to you
with the more freedom, as you can only see in them the disinterested
warnings of a parting friend, who can possibly have no personal motive
to bias his counsel. Nor can I forget, as an encouragement to it, your
indulgent reception of my sentiments on a former and not dissimilar
occasion.

Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every ligament of your
hearts, no recommendation of mine is necessary to fortify or confirm
the attachment.

The unity of government, which constitutes you one people, is also now
dear to you. It is justly so, for it is a main pillar in the edifice of
your real independence, the support of your tranquility at home, your
peace abroad, of your safety, of your prosperity, of that very liberty
which you so highly prize. But as it is easy to foresee that from
different causes and from different quarters, much pains will be taken,
many artifices employed, to weaken in your minds the conviction of this
truth, as this is the point in your political fortress against which
the batteries of internal and external enemies will be most constantly
and actively (though often covertly and insidiously) directed, it is of
infinite moment that you should properly estimate the immense value of
your national union to your collective and individual happiness, that
you should cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable attachment to it,
accustoming yourselves to think and speak of it as of the palladium of
your political safety and prosperity, watching for its preservation
with jealous anxiety, discountenancing whatever may suggest even a
suspicion that it can in any event be abandoned, and indignantly
frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to alienate any
portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties
which now link together the various parts.

For this you have every inducement of sympathy and interest. Citizens
by birth or choice of a common country, that country has a right to
concentrate your affections. The name of American, which belongs to you
in your national capacity, must always exalt the just pride of
patriotism, more than any appellation derived from local
discriminations. With slight shades of difference, you have the same
religion, manners, habits, and political principles. You have in a
common cause fought and triumphed together; the independence and
liberty you possess are the work of joint councils and joint efforts of
common dangers, sufferings, and successes.

But these considerations, however powerfully they address themselves to
your sensibility, are greatly out-weighed by those which apply more
immediately to your interest. Here every portion of our country finds
the most commanding motives for carefully guarding and preserving the
union of the whole.

The North, in an unrestrained intercourse with the South, protected by
the equal laws of a common government, finds in the productions of the
latter, great additional resources of maritime and commercial
enterprise, and precious materials of manufacturing industry. The
South, in the same intercourse, benefiting by the agency of the North,
sees its agriculture grow and its commerce expand. Turning partly into
its own channels the seamen of the North, it finds its particular
navigation invigorated--and while it contributes, in different ways,
to nourish and increase the general mass of the national navigation, it
looks forward to the protection of a maritime strength to which itself
is unequally adapted. The East, in like intercourse with the West,
already finds and in the progressive improvement of interior
communications by land and water, will more and more find a valuable
vent for the commodities which it brings from abroad or manufactures at
home. The West derives from the East supplies requisite to its growth
and comfort, and, what is perhaps of still greater consequence, it must
of necessity owe the secure enjoyment of indispensable outlets for its
own productions, to the weight, influence, and the future maritime
strength of the Atlantic side of the Union, directed by an indissoluble
community of interest as one nation. Any other tenure by which the West
can hold this essential advantage, whether derived from its own
separate strength or from an apostate and unnatural connection with any
foreign power, must be intrinsically precarious.

While, then, every part of our country thus feels an immediate and
particular interest in union, all the parts combined cannot fail to
find in the united mass of means and efforts, greater strength, greater
resource, proportionally greater security from external danger, a less
frequent interruption of their peace by foreign nations, and, what is
of inestimable value, they must derive from union an exemption from
those broils and wars between themselves which so frequently afflict
neighboring countries, not tied together by the same government, which
their own rivalships alone would be sufficient to produce, but which
opposite foreign alliances, attachments, and intrigues would stimulate
and embitter. Hence likewise they will avoid the necessity of those
overgrown military establishments, which, under any form of government,
are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as
particularly hostile to republican liberty. In this sense it is that
your union ought to be considered as a main prop of your liberty and
that the love of the one ought to endear to you the preservation of the
other.

These considerations speak a persuasive language to every reflecting
and virtuous mind and exhibit the continuance of the Union as a primary
object of patriotic desire. Is there a doubt whether a common
government can embrace so large a sphere? Let experience solve it. To
listen to mere speculation in such a case were criminal. We are
authorized to hope that a proper organization of the whole, with the
auxiliary agency of governments for the respective subdivisions will
afford a happy issue to the experiment. It is well worth a fair and
full experiment. With such powerful and obvious motives to union
affecting all parts of our country, while experience shall not have
demonstrated its impracticability, there will always be reason to
distrust the patriotism of those who, in any quarter, may endeavor to
weaken its bands.

In contemplating the causes which may disturb our union, it occurs as
matter of serious concern, that any ground should have been furnished
for characterizing parties by geographical discriminations--northern
and southern--Atlantic and western, whence designing men may endeavor
to excite a belief that there is a real difference of local interests
and views. One of the expedients of party to acquire influence, within
particular districts, is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other
districts. You cannot shield yourselves too much against the jealousies
and heart burnings which spring from these misrepresentations; they
tend to render alien to each other those who ought to be bound together
by fraternal affection. The inhabitants of our western country have
lately had a useful lesson on this head. They have seen, in the
negotiation by the executive and in the unanimous ratification by the
Senate of the treaty with Spain, and in the universal satisfaction at
that even throughout the United States, a decisive proof how unfounded
were the suspicions propagated among them of a policy in the general
government and in the Atlantic States, unfriendly to their interests in
regard to the Mississippi. They have been witnesses to the formation of
two treaties, that with Great Britain and that with Spain, which secure
to them everything they could desire in respect to our foreign
relations toward confirming their prosperity. Will it not be their
wisdom to rely for the preservation of these advantages on the Union by
which they were procured? Will they not henceforth be deaf to those
advisers, if such there are, who would sever them from their brethren
and connect them with aliens?

To the efficacy and permanency of your Union a government for the whole
is indispensable. No alliances, however strict, between the parts can
be an adequate substitute; they must inevitably experience the
infractions and interruptions which all alliances in all times have
experienced.

Sensible of this momentous truth you have improved upon your first
essay by the adoption of a constitution of government, better
calculated than your former, for an intimate union, and for the
efficacious management of your common concerns. This government, the
offspring of our own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full
investigation and mature deliberation, completely free in its
principles, in the distribution of its powers uniting security with
energy, and containing within itself a provision for its own
amendments, has a just claim to your confidence and your support.
Respect for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in
its measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of true
liberty. The basis of our political systems is the right of the people
to make and to alter their constitutions of government. But the
constitution which at any time exists, until changed by an explicit and
authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The
very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish a
government, presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the
established government.

All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and
associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design
to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberations and
action of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this
fundamental principle and of fatal tendency. They serve to organize
faction; to give it an artificial and extraordinary force; to put in
the place of the delegated will of the nation, the will of a party,
often a small, but artful and enterprising minority of the community,
and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make
the public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and
incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of consistent
and wholesome plans, digested by common councils and modified by mutual
interests.

However combinations or associations of the above description may now
and then answer popular ends they are likely, in the course of time and
things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and
unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people and
to usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterward
the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion.

Toward the preservation of your government and the permanency of your
present happy state, it is requisite not only that you steadily
discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged authority, but
also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its
principles, however specious the pretexts. One method of assault may be
to effect in the forms of the constitution alterations which will
impair the energy of the system, and thus to undermine what cannot be
directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited
remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true
characters of governments as of other human institutions--that
experience is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of
the existing constitution of a country--that facility in changes upon
the credit of mere hypothesis, and opinion exposes to perpetual change
from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion--and remember,
especially, that for the efficient management of your common interests,
in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much vigor as is
consistent with the perfect security of liberty is indispensable.
Liberty itself will find in such a government, with powers properly
distributed and adjusted, its surest guardian. It is, indeed, little
else than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the
enterprises of faction, to confine each member of the society within
the limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the secure
and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and property.

I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the State,
with particular reference to the founding of them on geographical
discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view and warn you
in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of
party generally.

This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its
root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under
different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled,
or repressed but in those of the popular form it is seen in its
greatest rankness and is truly their worst enemy.

The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the
spirit of revenge natural to party dissension, which in different ages
and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a
frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and
permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result gradually
incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute
power of an individual, and sooner or later the chief of some
prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors,
turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation on the
ruins of public liberty.

Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which
nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight) the common and
continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it
the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.

It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the
public administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded
jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against
another; foments occasional riot and insurrection. It opens the door to
foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to
the government itself, through the channel of party passions. Thus the
policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will
of another.

There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks
upon the administration of the government and serve to keep alive the
spirit of liberty. This, within certain limits, is probably true, and
in governments of a monarchical cast patriotism may look with
indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those
of the popular character, in governments purely elective, it is a
spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency it is certain
there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose,
and, there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by
force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be
quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a
flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume.

It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free
country should inspire caution in those entrusted with its
administration to confine themselves within their respective
constitutional spheres, avoiding, in the exercise of the powers of one
department, to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends
to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to
create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just
estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which
predominate in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the
truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the
exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into
different depositories and constituting each the guardian of the public
weal against invasions of the others, has been evinced by experiments
ancient and modern, some of them in our country and under our own eyes.
To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If, in the
opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the
constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected
by an amendment in the way which the constitution designates. But let
there be no change by usurpation, for though this, in one instance, may
be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free
governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly
overbalance, in permanent evil, any partial or transient benefit which
the use can at any time yield.

Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity,
religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that
man claim the tribute of patriotism, who should labor to subvert these
great pillars of human happiness--these firmest props of the duties of
men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man,
ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all
their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be
asked, where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if
the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which are the
instruments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us with
caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without
religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined
education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both
forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of
religious principles. It is substantially true, that virtue or morality
is a necessary spring of popular government. This rule indeed extends
with more or less force to every species of free government. Who that
is a sincere friend to it can look with indifference upon attempts to
shake the foundation of the fabric?

Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the
general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a
government gives force to public opinion it is essential that public
opinion should be enlightened.

As a very important source of strength and security, cherish public
credit. One method of preserving it is to use it as sparingly as
possible, avoiding occasions of expense by cultivating peace, but
remembering also, that timely disbursements to prepare for danger,
frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it; avoiding
likewise the accumulation of debt, not only by shunning occasions of
expense, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to discharge the
debts which unavoidable wars may have occasioned, not ungenerously
throwing upon posterity the burden which we ourselves ought to bear.
The execution of these maxims belongs to your representatives, but it
is necessary that public opinion should cooperate. To facilitate to
them the performance of their duty, it is essential that you should
practically bear in mind, that toward the payment of debts there must
be revenue; that to have revenue there must be taxes; that no taxes can
be devised which are not more or less inconvenient and unpleasant; that
the intrinsic embarrassment inseparable from the selection of the
proper objects (which is always a choice of difficulties), ought to be
a decisive motive for a candid construction of the conduct of the
government in making it, and for a spirit of acquiescence in the
measures for obtaining revenue, which the public exigencies may at any
time dictate.

Observe good faith and justice toward all nations, cultivate peace and
harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct, and can it
be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a
free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great nation, to give
to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always
guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt, that, in
the course of time and things, the fruits of such a plan would richly
repay any temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady
adherence to it? Can it be, that Providence has not connected the
permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue? The experiment, at
least, is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature.
Alas! is it rendered impossible by its vices?

In the execution of such a plan nothing is more essential than that
permanent inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and
passionate attachments for others, should be excluded, and that, in
place of them, just and amicable feelings toward all should be
cultivated. The nation which indulges toward another an habitual
hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a
slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is
sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy
in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer
insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage and to be
haughty and intractable when accidental or trifling occasions of
dispute occur.

Hence, frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed and bloody contests.
The nation, prompted by ill will and resentment, sometimes impels to
war the government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The
government sometimes participates in the national propensity and adopts
through passion what reason would reject; at other times it makes the
animosity of the nation subservient to projects of hostility instigated
by pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives. The
peace often, sometimes perhaps the liberty of nations has been the
victim.

So, likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another
produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation,
facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases
where no real common interest exists and infusing into one the enmities
of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels
and wars of the latter, without adequate inducements or justification.
It leads also to concessions to the favorite nation of privileges
denied to others, which are apt doubly to injure the nation making the
concessions by unnecessary parting with what ought to have been
retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill will, and a disposition to
retaliate, in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld, and
it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote
themselves to the favorite nation), facility to betray or sacrifice the
interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even with
popularity, gilding with the appearances of a virtuous sense of
obligation to a commendable deference for public opinion or a laudable
zeal for public good, the base or foolish compliances of ambition,
corruption, or infatuation.

As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments
are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent
patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic
factions, to practice the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion,
to influence or awe the public councils! Such an attachment of a small
or weak, toward a great and powerful nation, dooms the former to be the
satellite of the latter.

Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to
believe me, fellow-citizens), the jealousy of a free people ought to
be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign
influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But
that jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial, else it becomes the
instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defense
against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive
dislike of another cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on
one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on
the other. Real patriots who may resist the intrigues of the favorite
are liable to become suspected and odious, while its tools and dupes
usurp the applause and confidence of the people to surrender their
interests.

The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in
extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little
political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed
engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us
stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very
remote, relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies,
the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence,
therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by
artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the
ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a
different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient
government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury
from external annoyance, when we may take such an attitude as will
cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously
respected, when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making
acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us
provocation, when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided
by justice, shall counsel.

Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own
to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with
that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the
toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any
portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty
to do it, for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing
infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable
to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best
policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in
their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary, and would
be unwise to extend them.

Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a
respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary
alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

Harmony and a liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by
policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should
hold an equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting
exclusive favors or preferences; consulting the natural course of
things; diffusing and diversifying, by gentle means, the streams of
commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing, with powers so disposed--
in order to give trade a stable course, to define the rights of our
merchants, and to enable the government to support them--conventional
rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual
opinion will permit, but temporary, and liable to be from time to time
abandoned or varied, as experience and circumstances shall dictate,
constantly keeping in view that it is folly in one nation to look for
disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of
its independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that
by such acceptance it may place itself in the condition of having given
equivalents for nominal favors and yet of being reproached with
ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to
expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an
illusion which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to
discard.

In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and
affectionate friend, I dare not hope they will make the strong and
lasting impression I could wish; that they will control the usual
current of the passions or prevent our nation from running the course
which has hitherto marked the destiny of nations. But if I may even
flatter myself that they may be productive of some partial benefit,
some occasional good; that they may now and then recur to moderate the
fury of party spirit; to warn against the mischiefs of foreign
intrigue; to guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism, this
hope will be a full recompense for the solicitude for your welfare by
which they have been dictated.

How far, in the discharge of my official duties, I have been guided by
the principles which have been delineated, the public records and other
evidences of my conduct must witness to you and to the world. To myself
the assurance of my own conscience is that I have at least believed
myself to be guided by them.

In relation to the still subsisting war in Europe my proclamation of
the 22d of April, 1793, is the index to my plan. Sanctioned by your
approving voice and by that of your representatives in both Houses of
Congress, the spirit of that measure has continually governed me,
uninfluenced by any attempts to deter or divert me from it.

After deliberate examination, with the aid of the best lights I could
obtain, I was well satisfied that our country, under all the
circumstances of the case, had a right to take, and was bound in duty
and interest to take, a neutral position. Having taken it I determined,
as far as should depend upon me, to maintain it with moderation,
perseverance, and firmness.

The considerations which respect the right to hold this conduct it is
not necessary on this occasion to detail. I will only observe that,
according to my understanding of the matter, that right, so far from
being denied by any of the belligerent powers, has been virtually
admitted by all.

The duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred, without anything
more, from the obligation which justice and humanity impose on every
nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to maintain inviolate the
relations of peace and amity toward other nations.

The inducements of interest for observing that conduct will best be
referred to your own reflections and experience. With me a predominant
motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to settle and
mature its yet recent institutions and to progress, without
interruption, to that degree of strength and consistency which is
necessary to give it, humanely speaking, the command of its own
fortunes.

Though in reviewing the incidents of my administration I am unconscious
of intentional error, I am, nevertheless, too sensible of my defects
not to think it probable that I may have committed many errors.
Whatever they may be, I fervently beseech the Almighty to avert or
mitigate the evils to which they may tend. I shall also carry with me
the hope that my country will never cease to view them with indulgence,
and, after forty-five years of my life dedicated to its service, with
an upright zeal, the faults of incompetent abilities will be consigned
to oblivion, as myself must soon be to the mansions of rest.

Relying on its kindness in this as in other things, and actuated by
that fervent love toward it, which is so natural to a man who views in
it the native soil of himself and his progenitors for several
generations, I anticipate with pleasing expectation that retreat, in
which I promise myself to realize, without alloy, the sweet enjoyment
of partaking, in the midst of my fellow-citizens, the benign influence
of good laws under a free government, the ever favorite object of my
heart and the happy reward, as I trust, of our mutual cares, labors,
and dangers.

UNITED STATES, _September_ 17, 1796.

The sentiments of veneration with which this farewell address was
generally received were manifested in almost every part of the Union.
Some of the State Legislatures directed it to be inserted at large in
their journals, and nearly all of them passed resolutions expressing
their respect for the person of the President, their high sense of his
exalted services, and the emotions with which they contemplated his
retirement from office. Although the leaders of party might rejoice at
this event it produced solemn and anxious reflections in the great
body, even of those who belonged to the opposition.

The person in whom alone the voice of the people could be united having
declined a re-election, the two great parties in America brought
forward their respective chiefs, and every possible effort was made by
each to obtain the victory. Mr. John Adams and Mr. Thomas Pinckney, the
late minister at London, were supported as President and
Vice-President by the Federalists; the whole force of the opposite
party was exerted in favor of Mr. Jefferson.

Motives of vast influence were added on this occasion to those which
usually impel men in a struggle to retain or acquire power. The
continuance or the change, not only of those principles on which the
internal affairs of the United States had been administered, but of the
conduct which had been observed toward foreign nations, was believed to
depend on the choice of a chief magistrate. By one party the system of
neutrality pursued by the existing administration with regard to the
belligerent European powers, had been uniformly approved; by the other
it had been as uniformly condemned. In the contests, therefore, which
preceded the choice of electors, the justice of the complaints which
were made on the part of the French republic were minutely discussed,
and the consequences which were to be apprehended from her resentment
or from yielding to her pretensions were reciprocally urged as
considerations entitled to great weight in the ensuing election.

In such a struggle it was not to be expected that foreign powers could
feel absolutely unconcerned. In November, while the parties were so
balanced that neither scale could be perceived to preponderate, Mr.
Adet addressed a letter to Colonel Pickering, the Secretary of State,
in which he recapitulated the numerous complaints which had been urged
by himself and his predecessors against the government of the United
States, and reproached that government in terms of great asperity with
violating those treaties which had secured its independence, with
ingratitude to France, and with partiality to England. These wrongs,
which commenced with the "insidious" proclamation of neutrality, were
said to be so aggravated by the treaty concluded with Great Britain
that Mr. Adet announced the orders of the Directory to suspend his
ministerial functions with the Federal government. "But the cause," he
added, "which has so long restrained the just resentment of the
Executive Directory from bursting forth, now tempered its effects. The
name of America, notwithstanding the wrongs of its government, still
excited sweet sensations in the hearts of Frenchmen, and the Executive
Directory wished not to break with a people whom they loved to salute
with the appellation of friend." This suspension of his functions,
therefore, was not to be regarded "as a rupture between France and the
United States, but as a mark of just discontent, which was to last
until the government of the United States returned to sentiments and to
measures more conformable to the interests of the alliance, and to the
sworn friendship between the two nations." "Let your government return
to itself," concluded Mr. Adet, "and you will still find in Frenchmen
faithful friends and generous allies."

As if to remove any possible doubt respecting the purpose for which
this extraordinary letter was written, a copy was transmitted, on the
day of its date, to a printer for publication.

This open and direct appeal of a foreign minister to the American
people, in the critical moment of their election of a chief magistrate,
did not effect its object. Reflecting men, even among those who had
condemned the course of the administration, could not approve this
interference in the internal affairs of the United States, and the
opposite party resented it as an attempt to control the operations of
the American people in the exercise of one of the highest acts of
sovereignty, and to poison the fountain of their liberty and
independence by mingling foreign intrigue with their elections. The
reader of history, however, is familiar with the fact that the course
of Adet in this affair was in strict accordance with the uniform
practice of the new rulers of France at that time. Their agents
endeavored to prejudice the people of every country in Europe against
their respective governments, and never hesitated to interfere directly
between the people and the government, wherever there was any prospect
of introducing French ascendency by such proceedings. The people of the
United States, on the present occasion, resented the officious
interference of Adet in the pending election as a gross insult, and it
undoubtedly aided the party which it was intended to defeat. Congress
met on the 5th of December (1796). There was not a sufficient number of
senators present on that day to form a quorum. In the House of
Representatives, among the new members who presented themselves was
Andrew Jackson, from Tennessee, the future President of the United
States.

On the 7th of December Washington, for the last time, met the national
Legislature in the hall of the House of Representatives. His address
was comprehensive, temperate, and dignified. No personal consideration
could restrain him from recommending those great national measures
which he believed would be useful to his country, although open and
extensive hostility had been avowed to them.

After presenting a full view of the situation of the United States and
the late transactions of the executive, he added: "To an active external
commerce the protection of a naval force is indispensable--this is
manifest with regard to wars in which a State is itself a party; but,
besides this, it is in our own experience that the most sincere
neutrality is not a sufficient guard against the depredations of nations
at war. To secure respect to a neutral flag requires a naval force,
organized and ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression; this may
even prevent the necessity of going to war by discouraging belligerent
powers from committing such violations of the rights of the neutral
party as may, first or last, leave no other option. From the best
information I have been able to obtain, it would seem as if our trade to
the Mediterranean, without a protecting force, will always be insecure,
and our citizens exposed to the calamities from which numbers of them
have but just been relieved."

The speech next proceeded earnestly to recommend the establishment of
national works for manufacturing such articles as were necessary for
the defense of the country, and also for an institution which should
grow up under the patronage of the public and be devoted to the
improvement of agriculture. The advantages of a military academy and of
a national university were also urged, and the necessity of augmenting
the compensation to the officers of the United States in various
instances was explicitly stated.

The President, in adverting to the dissatisfaction which had been
expressed by one of the great powers of Europe, said: "It is with much
pain and deep regret I mention that circumstances of a very unwelcome
nature have lately occurred. Our trade has suffered, and is suffering,
extensive injuries in the West Indies from the cruisers and agents of
the French republic, and communications have been received from, its
minister here which indicate the danger of a further disturbance of our
commerce by its authority."

After stating his constant and earnest endeavors to maintain cordial
harmony and a perfectly friendly understanding with that republic, and
that his wish to maintain them remained unabated, he added: "In
pursuing this course, however, I cannot forget what is due to the
character of our government and nation, or to a full and entire
confidence in the good sense, patriotism, self-respect, and fortitude
of my countrymen."

After some other communications, the speech was concluded in the
following terms:

"The situation in which I now stand, for the last time, in the midst of
the representatives of the people of the United States, naturally
recalls the period when the administration of the present form of
government commenced; and I cannot omit the occasion to congratulate
you and my country on the success of the experiment, nor to repeat my
fervent supplications to the Supreme Ruler of the Universe and
Sovereign Arbiter of Nations that His providential care may still be
extended to the United States; that the virtue and happiness of the
people may be preserved, and that the government which they have
instituted for their protection may be perpetual."

The answer of the Senate embraced the various topics of the speech and
approved all the sentiments it contained.

It expressed the ardent attachment of that body to their chief
magistrate, and its conviction that much of the public prosperity was
to be ascribed to the virtue, firmness, and talents of his
administration. After expressing the deep and sincere regret with which
the official ratification of his intention to retire from the public
employments of his country was received, the address proceeded to say:
"The most effectual consolation that can offer for the loss we are
about to sustain arises from the animating reflection that the
influence of your example will extend to your successors, and the
United States thus continue to enjoy an able, upright, and energetic
administration."

In the House of Representatives a committee of five had been appointed
to prepare a respectful answer to the speech, three of whom were
friends to the administration.

Hoping that the disposition would be general to avow in strong terms
their attachment to the person and character of the President, the
committee united in reporting an answer which promised, in general
terms, due attention to the various subjects recommended to their
consideration, but was full and explicit in the expression of
attachment to himself and of approbation of his administration.

The unanimity which prevailed in the committee did not extend to the
House.

After amplifying and strengthening the expressions of the report, which
stated regret that any interruption should have taken place in the
harmony which had subsisted between the United States and France, and
modifying those which declared their hope for the restoration of that
harmony, so as to avoid any implication that its rupture was
exclusively ascribable to France, a motion was made by Mr. Giles to
expunge all those paragraphs which expressed attachment to the person
and character of the President, approbation of his administration, or
regret at his retiring from office.

After a very animated debate the motion to strike out was lost and the
answer was carried by a great majority.

Early in the session Washington communicated to Congress the copy of a
letter addressed by the Secretary of State to General Pinckney,
containing a minute and comprehensive detail of all the points of
controversy which had arisen between the United States and France, and
defending the measures which had been adopted by America with a
clearness and a strength of argument believed to be irresistible. The
letter was intended to enable General Pinckney to remove from the
government of France all impressions unfavorable to the fairness of
intention which had influenced the conduct of the United States, and to
efface from the bosoms of the great body of the American people all
those unjust and injurious suspicions which had been entertained
against their own administration. Should its immediate operation on the
executive of France disappoint his hopes, Washington persuaded himself
that he could not mistake its influence in America; and he felt the
most entire conviction that the accusations made by the French
Directory against the United States would cease, with the evidence that
these accusations were supported by a great portion of the American
people.

The letter and its accompanying documents were communicated to the
public, but, unfortunately, their effect at home was not such as had
been expected, and they were, consequently, inoperative abroad.

The measures recommended by Washington, in his speech at the opening of
the session, were not adopted, and neither the debates in Congress nor
the party publications with which the nation continued to be agitated,
furnished reasonable ground for hope that the political intemperance
which had prevailed from the establishment of the republican form of
government in France, was about to be succeeded by a more conciliatory
spirit. It was impossible for Washington to be absolutely insensible to
the bitter invectives and malignant calumnies of which he had long been
the object. Yet in one instance only did he depart from the rule he had
prescribed for his conduct regarding them. Apprehending permanent
injury from the republication of certain spurious letters, which have
been already noticed, he, on the day which terminated his official
character, addressed a letter to the Secretary of State, declaring them
to be forgeries and stating the circumstances under which they were
published.

On the 8th of February (1797) the votes for the President and Vice-
President were opened and counted in the presence of both Houses, and
John Adams announced the fact from the chair of the Vice-President that
he himself had received 71 votes, Thomas Jefferson 68, Thomas Pinckney
59, Aaron Burr 30, and that the balance of the votes were given in
varying small numbers to Samuel Adams, Oliver Ellsworth, John Jay, etc.
The total number of electors was 138. Thus John Adams became the second
President of the United States, and by some mismanagement on the part
of the Federalists Pinckney missed the Vice-Presidency, and the man of
all others most dreaded by the Federal party was placed in the very
front rank of the Republicans, and with the clear presage of success in
the future.

Washington's feelings on the immediate prospect of retirement from
office are expressed in the following extract from a letter to General
Knox, dated March 2, 1797: "To the wearied traveler who sees a resting-
place and is bending his body to lean thereon, I now compare myself,
but to be suffered to do this in peace is too much to be endured by
some. To misrepresent my motives, to reprobate my politics, and to
weaken the confidence which has been reposed in my administration are
objects which cannot be relinquished by those who will be satisfied
with nothing short of a change in our political system. The
consolation, however, which results from conscious rectitude and the
approving voice of my country, unequivocally expressed by its
representatives, deprive their sting of its poison and place in the
same point of view both the weakness and malignity of their efforts.

"Although the prospect of retirement is most grateful to my soul, and I
have not a wish to mix again in the great world or to partake in its
politics, yet I am not without my regrets at parting with (perhaps
never more to meet) the few intimates whom I love. Among these, be
assured, you are one."

Bishop White has given the following anecdote, illustrating the strong
feelings of regret awakened among Washington's friends by his
approaching retirement from public life:

"On the day before President Washington retired from office a large
company dined with him. Among them were the foreign ministers and their
ladies, Mr. and Mrs. Adams, Mr. Jefferson, and other conspicuous
persons of both sexes. During the dinner much hilarity prevailed, but
on the removal of the cloth it was put an end to by the President,
certainly without design. Having filled his glass, he addressed the
company, with a smile, as nearly as can be recollected, in the
following words: 'Ladies and gentlemen, this is the last time I shall
drink your health as a public man. I do it with sincerity, wishing you
all possible happiness.' There was an end of all pleasantry. He who
gives this relation accidentally directed his eye to the lady of the
British minister, Mrs. Liston, and tears were running down her cheeks."

Mr. Gibbs, in his "Administrations of Washington and Adams," refers to
the parting levee in the following terms:

"Just before his final retirement, Washington held his last formal
levee. An occasion more respectable in simplicity, more imposing in
dignity, more affecting in the sensations which it awakened, the
ceremonials of rulers never exhibited. There were the great chiefs of
the republic of all parties and opinions; veterans of the War of
Independence, weather-stained and scarred; white-haired statesmen, who,
in retirement, were enjoying the fruits of former toil; there were his
executive counselors and private friends; ministers of foreign
governments, whose veneration approached that of his countrymen;
citizens who came to offer the tribute of a respect, sincere and
disinterested. Little was there of the pageantry of courts, little of
the glitter which attends the receptions of royalty, yet in the grave
assemblage that stood in that unadorned chamber there was a majesty
which these knew not. The dignitaries of a nation had come together to
bid farewell to one who, at their own free call, by their own willing
trust--not as an honor to be coveted, but as a duty to be
discharged--had, in turn, led their armies and executed their laws; one
who now, his last task worthily fulfilled, was to take his place again
among them, readier to relinquish than he had been to undertake power;
a soldier without stain upon his arms; a ruler without personal
ambition; a wise and upright statesman; a citizen of self-sacrificing
patriotism; a man pure, unblemished, and true in every relation he had
filled; one to whom all ages should point as the testimony that virtue
and greatness had been and could be united.

"And he who was the object of this gathering--what thoughts crowded
upon his mind; what recollections filled the vista of the sixty odd
years which had passed over him; what changes of men, opinions,
society, had he seen! Great changes, indeed, in the world and its old
notions; the growing dissatisfaction of certain English emigrants at
customary tyrannies and new intended ones had taken form and shape,
embodied itself into principles, and vindicated them; blazed up an
alarming beacon in the world's eyes as the Sacred Right of Rebellion;
fought battles; asserted independence and maintained it at much cost of
bloodshed; made governments after its own new-fangled fashion;
impressed a most unwilling idea on history--the doctrine of popular
sovereignty--one which had proved contagious and had been adopted
elsewhere, running riot indeed in its novelty. And out of all this
confusion there had arisen the nation which he had presided over,
already become great, and factious in its greatness, with a noble
birthright, noble virtues, energies, and intellect; with great faults
and passions that, unchecked, would, as in lusty individual manhood,
lead to its ruin.

"What was to be the future of that nation? Dark clouds hung over it,
dangers threatened it, enemies frowned upon it--the worst enemy was
within. License might blast, in a few hours, the growth of years;
faction destroy the careful work of the founders. On this he had left
his great solemn charge, like the last warning of a father to his
children."

The relation in which the secretaries had stood with the President had
been one of respectful but affectionate intimacy. The most cordial and
unreserved friendship was extended to all whom he trusted and esteemed.
The Secretaries of State and War (Pickering and McHenry) had been his
fellow-soldiers; the Secretary of the Treasury (Wolcott) had, as it
were, grown up under his eye. The simplicity and military frankness of
Pickering, the kindly nature and refinement of McHenry, the
warm-heartedness and _bonhommie_ of Wolcott, all won upon his regard.
On their part there was a no less sincere love for their chief. There
are those devotion to whom is no degradation. Washington was such a
one, and to him it was rendered in the spirit of men who respected
themselves. Among all connected with him, either in military or civil
life, this sentiment was retained. His death hallowed his memory in
their hearts to a degree and with a sanctity which none can know who
have not heard from their own lips--none can feel Who were not of them.
And in likewise the wife and family of Washington were cherished. They
had been universally beloved on their own account, and the hand of
fate, in depriving them of a husband and father, as it were, bequeathed
them to the tender care of a nation. There was something beautiful in
these sentiments, in a land where the ties that bind men depend so
little upon association.

Wolcott, among others, had enjoyed much of the domestic society of the
President's house. His gentle and graceful wife had been regarded with
maternal tenderness by Mrs. Washington and was the friend and
correspondent of her eldest daughter. His child had been used to climb,
confident of welcome, the knees of the chief, and though so many years
his junior, while Wolcott's character and judgment had been held in
respect by the President, his personal and social qualities had drawn
toward him a warm degree of interest.

On leaving the seat of government, Washington presented, it is
believed, to all his chief officers some token of regard. To Wolcott he
gave a piece of plate. Mrs. Washington gave to his wife, when visiting
her for the last time, a relic still more interesting. Asking her if
she did not wish for a memorial of the general, Mrs. Wolcott replied,
"Yes," she "should like a lock of his hair." Mrs. Washington, smiling,
took Her scissors and cut off for her a lock of her husband's and one
of her own. These, with the originals of Washington's letters, Wolcott
preserved with careful veneration and divided between his surviving
children.

"On the retirement of General Washington," says Wolcott, "being
desirous that my personal interests should not embarrass his successor,
and supposing that some other person might be preferred to myself, I
tendered my resignation to Mr. Adams before his inauguration. The
tender was declined and I retained office under my former commission."

On the 1st of March (1797) Washington had addressed a note to the
Senate, desiring them to attend in their chamber on Saturday, the 4th,
at 10 o'clock, "to receive any communication which the President of the
United States might lay before them touching their interests." In
conformity with this summons the Senate assembled on that day and
commenced their thirteenth session. The oath of office was administered
by Mr. Bingham to Mr. Jefferson, who thereupon took the chair. The new
Senators were then sworn and the Vice-President delivered a brief
address. The Senate then repaired to the chamber of the House of
Representatives to attend the administration of the oath of office to
the new President. Mr. Adams entered, accompanied by the heads of
departments, [1] the marshal of the district and his officers, and took
his seat in the speaker's chair. The Vice-President and secretary of
the Senate were seated in advance on his right, and the late speaker
and clerk on the left; the justices of the Supreme Court sat before the
President, the foreign ministers and members of the House in their
usual seats. Washington, once more a private citizen, sat in front of
the judges. Mr. Adams then rose and delivered his inaugural speech.
This address was brief and well suited to the occasion. After adverting
to the circumstances which led to the formation of the new
constitution, he expressed the unqualified approbation with which, in a
foreign land and apart from the scene of controversy, he had first
perused it, and the undiminished confidence which, after eight years of
experience, he entertained of its fitness. He remarked briefly on the
abuses to which it was subject, and against which it became the duty of
the people to guard, and having disclosed his opinions of general
policy, pledged himself anew to the support of the government. The oath
of office was then administered by Chief Justice Ellsworth, the other
justices attending, after which he retired. [2]

The citizens of Philadelphia celebrated the day of Adams' inauguration
by a testimony of their respect and affection for Washington. They
prepared a magnificent entertainment, designed for him as the principal
guest, to which were invited the foreign ministers, the members of the
Cabinet, officers of the army and navy, and other distinguished
persons.

In the rotunda in which it was given, an elegant compliment was
prepared for the principal guest, which is thus described in the papers
of the day:

"Upon entering the area, the general was conducted to his seat. On a
signal given music played Washington's march, and a scene which
represented simple objects in the rear of the principal seat was drawn
up and discovered emblematical painting.

"The principal was a female figure, large as life, representing
America, seated on an elevation composed of sixteen marble steps. At
her left side stood the Federal shield and eagle, and at her feet lay
the cornucopias, in her right hand she held the Indian calumet of peace
supporting the cap of liberty; in the perspective appeared the temple
of fame, and on her left hand an altar dedicated to public gratitude,
upon which incense was burning. In her left hand she held a scroll
inscribed Valedictory, and at the foot of the altar lay a plumed helmet
and sword, from which a figure of General Washington, large as life,
appeared, retiring down the steps, pointing with his right hand to the
emblems of power which he had resigned, and with his left to a
beautiful landscape representing Mount Vernon, in front of which oxen
were seen harnessed to the plough. Over the general appeared a Genius,
placing a wreath of laurels on his head."

After Washington had paid to his successor those respectful compliments
which he believed to be equally due to the man and to the office, he
hastened to that real felicity which awaited him at Mount Vernon, the
enjoyment of which he had long impatiently anticipated.

The same marks of respect and affection for his person which had on all
great occasions been manifested by his fellow-citizens, still attended
him. His endeavors to render his journey private were unavailing, and
the gentlemen of the country through which he passed, were still
ambitious of testifying their sentiments for the man who had, from the
birth of the Republic been deemed the first of American citizens. Long
after his retirement he continued to receive addresses from legislative
bodies and various classes of citizens, expressive of the high sense
entertained of his services.

"Notwithstanding the extraordinary popularity of the first President of
the United States," says Marshall, "scarcely has any important act of
his administration escaped the most bitter invective.

"On the real wisdom of the system which he pursued, every reader will
decide for himself. Time will, in some measure, dissipate the
prejudices and passions of the moment, and enable us to view objects
through a medium which represents them truly.

"Without taking a full review of measures which were reprobated by one
party and applauded by the other, the reader may be requested to glance
his eye at the situation of the United States in 1797, and to contrast
it with their condition in 1788.

"At home a sound credit had been created; an immense floating debt had
been funded in a manner perfectly satisfactory to the creditors; an
ample revenue had been provided; those difficulties which a system of
internal taxation, on its first introduction, is doomed to encounter,
were completely removed, and the authority of the government was firmly
established. Funds for the gradual payment of the debt had been
provided; a considerable part of it had been actually discharged, and
that system which is now operating its entire extinction had been
matured and adopted. The agricultural and commercial wealth of the
nation had increased beyond all former example. The numerous tribes of
warlike Indians, inhabiting those immense tracts which lie between the
then cultivated country of the Mississippi, had been taught, by arms
and by justice, to respect the United States and to continue in peace.
This desirable object having been accomplished, that humane system was
established for civilizing and furnishing them with the conveniences of
life, which improves their condition, while it secures their
attachment.

"Abroad, the differences with Spain had been accommodated, and the free
navigation of the Mississippi had been acquired, with the use of New
Orleans as a place of deposit for three years, and afterward, until
some other equivalent place should be designated. Those causes of
mutual exasperation which had threatened to involve the United States
in a war with the greatest maritime and commercial power in the world,
had been removed, and the military posts which had been occupied within
their territory, from their existence as a nation, had been evacuated.
Treaties had been formed with Algiers and with Tripoli, and no captures
appear to have been made by Tunis, so that the Mediterranean was opened
to American vessels.

"This bright prospect was indeed, in part, shaded by the discontents of
France. Those who have attended to the particular points of difference
between the two nations will assign the causes to which these
discontents are to be ascribed, and will judge whether it was in the
power of the President to have avoided them without surrendering the
real independence of the nation and the most invaluable of all rights--
the right of self-government."

Such was the situation of the United States at the close of
Washington's administration. Their circumstances at its commencement
will be recollected, and the contrast is too striking not to be
observed. That this beneficial change in the affairs of America is to
be ascribed exclusively to the wisdom which guided the national
councils will not be pretended. That many of the causes which produced
it originated with the government, and that their successful operation
was facilitated, if not secured, by the system which was adopted, will
scarcely be denied. To estimate that system correctly, their real
influence must be allowed to those strong prejudices and turbulent
passions with which it was assailed.

Accustomed, in the early part of his life, to agricultural pursuits,
and possessing a real taste for them, Washington was particularly well
qualified to enjoy, in retirement, that tranquil felicity which he had
anticipated. Resuming former habits, and returning to ancient and well-
known employments, he was familiar with his new situation, and
therefore exempt from the danger of that disappointment which is the
common lot of those who, in old age, retire from the toils of business,
or the cares of office, to the untried pleasures of the country. A
large estate, which exhibited many proofs of having been long deprived
of the attentions of its proprietor in the management and improvement
of which he engaged with ardor, an extensive correspondence, and the
society of men and books, gave employment to every hour which was
equally innocent and interesting, and furnished ground for the hope
that the evening of a life which had been devoted to the public
service, would be as serene as its midday had been brilliant.

In his journey from Philadelphia to Mount Vernon Washington was
accompanied by Mrs. Washington, Miss Custis, George Washington
Lafayette, eldest son of the general, and M. Frestel, young Lafayette's
tutor.

Writing to Mr. McHenry, Secretary of War, from Mount Vernon, April 3,
1797, he thus describes His return home and his situation there:

"We got home without accident and found the roads dryer and better than
I ever found them at that season of the year. The attentions we met
with on our journey were very flattering, and, to some, whose minds are
differently formed from mine, would have been highly relished; but I
avoided, in every instance, where I had any previous knowledge of the
intention, and could by earnest entreaties prevail, all parade and
escorts. Mrs. Washington took a violent cold in Philadelphia, which
hangs upon her still, but it is not as bad as it has been. [3]

"I find myself in the situation nearly of a new beginner, for, although
I have not houses to build (except one, which I must erect for the
accommodation and security of my military, civil, and private papers,
which are voluminous, and may be interesting), yet I have scarcely
anything else about me that does not require considerable repairs. In a
word, I am already surrounded by joiners, masons, and painters, and,
such is my anxiety to get out of their hands, that I have scarcely a
room to put a friend into or to sit in myself without the music of
hammers or the odoriferous scent of paint."

To Mr. Wolcott, Secretary of the Treasury, he writes:

"For myself, having turned aside from the broad walks of political into
the narrow paths of private life, I shall leave it with those whose
duty it is to consider subjects of this sort, and, as every good
citizen ought to do, conform to whatsoever the ruling powers shall
decide. To make and sell a little flour annually, to repair houses
(going fast to ruin), to build one for the security of my papers of a
public nature, and to amuse myself in agricultural and rural pursuits,
will constitute employment for the few years I have to remain on this
terrestrial globe. If, also, I could now and then meet the friends I
esteem, it would fill the measure and add zest to my enjoyments; but,
if ever this happens, it must be under my own vine and fig-tree, as I
do not think it probable that I shall go beyond twenty miles from
them."

To another correspondent he repeats the same interesting sentiments, in
reference to his retirement and the happiness he found in it:

"Retired from noise myself, and the responsibility attached to public
employment, my hours will glide smoothly on. My best wishes, however,
for the prosperity of our country will always have the first place in
my thoughts; while to repair buildings and to cultivate my farms, which
require close attention, will occupy the few years, perhaps days, I may
be a sojourner here, as I am now in the sixty-sixth year of my
peregrination through life."

In a letter to Mr. McHenry, May 29th, he says: "I begin my diurnal
course with the sun; if my hirelings are not in their places at that
time, I send them messages of sorrow for their indisposition; having
put these wheels in motion, I examine the state of things further. The
more they are probed the deeper I find the wounds which my buildings
have sustained by an absence and neglect of eight years; by the time I
have accomplished these matters, breakfast (a little after 7 o'clock)
is ready; this being over, I mount my horse and ride round my farms,
which employs me until it is time to dress for dinner, at which I
rarely miss seeing strange faces--come, as they say, out of respect for
me. Pray, would not the word curiosity answer as well? And how
different this from having a few social friends at a cheerful board!
The usual time of setting at table, a walk, and tea bring me within the
dawn of candle-light, previous to which, if not prevented by company, I
resolve that, as soon as the glimmering taper supplies the place of the
great luminary, I will retire to my writing table and acknowledge the
letters I have received; but, when the lights are brought, I feel tired
and disinclined to engage in this work, conceiving that the next night
will do as well. The next night comes, and with it, the same causes for
postponement, and so on.

"This will account for your letter remaining so long unacknowledged;
and, having given you the history of a day, it will serve for a year,
and I am persuaded you will not require a second edition of it. But it
may strike you, that in this detail no mention is made of any portion
of time allotted for reading. The remark would be just, for I have not
looked into a book since I came home; nor shall I be able to do it
until I have discharged my workmen, probably not before the nights grow
longer, when, possibly, I may be looking in Doomsday Book. At present I
shall only add, that I am always and affectionately yours."

The celebrated Mr. (afterward Lord) Erskine, having sent Washington a
copy of his "View of the Causes and Consequences of the Present War
with France," he acknowledged it in a letter, of which the following is
a part:

"To have so conducted my steps in the intricate walks of public life,
and through a long course, as to meet the approbation of my country and
the esteem of good men, is, next to the consciousness of having acted
in all things from my best judgment, the highest gratification of which
my mind is susceptible, and will, during the remainder of a life which
is hastening to an end, and in moments of retirement better adapted to
calm reflection than I have hitherto experienced, alleviate the pain
and soften any cares, which are yet to be encountered, though hid from
me at the present.

"For me to express my sentiments with respect to the administration of
the concerns of another government might incur a charge of stepping
beyond the line of prudence; but the principles of humanity will
justify an avowal of my regret, and I do regret exceedingly, that any
causes whatever should have produced and continued until this time, a
war, more bloody, more expensive, more calamitous, and more pregnant
with events than modern, or perhaps any other times can furnish an
example of. And I most sincerely and devoutly wish that your exertions,
and those of others having the same object in view, may effect what
human nature cries aloud for, a general peace." [4]

His correspondence with the Earl of Radnor shows the estimation in
which he was held abroad, and also illustrates his situation and
feelings at the time.

"_To General Washington._

"SIR.--Though of necessity a stranger to you, I cannot deny myself the
satisfaction, among the many who will, probably, even from this
country, intrude upon your retirement, of offering to you my
congratulations on your withdrawing yourself from the scene of public
affairs, with a character which appears to be perfectly unrivalled in
history. The voluntary resignation of authority, wielded, as it was,
while you thought fit to yield it, for the advantage of your country,
in the universal opinion of mankind, confirms the judgment I had
presumed to form of your moderation, and completes the glory of your
life.

"Permit me, sir, who, enlisted in no political party, have, as a public
man, looked up to you with veneration; who have seen the beginning of
your career against England with approbation, because I felt England
was unjust; who have seen you discontinue your hostility toward
England, when, in good faith, she was no longer acting as an enemy to
America, by honest counsels endeavoring to be as closely connected with
amity, as she is by natural and mutual interests; who have seen you the
instrument, in the hand of Providence, of wresting from the British
Parliament an influence destructive of the just rights of both
countries and of establishing the independence of America, which, I am
persuaded, will continually, if your principles and your wisdom shall
actuate your successors, be the means of securing them respectively to
us both; who have seen you, in adversity and prosperity alike, the
good, the firm, the moderate, the disinterested patriot; permit me, I
say, as an Englishman and as a man, to rejoice at the completion of
such a character, and to offer my unfeigned wishes for a peaceful
evening of your life and the realization (as is my sincere belief) of
your posthumous fame and your eternal happiness.

"I have the honor to subscribe myself, etc.,

"RADNOR.

"LONGFORD CASTLE, _January_ 19, 1797."


The following is Washington's reply:

"MY LORD.--The sentiments which your lordship has been pleased to
express, in your favor of the 19th of January last, relative to my
public conduct, do me great honor, and I pray you to accept my grateful
acknowledgment of the unequivocal evidence, conveyed in your letter, of
the favorable opinion you entertain of the principles by which it was
actuated.

"For having performed duties which I conceive every country has a right
to require of its citizens, I claim no merit; but no man can feel more
sensibly the reward of approbation for such services than I do. Next to
the consciousness of having acted faithfully in discharging the several
trusts to which I have been called, the thanks of one's country and the
esteem of good men are the highest gratification my mind is susceptible
of.

"At the age of sixty-five, I am now recommencing my agricultural and
rural pursuits, which were always more congenial to my temper and
disposition than the noise and bustle of public employments,
notwithstanding so small a portion of my life has been engaged in the
former.

"I reciprocate, with great cordiality, the good wishes you have been
pleased to bestow on me, and pray devoutly that we may both witness,
and that shortly, the return of peace; for a more bloody, expensive,
and eventful war is not recorded in modern, if to be found in ancient
history."

Before leaving the subject of Washington's European reputation it is
proper to quote the remarks made by the celebrated orator and
statesman, Charles James Fox, in the British Parliament, January 31,
1794. It was in reference to Washington's communications to Congress at
the opening of the session, December 3, 1793:

"And here, sir, I cannot help alluding to the President of the United
States, General Washington, a character whose conduct has been so
different from that which has been pursued by the ministers of this
country. How infinitely wiser must appear the spirit and principles
manifested in his late address to Congress than the policy of modern
European courts! Illustrious man, deriving honor less from the splendor
of his situation than from the dignity of his mind; before whom all
borrowed greatness sinks into insignificance, and all the potentates of
Europe (excepting the members of our own royal family) become little
and contemptible. He has had no occasion to have recourse to any tricks
of policy or arts of alarm; his authority has been sufficiently
supported by the same means by which it was acquired, and his conduct
has uniformly been characterized by wisdom, moderation, and firmness.
Feeling gratitude to France for the assistance received from her in
that great contest which secured the independence of America, he did
not choose to give up the system of neutrality. Having once laid down
that line of conduct which both gratitude and policy pointed out as
most proper to be pursued, not all the insults and provocation of the
French minister, Genet, could turn him from his purpose. Entrusted with
the welfare of a great people, he did not allow the misconduct of
another, with respect to himself, for one moment to withdraw his
attention from their interest. He had no fear of the Jacobins; he felt
no alarm from their principles, and considered no precaution necessary
in order to stop their progress.

"The people over whom he presided he knew to be acquainted with their
rights and their duties. He trusted to their own good sense to defeat
the effect of those arts which might be employed to inflame or mislead
their minds, and was sensible that a government could be in no danger
while it retained the attachment and confidence of its subjects--
attachment, in this instance, not blindly adopted; confidence not
implicitly given, but arising from the conviction of its excellence
and the experience of its blessings. I cannot, indeed, help admiring
the wisdom and fortune of this great man. By the phrase 'fortune,'
I mean not in the smallest degree to derogate from his merit. But
notwithstanding his extraordinary talents and exalted integrity, it
must be considered as singularly fortunate that he should have
experienced a lot which so seldom falls to the portion of humanity,
and have passed through such a variety of scenes without stain and
without reproach. It must, indeed, create astonishment, that, placed
in circumstances so critical, and filling for a series of years, a
station so conspicuous, his character should never once have been
called in question; that he should in no one instance have been accused
either of improper insolence or mean submission in his transactions
with foreign nations. For him it has been reserved to run the race of
glory, without experiencing the smallest interruption to the brilliancy
of his career."


1. Footnote: All the Cabinet officers of Washington were retained by
Mr. Adams, viz.: Timothy Pickering, Secretary of State; James McHenry,
Secretary of War; Oliver Wolcott, Secretary of the Treasury, and
Charles Lee, Attorney-General. The navy department was not organized
till 1798. 2. Footnote: Gibbs, "Administrations of Washington and John
Adams."

3. Footnote: The following extract is from a Baltimore paper, dated
March 13th: "Last evening arrived in this city, on his way to Mount
Vernon, the illustrious object of veneration and gratitude, George
Washington. His Excellency was accompanied by his lady and Miss Custis,
and by the son of the unfortunate Lafayette and his preceptor. At a
distance from the city, he was met by a crowd of citizens, on horse and
foot, who thronged the road to greet him, and by a detachment from
Captain Hollingsworth's troop, who escorted him in through as great a
concourse of people as Baltimore ever witnessed. On alighting at the
Fountain Inn, the general was saluted with reiterated and thundering
huzzas from the spectators. His Excellency, with the companions of his
journey, leaves town, we understand, this morning."

4. Footnote: Erskine's opinion of Washington is thus expressed in his
letter, dated London, March 15, 1795: "I have taken the liberty," he
writes, "to introduce your august and immortal name in a short
sentence, which will be found in the book I send you. I have a large
acquaintance among the most valuable and exalted classes of men; but
you are the only human being for whom I ever felt an awful reverence. I
sincerely pray God to grant a long and serene evening to a life so
gloriously devoted to the universal happiness of the world.

"T. ERSKINE."




CHAPTER XII.


WASHINGTON APPOINTED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL. 1797-1798.


We have mentioned, incidentally, that George Washington Motier de
Lafayette, the son of the general, with his tutor, M. Frestel,
accompanied Washington on his journey from Philadelphia to Mount
Vernon. When the wife and daughters of Lafayette left France to join
him in the prison of Olmutz his son came to the United States. He
arrived at Boston in the summer of 1795, with his tutor, and had
immediately written to Washington to apprise him of his arrival. The
letter was received just as he was leaving Philadelphia for Mount
Vernon. Washington would have been delighted to receive him immediately
into his family, but this was forbidden by political considerations of
great weight. He therefore wrote to George Cabot, of Boston, desiring
him to assure the young man of his friendship and protection, and
recommending that he should be entered as a student at Harvard
University, Cambridge, and offering to defray the expenses of his
education there. This was declined, however, on account of the
different course of study which he was pursuing under the tuition of M.
Frestel, and George went to take up his residence with M. Lacolombe,
[1] in a country-house near New York. In November, 1795, Washington
wrote to young Lafayette and his tutor, assuring the former of his
paternal regard and support, and desiring him to repair to Colonel
Hamilton in New York. On the 18th of March, 1796, the following
resolution, and order were passed by the House of Representatives in
Congress:

"Information having been given to this House that a son of General
Lafayette is now within the United States;

"_Resolved_, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the truth of
the said information and report thereon, and what measures it would be
proper to take, if the same be true, to evince the grateful sense
entertained by this country for the services of his father.

"_Ordered_, That Mr. Livingston, Mr. Sherburne, and Mr. Murray be
appointed a committee pursuant to the said resolution."

As chairman of this committee, Mr. Livingston wrote to young Lafayette
as follows:

"SIR.--Actuated by motives of gratitude to your father, and eager to
seize every opportunity of showing their sense of his important
services, the House of Representatives have passed the resolution which
I have the pleasure to communicate. The committee being directed to
inquire into the fact of your arrival within the United States, permit
me to advise your immediate appearance at this place, that the
Legislature of America may no longer be in doubt whether the son of
Lafayette is under their protection and within the reach of their
gratitude.

"I presume to give this advice as an individual personally attached to
your father, and very solicitous to be useful to any person in whose
happiness he is interested. If I should have that good fortune on this
occasion, it will afford me the greatest satisfaction.

"I am, &c.,

"EDWARD LIVINGSTON."

On receiving this letter, young Lafayette wrote to Washington,
enclosing the resolution and the letter of Mr. Livingston, and asking
his advice relative to the course which he should pursue. The following
is Washington's answer:

"Your letter of the 28th instant was received yesterday. The enclosures
which accompanied it evidence much discretion, and your conduct therein
meets my entire approbation.

"In the early part of this month I put a letter into the hands of
Colonel Hamilton, inviting you to this place, and expected, until your
letter of the above date was received, to have embraced you under my
own roof tomorrow or next day.

"As the period for this seems to be more distant, from the purport of
your inquiries, I again repeat my former request, and wish that,
without delay, you and M. Frestel would proceed immediately to this
city and to my house, where a room is prepared for you and him.

"Under expectation of your doing this, it is as unnecessary as it might
be improper to go more into detail until I have the pleasure of seeing
you and of rendering every service in my power to the son of my friend,
for whom I have always entertained the purest affection, which is too
strong not to extend itself to you. Therefore believe me to be, as I
really am, sincerely and affectionately yours, &c."

From this time (March, 1796) to April, 1797, when he journeyed with
Washington to Mount Vernon, young Lafayette resided with him in
Philadelphia. Writing to General Dumas (June 24, 1797) from Mount
Vernon, Washington, after expressing an ardent wish for the restoration
of General Lafayette to liberty, says: "His son and M. Frestel, who
appears to have been his mentor, are, and have been, residents in my
family since their arrival in this country, except in the first moments
of it; and a modest, sensible, well-disposed youth he is."

In October, 1797, intelligence of the liberation of General Lafayette
from his Austrian prison having been received, his son hastened to meet
him in France. He sailed with M. Frestel from New York, on the 26th of
October, bearing the following letter from Washington to his father:
[2]

"This letter, I hope and expect, will be presented to you by your son,
who is highly deserving of such parents as you and your amiable lady.

"He can relate much better than I can describe my participation in your
sufferings, my solicitude for your relief, the measures I adopted,
though ineffectual, to facilitate your liberation from an unjust and
cruel imprisonment, and the joy I experienced at the news of its
accomplishment. I shall hasten, therefore, to congratulate you, and be
assured that no one can do it with more cordiality, with more
sincerity, or with greater affection, on the restoration of that
liberty which every act of your life entitles you to the enjoyment of;
and I hope I may add, to the uninterrupted possession of your estates
and the confidence of your country. The repossession of these things,
though they cannot compensate for the hardships you have endured, may
nevertheless soften the painful remembrance of them.

"From the delicate and responsible situation in which I stood as a
public officer, but more especially from a misconception of the manner
in which your son had left France, till explained to me in a personal
interview with himself, he did not come immediately into my family on
his arrival in America, though he was assured in the first moments of
it of my protection and support. His conduct, since he first set his
feet on American ground, has been exemplary in every point of view,
such as has gained him the esteem, affection, and confidence of all who
have had the pleasure of his acquaintance. His filial affection and
duty and his ardent desire to embrace his parents and sisters, in the
first moments of their release, would not allow him to wait the
authentic account of this much-desired event; but, at the same time
that I suggested the propriety of this, I could not withhold my assent
to the gratification of his wishes to fly to the arms of those whom he
holds most dear, persuaded as he is, from the information he has
received, that he shall find you all in Paris.

"M. Frestel has been a true mentor to George. No parent could have been
more attentive to a favorite son, and he richly merits all that can be
said of his virtues, of his good sense, and of his prudence. Both your
son and he carry with them the vows and regrets of this family and all
who know them. And you may be assured that yourself never stood higher
in the affections of the people of this country than at the present
moment.

"Having bid a final adieu to the walks of public life, and meaning to
withdraw myself from politics, I shall refer you to M. Frestel and
George, who, at the same time that they have, from prudential
considerations, avoided all interference in the politics of the
country, cannot have been inattentive observers of what was passing
among us, to give you a general view of our situation, and of the party
which, in my opinion, has disturbed the peace and tranquility of it.
And with sentiments of the highest regard for you, your lady, and
daughters, and with assurances that, if inclination or events should
induce you or any of them to visit America, no person in it would
receive you with more cordiality and affection than Mrs. Washington and
myself, both of us being most sincerely and affectionately attached to
you, and admirers of them."

Devoted as Washington, in his retirement, was to his favorite pursuit
of agriculture, he nevertheless took a lively interest in the political
affairs of the country. In the events which were now passing he found
cause for considerable anxiety. The conduct of the French Directory
still indicated a persistence in their favorite policy of detaching the
people of the United States from the support of the executive, and
effecting a revolution in the government. Their treatment of General
Pinckney, the minister sent to France by Washington, fully disclosed
their views and intentions. After inspecting General Pinckney's letter
of credence, the Directory announced to him their determination "not to
receive another minister plenipotentiary from the United States until
after the redress of grievances demanded of the American government,
which the French republic had a right to expect from it." This message
was succeeded, first by indecorous verbal communications, calculated to
force the American minister out of France, and afterward, by a written
mandate to quit the territories of the republic.

This act of hostility was accompanied with another, which would explain
the motives for this conduct, if previous measures had not rendered all
further explanation unnecessary.

On giving to the recalled minister his audience of leave, the President
of the Directory addressed a speech to him, in which terms of outrage
to the government were mingled with expressions of affection for the
people of the United States, and the expectation of ruling the former,
by their influence over the latter, was too clearly manifested not to
be understood. To complete this system of hostility, American vessels
were captured wherever found, and, under the pretext of their wanting a
document, with which the treaty of commerce had been uniformly
understood to dispense, they were condemned as prize.

This serious state of things demanded a solemn consideration. On
receiving from General Pinckney the dispatches which communicated it,
President Adams issued his proclamation requiring Congress to meet on
the 15th day of May. The speech delivered by him at the commencement of
the session showed that the insults of the French Directory were deeply
resented. He said: "The speech of the President discloses sentiments
more alarming than the refusal of a minister, because more dangerous to
our independence and union, and, at the same time, studiously marked
with indignities toward the government of the United States. It evinces
a disposition to separate the people from their government; to persuade
them that they have different affections, principles, and interests
from those of their fellow-citizens whom they themselves have chosen to
manage their common concerns; and thus to produce divisions fatal to
our peace. Such attempts ought to be repelled with a decision which
shall convince France, and the world, that we are not a degraded
people, humiliated under a colonial spirit of fear and sense of
inferiority, fitted to be the miserable instruments of foreign
influence, and regardless of national honor, character, and interest.
Retaining still the desire which had uniformly been manifested by the
American government to preserve peace and friendship with all nations,
and believing that neither the honor nor the interest of the United
States absolutely forbade the repetition of advances for securing these
desirable objects with France, he should," he said, "institute a fresh
attempt at negotiation, and should not fail to promote and accelerate
an accommodation on terms compatible with the rights, duties,
interests, and honor of the nation." But while he should be making
these endeavors to adjust all differences with the French republic by
amicable negotiation, he earnestly recommended it to Congress to
provide effectual measures of defense.

The drawing up an answer to this speech of President Adams occasioned a
full fortnight's debate in the House of Representatives, but at length
a reply, correspondent to the President's tone and views, was carried
by 51 or 52 voices against 48. This showed the balance of parties,
proved that Adams still kept the ascendency, however small, that
Washington had done, and that the dread of democratic violence
prevailed over the suspicions endeavored to be awakened of monarchism
and an arbitrary executive. This feeling was, no doubt, strengthened
greatly by refugees from St. Domingo, who related the dire effects
which democratic acts had produced in that island. France, however, was
never more formidable. Tidings of her victories poured in, whilst those
of England told of bank payments suspended, a mutiny in the fleet, and
the abandonment of her best continental ally.

To carry into effect the pacific dispositions avowed by President Adams
in his speech, he appointed three envoys to the French Directory.
General Pinckney, who was still residing in Europe, was placed at the
head of the mission. Gen. John Marshall, afterward chief justice, a
sturdy Federalist, and Elbridge Gerry, an anti-Federalist, but a strong
personal friend and favorite of the President, were joined with
Pinckney in the mission. They were instructed to endeavor to procure
peace and reconciliation by all means compatible with the honor and
faith of the United States, but no national engagements were to be
impaired, no innovation to be permitted upon those internal regulations
for the preservation of peace which had been deliberately and uprightly
established, nor were the rights of the government to be surrendered.
On their arrival in France the envoys saw M. Talleyrand, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, but were informed that they could not be received
by the Directory. They had permission to remain in Paris, however, and
the agents of M. de Talleyrand--a female amongst others were employed
to negotiate with them. The true difficulty in the way of
accommodation, in addition to the impertinent arrogance of the
Directory, seemed to be that Merlin and others received a great part of
the gains accruing from American prizes made by the French. In order to
counteract this gold in one hand by gold in the other, Talleyrand
demanded a douceur of 50,000 for himself and chiefs, besides a loan to
be afterward made from America to France. To extract these conditions,
every argument that meanness could suggest was employed by Talleyrand;
he demanded to be fed as a lawyer or bribed as a friend. But the
Americans were inexorable, and two of their number, Pinckney and
Marshall, returned to announce to their countrymen the terms on which
peace was offered. The cupidity of the French government completely
turned against it the tide of popular feeling in America. "Millions for
defense, not a cent for tribute," was instantly the general cry. The
President felt his hands strengthened by the demands of the French.
Certainly, never did minister show himself less sagacious than M. de
Talleyrand in this affair, or more ignorant of the spirit and manners
of a nation amongst whom he had resided.

In Congress (May, 1798), vigorous measures were adopted for placing the
country in a state of defense against impending hostilities from one of
the most powerful nations of the world. Among these was a regular army.
A regiment of artillerists and engineers was added to the permanent
establishment, and the President was authorized to raise twelve
additional regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry to serve
during the continuance of the existing differences with the French
republic, if not sooner discharged. He was also authorized to appoint
officers for a provisional army and to receive and organize volunteer
corps who should be exempt from ordinary militia duty, but neither the
volunteers nor the officers of the provisional army were to receive pay
unless called into actual service.

Addresses to the executive from every part of the United States
attested the high spirit of the nation, and the answers of President
Adams were well calculated to give it solidity and duration.

No sooner had a war become probable, to the perils of which no man
could be insensible, than the eyes of all were directed to Washington,
as the person who should command the American army. He alone could be
seen at the head of a great military force without exciting jealousy;
he alone could draw into public service and arrange properly the best
military talents of the nation, and he, more than any other, could
induce the utmost exertion of its physical strength. Indignant at the
unprovoked injuries which had been heaped upon his country, and
convinced that the conflict, should a war be really prosecuted by
France with a view to conquest, would be extremely severe and could be
supported, on the part of America, only by a persevering exertion of
all her force, he could not determine, should such a crisis arrive, to
withhold those aids which it might be in his power to afford, should
public opinion really attach to his services that importance which
would render them essential. His own reflections appear to have
resulted in a determination not to refuse once more to take the field,
provided he could be permitted to secure efficient aid by naming the
chief officers of the army, and to remain at home until his service in
the field should be required by actual invasion. [3]

A confidential and interesting letter from Colonel Hamilton of the 19th
of May, on political subjects, concludes with saying: "You ought also
to be aware, my dear sir, that in the event of an open rupture with
France the public voice will again call you to command the armies of
your country, and though all who are attached to you will, from
attachment as well as public consideration, deplore an occasion which
should once more tear you from that repose to which you have so good a
right, yet it is the opinion of all those with whom I converse that you
will be compelled to make the sacrifice. All your past labors may
demand, to give them efficacy, this further, this very great
sacrifice."

"You may be assured," said Washington in reply, "that my mind is deeply
impressed with the present situation of public affairs and not a little
agitated by the outrageous conduct of France toward the United States,
and at the inimitable conduct of those partisans who aid and abet her
measures. You may believe further, from assurances equally sincere,
that if there was anything in my power to be done consistently to avert
or lessen the danger of the crisis, it should be rendered with hand and
heart."

"But, my dear sir, dark as matters appear at present, and expedient as
it is to be prepared for the worst that can happen (and no man is more
disposed to this measure than I am), I cannot make up my mind yet for
the expectation of open war; or, in other words, for a formidable
invasion by France. I cannot believe, although I think her capable of
anything, that she will attempt to do more than she has done. When she
perceives the spirit and policy of this country rising into resistance,
and that she has falsely calculated upon support from a large part of
the people to promote her views and influence in it, she will desist
ever from those practices, unless unexpected events in Europe or the
acquisition of Louisiana and the Floridas should induce her to continue
them. And I believe further, that, although the leaders of their party
in this country will not change their sentiments, they will be obliged
to change their plan or the mode of carrying it on. The effervescence
which is appearing in all quarters, and the desertion of their
followers, will frown them into silence--at least for a while.

"If I did not view things in this light my mind would be infinitely
more disquieted than it is, for, if a crisis should arrive when a sense
of duty or a call from my country should become so imperious as to
leave me no choice, I should prepare for relinquishment and go with as
much reluctance from my present peaceful abode as I should go to the
tombs of my ancestors."

The opinion that prudence required preparations for open war and that
Washington must once more be placed at the head of the American armies
strengthened every day, and on the 22d of June President Adams
addressed him a letter in which that subject was thus alluded to.

"In forming an army, whenever I must come to that extremity I am at an
immense loss whether to call out the old generals or to appoint a young
set. If the French come here we must learn to march with a quick step
and to attack, for in that way only they are said to be vulnerable. I
must tax you sometimes for advice. We must have your name, if you will
in any case permit us to use it. There will be more efficacy in it than
in many an army."

A letter from McHenry, the Secretary of War, written four days
afterward, concludes with asking: "May we flatter ourselves that, in a
crisis so awful and important you will accept the command of all our
armies? I hope you will, because you alone can unite all hearts and all
hands, if it is possible that they can be united."

These letters reached Washington on the same day. The following extract
from his reply to the President will exhibit the course of his
reflections relative to his appearance once more at the head of the
American armies:

"At the epoch of my retirement an invasion of these States by an
European power, or even the probability of such an event in my days,
was so far from being contemplated by me that I had no conception
either that or any other occurrence would arise in so short a period
which could turn my eyes from the shades of Mount Vernon. But this
seems to be the age of wonders. And it is reserved for intoxicated and
lawless France (for purposes of Providence far beyond the reach of
human ken) to slaughter her own citizens and to disturb the repose of
all the world besides. From a view of the past--from the prospect of
the present--and of that which seems to be expected, it is not easy for
me to decide satisfactorily on the part it might best become me to act.
In case of actual invasion by a formidable force I certainly should not
entrench myself under the cover of age and retirement, if my services
should be required by my country to assist in repelling it. And if
there be good cause to expect such an event, which certainly must be
better known to the government than to private citizens, delay in
preparing for it may be dangerous, improper, and not to be justified by
prudence. The uncertainty, however, of the latter, in my mind, creates
my embarrassment, for I cannot bring it to believe, regardless as the
French are of treaties and of the laws of nation, and capable as I
conceive them to be of any species of despotism and injustice, that
they will attempt to invade this country after such a uniform and
unequivocal expression of the determination of the people in all parts
to oppose them with their lives and fortunes. That they have been led
to believe by their agents and partisans among us that we are a divided
people, that the latter are opposed to their own government, and that
the show of a small force would occasion a revolt, I have no doubt; and
how far these men (grown desperate) will further attempt to deceive,
and may succeed in keeping up the deception, is problematical. Without
that, the folly of the Directory in such an attempt would, I conceive,
be more conspicuous, if possible, than their wickedness."

"Having with candor made this disclosure of the state of my mind, it
remains only for me to add that to those who know me best it is best
known that, should imperious circumstances induce me to exchange once
more the smooth paths of retirement for the thorny ways of public life,
at a period too when repose is more congenial to nature, it would be
productive of sensations which can be more easily conceived than
expressed."

His letter to the Secretary of War was more detailed and more explicit.
"It cannot," he said, "be necessary for me to premise to you or to
others who know my sentiments; that to quit the tranquility of
retirement, and enter the boundless field of responsibility, would be
productive of sensations which a better pen than I possess would find
it difficult to describe. Nevertheless, the principle by which my
conduct has been actuated through life would not suffer me, in any
great emergency, to withhold any services I could render when required
by my country--especially in a case where its dearest rights are
assailed by lawless ambition and intoxicated power, in contempt of
every principle of justice, and in violation of a solemn compact and of
laws which govern all civilized nations--and this too with the obvious
intent to sow thick the seeds of disunion for the purpose of
subjugating our government and destroying our independence and
happiness.

"Under circumstances like these, accompanied by an actual invasion of
our territory, it would be difficult for me, at any time, to remain an
idle spectator, under the plea of age or retirement. With sorrow, it is
true, I should quit the shades of my peaceful abode, and the ease and
happiness I now enjoy, to encounter anew the turmoils of war, to which,
possibly, my strength and powers might be found incompetent. These,
however, should not be stumbling-blocks in my own way. But there are
other things highly important for me to ascertain and settle before I
could give a definitive answer to your question:

"1st. The propriety in the opinion of the public, so far as that
opinion has been expressed in conversation, of my appearing again on
the public theater after declaring the sentiments I did in my
valedictory address of September, 1796.

"2dly. A conviction in my own breast, from the best information that
can be obtained, that it is the wish of my country that its military
force should be committed to my charge; and,

"3dly. That the army now to be formed should be so appointed as to
afford a well-grounded hope of its doing honor to the country and
credit to him who commands it in the field.

"On each of these heads you must allow me to make observations."
Washington then proceeded to detail his sentiments on those points on
which his consent to take command of the army must depend.

Some casual circumstances delayed the reception of the letters of the
President and Secretary of War for several days, in consequence of
which, before the answer of Washington reached the seat of government,
the President had nominated him to the chief command of all the armies
raised or to be raised in the United States, with the rank of
lieutenant-general; and the Senate had unanimously advised and
consented to his appointment.

By the Secretary of War, who was directed to wait upon him with his
commission, the President addressed to him the following letter:

"Mr. McHenry, the Secretary of War, will have the honor to wait on you
in my behalf, to impart to you a step I have ventured to take, which I
should have been happy to have communicated in person, had such a
journey at this time been in my power."

"My reasons for this measure will be too well known to need any
explanation to the public. Every friend and every enemy of America will
comprehend them at first blush. To you, sir, I owe all the apology I
can make. The urgent necessity I am in of your advice and assistance,
indeed of your conduct and direction of the war, is all I can urge; and
that is a sufficient justification to myself and to the world. I hope
it will be so considered by yourself. Mr. McHenry will have the honor
to consult you upon the organization of the army, and upon everything
relating to it."

Open instructions, signed by the President, were on the same day
delivered to the Secretary of War, of which the following is a copy:

"It is my desire that you embrace the first opportunity to set out on
your journey to Mount Vernon and wait on General Washington with the
commission of lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief of the armies
of the United States, which, by the advice and consent of the Senate,
has been signed by me.

"The reasons and motives which prevailed on me to venture on such a
step as the nomination of this great and illustrious character, whose
voluntary resignation alone occasioned my introduction to the office I
now hold, were too numerous to be detailed in this letter, and are too
obvious and important to escape the observation of any part of America
or Europe. But as it is a movement of great delicacy it will require
all your address to communicate the subject in a manner that shall be
inoffensive to his feelings and consistent with all the respect that is
due from me to him.

"If the general should decline the appointment all the world will be
silent and respectfully acquiesce. If he should accept it all the
world, except the enemies of his country, will rejoice. If he should
come to no decisive determination, but take the subject into
consideration, I shall not appoint any other lieutenant-general until
his conclusion is known.

"His advice in the formation of a list of officers would be extremely
desirable to me. The names of Lincoln, Morgan, Knox, Hamilton, Gates,
Pinckney, Lee, Carrington, Hand, Muhlenberg, Dayton, Burr, Brooks, Cobb,
Smith, as well as the present commander-in-chief, may be mentioned to
him, and any others that occur to you. Particularly, I wish to have his
opinion on the men most suitable for inspector-general, adjutant-general,
and quartermaster-general.

"His opinion on all subjects would have great weight, and I wish you to
obtain from him as much of his reflections upon the times and the
service as you can."

The communications between Washington and the Secretary of War appear
to have been full and unreserved. The impressions of the former
respecting the critical and perilous situation of his country had
previously determined him to yield to the general desire and accept the
commission offered him, provided he could be permitted to select for
the high departments of the army, and especially for the military
staff, those in whom he could place the greatest confidence. Being
assured that there was every reason to believe his wishes in this
respect would not be thwarted, he gave to the secretary the arrangement
which he would recommend for the principal stations in the army, and on
the 13th of July addressed the following letter to the President:

"I had the honor, on the evening of the 11th instant, to receive from
the hands of the Secretary at War your favor of the 7th, announcing
that you had, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appointed me
lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief of the armies raised or to be
raised for the service of the United States."

"I cannot express how greatly affected I am at this new proof of public
confidence, and at the highly flattering manner in which you have been
pleased to make the communication. At the same time I must not conceal
from you my earnest wish that the choice had fallen upon a man less
declined in years and better qualified to encounter the usual
vicissitudes of war."

"You know, sir, what calculations I had made relative to the probable
course of events on my retiring from office and the determination with
which I had consoled myself of closing the remnant of my days in my
present peaceful abode. You will, therefore, be at no loss to conceive
and appreciate the sensations I must have experienced to bring my mind
to any conclusion that would pledge me at so late a period of life to
leave scenes I sincerely love to enter upon the boundless field of
public action, incessant trouble, and high responsibility.

"It was not possible for me to remain ignorant of or indifferent to
recent transactions. The conduct of the Directory of France toward our
country; their insidious hostility to its government; their various
practices to withdraw the affections of the people from it; the evident
tendency of their arts, and those of their agents to countenance and
invigorate opposition; their disregard of solemn treaties and the laws
of nations; their war upon our defenseless commerce; their treatment of
our ministers of peace, and their demands, amounting to tribute, could
not fail to excite in me sentiments corresponding with those my
countrymen have so generally expressed in their affectionate addresses
to you.

"Believe me, sir, no man can more cordially approve the wise and
prudent measures of your administration. They ought to inspire
universal confidence, and will no doubt, combined with the state of
things, call from Congress such laws and means as will enable you to
meet the full force and extent of the crisis. Satisfied, therefore,
that you have sincerely wished and endeavored to avert war, and
exhausted to the last drop the cup of reconciliation, we can, with pure
hearts, appeal to Heaven for the justice of our cause, and may
confidently trust the final result to that kind Providence who has
heretofore and then so often signally favored the people of the United
States.

"Thinking in this manner and feeling how incumbent it is upon every
person of every description to contribute at all times to his country's
welfare, and especially in a moment like the present, when everything
we hold dear and sacred is so seriously threatened, I have finally
determined to accept the commission of commander-in-chief of the armies
of the United States, with the reserve only that I shall not be called
into the field until the army is in a situation to require my presence
or it becomes indispensable by the urgency of circumstances.

"In making this reservation, I beg it to be understood that I do not
mean to withhold any assistance to arrange and organize the army, which
you may think I can afford. I take the liberty also to mention that I
must decline having my acceptance considered as drawing after it any
immediate charge upon the public, or that I can receive any emoluments
annexed to the appointment before I am in a situation to incur
expense."

From this period Washington intermingled the cares and attentions of
office with his agricultural pursuits. His solicitude respecting the
organization of an army which he might possibly be required to lead
against an enemy the most formidable in the world, was too strong to
admit of his being inattentive to its arrangements.

Having stipulated, in accepting office, that he should have a
concurrent voice in the appointment of the general officers and general
staff of the army, he named Alexander Hamilton as inspector-general and
second in command, with Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and Henry Knox as
major-generals. Adams, who particularly disliked Hamilton, and was very
suspicious of his designs and purposes, especially if placed in any
position of power and influence, was not at all pleased with this
arrangement; but he unwillingly acquiesced. General Knox was
dissatisfied with the rank assigned him, and refused to serve; General
Pinckney, on the other hand, accepted the post offered him.

During the months of November and December (1798), Washington was at
Philadelphia, where he was busily occupied, with Hamilton and Pinckney,
in concerting arrangements for raising and organizing the army. From
this time to the end of his life a great part of his time was bestowed
upon military affairs.

"His correspondence with the Secretary of War, the major-generals, and
other officers," as Mr. Sparks states, "was unremitted and very full,
entering into details and communicating instructions which derived
value from his long experience and perfect knowledge of the subject.
His letters during this period, if not the most interesting to many
readers, will be regarded as models of their kind, and as affording
evidence that the vigor and fertility of his mind had not decreased
with declining years.

"He never seriously believed that the French would go to the extremity
of invading the United States. But it had always been a maxim with him,
that a timely preparation for war afforded the surest means for
preserving peace, and on this occasion he acted with as much
promptitude and energy as if the invaders had been actually on the
coast. His opinion proved to be correct, and his prediction was
verified." For the French government, when it was found that the people
would support the executive in resisting aggressions, soon manifested a
disposition to draw back from their war-like attitude, since war with
the United States was the last thing which was really desired.

While Washington was engaged in organizing the army actual hostilities
between the United States and France were going on at sea. A _navy_
department was formed by act of Congress in April (1798), and on May
21st Benjamin Stoddert, of Maryland, became the first Secretary of the
Navy. The frigates United States, 44, and Constellation, 38, were
launched and fitted for sea in the summer and autumn succeeding; and
the whole force authorized by a law passed on the 16th of July,
consisted of twelve frigates, twelve ships of a force between twenty
and twenty-four guns inclusive, and six sloops, besides galleys and
revenue cutters, making a total of thirty active cruisers. Numerous
privateers were also fitted out. The chief theater of naval operations
was the archipelago of the West Indies, where the aggressions on our
commerce by French cruisers and privateers had originally commenced. Of
the numerous encounters which took place, two remarkable ones afforded
a promise of the future glories of the American navy. One of these was
a very severe action (February, 1799) between the American frigate
Constellation, of thirty-eight guns, commanded by Commodore Truxton,
and the French frigate l'Insurgente, of forty guns, which terminated in
the capture of the latter. Truxton, in a subsequent engagement,
compelled another French frigate, the Vengeance, mounting no less than
fifty-two guns, to strike her colors, but she afterward made her escape
in the night.

The determined attitude of the United States soon convinced the French
Directory that the people were united in support of the administration
in its hostile operations, and Talleyrand sent certain intimations to
our government, through William Vans Murray, American minister at the
Hague, as well as by more private channels, that the Directory were
willing and desirous to treat for peace. President Adams determined to
avail himself of these friendly dispositions, and, without consulting
his Cabinet or the leading members of Congress, on the 18th of February
(1799) nominated to the Senate Mr. Murray as minister plenipotentiary
to the French republic. Patrick Henry and Chief Justice Oliver
Ellsworth were subsequently appointed joint ambassadors, but the latter
declining on account of ill health, Gen. William Richardson Davie,
Governor of North Carolina, was appointed in his place. Ellsworth and
Davie did not leave the country, however, till November. The peace
which terminated the quasi war with France was negotiated by these
envoys, but it did not take place till the 3d of September, 1800, when
Napoleon was at the head of affairs in France, as First Consul, and
after the death of Washington.

We have seen that when Washington retired from the office of President,
he had promised himself a season of leisure and repose before closing
his useful and honorable life. But this the course of events did not
permit. His last days were destined to be fully occupied with public
affairs.

During the years 1798 and 1799 he was engaged in a most voluminous
correspondence with the President, the heads of departments, and the
officers of the provisional army, in relation to military affairs, and
in addition to this his published letters show that he had to keep up a
correspondence with many public men, both in Europe and America, as
well as with his own connections and dependants.

This correspondence and the arrangement of his papers added to the
writing occasioned by his accounts and the army affairs, made it
necessary for him to have assistance, and he accordingly wrote to his
old secretary, Mr. Tobias Lear, with a view to engaging him in the same
office again (August 2, 1798). An extract from his letter to Mr. Lear
shows how his writing labors had increased.

"The little leisure I had," he writes, "before my late appointment (from
visits, my necessary rides, and other occurrences), to overhaul,
arrange, and separate papers of real from those of little or no value,
is now, by that event, so much encroached upon by personal and written
applications for offices, and other matters incidental to the
commander-in-chief, that, without assistance, I must abandon all idea
of accomplishing this necessary work before I embark in new scenes,
which will render them more voluminous, and, of course, more difficult;
a measure which would be extremely irksome to me to submit to,
especially as it respects my accounts, which are yet in confusion; my
earnest wish and desire being, when I quit the stage of human action,
to leave all matters in such a situation as to give as little trouble
as possible to those who will have the management of them hereafter.

"Under this view of my situation, which is far from being an agreeable
one, and at times fills me with deep concern when I see so little
prospect of complete extrication, I have written to the Secretary of
War to be informed whether--as my taking the field is contingent, and
no pay or emolument will accrue to myself until then--I am at liberty
to appoint my secretary immediately, who shall be allowed his pay and
forage from the moment he joins me. If he answers in the affirmative,
can you do this on these terms?"

Mr. Lear accepted the appointment of secretary, proceeded immediately
to Mount Vernon, and remained with Washington till his decease.

With the aid of Mr. Lear, who was thoroughly conversant with his papers
and accustomed to his methods of transacting business, he was enabled
to keep up his old habit of riding over the estate, and superintending
its culture, during the early hours of the day. "When he returned from
his morning ride," which, he remarks in a letter to Mr. McHenry,
"usually occupied him till it was time to dress for dinner," he
generally found some newly arrived guests, perfect strangers to him,
come, as they said, out of respect to him. They were always received
courteously, but their number and their constant succession must have
made serious inroads on the domestic quiet in which he so much
delighted. "How different this," he says in the same letter, "from
having a few social friends at a cheerful board."

During the last two years of his life his domestic circle was small.
Mrs. Washington, Miss Custis, and some others of his adopted children,
and his old friend, Mr. Lear, were at Mount Vernon; and some of his
visitors were such as he himself would have chosen. But the greater
part of them were comparative strangers.

Distinguished persons sometimes came from Europe to visit him, and
these were received with his usual hospitality. When they sought to
draw him into conversation about his own actions, he changed the
subject and made inquiries about Europe and its affairs. In his own
house, although maintaining toward strangers great courtesy and
amenity, he always avoided discussing on matters in which he himself
had played the most conspicuous part. At home he was the plain, modest
country gentleman he had been before the destinies of an army and an
empire had been placed in his hands.


1. Footnote: M. de Lacolombe had been adjutant-general under Lafayette,
when the latter commanded the National Guard.

2. Footnote: Sparks, "Writings of Washington."

3. Footnote: Marshall.




CHAPTER XIII.


LAST ILLNESS, DEATH, AND CHARACTER OF WASHINGTON. 1799.


On Thursday, December 12, 1799, Washington rode out to superintend as
usual the affairs of his estate. He left the house at 10 o'clock in the
morning and did not return till 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Soon after
he went out the weather became very inclement, rain, hail, and snow
falling alternately, with a cold wind. When he came in his secretary
and superintendent, Mr. Lear, handed him some letters to frank, but he
declined sending them to the post-office that evening, remarking that
the weather was too bad to send a servant with them. On Mr. Lear's
observing that he was afraid he had got wet, he said, No, his great
coat had kept him dry. Still his neck was wet and snow was hanging on
his hair. But he made light of it, and sat down to dinner without
changing his dress. In the evening he appeared as well as usual. [1]

A heavy snowstorm on Friday prevented his riding out on the estate as
usual. He had taken cold the day before by his long exposure, and he
complained of a sore throat. This, however, did not prevent his going
out in the afternoon to mark some trees not far from the house, which
were to be cut down. He had now a hoarseness, which increased toward
the close of the day. He spent the evening in the parlor with Mrs.
Washington and Mr. Lear, perusing the newspapers, occasionally reading
an interesting article aloud as well as his hoarseness would permit,
and cheerful as usual. On his retiring, Mr. Lear proposed that he
should take some remedy for his cold, but he answered "No, you know I
never take anything for a cold. Let it go as it came."

Between 2 and 3 o'clock on Saturday morning he had an ague fit, but
would not permit the family to be disturbed in their rest till
daylight. He breathed with great difficulty and was hardly able to
utter a word intelligibly. At his desire he was bled by Mr. Rawlins,
one of the overseers. An attempt to take a simple remedy for a cold
showed that he could not swallow a drop, but seemed convulsed and
almost suffocated in his efforts. Dr. Craik, the family physician, was
sent for and arrived about 9 o'clock, who put a blister on his throat,
took some more blood from him and ordered a gargle of vinegar and sage
tea, and inhalation of the fumes of vinegar and hot water. Two
consulting physicians, Dr. Brown and Dr. Dick, were called in, who
arrived about 3 o'clock, and after a consultation he was bled a third
time. The patient could now swallow a little, and calomel and tartar
emetic were administered without any effect.

About half past 4 o'clock he desired Mr. Lear to call Mrs. Washington
to his bedside; when he requested her to bring from his desk two wills,
and on receiving them, he gave her one, which he observed was useless
as being superseded by the other, and desired her to burn it, which she
did, and put the other into her closet.

"After this was done," says Mr. Lear, in concluding his touching
narrative, "I returned to his bedside and took his hand. He said to me:
'I find I am going. My breath cannot last long. I believed from the
first that the disorder would prove fatal. Do you arrange and record
all my late military letters and papers. Arrange my accounts and settle
my books, as you know more about them than anyone else, and let Mr.
Rawlins finish recording my other letters, which he has begun.' I told
him this should be done. He then asked if I recollected anything which
it was essential for him to do, as he had but a very short time to
continue with us. I told him that I could recollect nothing which it
was essential for him to do, but that I hoped he was not so near his
end. He observed, smiling, that he certainly was, and that, as it was
the debt we must all pay, he looked to the event with perfect
resignation.

"In the course of the afternoon he appeared to be in great pain and
distress, from the difficulty of breathing, and frequently changed his
posture in the bed. On these occasions I lay upon the bed and
endeavored to raise him and turn him with as much ease as possible. He
appeared penetrated with gratitude for my attentions, and often said,
'I am afraid I shall fatigue you too much,' and upon assuring him that
I could feel nothing but a wish to give him ease, he replied, 'Well, it
is a debt we must pay to each other, and I hope when you want aid of
this kind you will find it.'

"About 5 o'clock Dr. Craik came again into the room, and, upon going to
the bedside, the general said to him, 'Doctor, I die hard, but I am not
afraid to go. I believed, from my first attack, that I should not
survive it. My breath cannot last long.' The doctor pressed his hand,
but could not utter a word. He retired from the bedside and sat by the
fire, absorbed in grief.

"Between 5 and 6 o'clock Dr. Craik, Dr. Dick, and Dr. Brown came again
into the room, and with Dr. Craik went to the bed, when Dr. Craik asked
him if he could sit up in the bed. He held out his hand and I raised
him up. He then said to the physicians, 'I feel myself going; I thank
you for your attentions, but I pray you to take no more trouble about
me. Let me go off quietly. I cannot last long.' They found that all
which had been done was without effect. He lay down again, and all
retired except Dr. Craik. He continued in the same situation, uneasy
and restless, but without complaining, frequently asking what hour it
was. When I helped him to move at this time he did not speak, but
looked at me with strong expressions of gratitude.

"About 8 o'clock the physicians came again into the room and applied
blisters and cataplasms of wheat bran to his legs and feet, after which
they went out, except Dr. Craik, without a ray of hope. I went out
about this time and wrote a line to Mr. Law and Mr. Peter, requesting
them to come with their wives (Mrs. Washington's granddaughters) as
soon as possible to Mount Vernon.

"About 10 o'clock he made several attempts to speak to me before he
could effect it. At length he said, 'I am just going. Have me decently
buried, and do not let my body be put into the vault in less than three
days after I am dead.' I bowed assent, for I could not speak. He then
looked at me again and said, 'Do you understand me?' I replied, 'Yes.'
'Tis well,' said he.

"About ten minutes before he expired (which was between 10 and 11
o'clock) his breathing became easier. He lay quietly; he withdrew his
hand from mine and felt his own pulse. I saw his countenance change. I
spoke to Dr. Craik, who sat by the fire. He came to the bedside. The
general's hand fell from his wrist. I took it in mine and pressed it to
my bosom. Dr. Craik put his hands over his eyes, and he expired without
a struggle or a sigh (December 14, 1799).

"While we were fixed in silent grief, Mrs. Washington, who was sitting
at the foot of the bed, asked, with a firm and collected voice, 'Is he
gone?' I could not speak, but held up my hand as a signal that he was
no more. 'Tis well,' said she, in the same voice, 'all is over now. I
shall soon follow him. I have no more trials to pass through.'

"During his whole illness," adds Mr. Lear, "he spoke but seldom, and
with great difficulty and distress, and in so low and broken a voice as
at times hardly to be understood. His patience, fortitude, and
resignation never forsook him for a moment. In all his distress he
uttered not a sigh nor a complaint, always endeavoring, from a sense of
duty, as it appeared, to take what was offered him and to do as he was
desired by the physicians."

By this simple and touching record of the last moments of Washington,
it will be perceived that his conduct, in the last trying scene, was in
all respects consistent with his whole life and character. His habitual
serenity and self-command, and the ever-present sense of duty, are
apparent through the whole. He died as he had lived, a hero in the
highest sense of the word and a true Christian.

The deep and wide-spreading grief occasioned by this melancholy event
assembled a great concourse of people for the purpose of paying the
last tribute of respect to the first of Americans, and on Wednesday,
the 18th of December, his body, attended by military honors, and with
religious and Masonic ceremonies, was deposited in the family vault on
his estate.

In December, 1837, the remains of the great father of our nation, after
a slumber of thirty-eight years, were again exposed by the circumstance
of placing his body once and forever within the marble sarcophagus made
by Mr. Struthers, of Philadelphia. The body, as Mr. Struthers related,
was still in a wonderful state of preservation, the high pale brow wore
a calm and serene expression, and the lips, pressed together, had a
grave and solemn smile.

When intelligence reached Congress of the death of Washington, they
instantly adjourned until the next day, when John Marshall, then a
member of the House of Representatives and afterward chief justice of
the United States and biographer of Washington, addressed the speaker
in the following words:

"The melancholy event which was yesterday announced with doubt has been
rendered but too certain. Our Washington is no more. The hero, the
patriot, and the sage of America; the man on whom, in times of danger,
every eye was turned, and all hopes were placed, lives now only in his
own great actions and in the hearts of an affectionate and afflicted
people.

"If, sir, it had even not been usual openly to testify respect for the
memory of those whom Heaven has selected as its instruments for
dispensing good to man, yet such has been the uncommon worth and such
the extraordinary incidents which have marked the life of him whose
loss we all deplore, that the whole American nation, impelled by the
same feelings, would call with one voice for a public manifestation of
that sorrow, which is so deep and so universal.

"More than any other individual, and as much as to any one individual
was possible, has he contributed to found this, our wide-spreading
empire, and to give to the western world independence and freedom.

"Having effected the great object for which he was placed at the head
of our armies, we have seen him convert the sword into the ploughshare
and sink the soldier into the citizen.

"When the debility of our Federal system had become manifest, and the
bonds which connected this vast continent were dissolving, we have seen
him the chief of those patriots who formed for us a constitution,
which, by preserving the Union, will, I trust, substantiate and
perpetuate those blessings which our Revolution had promised to bestow.

"In obedience to the general voice of his country, calling him to
preside over a great people, we have seen him once more quit the
retirement he loved, and, in a season more stormy and tempestuous than
war itself, with calm and wise determination, pursue the true interests
of the nation and contribute more than any other could contribute to
the establishment of that system of policy which will, I trust, yet
preserve our peace, our honor, and our independence. Having been twice
unanimously chosen the chief magistrate of a free people, we have seen
him, at a time when his re-election with universal suffrage could not
be doubted, afford to the world a rare instance of moderation, by
withdrawing from his high station to the peaceful walks of private
life. However the public confidence may change, and the public
affections fluctuate with respect to others, with respect to him they
have, in war and in peace, in public and in private life, been as
steady as his own firm mind and as constant as his own exalted virtues.
Let us then, Mr. Speaker, pay the last tribute of respect and affection
to our departed friend. Let the grand council of the nation display
those sentiments which the nation feels. For this purpose I hold in my
hand some resolutions which I take the liberty of offering to the
House.

"_Resolved_, That this House will wait on the President in condolence
of this mournful event.

"_Resolved_, That the speaker's chair be shrouded with black, and that
the members and officers of the House wear black during the session.

"_Resolved_, That a committee, in conjunction with one from the Senate,
be appointed to consider on the most suitable manner of paying honor to
the memory of the man first in war, first in peace, and first in the
hearts of his fellow-citizens."

The Senate, on this melancholy occasion, addressed to the President the
following letter:

"The Senate of the United States respectfully take leave, sir, to
express to you their deep regret for the loss their country sustains in
the death of Gen. George Washington.

"This event, so distressing to all our fellow-citizens, must be
peculiarly heavy to you, who have long been associated with him in
deeds of patriotism. Permit us, sir, to mingle our tears with yours. On
this occasion it is manly to weep. To lose such a man at such a crisis
is no common calamity to the world. Our country mourns a father. The
Almighty Disposer of human events has taken from us our greatest
benefactor and ornament. It becomes us to submit with reverence to Him
'who maketh darkness His pavilion.'

"With patriotic pride we review the life of our Washington and compare
its events with those of other countries who have been preeminent in
fame. Ancient and modern times are diminished before him. Greatness and
guilt have too often been allied, but his fame is whiter than it is
brilliant. The destroyers of nations stood abashed at the majesty of
his virtues. It reproved the intemperance of their ambition and
darkened the splendor of victory. The scene is closed, and we are no
longer anxious lest misfortune should sully his glory; he has traveled
on to the end of his journey and carried with him an increasing weight
of honor; he has deposited it safely where misfortune cannot tarnish
it, where malice cannot blast it. Favored of Heaven, he departed
without exhibiting the weakness of humanity. Magnanimous in death, the
darkness of the grave could not obscure his brightness.

"Such was the man whom we deplore. Thanks to God, his glory is
consummated. Washington yet lives on earth in his spotless example; his
spirit is in Heaven. Let his countrymen consecrate the memory of the
heroic general, the patriotic statesman, and the virtuous sage. Let
them teach their children never to forget that the fruits of his labors
and his example are their inheritance."

To this address the President returned the following answer:

"I receive with the most respectful and affectionate sentiments, in
this impressive address, the obliging expressions of your regret for
the loss our country has sustained in the death of her most esteemed,
beloved, and admired citizen.

"In the multitude of my thoughts and recollections on this melancholy
event, you will permit me to say that I have seen him in the days of
adversity, in some of the scenes of his deepest distress and most
trying perplexities. I have also attended him in the highest elevation
and most prosperous felicity, with uniform admiration of his wisdom,
moderation, and constancy.

"Among all our original associates in that memorable league of this
continent in 1774, which first expressed the sovereign will of a free
nation in America, he was the only one remaining in the general
government. Although with a constitution more enfeebled than his, at an
age when he thought it necessary to prepare for retirement, I feel
myself alone bereaved of my last brother; yet I derive a strong
consolation from the unanimous disposition which appears in all ages
and classes to mingle their sorrows with mine on this common calamity
to the world.

"The life of our Washington cannot suffer by a comparison with those of
other countries, who have been most celebrated and exalted by fame. The
attributes and decorations of royalty could only have served to eclipse
the majesty of those virtues which made him, from being a modest
citizen, a more resplendent luminary. Misfortune, had he lived, could
hereafter have sullied his glory only with those superficial minds,
who, believing that character and actions are marked by success alone,
rarely deserve to enjoy it. Malice could never blast his honor, and
envy made him a singular exception to her universal rule. For himself,
he had lived long enough to life and to glory; for his fellow-citizens,
if their prayers could have been answered, he would have been immortal;
for me, his departure is at a most unfortunate moment. Trusting,
however, in the wise and righteous dominion of Providence over the
passions of men and the results of their actions, as well as over their
lives, nothing remains for me but humble resignation.

"His example is now complete, and it will teach wisdom and virtue to
magistrates, citizens, and men, not only in the present age, but in
future generations, as long as our history shall be read."

The committee of both Houses appointed to devise the mode by which the
nation should express its grief reported the following resolutions,
which were unanimously adopted:

"That a marble monument be erected by the United States at the capitol
of the city of Washington, and that the family of General Washington be
requested to permit his body to be deposited under it, and that the
monument be so designed as to commemorate the great events of his
military and political life.

"That there be a funeral from Congress Hall to the German Lutheran
Church, in memory of Gen. George Washington, on Thursday, the 26th
instant, and that an oration be prepared at the request of Congress, to
be delivered before both Houses that day; and that the president of the
Senate and speaker of the House of Representatives be desired to
request one of the members of Congress to prepare and deliver the same.

"That the President of the United States be requested to direct a copy
of these resolutions to be transmitted to Mrs. Washington, assuring her
of the profound respect Congress will ever bear to her person and
character, of their condolence on the late affecting dispensation of
Providence, and entreating her assent to the interment of the remains
of General Washington in the manner expressed in the first resolution.

"That the President be requested to issue his proclamation, notifying
the people throughout the United States the recommendation contained in
the third resolution."

These resolutions passed both Houses unanimously, and those which would
admit of immediate execution were carried into effect. The whole nation
appeared in mourning. The funeral procession was grand and solemn, and
the eloquent oration, which was delivered on the occasion by General
Lee, was heard with profound attention and with deep interest.

Throughout the United States similar marks of affliction were
exhibited. In every part of the continent funeral orations were
delivered, and the best talents of the nation were devoted to an
expression of the nation's grief.

To the letter of the President which transmitted to Mrs. Washington the
resolutions of Congress, and of which his secretary was the bearer,
that lady answered:

"Taught by the great example which I have so long had before me, never
to oppose my private wishes to the public will, I must consent to the
request made by Congress which you have had the goodness to transmit to
me; and in doing this I need not, I cannot, say what a sacrifice of
individual feeling I make to a sense of public duty."

On receiving intelligence of the death of Washington, Napoleon, then
First Consul of France, issued the following order of the day to the
army:

"Washington is dead. This great man fought against tyranny; he
established the liberty of his country. His memory will always be dear
to the French people, as it will be to all freemen of the two worlds;
and especially to French soldiers, who, like him and the American
soldiers, have combated for liberty and equality."

Napoleon ordered that during ten days black crape should be suspended
from all the standards and flags throughout the republic. On the 9th of
February, 1800, a splendid funeral solemnity took place in the Champ de
Mars; and a funeral oration in honor of Washington was pronounced by M.
de la Fontaines, in the Hotel des Invalides, at which the First Consul
and the civil and military authorities were present. [2]

The British admiral in command of the fleet lying at Torbay, on
receiving the news of Washington's death, honored his memory by
lowering his flag to half-mast; and his example was followed by the
whole fleet. [3]

Judge Marshall, who had enjoyed the advantage of an intimate personal
acquaintance with Washington, who was one of his most steadfast
political supporters, and whose able biography shows a thorough
appreciation of his extraordinary abilities and virtues, gives the
following summary view of his character:

"General Washington was rather above the common size, his frame was
robust, and his constitution vigorous--capable of enduring great
fatigue and requiring a considerable degree of exercise for the
preservation of his health. His exterior created in the beholder the
idea of strength, united with manly gracefulness.

"His manners were rather reserved than free, though they partook
nothing of that dryness and sternness which accompany reserve when
carried to an extreme, and on all proper occasions he could relax
sufficiently to show how highly he was gratified by the charms of
conversation and the pleasures of society. His person and whole
deportment exhibited an unaffected and indescribable dignity, unmingled
with haughtiness, of which all who approached him were sensible; and
the attachment of those who possessed his friendship and enjoyed his
intimacy was ardent, but always respectful.

"His temper was humane, benevolent, and conciliatory, but there was a
quickness in his sensibility to anything apparently offensive which
experience had taught him to watch, and to correct.

"In the management of his private affairs he exhibited an exact yet
liberal economy. His funds were not prodigally wasted on capricious and
ill-examined schemes, nor refused to beneficial though costly
improvements. They remained, therefore, competent to that expensive
establishment which his reputation, added to a hospitable temper, had,
in some measure, imposed upon him, and to those donations which real
distress has a right to claim from opulence.

"He made no pretensions to that vivacity which fascinates, or to that
wit which dazzles and frequently imposes on the understanding. More
solid than brilliant, judgment rather than genius, constituted the most
prominent feature of his character.

"Without making ostentatious professions of religion, he was a sincere
believer in the Christian faith and a truly devout man.

"As a military man, he was brave, enterprising, and cautious. That
malignity which has sought to strip him of all the higher qualities of
a general, has conceded to him personal courage and a firmness of
resolution which neither dangers nor difficulties could shake. But
candor will allow him other great and valuable endowments. If his
military course does not abound with splendid achievements, it exhibits
a series of judicious measures adopted to circumstances, which probably
saved his country.

"Placed, without having studied the theory or been taught in the school
of experience the practice of war, at the head of an undisciplined,
ill-organized multitude, which was impatient of the restraints and
unacquainted with the ordinary duties of a camp, without the aid of
officers possessing those lights which the Commander-in-Chief was yet
to acquire, it would have been a miracle indeed had his conduct been
absolutely faultless. But, possessing an energetic and distinguishing
mind, on which the lessons of experience were never lost, his errors,
if he committed any, were quickly repaired, and those measures which
the state of things rendered most advisable were seldom, if ever,
neglected. Inferior to his adversary in the numbers, in the equipment,
and in the discipline of his troops, it is evidence of real merit that
no great and decisive advantages were ever obtained over him, and that
the opportunity to strike an important blow never passed away unused.
He has been termed the American Fabius, but those who compare his
actions with his means will perceive at least as much of Marcellus as
of Fabius in his character. He could not have been more enterprising
without endangering the cause he defended, nor have put more to hazard
without incurring justly the imputation of rashness. Not relying upon
those chances which sometimes give a favorable issue to attempts
apparently desperate, his conduct was regulated by calculations made
upon the capacities of his army and the real situation of his country.
When called a second time to command the armies of the United States a
change of circumstances had taken place, and he meditated a
corresponding change of conduct. In modeling the army of 1798 he sought
for men distinguished for their boldness of execution, not less than
for their prudence in council, and contemplated a system of continued
attack. 'The enemy,' said the general in his private letters, 'must
never be permitted to gain foothold on our shores.'

"In his civil administration, as in his military career, ample and
repeated proofs were exhibited of that practical good sense, of that
sound judgment, which is perhaps the most rare and is certainly the
most valuable quality of the human mind. Devoting himself to the duties
of his station, and pursuing no object distinct from the public good,
he was accustomed to contemplate at a distance those critical
situations in which the United States might probably be placed, and to
digest, before the occasion required action, the line of conduct which
it would be proper to observe.

"Taught to distrust first impressions, he sought to acquire all the
information which was attainable, and to hear, without prejudice, all
the reasons which could be urged for or against a particular measure.
His own judgment was suspended until it became necessary to determine,
and his decisions, thus maturely made, were seldom if ever to be
shaken. His conduct, therefore, was systematic, and the great objects
of his administration were steadily pursued.

"Respecting, as the first magistrate in a free government must ever do,
the real and deliberate sentiments of the people, their gusts of
passion passed over, without ruffling the smooth surface of his mind.
Trusting to the reflecting good sense of the nation for approbation and
support, he had the magnanimity to pursue its real interests, in
opposition to its temporary prejudices; and, though far from being
regardless of popular favor, he could never stoop to retain, by
deserving to lose it. In more instances than one we find him committing
his whole popularity to hazard, and pursuing steadily, in opposition to
a torrent which would have overwhelmed a man of ordinary firmness, that
course which had been dictated by a sense of duty.

"In speculation he was a real republican, devoted to the constitution
of his country and to that system of equal political rights on which it
is founded. But between a balanced republic and a democracy the
difference is like that between order and chaos. Real liberty, he
thought, was to be preserved only by preserving the authority of the
laws and maintaining the energy of government. Scarcely did society
present two characters which, in his opinion, less resembled each other
than a patriot and a demagogue.

"No man has ever appeared upon the theater of public action whose
integrity was more incorruptible, or whose principles were more
perfectly free from the contamination of those selfish and unworthy
passions which find their nourishment in the conflicts of party. Having
no views which required concealment, his real and avowed motives were
the same; and his whole correspondence does not furnish a single case
from which even an enemy would infer that he was capable, under any
circumstances, of stooping to the employment of duplicity. No truth can
be uttered with more confidence than that his ends were always upright
and his means always pure. He exhibits the rare example of a politician
to whom wiles were absolutely unknown, and whose professions to foreign
governments and to his own countrymen were always sincere. In him was
fully exemplified the real distinction which forever exists between
wisdom and cunning, and the importance as well as truth of the maxim,
that 'honesty is the best policy.'

"If Washington possessed ambition that passion was, in his bosom, so
regulated by principles or controlled by circumstances that it was
neither vicious nor turbulent. Intrigue was never employed as the means
of its gratification, nor was personal aggrandizement its object. The
various high and important stations to which he was called by the
public voice were unsought by himself; and, in consenting to fill them,
he seems rather to have yielded to a general conviction that the
interests of his country would be thereby promoted, than to an avidity
for power.

"Neither the extraordinary partiality of the American people, the
extravagant praises which were bestowed upon him, nor the inveterate
opposition and malignant calumnies which he encountered, had any
visible influence upon his conduct. The cause is to be looked for in
the texture of his mind.

"In him, that innate and unassuming modesty which adulation would have
offended, which the voluntary plaudits of millions could not betray
into indiscretion, and which never obtruded upon others his claims to
superior consideration, was happily blended with a high and correct
sense of personal dignity, and with a just consciousness of that
respect which is due to station. Without exertion he could maintain the
happy medium between that arrogance which wounds and that facility
which allows the office to be degraded in the person who fills it.

"It is impossible to contemplate the great events which have occurred
in the United States under the auspices of Washington without ascribing
them, in some measure, to him. If we ask the causes of the prosperous
issue of a war, against the successful termination of which there were
so many probabilities; of the good which was produced, and the ill
which was avoided, during an administration fated to contend with the
strongest prejudices that a combination of circumstances and of
passions could produce; of the constant favor of the great mass of his
fellow-citizens, and of the confidence which, to the last moment of his
life, they reposed in him, the answer, so far as these causes may be
found in his character, will furnish a lesson well meriting the
attention of those who are candidates for political fame.

"Endowed by nature with a sound judgment, and an accurate
discriminating mind, he feared not that laborious attention which made
him perfectly master of those subjects, in all their relations, on
which he was to decide; and this essential quality was guided by an
unvarying sense of moral right, which would tolerate the employment
only of those means that would bear the most rigid examination, by a
fairness of intention which neither sought nor required disguise, and
by a purity of virtue which was not only untainted but unsuspected."
The eulogies of Washington, at the time of his death, were almost as
numerous as the towns and cities of the republic; for everywhere
funeral honors were paid to his memory. The following, by the
celebrated orator, Fisher Ames, pronounced before the Legislature of
Massachusetts, is as remarkable for its conciseness as for its just and
comprehensive estimate of Washington's character.

"It is not impossible," he said, "that some will affect to consider the
honors paid to this great patriot by the nation as excessive,
idolatrous, and degrading to freemen who are all equal. I answer, that
refusing to virtue its legitimate honors would not prevent their being
lavished in future on any worthless and ambitious favorite. If this
day's example should have its natural effect, it will be salutary. Let
such honors be so conferred only when, in future, they shall be so
merited; then the public sentiment will not be misled nor the
principles of a just equality corrupted. The best evidence of
reputation is a man's whole life. We have now, alas, all of
Washington's before us. There has scarcely appeared a really great man
whose character has been more admired in his lifetime or less correctly
understood by his admirers. When it is comprehended it is no easy task
to delineate its excellencies in such a manner as to give the portrait
both interest and resemblance, for it requires thought and study to
understand the true ground of the superiority of his character over
many others, whom he resembled in the principles of action and even in
the manner of acting. But, perhaps, he excels all the great men that
ever lived, in the steadiness of his adherence to his maxims of life
and in the uniformity of all his conduct to those maxims. Those maxims,
though wise, were yet not so remarkable for their wisdom as for their
authority over his life, for if there were any errors in his judgment--
and he displayed as few as any man--we know of no blemishes in his
virtue. He was the patriot without reproach; he loved his country well
enough to hold success in serving it an ample recompense. Thus far,
self-love and love of country coincided, but when his country needed
sacrifices that no other man could, or perhaps would be willing to
make, he did not even hesitate. This was virtue in its most exalted
character. More than once he put his fame at hazard, when he had reason
to think it would be sacrificed, at least in this age. Two instances
cannot be denied: when the army was disbanded, and again when he stood,
like Leonidas at the pass of Thermopylae, to defend our independence
against France.

"It is indeed almost as difficult to draw his character as to draw the
portrait of virtue. The reasons are similar; our ideas of moral
excellence are obscure, because they are complex, and we are obliged to
resort to illustrations. Washington's example is the happiest to show
what virtue is, and to delineate his character, we naturally expatiate
on the beauty of virtue; much must be felt and much imagined. His
pre-eminence is not so much to be seen in the display of any one
virtue, as in the possession of them all and in the practice of the most
difficult. Hereafter, therefore, his character must be studied before
it will be striking, and then it will be admitted as a model--a
precious one to a free republic.

"It is no less difficult to speak of his talents. They were adapted to
lead, without dazzling mankind, and to draw forth and employ the
talents of others without being misled by them. In this he was
certainly superior, that he neither mistook nor misapplied his own. His
great modesty and reserve would have concealed them if great occasions
had not called them forth, and then, as he never spoke from the
affectation to shine nor acted from any sinister motives, it is from
their effects only that we are to judge of their greatness and extent.
In public trusts, where men, acting conspicuously, are cautious, and in
those private concerns where few conceal or resist their weakness,
Washington was uniformly great, pursuing right conduct from right
maxims. His talents were such as to assist a sound judgment and ripen
with it. His prudence was consummate and seemed to take the direction
of his powers and passions; for, as a soldier, he was more solicitous
to avoid mistakes that might be fatal than to perform exploits that are
brilliant; and, as a statesman, to adhere to just principles, however
old, than to pursue novelties; and, therefore, in both characters, his
qualities were singularly adapted to the interest and were tried in the
greatest perils of the country. His habits of inquiry were so far
remarkable that he was never satisfied with investigating, nor desisted
from it, so long as he had less than all the light that he could obtain
upon a subject, and then he made his decision without bias.

"This command over the partialities that so generally stop men short or
turn them aside in their pursuit of truth, is one of the chief causes
of his unvaried course of right conduct in so many difficult scenes,
where every human action must be presumed to err. If he had strong
passions he had learned to subdue them, and to be moderate and mild. If
he had weaknesses, he concealed them, which is rare, and excluded them
from the government of his temper and conduct, which is still more
rare. If he loved fame, he never made improper compliances for what is
called popularity. The fame he enjoyed is of the kind that will last
forever, yet it was rather the effect than the motive of his conduct.
Some future Plutarch will search for a parallel to his character.
Epaminondas is, perhaps, the brightest name of all antiquity. Our
Washington resembled him in the purity and ardor of his patriotism,
and, like him, he first exalted the glory of his country. There, it is
to be hoped, the parallel ends, for Thebes fell with Epamanondas. But
such comparisons cannot be pursued far without departing from the
similitude. For we shall find it as difficult to compare great men as
great rivers; some we admire for the length and rapidity of their
currents and the grandeur of their cataracts; others for the majestic
silence and fullness of their streams; we cannot bring them together,
to measure the difference of their waters. The unambitious life of
Washington, declining fame yet courted by it, seemed, like the Ohio, to
choose its long way through solitudes, diffusing fertility, or like his
own Potomac, widening and deepening its channel as it approaches the
sea, and displaying most the usefulness and serenity of its greatness
toward the end of its course. Such a citizen would do honor to any
country. The constant veneration and affection of his country will show
that it was worthy of such a citizen.

"However his military fame may excite the wonder of mankind, it is
chiefly by his civil magistracy that his example will instruct them.
Great generals have arisen in all ages of the world, and perhaps most
of them in despotism and darkness. In times of violence and convulsion
they rise, by the force of the whirlwind, high enough to ride in it and
direct the storm. Like meteors, they glare on the black clouds with a
splendor that, while it dazzles and terrifies, makes nothing visible
but the darkness. The fame of heroes is indeed growing vulgar; they
multiply in every long war; they stand in history and thicken in their
ranks almost as undistinguished as their own soldiers.

"But such a chief magistrate as Washington appears like the pole-star
in a clear sky to direct the skilful statesman. His presidency will
form an epoch and be distinguished as the age of Washington. Already it
assumes its high place in the political region. Like the milky-way, it
whitens along its allotted portion of the hemisphere. The latest
generations of men will survey, through the telescope of history, the
space where so many virtues blend their rays, and delight to separate
them into groups and distinct virtues. As the best illustration of
them, the living monument, to which the first of patriots would have
chosen to consign his fame, it is my earnest prayer to Heaven that our
country may subsist even to that late day in the plenitude of its
liberty and happiness, and mingle its mild glory with Washington's."


1. Footnote: Our authority for the details of Washington's last illness
and death is a statement carefully prepared by Mr. Lear at the time,
and published from the original in Sparks' "Life of Washington." It is
the most exact and reliable authority extant.

2. Footnote: Sparks, "Life of Washington."

3. Footnote: Sparks, "Life of Washington."




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